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Foreword 
0 
N THE frontiers of the social order we can expect 
to find scholarship unusually prolific, and in recent 
years no legal frontier has invoked more intensive 
effort than has American administrative law. In law review 
articles, reports, monographs, and treatises, legal literature 
has teemed with discussion of every phase of the subject, 
both general and particular. Able legal writers-Benjamin, 
Dickinson, Freund, Gellhorn, Goodnow, Landis, and Sharf-
man, to name only a few from a very long list-have ex-
pounded the theory and embellished the practice in every 
nook and corner. They have given administrative law an 
important niche in American jurisprudence, so much so that 
at long last even the digest-makers now give it recognition 
in tables of contents and key number systems. Across the 
Atlantic, writings of such leaders of legal thought as Sir 
Cecil Carr, Lord Hewart, and Professors Robson and Wade 
have opened the way to understanding of English theory and 
practice. At the level of practical administrative operations, 
the President's Committee on Administrative Management 
and the United States Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure have made available comprehen-
sive studies of administrative organization and procedure as 
they are found among federal administrative agencies, studies 
that have been ably paralleled for state agencies by the 
Benjamin report, Administrative Adjudication in the State 
of New York. In the legislative branch the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of I 946 and equivalent state enact-
ments in Wisconsin, California, Missouri, and elsewhere 
have instituted the practice of statutory codification of admin-
istrative procedure. These statutes are milestones in proced-
ural law. They have evoked a wealth of periodical comment, 
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both pro and con. In fact, administrative agencies, though 
frequently the object of criticism and even distrust, are now 
fully accepted as an essential part of the modern social, 
economic, and political order. American administrative law, 
born in its modern aspect not more than two generations 
ago, has definitely come of age. 
In the United States, in sharp contrast with practice in 
Great Britain, and, indeed, with that in most continental 
countries, we have committed ourselves to judicial control 
of administration and administrative agencies. It is an ac-
cepted part of our constitutional theory of distribution of 
powers. We look to the judiciary for protection of rights and 
liberties-for protection against the hazards of uncontrolled 
bureaucracy. 
Judicial control is manifested in two principal ways. In the 
first place, we command administrative agencies to follow 
the usual judicial patterns of procedure in conducting their 
quasi-judicial processes, and to a certain extent we impose 
equivalent requirements in connection with quasi-legislation, 
the promulgation of administrative rules. Notice to interested 
parties, with opportunity to be heard orally and in writing, 
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, rules of evidence in 
quasi-judicial proceedings differing not too widely from 
common-law standards, orders based upon written opinions 
setting forth conclusions of fact and law-ali of these are 
required as part of the administrative process. In short we 
believe in the virtue of the "paraphernalia" of the judicial 
process as a means of channeling the administrative process 
and thereby assuring fair play. Then, in the second place, and 
even more importantly, we are committed to a thorough-
going doctrine and practice of judicial review of administra-
tive rules and orders. Constitutional questions, questions of 
interpretation, and all other legal questions the courts reserve 
to themselves for final judicial decision. Even with respect to 
fact questions, a certain measure of control is asserted and at 
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least a limited judicial review is made available. It is a fact 
that we are more trustful of courts than we are of administra-
tion, and we rely upon them and their processes to assure fair 
treatment for the individual. Judicial controls are definitely a 
part of our jurisprudence, in sharp contrast, it may be noted, 
to the practice in Britain, where judicial procedure is ordi-
narily not expected of administration and judicial review is 
virtually nonexistent. The British rely upon Parliamentary 
control of the ministerial departments. We rely upon the 
courts. 
Notwithstanding the wealth of literature on administrative 
law, there is ample room for Mr. Cooper's volume, Admin-
istrative Agencies and the Courts, a volume which, with 
careful attention to practical detail, reflects our judicial atti-
tude toward administrative agencies. The author, within 
reasonable confines, gives us a careful exposition of the 
judicial procedures that have been imposed upon adminis-
tration as interpreted by judicial decision and the judicial 
limitations that have been evolved through the case law of 
judicial review, all to channel administrative agency powers 
and assure justice in administrative law. Both quasi-judicial 
and quasi-legislative processes are treated. Decisions of the 
agencies are used to capture the spirit of administrative law 
in action and to expound in concise form the details of the 
administrative processes themselves. The method and scope 
of judicial review of administrative decisions-our system 
of checking administrative error-are thoroughly covered. 
Court decisions, both federal and state, handed down in the 
various substantive fields in which administrative agencies 
play a part, are correlated. The principles generally appli-
cable to the functioning of this new departure in American 
jurisprudence are presented. In this volume we have some-
thing a little different in the literature on. administrative 
law-a systematic treatment, not too detailed for the student 
and the novitiate, yet sufficiently detailed to provide the 
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general background essential to a practical understanding of 
the relationship between the courts and administrative agen-
cies in this country. 
American administrative law, although a comparative 
newcomer in our jurisprudence, today rests on a firm ju-
ristic foundation, stemming from the prevailing statutes ex-
pounded and interpreted by some unusually high-grade, 
judge-made law, enlarging upon the statutes and correlating 
administrative practices to constitutional principles. The lead-
ing decisions are well known to all who work in the field. To 
name only a few, consider, for example, Morgan v. United 
States, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, Ohio Valley Water 
Company v. Ben Avon Borough, Crowell v. Benson, Rowan 
and Nichols Oil Company v. State Railroad Commission of 
Texas, Hearst v. National Labor Relations Board, and only 
recently the important interpretation of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act expounded in Universal Camera Cor-
poration v. National Labor Relations Boar d. All decided by 
the United States Supreme Court, these opinions are land-
marks in the administrative law of the land. State Supreme 
Court decisions add to the wealth of material. For example, 
observe the series of great opinions of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, Borgnis v. Falk Company, State ex rel. Wisconsin 
Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, State ex rel. Madison Air-
port Co. v. Wrabetz, Tesch v. Industrial Commission, and 
others. These are only illustrative of the very considerable 
body of valuable case law reflecting the judicial attitude 
toward administration-the foundation on which American 
administrative law rests. 
Mr. Cooper's book serves to correlate these and many 
other judicial pronouncements in a volume which portrays 
well the relationship in American jurisprudence between the 
courts and administrative agencies. Statutes enacted by legis-
lative bodies reveal occasional glimpses of statesmanship; 
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administrative pronouncements, made by men "appointed 
by law and informed by experience," sometimes reach a high 
level; but by and large in American administrative law we 
encounter most of our finest contributions to jurisprudence 
in the opinions of our courts. Mr. Cooper's volume is devoted 
primarily to those contributions. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
April r4, I95I 
E. BLYTHE STASON 
Preface 
THE limits which courts place on the powers of ad-ministrative tribunals have particular significance to practicing attorneys and law students. It is largely to 
the extent that such limits are imposed, that our government 
remains a government of laws and not a government of men. 
The following pages have been written to describe the 
standards which the courts impose upon administrative 
agencies, thereby controlling and limiting their powers. More 
particularly, the writer has sought: (I) to bring together 
the leading cases in which the courts have laid down the 
principles that govern frequently litigated questions in con-
tests between the agencies and the parties with whom 
they deal; ( 2) to describe the criteria and techniques of 
administrative adjudication-what may be termed the juris-
prudence of administrative tribunals-within these court-
imposed standards. 
No attempt has been made to discuss the problems of 
administrative organization and agency management, which 
are of particular interest to the political scientist and special-
ist in government. The purpose of this volume is more 
modest. It is an examination of the relationship between 
administrative agencies and the courts, with particular refer-
ence to judicial doctrines concerning: (I) constitutional 
limitations on the delegation of powers to administrative 
agencies; ( 2) procedural requirements in cases where agen-
cies exercise judicial powers; (3) procedural and substantive 
requirements imposed in connection with rule-making ac-
tivities; (4) methods and scope of judicial review. 
It is a pleasurable duty to acknowledge my indebtedness 
to E. Blythe Stason, Dean of the University of Michigan 
Law School, whose kindly encouragement led to the writing 
Xlll 
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of this study, and whose scholarly case book has been relied 
on repeatedly throughout the following pages. The views 
expressed, however, are those of the writer. 
Detroit, Michigan 
February, 1951 
FRANK E. CooPER 
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PART ONE 
THE PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES IN THE JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 
CHAPTER I 
Development of Administrative Agencies 
FOR many years, both federal and state courts tacitly refused to admit the existence of administrative law as a distinctive part of our legal system. It was considered 
a Continental concept, alien to our common law, and some-
thing to be shunned.1 While the development of adminis-
trative law is now recognized as an outstanding characteristic 
of twentieth-century jurisprudence, the effects of this long-
continued and persistent disregard are still felt. It has 
affected judicial doctrine, and the attitudes of the adminis-
trative agencies themselves. It has increased the difficulties 
of the lawyer's task. The law digests and encyclopedias, for 
example, until very recently failed to recognize the subject 
as one worthy of its own index heading. It has increased the 
difficulties of any systematic study of this branch of the law. 
Indeed, there is not even to be found any generally accepted 
definition of the term "administrative law." Defining the 
term thus becomes the first element of any discussion of the 
subject. 
1 Cf. A. V. Dicey, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1886) for an English 
statement of this view. It is interesting to note that thirty years later, viewing 
with alarm the decisions in Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A. C. 179, 
and Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A. C. uo, Mr. Dicey 
recognized the existence of this new system of jurisprudence (which he still 
considered to be in derogation of the Rule of Law) by entitling a review 
of these decisions, "The Development of Administrative Law in England," 
31 L. Q. R. 148 (1915). In this article, he acknowledges with misgivings 
that "a considerable step" had been taken toward the introduction of "some-
thing like the droit administratif in France"; and cf. Mr. Dicey's introduction 
to the 8th edition of LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1915) xxxviii. 
3 
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I. Definitions of Administrative Law 
In the broadest sense, administrative law may be defined 
as including all those branches of public law which relate to 
the organization of governmental administration.2 In this 
sense, it covers many of the principles and doctrines compris-
ing the fields usually described as constitutional law, legis-
lation, public corporations, public officers, civil service, and 
taxation, and includes, in fact, all branches of the law affect-
ing the executive activities of the government. 
At the opposite extreme, the subject is sometimes viewed 
as involving little more than the doctrine of separation of 
powers and its application to the creation and operation of 
administrative agencies. 
In most discussions of the subject, however, it is deemed 
to involve somewhat more than the doctrine of separation 
of powers, but somewhat less than would be included in the 
definition first suggested. The subject is generally thought 
to embrace the activities of those administrative agencies 
which, either by adjudicating judicial questions or by pre-
scribing general rules and standards of conduct, act as little 
courts or little legislatures in regulating individual activities. 
It includes those aspects of constitutional law which pertain 
to limitations on the powers of such agencies, and embraces 
as well questions of-practice and procedure before such agen-
cies, and also questions relating to judicial review of the 
determinations and orders of such agencies. 
It is these three questions-constitutional power, practice 
and procedure, and judicial review-which are at the nub 
of all discussions of the subject. It is these three questions, in 
variant applications, which beset the lawyer in the conduct of 
every case tried before an administrative agency. To an exam-
2 Cf. M. E. Dimock, "The Development of American Administrative Law," 
15 J. COMP. LEG. & INT. LAW (3d series) 35 et seq. (1933). 
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ination of these three topics, therefore, the following pages 
will be devoted. 
2. Administrative Agencies and the Administration of Law 
There is a constantly accelerating trend toward the adop-
tion of administrative techniques for disposition of legal 
matters that have been traditionally handled by the courts. 
In every field of practice, this tendency may be observed. In 
the tax field, for example, it is a rare case that justifies an 
appeal to the courts; and the recent indication by the United 
States Supreme Court that it will not always concern itself 
even with asserted errors of law committed by the adminis-
trative agencies,3 only emphasizes the importance of the 
agencies' role in this field. In corporation law, those issues 
which are most vital in the conduct of corporate affairs are 
ordinarily committed to such administrative agencies as the 
state corporation commissions, the Federal Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and state and federal utility commis-
sions. The field of labor law, which in recent years has as-
sumed unique social importance, is almost completely a 
creature of administrative tribunals. Even in the private law 
realm of contracts, administrative agencies are important. 
They effectively prescribe, by imposition of conditions and 
provisos which must be included or excluded, the general 
form and content of the most significant clauses of many 
types of private contracts, including agreements of employ-
ment, some contracts of sale, and various types of obligation 
relating to trade and finance. Furthermore, such agencies 
frequently are concerned with reviewing the performance of 
such contracts, and imposing sanctions for breach of the re-
3 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 
239 ( 1943). Despite apparent Congressional disapproval of the Dobson rule, 
so-called (I.R.C. 1141(a), 1948), the general trend of the courts is still to 
reverse only for gross error. 
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quired conditions. A substantial segment of the law of torts 
is now a matter of administrative adjudication: workmen's 
compensation, many forms of unfair competition cases, and 
the granting of reparations for various statutory offenses are 
all matters of administrative competence. Suggestions are 
frequently made that automobile accident cases should be 
taken from the courts and entrusted to the assertedly more 
expert handling of a commission or agency. Even in the field 
of criminal law, much is now being left to the psychiatrist 
and the parole board, and it is often suggested that there 
should be still more of this. In the field of domestic relations 
there has been a similar movement. Issues of alimony and 
custody in divorce cases are quite likely to be decided by a 
Friend of the Court or some similar agency. Likewise there 
should be mentioned the insurance commissions, the banking 
commissions, the trade commissions, and all the other like 
agencies that police their designated fields. 
Perhaps more significant than the infiltration of adminis-
trative elements into the traditional fields of judicial activity 
is the gravitation of law practice into matters of purely ad-
ministrative concern. A great part of the practice of law today 
does not take the lawyer or his client into the courts, but 
involves matters handled and concluded solely by adminis-
trative agencies. 
Almost all of the social legislation of recent years has 
been implemented by the creation of new administrative 
agencies, some of them passing on many thousands of justici-
able cases annually. It is in his dealings with these agencies 
that the citizen most frequently requires the aid of counsel. 
Many men can avoid "court trouble" but few indeed can 
avoid the administrative agencies. Like death and taxes (both 
of which, incidentally, are now the concern of administrative 
agencies) the agencies reach everyone. 
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All this is not to deprecate the position of the courts and 
legislatures. With them remains the power of superintending 
control. While tendencies toward s.elf-abnegation by the 
judicial and legislative organs may sometimes be noted, it 
is with the courts and the legislatures that there rests the 
sole power to correct widely noted defects of administrative 
action. 
It must be conceded, nonetheless, that with the develop-
ments in administrative law, the center of balance has been 
shifting. The implications of these developments are porten-
tous both to those professionally concerned and to the general 
public. 
3· Historical Development of Administrative Agencies 
(a) In general. Administrative law is no modern phe-
nomenon. It is, on the contrary, much older than the common 
law-older even than judicial systems or democratic legis-
lation. In the earlier periods of history, when the law was 
little more than custom, it was administered only through 
despotically controlled administrative processes. The devel-
opment of the philosophy that government should be by law, 
and not by men (which originated at least as early as the 
time of Aristotle)/ represented a trend away from adminis-
trative law. 
At various periods of legal history, trends toward and 
away from administrative law have produced governmental 
upheavals. Many revolutions have been premised on dis-
satisfaction with administrative processes. The barons at Run-
nymede were protesting King John's administrative law. 
4 The classic phrase found in Part I, Section XXX of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, 178o, was borrowed from Harrington (OcEANA (1656) 2-2.9), 
who acknowledged his indebtedness to Aristotle. See Aristotle's PoLITICS, III, 
xvi, 4, 5, "He who bids the law rule, bids God and reason rule, but he who 
bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a beast, and passion 
perverts rulers, even though they be the best of men." 
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The American Declaration of Independence charged many 
abuses against the administrative agencies comprising the 
British Government's colonial establishment. It declared, 
among other charges, that the King had created a multitude 
of new offices and had sent hither swarms of officers to harass 
the American people; that the King had invested his agencies 
with power to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatso-
ever, superseding the colonial legislatures; that the King had 
altered fundamentally American forms of government and 
deprived Americans, in many cases, of the benefits of trial 
by jury. The revolution that led to the downfall of the 
Russian monarchy was in large measure a protest against the 
czarist system of administrative law. 
While no close parallel can be drawn between the droit 
administratif of France or the administrative law systems of 
other Continental countries and our American legal system, 
yet a most intriguing comparison does exist between the de-
velopments in the United States during the fourth and fifth 
decades of the twentieth century, and the experience of 
England some four hundred years earlier. In the middle of 
the sixteenth century, English lawyers were heard complain-
ing that the common law was being set aside and that scarcely 
any business of importance came to the King's law courts. 
Legal matters were being handled instead by administrative 
tribunals-the Star Chamber, the Court of Requests, Chan-
cery, and the Great Councils. Each of these agencies was 
staffed with a permanent clerical establishment, which (the 
bar complained) undertook the duties performed by attorneys 
in the law courts, so that the members of the bar had but 
little place in these new agencies. There remained only, as 
Professor Plucknett says, "numerous duties of a quasi-legal 
character which had to be done, and litigants soon found it 
convenient to have a sort of law agent who would set the 
complicated machinery in motion by engaging and conferring 
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with the various branches of the profession as occasion re-
quired, and doing other duties, sometimes of a legal and 
sometimes of a business character." It was thought for a time 
that the professional courts, with their judges and trained 
lawyers, would be discarded and that the Crown would place 
all judicial powers in laymen as exponents of a new technique 
of law and government. But in the end a compromise was 
worked out. The common-law courts survived and ultimately 
regained their former importance.5 
While the underlying causes and conditions are of course 
different now than in sixteenth-century England, yet the 
striking similarity between that ancient development and the 
current situation compels attention. A host of new agencies 
are set up. They take over the conduct of many of the most 
significant aspects of the legal matters that had formerly 
been handled in the courts. These matters are handled on 
a nonlegal basis. The agencies in charge are staffed with large 
clerical establishments who perform many of the functions 
which in the judicial courts are assigned to attorneys. The 
function of lawyers, in some of the agencies at least, is pretty 
well limited to setting the wheels in motion and to confer-
ring informally with the administrative staff, as the occasion 
reqUlres. 
The final outcome of the English crisis of four hundred 
years ago was characterized principally by the assimilation 
of the equity courts as a special branch of the judicial 
system. Does this bit of history carry any hint as to the 
future course in the United States? The possibility is worthy 
of conjecture. In emphasizing the importance of granting 
respect and deference to the determinations of administrative 
agencies, the Supreme Court not long ago remarked that 
the twentieth-century judicial system should not "repeat in 
5 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942.) 36; Simmons, "Law and Adminis-
trative Government," 2.8 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 133 (1945); Plucknett, CoNCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, zd ed. (1936). 
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this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity 
was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of 
justice." 6 
(b) In the United States. The development of adminis-
trative agencies in the United States reflects the social history 
of the country, and can be roughly divided into three gen-
eral periods. As above noted, the birth of this country was 
prompted by the abuses of the administrative agencies of the 
Tudors and Stuarts, who (at least so far as the American 
colonies were concerned) had waged unremitting war against 
the supremacy of law. The long-standing and bitter conflict 
between the colonists and the Crown agencies set up to gov-
ern the colonies had served to establish a firm conviction in 
American minds that broad grants of discretionary power to 
governmental agencies must be avoided; governmental pow-
ers must be strictly limited and effectively separated between 
the different branches of government; the government must 
be one of law. This philosophy of course left little room for 
the development of administrative tribunals. In addition to 
this hatred for the things that English administrative govern-
ment had stood for in the colonies, other factors also militated 
against the development of administrative government in 
early America. These were the economic condition and the 
social philosophy of the country. The relatively simple course 
of trade and commerce in a sparsely settled, agricultural 
country created no need for close governmental supervision, 
and the highly individualistic spirit of the times rebelled 
against bureaucratic control. 
For these reasons, very few administrative agencies were 
created during the first century of this nation's existence, 
except those which were clearly necessary to carry on the 
6 United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 191, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939). 
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public business, such as the collection of customs and taxes, 7 
the disposition of public lands,8 the distribution of veterans' 
pensions,9 and the conduct of Indian affairs.10 
A reaction occurred, however, in the years following the 
Civil War. As Dean Pound expresses it, 11 the country had 
become "law ridden," and a counterswing was inevitable 
because the lines had been drawn so rigidly. The long-
standing opposition to administrative control was replaced 
by a willingness to experiment with what was looked on as 
a new device. This new spirit inaugurated a second period-
the beginning of modern administrative agencies. The de-
mands of an expanding law of public utilities, and the birth 
of so-called social legislation, imposing stricter and more 
thoroughgoing public supervision over the conduct of certain 
types of business, united to produce a need for a greater 
measure of administrative control. The rapid increase in 
population, the expansion of industrial organization, and the 
growing complexity of national affairs, all contributed to this 
new desire for a more detailed and adaptable method of 
governmental regulation than could be afforded by legis-
latures and the courts alone. 
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
I 887 signaled the change. This was the first federal agency 
7 Among the laws enacted at the first session of Congress were two granting 
administrative powers in connection with customs collections: Act of July 3 I, 
I789, I Stat. 29; Act of Sept. I, I789, I Stat. 55· Similarly, local assessors 
operated under state statutes since an early date; but it is interesting that while 
federal tax laws had been more or less continuous from I789, the office of 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not created until 1862. 
8 The General Land Office was established in I 8 I 2. 
9 But the Act of Sept. 29, I789, 1 Stat. 95, granting certain administrative 
powers in connection with the payment of pensions to soldiers of the Revolu-
tionary War, bore little resemblance to the statutes of more recent years vesting 
broad powers in the Veteran's Administration. 
10 The Act of April I 8, I 796, I Stat. 452, authorized the President to pre-
scribe rules in connection with the establishment of trading houses dealing with 
the Indians. 
11 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (I942) 27. 
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with broad regulatory powers over private affairs.12 Some 
ten other agencies with significant regulatory powers were 
created between the turn of the century and the New Deal 
of I9J2. These included the Food and Drug Administration 
(I 906), Federal Reserve System (I 9 I 3), Federal Trade 
Commission ( I9I4), National Advisory Commission for Aer-
onautics (I9I5), United States Tariff Commission (I9I6), 
the Shipping Board (I 9 I 6), Federal Power Commission 
(1920), Board of Tax Appeals (I924), Railroad Adjust-
ment Board (I 926), and Federal Radio Commission (I 926). 
The flood-tide, of course, came in the decade following 
1932, with the adoption of the policy of revamping the social 
and economic structure of the country through administrative 
action. During this third period, not only did the number 
of federal agencies exercising important regulatory functions 
increase tremendous} y, but there was a growing tendency to 
vest in such agencies an even greater measure of uncontrolled 
discretionary power. This decade, further, saw a vast expan-
sion of administrative agencies among the state governments. 
It was during this period that administrative law in America 
became of age. Characteristic of the development were such 
agencies as the Securities and Ex;change Commission, the 
National Labor Relations Board, the Wage and Hour Di-
vision of the Department of Labor, the Social Security Board, 
the Bituminous Coal Division, as well as numerous state 
price-fixing agencies, labor boards, unemployment commis-
sions, and the like. 
While not precisely paralleling these three periods in the 
development of the administrative agency as a new govern-
mental technique in this country, a roughly similar evolution 
12 A somewhat detailed history of the origin of the various agencies, com-
piled by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, dis-
closes that some comparatively minor regulatory powers were granted to 
administrative agencies somewhat earlier. "Administrative Procedure in Gov-
ernment Agencies," Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 8, 9· 
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has been exhibited in the attitude of the bench and bar of 
the country toward these agencies. The earliest attitude 
viewed with alarm the introduction of this alien concept. The 
principal questions examined and discussed were those con-
cerning the validity of the statutes creating the agencies, and 
the extent of the powers that could be delegated to them. 
Then (starting shortly after World War I and continuing 
for some twenty years-indeed, the problem is still far from 
solved) attention was turned to the availability and utility of 
judicial review as a method of checking or controlling the 
activities of the agencies. 
But as experience has demonstrated the limited effective-
ness of judicial review in cases where broad discretion is 
conferred on the agency and its findings of fact are ordinarily 
unassailable, legal thought has turned to matters of procedure 
within the agencies themselves. Recognizing administrative 
tribunals as co-ordinate agencies in the disposition of signifi-
cant segments of judicial and legislative business, the more 
recent point of view is concerned chiefly with improving the 
level of performance attained by the agencies. 
CHAPTER 2 
Functions and Character of 
Administrative Agencies 
J\ DMINISTRATIVE agencies serve certain govern-
£"l_ mental purposes more efficiently than do the tradi-
tional judicial and legislative organs. Where the 
government's purpose is that of policing the minutiae of 
conduct in some designated field, with a view to forestalling 
any deviations from the prescribed course of conduct rather 
than merely enforcing penalties for noncompliance, such an 
objective can be best achieved by an administrative agency. 
As legislative programs have tended more and more to adopt 
such a purpose, resort to the administrative agency as an en-
forcement device has become correspondingly more common. 
1. Execution of Preventive Legislation 
The traditional technique of legislation, depending largely 
on court action to compel enforcement of the law, has not 
been effective to prevent anticipated evils from arising. It has 
been limited, primarily, to correcting evils after they have 
occurred. Criminal proceedings, of course, are instituted only 
after the crime has been committed. Most civil actions simi-
larly operate after the event, embracing a claim for damages 
for violation of one's rights. Injunctive remedies, it is true, 
are essentially preventive in nature, and thus operate to some 
extent to eliminate the occurrence of a threatened wrong, but 
even here there are certain obvious limitations. It is patent 
that if the enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Act, 
for example, were premised upon the bringing of judicial 
actions to enjoin the issuance of any securities suspected to 
be fraudulent, the investment banking business would be less 
14 
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effectively policed than can be done under the various admin-
istrative processes which have been developed by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. 
Many administrative agencies serve primarily the function 
of accomplishing what ordinary legal remedies cannot nor-
mally achieve-avoiding the occurrence of an injury, which, 
of course, is usually far more satisfactory to the party con-
cerned than to suffer the injury and subsequently obtain a 
judgment for money damages as at least partial compensa-
tion for the injury. Thus, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, in determining in advance what freight rates are reason-
able, saves the shipper the trouble and expense of shipping 
his goods and paying an unreasonably excessive tariff, and 
of suing later for reparations. Similarly, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission aims to prevent the occurrence of a 
situation wherein a defrauded purchaser of securities must 
bring a suit for damages. The state public utilities commis-
sions, and the state and federal trade commissions, and of 
course the various agencies and boards which license those 
who engage in various types of activities (from the practice 
of chiropractic to the operation of radio stations) all serve a 
similar preventive purpose. In any field where the execution 
of a preventive program necessitates constant supervision and 
inspection, administrative devices are much better adapted to 
the successful operation of the program than are the tradi-
tional judicial remedies. 
Since most preventive legislation has broad social purposes, 
reliance on the administrative agency as an enforcement de-
vice is prompted not only because administrative devices are 
more effective to assure compliance than are ordinary legal 
remedies, but also because more effective enforcement can be 
attained through this device than where dependence is placed 
on private initiative in instituting action. Administrative 
agencies will take action in many cases where the individuals 
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directly affected, for one reason or another, would be unwill-
ing to appeal to the courts to seek protection of their rights. 
Where the legislative purpose is to achieve what are com-
monly called social ends, it is desirable not only that effective 
preventive remedies be made available, but also that such 
remedies be availed of in every case. It is deemed desirable, 
for example, not only that a method be provided for pre-
venting the commission of unfair trade practices, but also to 
make sure that appropriate action be taken in every case 
where any unfair trade practice may be committed. Accord-
ingly, administrative agencies have been created to protect 
both private parties and the public interest by assuming direct 
control over business management and social relations, in a 
wide variety of fields.1 
2. Conducting Social Experiments 
As the assertion of social control over private affairs ex-
tends into new fields of governmental activity, many situa-
tions are encountered where it is uncertain just what type or 
degree of control is desirable. It is clear that something 
should be done, but nobody knows exactly what. There ought 
to be a law, it is agreed; but just what the law should be is 
uncertain. In situations of this type, the administrative agency 
is conveniently available as a means of coping with problems 
of recognized public concern on an experimental basis. This 
is obviously not a function of the courts, and the legislatures 
cannot achieve this method of control except through the 
awkward and impractical expedient of repeated repeals, 
amendments, and re-enactments. Legislative procedures do 
not ordinarily permit this to be done, at least not on anything 
like the scale that is feasible in administrative agencies. When 
1 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JVDIC!AL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) ix. 
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Congress adopted the wage stabilization law/ for example, 
it appreciated that there would exist a practical necessity for 
permitting certain normal, minor wage adjustments to be 
made freely despite the general prohibition against voluntary 
wage increases during World War II. But it was impractica-
ble for Congress to define the standards or tests to be em-
ployed in determining what types of wage increases were to 
be permissible as voluntary adjustments that could be put 
into effect without seeking prior governmental approval. The 
National War Labor Board, to which was delegated the task 
of administration, very shortly after its creation issued a 
"general order" which specified the types of cases in which 
wage increases could be made without prior approval. But as 
experience was· obtained, the need for revisions in this "gen-
eral order" became apparent; and during the ensuing two 
years numerous amendments were issued. Some of the 
amendments were quite plainly experimental in nature-
an idea would be tried to see how well it would work out, 
and if early results were not encouraging, a change would 
promptly be made. Similarly, much of the work of the 
Federal Communications Commission has been experimental 
in character. Many similar examples could be named. 
As an agency gains experience, the need for continued ex-
perimentation diminishes, but almost every important agency 
at the time of its creation faces a necessity of picking out a 
path on an uncharted sea, and it must, on some of its excur-
sions at least, adopt a trial and error method. 
Where the necessity of experimentation thus exists, the 
obvious need of flexibility and discretion dictates the desir-
ability of reposing powers in an administrative agency. In 
this type of case the aqministrative agency can perform val-
2 Act of October z, 1942, as amended; 56 Stat. 765; 50 U.S.C. App. § 901 
at 198. 
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uable functions for which the traditional judicial and legis-
lative organizations are unsuited. 
3· Other Reasons for Utilization of Administrative Agencies 
It is sometimes said that the traditional legislative and 
judicial systems broke down in the face of modern necessities; 
that they were not effective to cope with important problems 
of recognized public concern; and that accordingly, resort to 
some more modern device was necessitated. But this unfairly 
belittles the importance of the legislatures and the courts. It 
is fairer to say that administrative tribunals have been availed 
of as a valuable assistance to hard-pressed and overburdened 
legislatures and judiciaries. Supervising control has been re-
tained-the effectiveness and extent of which remains subject 
to the desires of the legislatures and courts themselves-and 
there have been delegated only subsidiary functions which 
are adaptable to administrative handling. 
The ever-broadening delegation of legislative power has 
come about not only because the legislature may lack time 
and technique to prescribe detailed rules, but equally because 
the delegation of certain rule-making powers to administra-
tive agencies is desirable to relieve the legislature of a burden 
of detail so that its essential policy-making work may go 
forward more effectively. It is not only the fact that courts 
may be inexpert in making factual determinations in certain 
highly technical and complex fields, which has led to the 
delegation of judicial powers to administrative agencies, but 
it is equally a purpose of such delegation to avoid burdening 
the judiciary with a myriad of small cases, the consideration 
of which would interfere with the most effective disposition 
of the courts' more important duties in laying down funda-
mental principles. 
In certain types of cases, however, some definite advan-
tages are inherent in the administrative process. It makes 
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available a continuity of attention which, particularly in fields 
where expert knowledge of changing conditions is an aid to 
effective social control, enables regulation to keep pace with 
new events. This would appear to be true in the case of the 
regulation of the television industry. Again, reliance on ad-
ministrative agencies makes possible the application of uni-
form national policies in fields where reliance on ordinary 
judicial procedure would lead to a conflict of decision on 
many points. If, for example, it were left exclusively to the 
courts to determine what were unfair trade practices, or un-
fair labor practices, it seems clear that it would be much less 
certain what was permitted, and what forbidden. Further, 
utilization of the administrative process satisfies the need of 
an organization equipped to dispose of a great volume of 
business. For example, the courts would obviously be flooded 
if called upon to decide the hundreds of thousands of cases 
arising yearly under workmen's compensation and social 
security and unemployment insurance legislation. Similarly, 
creation of administrative agencies avoids dangers of unfair-
ness which might be present in some fields if reliance were 
placed on purely executive action. For example, while the 
distribution of public improvement funds for the use of 
municipalities may safely be left to ordinary executive action, 
yet when it comes to the allowance of benefit claims of the 
sort handled by the Veterans' Administration, it is plain that 
some orderly procedure and provision for assuring equal 
treatment is highly desirable. Finally, administrative pro-
cedure achieves a speed which cannot be attained through 
the ordinary processes of legislation and adjudication. 
Thus, there is a plain need for the administrative tribunal. 
It serves its own particular functions; and it is capable of 
serving them well. The administrative process is needed as 
a supplement to the legislative and judicial processes. It is 
needed as a directing process in an industrialized, urban 
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soctety which requires that social controls be administered 
with a greater degree of adjustment to unique situations and 
with a greater degree of preventive control than ordinary 
judicial processes, looking at controversies after the event, 
can afford.3 
4· Administrative and Judicial Procedures Contrasted 
But despite the plain need for administrative agencies, and 
their inherent ability to serve certain functions more effec-
tively than can either courts or legislatures acting alone, yet 
there have developed in many administrative agencies, within 
both the state and the federal governments, certain character-
istics of attitude and procedure which are detrimental to their 
most effective fulfillment of their particular functions. These 
characteristics often color every step of administrative pro-
cedure, and affect the task of the attorney who conducts cases 
before such agencies. They underly the mistrust harbored by 
large segments both of the bar and of the public as to the 
fairness and justice of many administrative agencies. 
(a) Interest in result. Perhaps the outstanding trait of 
administrative tribunals is their interest in the result of the 
cases pending before them. As later pointed out, this interest 
may affect all the processes of pleading, hearing, and decision. 
It is, of course, inevitable that administrative agencies should 
have such an interest in the result of pending administrative 
proceedings. Most agencies are created for the purpose of 
administering certain broad policies of social or economic re-
form. They are naturally interested in attaining such reforms. 
So long as this interest in the general course of decision does 
not affect the fairness and impartiality with which each con-
tested case is decided, there are but scant grounds for objec-
tion to its existence. It is inherent in the purpose for which 
such agencies are created, and the absence of such interest 
3 Cf. Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 26. 
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would interfere with their most effective functioning. But 
overconcern with the desirability of achieving appointed ends 
leads sometimes to an excess of zeal. For example, it has 
produced in some agencies an antipathy toward participation 
by counsel in agency proceedings. The diligent efforts of 
counsel on behalf of the party respondent are sometimes 
resented, as tending undesirably to hamper the expeditious 
execution of the agency's work. There is a feeling on the 
part of the agency that its expertness as to both the law and 
the facts renders the assistance of counsel superfluous. Simi-
larly, a pronounced antagonism toward judicial review has 
sometimes developed. Some agencies put every obstacle in 
the path of a party who seeks to obtain a court decision as 
to the validity of an administrative determination. These, 
of course, are extreme examples, but they indicate the funda-
mental differences between administrative and judicial pro-
cedures which are a necessary concomitant of the fact that 
administrative agencies are normally parties in interest to 
the proceedings they conduct. 
(b) Role of discretion. A second outstanding characteristic 
of the administrative process is the broad scope and effective-
ness of administrative discretion. Authorized in increasingly 
frequent instances to make decision on the basis of what is 
"fair" or "reasonable" (and being ordinarily the sole judges 
of the reasonableness or fairness of the measure involved) 
administrative agencies tend to substitute a rule of discretion 
for the rule of law. This is what is sometimes·called adminis-
trative absolutism. Indeed, it may well be that delegation 
of power to administrative agencies is often resorted to be-
cause the matter in hand cannot be regulated by general rules 
but only by the exercise of discretion in the decision of 
particular cases. 4 
4 Cf. Hayek, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM ( 1944) 65, 66, 78. 
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There can be no argument but that the vesting of discre-
tionary powers in administrative agencies is necessary to the 
most effective performance of their appointed tasks. At the 
same time, there can be little question but that these dis-
cretionary powers have had an important effect on all the 
processes of administrative adjudication. The possession of 
discretionary power has engendered in many agencies an 
impatience to proceed along the tiresome, detailed, plodding 
path of deciding each case on the basis of careful and pains-
taking consideration of all the evidence produced in the slow-
moving process of a contested hearing. Discretion can be 
more freely exercised when cases are decided without a hear-
ing, or without hearing both parties.5 This tendency of many 
agencies to minimize the importance of hearings, as may be 
noted in the common practice of basing the decision not on 
the record of the hearing itself but rather on abstracts or 
reports prepared by staff assistants, has had far-reaching 
effects on the course of administrative decision. 
The same tendency to rely on discretion is largely re-
sponsible for the willingness evidenced by many agencies to 
set up policies going beyond or even at variance with the 
standards of the statutes which the agencies administer. The 
tendency is to decide cases, not on the basis of interpreting 
the governing statutes-as courts would-to discover the 
apparent legislative intent, but rather to decide on the basis 
of broader policies which it is thought may be, within the 
broad discretionary powers of the agency, superimposed on 
the stated legislative purpose. 
Again, reliance on the role of discretion has disinclined 
many agencies to make available for the use of interested 
parties any clear statements either of the exact practice and 
procedure of the agency or the criteria relied on by the 
5 Cf. Reports of American Bar Association's Special Committee on Adminis-
trative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 331, 346 (1938); 64 A.B.A. REP. 575 (1939); 
Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942) 68-73. 
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agency in deciding cases.6 Discretion can be more freely 
exercised if procedural matters can be settled in accordance 
with the agency's convenience in each case. Similarly, dis-
cretion has a broader range if the agency has not committed 
itself to any stated bases or principles of decision comparable 
to common-law rules of decision, but has reserved the privi-
lege of deciding each case on its "merits," permitting such 
departures from prior criteria of decision as may seem ex-
pedient in any particular case. Hence, the party appearing 
before the agency may be in the position of not having the 
assurance, commonly available in court proceedings, that 
established procedures and rules of decision will govern the 
disposition of his particular case. 
5· The Lawyer and Administrative Agencies 
The task of the lawyer in conducting cases before admin-
istrative agencies is a difficult one.7 
Even the preliminary step of discovering the court-made 
case law on the particular issues with which he may be con-
cerned is no easy one. The historic reluctance of the courts 
to recognize administrative law as a distinct topic is reflected 
by the absence of any such heading, until very recently, in 
most law digests and encyclopedias. The search for the law 
applicable to questions of administrative procedure, or gov-
erning the validity of administrative action in certain types 
of cases, leads the researcher through almost every topic in 
the digests. Decisions involving a single point of law, uni-
formly applicable to any agency, may be scattered through 
such diverse headings as Aliens, Agriculture, Carriers, Com-
merce, Constitutional Law, Gas, Electricity, Mandamus, 
6 Sec. 3 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Ch. 3 z4, 
6o Stat. z37; 5 U.S.C. § 1001, imposes certain requirements for the publication 
of such information. See Davis, "Separation of Functions in Administrative 
Agencies," 61 HARV. L. REV. 389 ( 1948). 
7 See Dulles, "Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude for Lawyers," 
zs A.B.A. J. Z75 (1939). 
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Internal Revenue, Licenses, Master and Servant, Mines 
and Minerals, Post Office, Public Lands, Public Service 
Commissions, Radio, Railroads, Rate Regulation, War, and 
Workmen's Compensation. In the following pages, an at-
tempt is made to correlate the decisions, handed down in 
various substantive fields and involving various federal and 
state agencies, which lay down principles generally appli-
cable to the functioning of all administrative agencies. 
But the problems of administrative law cannot be properly 
understood without going beyond the decisions of the courts 
to the decisions of the agencies themselves and to the proc-
esses of administration.8 Accordingly, the following discus-
sion will attempt to capture the spirit of administrative law 
in action. An appreciation of the philosophy of administra-
tive adjudication is essential to the most effective participa-
tion of the bar in the administrative processes. The lawyer 
appearing at an administrative agency must accommodate 
himself to the difference between administrative and judicial 
proceedings. In many respects, greater skill in advocacy is 
required in the administrative than in the judicial hearing. 
In court proceedings, the attorney need not be concerned 
with convincing his opponent of the merits of his case; but 
in an administrative proceeding, it is the opponent's reaction 
which is paramount, for the agency which decides the case 
often appears as the opponent of the respondent. Effective 
presentation of the respondent's case requires not only knowl-
edge of the applicable rules of law, but an adaptation to 
principles of procedure and decision which are based on 
somewhat different considerations than those which control 
judicial proceedings. 
8 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 





Delegation and Combination of Powers 
A. EFFECT OF SEPARATION oF PowERS DocTRINE oN 
DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF 
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PowERS 
THE vitality of the nineteenth-century belief in the principle of separation of powers accounts for much of the bitterness with which the development of adminis-
trative tribunals has been assailed. An offshoot of the theory 
that governmental powers must be separated is the rule 
against delegation of powers. Since the creation of each new 
administrative tribunal vested with regulatory powers in-
volves a delegation of some measure of legislative power or 
judicial power (or both) and with it a further encroachment 
on the principle that the powers of government must be 
separated and channeled in the three constitutionally created 
departments of government, it was inevitable that the law of 
administrative tribunals should involve at the outset a col-
lision with these time-honored shibboleths.1 
Much of the difficulty is today of little more than his-
torical interest. But since the doctrine still retains some 
vitality, in modified form, and for the further reason that 
the ghosts of many old decisions (long overruled sub silen-
1 There is no fixed or unvarying constitutional requirement prescribing the 
separation of the powers of government or proscribing delegations of power. 
The Federal Constitution does not require the several states to observe in their 
internal organization the limitations imposed by the separation of powers 
doctrine. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 552, 28 
S. Ct. 178 (x9o8). Neither the provision of Article IV, Section 4, of the 
Constitution, providing that the United States shall guarantee to every state 
a republican form of government, nor the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, have been held to necessitate a rigid separation of powers. Ohio ex rel. 
Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 28 I U. S. 74, 79-80, so S. Ct. 
228 (1930); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903). 
As to agencies created by state law, the question is primarily whether a delega-
27 
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tio) still haunt the books, a brief examination of the problem 
is essential. 
I. Validity of Delegations 
If judicial power be conceived of as the sort of power 
which a court exercises (for example, applying the general 
rule of a statute to particular factual situations), and simi-
larly if legislative power be conceived as the sort of power 
which a legislature exercises (for example, determining what 
types of conduct shall be prohibited), then it must be con-
ceded that both judicial and legislative powers may be 
delegated to administrative tribunals. There is no generical 
distinction between the function of a workmen's compensa-
tion commission in adjudicating a claim of an injured em-
ployee and that of a court in adjudicating a claim under 
some other statute imposing liability without fault. There 
was no change of function when the Board of Tax Appeals 
became the Tax Court.2 Similarly, the policy-framing func-
tions of the legislature in determining, for example, that 
switchboard operators employed in a public telephone ex-
change which has less than five hundred stations 3 should 
be exempted from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act 4 are not of a different genre than the policy-
framing responsibility of the administrator who determined 
tion of power is improper under the terms of the state constitution; and this 
is a question of state law. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 59 S. Ct. 170 
(1938); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 186, 56 
S. Ct. 159 (1935). The federal courts will, however, sometimes inquire as to 
whether a delegation of power under a state statute is so vague and general 
as to permit the agency to exercise an untrammeled discretion in a manner that 
might be discriminatory or oppressive. See Yick VVo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). And see Jaffe, "An Essay on Delegation of Legis-
lative Power: 1," 47 CoL. L. REv. 359 (1947); Jefferson, The Supreme 
Court and State Separation and Delegation of Powers," 44 CoL. L. REV. r 
(1944). 
2 56 Stat. 957, 26 U.S.C. § r 100. 
3 Act of June 25, 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 
4 This specific exemption in Section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
was added by the amendment of August 9, 1939, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (53 Stat. 
1266). 
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that professional workers who earned over $325 monthly 5 
should be exempted from the same statute. 
Yet many courts have avoided candid recognition of the 
nature of such delegated powers. This has been accomplished 
by the convenient formula of describing such delegated pow-
ers as being only "quasi-judicial," or "quasi-legislative"-
the "quasi" meaning, apparently, "not quite." These dis-
tinctions between "judicial" and "quasi-judicial," between 
"legislative" and "quasi-legislative" should be considered 
convenient fictions. 
Refusal to recognize the fiction and insistence on the 
making of some logical distinction based on the nature of 
the delegable powers leads to inextricable difficulties. For 
example, the Wisconsin Court in an early case 6 held that 
the function of a workmen's compensation commission was 
only quasi-judicial, since the commission merely "found the 
facts" on which the law operated; but when a few years 
later the state legislature bestowed upon another adminis-
trative agency the responsibility for finding as a fact whether 
or not illegal stock sales were made in bad faith, the court 
found that here the proposed function was purely judicial, 
and that the statute was hence void.7 Again, the New York 
Court in I 908 8 said that the power to fix utility rates was 
only quasi-legislative, and for the reason that such powers 
had historically been delegated by the legislatures in various 
instances. But the next year it was argued before the same 
court that since a commission fixing rates was exercising only 
quasi-legislative powers, the courts could not on writ of 
5 Sec. 13 of the act created an exemption for such individuals as might be 
defined as "professional" employees by the Administrator, and thus empowered 
the Administrator to decide what the exemption should be. Earlier, the regula-
tions had fixed $200 as the monthly salary requirement. 
6 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911). 
7 Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457 (1923). 
8 Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & 
Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908). 
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certiorari review the commission's determination. And then 
the court, refusing to follow the logical implications of its 
earlier decision, decided that the power of the commission 
was not quasi-legislative but rather quasi-judicial, and hence 
reviewable.9 In some types of cases, the courts disagreed as 
to whether certain types of function were "purely" judicial 
or only "quasi" judicial. For example, the grant of a power 
to remove a public officer was held by some courts to be 
purely judicial 10 and by others to be only quasi-judicial.11 
In other instances, powers which were originally held to be 
purely judicial and hence nondelegable were later held to 
be only quasi-judicial, and a proper subject for delegation 
to administrative tribunals.12 Logic has retreated in the face 
of practical necessities. Not infrequently, the members of 
a court have been in disagreement as to whether a given 
power was "purely" or only "quasi" legislative or judicial.13 
Demonstration that the distinction cannot be predicated on 
logical grounds can be found in the many cases discussing 
delegation of the power to punish for contempt.14 
But the fact that the appellative "quasi" affords no logical 
distinction between those governmental powers which may 
be delegated to administrative tribunals and those which 
9 People ex rel. Central Park, North & East River R. Co. v. Willcox, 194 
N.Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (r9o9). 
10 Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112 (r884). 
11 State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228 
(r886). 
12 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942) 32, discussing the statutes which 
empowered administrative boards to apportion the use of the water rights in 
a stream between conflicting claimants. In r 8 70, a pioneer statute of this 
character was declared unconstitutional as a delegation of purely judicial 
powers customarily exercised by courts of equity in suits to "adjudicate a 
stream." Two or three decades later, when such statutes became more common, 
the courts agreed that such power was only quasi-judicial. 
13 For example, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Field v. 
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (r892). See also J. W. Hampton, Jr. & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928). 
14 See 35 CoL. L. REV. 578 (1935). 
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must be reserved to the legislatures and the courts, does not 
of course mean that any or all of such legislative and judicial 
powers may be delegated. Rather, it points out merely the 
simple truth that "The line has not been exactly drawn which 
separates those important subjects, which must be entirely 
regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, 
in which a general provision may be made, and power given 
to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill 
up the details." 15 The principles against delegability of es-
sential powers still retain vitality at least to the extent of 
invalidating delegations which would render one department 
of government subject to the control of another department 
or which would confer uncontrolled discretion on adminis-
trative agencies in matters affecting substantial property 
rights or rights of personal liberty. 
2. Preserving Essential Independence of the Departments 
of Government 
Essentially, the doctrine of separation of powers concerns 
little more than the "fundamental necessity of maintaining 
each of the three general departments of government en-
tirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or 
indirect, of either of the others." 16 The exercise of powers 
by one agency or department of government which logically 
should be exercised by another is accordingly countenanced 
as a matter of practical necessity; 17 and administrative agen-
cies are permitted to exercise powers which logically belong 
to the courts, or to the legislature, so long as the independ-
ence of the courts or of the legislature is not impaired. But 
15 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 5o6, 517, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911). 
16 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 6o2, 629, 55 S. Ct. 869 
(1935). 
17 c;:f. Dean Henry M. Bates, "Trends in American Government," Proceed-
ings Annual Meeting, 5 CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, 58, 67-68 ( 1932). 
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when an attempt is made to vest in an administrative agency, 
or when an administrative agency or executive officer claims, 
powers which could be exercised in such a way as to deprive 
the legislature or the courts of their constitutional preroga-
tives, then there has been a violation of the essential consti-· 
tutional precept. The rule is well illustrated by the decisions 
in Myers v. United States 17a and in Humphrey's Executor 
v. United States.17b In the former case, an attempt by Con-
gress to deprive the President of his power of summary 
removal of a local postmaster was held unconstitutional. In 
the latter case, it was held that Congress could properly 
restrict the powers of the President in removing members 
of the Federal Trade Commission. Is not the reason for this 
distinction based upon the test suggested above? The local 
postmaster is a ministerial employee of the executive depart-
ment of government. He performs few, if any, functions of 
a legislative or judicial character. Hence the purpose of 
Congress in seeking to limit the exclusive power of the chief 
executive officer to remove an executive assistant amounted 
to an attempt by the legislature to control the independence 
of the executive branch of the government; and this could 
not be sustained. The converse was true in the Humphrey's 
case. There, the Federal Trade Commission was charged 
with important responsibilities in formulating legislative 
policy in the field of unfair trade practices, and was charged 
with important responsibilities in adjudicating asserted vio-
lations of the law. As the court pointed out, in order to 
perform its duties properly, the commission was required 
to be free of executive control. In that case, therefore, an 
assertion by the chief executive of a power of arbitrary 
removal of a member of the commission, if sustained, would 
have vested in the executive department control over a crea-
17a Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. sz, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926). 
l7b Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6oz, 55 S. Ct. 869 
(1935). 
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ture of the legislative department, which was at the same 
time, and for certain purposes, a judicial agency. 
The same type of situation exists in other cases where the 
separation-of-powers philosophy has been relied upon in 
invalidating legislation. In Springer v. Government of the 
Philippine Islands/7c for example, the statute which was 
held invalid was designed so as to give the legislature con-
trol over a government corporation which had been chartered 
to perform purely executive functions. 
To the extent suggested by such decisions, the doctrine 
of separation of powers retains vitality in the field of ad-
ministrative law. An administrative agency, it seems safe to 
say, may not validly be granted powers which would permit 
it to displace the courts, or the legislature, or the executive, 
in matters constitutionally committed to these departments. 
Nor may an agency controlled by one department be given 
powers which would permit that department to control the 
others.18 
3· Precluding the Vesting of Administrative Duties in the 
Courts 
The doctrine of separation of powers still retains vitality, 
in at least a negative aspect, in connection with the rule that 
courts (at least, the federal constitutional courts) will not 
undertake the discharge of any nonjudicial duties. This rule 
has been applied not only in cases where courts have refused 
to revise determinations of administrative tribunals on the 
grounds that such revisory duties, though sanctioned or im-
17c Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 2.77 U. S. 189, 48 
s. Ct. 480 (19Z8). 
18 An interesting application of this principle is found in Kreutz v. Durning 
(C.C.A. zd 1934), 69 F. (zd) 8oz. There, the court reviewed a statute which 
vested in a legislative court the power to make a final and nonreviewable de-
cision on certain questions of law concerning the imposition of import duties. 
In sustaining the statute, the court relied upon the fact that the legislative court 
was independent of the executive. 
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posed by statute, would impose nonjudicial powers on the 
courts, 19 but also in cases where the court's refusal to review 
an agency's determination is based on the principle that the 
agency is exercising essentially administrative functions.20 
In cases involving technical competence, where the courts 
may feel that an administrative agency possesses superior 
qualifications to pass upon questions of interpretation and 
implementation of policies expressed generally in statutory 
law, the courts display some readiness to characterize as 
administrative, and hence beyond judicial review, functions 
which might on purely logical tests be deemed judicial. The 
doctrine of separation of powers can thus be relied upon 
occasionally as strengthening rather than weakening the 
powers of an administrative agency to dispose with finality 
of the problem at hand. 
4· Preventing Uncontrolled Administrative Discretion 
If it be conceded that legislative powers and judicial pow-
ers may be delegated to administrative tribunals-subject in 
some jurisdictions at least to the condition of attaching the 
pious appellative "quasi"-the problem of formulating a 
guide for determining the limits to be placed on the extent 
of permissible delegation is at once apparent. There can be 
no doubt that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for 
example, could not be vested with power to rewrite the 
federal tax laws, imposing such types of levies and at such 
rates as appeared to him best. But what distinction is to be 
drawn between this and the valid delegation of the power 
to determine whether or not an applicant shall be given 
l9 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445 
(1923). This problem is discussed more fully infra, Ch. 16, ns. 12. and 13, 
in connection with the discussion of review of administrative determinations, 
where it is noted that the state courts have been more willing to extend their 
powers in this direction than have the federal courts. 
20 United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 
413 (1927). 
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relief from the harshness, as applied to his situation, of the 
provisions of a statute imposing taxes on excess profits? 21 
Similarly, it is inconceivable that the Tax Court could be 
given power to determine with finality the validity of a tax 
statute, but the Supreme Court has made it clear that it will 
not concern itself with the correctness of the decision of the 
Tax Court on certain "minor" issues of law said to have 
been improperly determined by that tribunaJ.22 Here again 
the question is presented of finding a basis for predicting 
the outer periphery of the delegable powers. It is of course 
quite possible to say, as many courts have observed during 
the last half century, that the one involves "pure" legisla-
tive or judicial power, which may not be entrusted to an 
administrative agency, while the other involves only "quasi" 
legislative or judicial power, which may be freely delegated. 
But resort to this convenient fiction does not simplify the 
problem. The twin consiaerations of sound logic and mental 
honesty recommend saying, rather, that the kind of power 
which the Interstate Commerce Commission (to cite another 
example) exercised when it decided whether or not it should 
regulate the hours and working conditions of drivers em-
ployed by private carriers 23 was the same kind of legislative 
power that Congress exercised when it decided whether or 
not there should be regulation of the hours and working 
conditions of drivers employed by common or contract car-
riers.24 Similarly, the function of a workmen's compensation 
21 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 55 I, 48 S. Ct. 
587 (1928). 
22 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 32I U. S. 23I, 64 S. Ct. 
495 (I944). See Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law 
and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 (I944). 
23 Sec. 204 (a) (3) of the Motor Carrier Act of I935> 49 Stat. 543; 49 
U.S.C. § 304 placed upon the Commission the duty "To establish for private 
carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found [italics inserted], 
reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation." In a proceeding en-
titled "Ex Parte No. MC-4," I I.C.C. Motor Carrier Cases I (I936), the 
Commission determined that such need existed. 
24 Motor Carrier Act of I935, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. § 304. 
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commission in determining whether an applicant for benefits 
was injured as a result of his wanton and willful negligence, 
is indistinguishable on logical grounds from the function 
exercised by a court in determining whether a guest passen-
ger in an automobile was injured as a result of the wanton 
and willful negligence of the driver. 
The true situation would appear to be that legislative 
and judicial powers may be delegated in certain instances, 
but not in others. Determination of the category into which 
a particular situation falls depends, apparently, in part on 
the subject matter involved and in part on the degree of 
control delegated. In some fields, administrative agencies 
may be vested with absolute and unreviewable legislative 
and judicial powers. In such cases, the agency is free to 
exercise uncontrolled discretion. In other fields, where rights 
of personal liberty or private property are more significantly 
involved, delegation is permitted ·only if reasonable limits 
and controls are imposed on the agency's discretion. Such 
control is ordinarily exercised by the creation of statutory 
standards to which the activities of the agency must con-
form. Thus, the question of determining the extent to which 
legislative and judicial powers may be delegated to admin-
istrative bodies resolves itself into a question as to what sort 
of standard the legislature must set up to limit administra-
tive discretion. If not appropriately limited, the statute is 
invalid.25 
(a) Various "tests" suggested by courts for determining 
sufficiency of standards devised to limit administrative discre-
tion. Implicitly recognizing that the principle against dele-
gation of judicial or legislative powers to administrative 
agencies is nothing more than a proscription of the grant of 
25 Except of course in cases where constitutional limitations are nonexistent, 
and where legislative and judicial powers may be delegated to the uncontrolled 
discretion of the agency. These are separately discussed, infra. 
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unlimited discretionary powers to administrative agencies 
whose determinations affect substantial rights of person or 
property, the courts at various times have suggested a num-
ber of "tests" by which to determine whether the delegated 
discretionary powers have been sufficiently limited. 
Thus, it is sometimes said that an administrative tribunal 
may not be given power to make the law, but may be given 
discretion as to the execution of the law. This criterion has 
in certain case situations the advantage of glib plausibility. 
Apparently originating in Justice Ranney's opinion in Cin-
cinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Commissioners,25a 
this phrase has been repeated in a very large number of 
cases.26 But it cannot be accepted as an actual basis for de-
cision. Thus, when Congress "made the law" by prohibiting 
interstate transportation of "hot" oil, but gave to an admin-
istrative officer discretion as to executing the law, the grant 
of unlimited discretion was invalidated, although it could 
well have been supported on the basis of this "test." 27 
An alternative "true test" suggested in many decisions 
is that an administrative agency may not be vested with 
discretionary power to determine policies, but may be em-
25a Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 
88 (18p), 
26 It was frequently relied upon in decisions invalidating the delegation to 
an insurance commission of the power to prescribe a standard form of policy. 
E.g., King v. Concordia Fire-Insurance Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N. W. 616 
(1905); Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896). 
The latter case was in effect overruled in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection 
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928), in an excellent 
opinion by Justice Rosenberry. A comment on administrative control of insur-
ance policy forms by Professor Edwin W. Patterson appears in 25 CoL. L. REV. 
253 (1925). The cases on this particular point present an interesting history. 
Many early decisions invalidating delegation of administrative discretion to 
insurance commissioners cast a long shadow, both in the direction of legislative 
hesitancy to grant such powers and in the direction of judicial tendency to 
invalidate the delegation of discretionary powers in this particular field, by 
strong reliance on stare decisis, even though in other fields comparable grants 
of delegated discretion had been upheld. 
27Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). 
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powered only to determine the facts to which the legislative 
policy will apply.28 But this test is obviously fallacious. Thus, 
to say that a public utility commission is merely finding a 
fact in determining what rate is reasonable, is to overlook 
entirely the fact that in such a field the commission has the 
same breadth of discretion as does the legislature. Where a 
statute 29 in terms provides that no employees engaged on 
certain contracts shall be employed more than eight hours 
a day, and an administrative agency can determine by regu-
lation that such employees may legally be employed more 
than eight hours a day, providing they are compensated for 
overtime at rates to be prescribed by the head of the admin-
istrative agency,S0 it is absurd to say that the agency is per-
forming only fact-finding functions, without policy-making 
responsibility. 
In safer, less precise language, it is sometimes declared 
that the true general test is that administrative tribunals may 
validly be empowered only to fill in the details by making 
subordinate rules within prescribed limits. This suggestion 
has the security of vague ambiguity. To what must the 
administrative rule be subordinate? By what standards must 
the limits of its discretion be prescribed? Seemingly, the rule 
is little more than a restatement of the problem. It has been 
relied upon to sustain a grant of power to exempt certain 
shipments of food from the labeling and branding require-
ments of the Food and Drug Act/1 where the legislative 
principle to which the rule was subordinate was a mandatory 
requirement of labeling (and the rule was subordinate only 
28 This is mentioned in many cases sustaining the delegation to public utility 
commissions of power to fix rates. The "test" is referred to in some federal 
court decisions. See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (1892); 
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1904). 
29 The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 49 Stat. 2036, 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 35-46. 
30 Article 103 of Regulations 504, prescribed by the Secretary of Labor under 
the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. 
31 34 Stat. 768, 21 U.S.C. § 2. 
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in that it eliminated the statutory requirement) and where 
the prescribed limit was "reasonable variations . . . tol-
erances and also exemptions as to small packages." 32 It is 
elastic enough to permit the delegation of power to fix 
prices, subject to a "standard" empowering the administra-
tive agency to fix such prices as are deemed by it to be 
"generally fair and equitable," in any situation where there 
"threatens" a rise in prices "inconsistent with the purposes 
of the Act," those purposes being stated in terms of broadest 
generality.33 Administrative rules setting up a system where-
by permits to graze sheep within government forest preserves 
might be obtained on certain conditions, including the pay-
ment of various fees, was deemed properly subordinate to 
a legislative purpose to "improve and protect" the forest 
preserves, and within the limits prescribed by a statutory 
grant of power to make regulations to insure the effectuation 
of "the objects of such reservation [the forest reserves], 
namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve 
the forests thereon from destruction." 34 
Applying this last-mentioned rule to specific case situations, 
then, it appears that the "detail" which may be left to the 
agency may include such broad questions of legislative policy 
as whether there shall or shall not be regulation; that the 
"subordination" to the statute means only that the adminis-
trative law must not be directly contradictory to the statute; 
that the "limits" need be no tighter than those of "fairness" 
or "equity," which as is well know-9- varies with the length 
of the chancellor's foot. 
This is but another way of saying that there has been 
devised no general rule by which it is possible to determine 
32 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 78, 53 
S. Ct. 42 (1932). 
33 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 66o (1944); Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944). 
34 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6, 507, 509, 31 S. Ct. 48o ( 1911). 
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the validity of any given proposed delegation of power. Any 
of the suggested rules aptly describe the results in certain 
cases; but none of them can be applied in all cases.85 In no 
case do any of the rules account for the result; at best they 
are a description of results reached in certain cases. The 
considerations which actually motivate decision are less pre-
cise, and less legalistic. 
(b) Factors that motivate decision. But what are the in-
nominate, imponderable factors which do, in fact, motivate 
decision? They perhaps cannot be catalogued. Their nature 
and relative importance vary from one case to another. The 
basic reasoning of a decision vesting broad discretion in an 
agency to revoke, say, the charter of a bank, will be rejected 
by the court (even though it might logically be applied) 
where the charter to be revoked is a professional license to 
practice law or medicine. In the case of a revocation of a 
license to operate a saloon, still other factors will be involved. 
These subtle distinctions between logically analogous case 
situations must be kept in mind. 
It must likewise be recognized that in this field judgment 
is somewhat temporal, reflecting to a degr~e contemporane-
ous economic and political thinking.36 Then, too, courts must 
necessarily be concerned with matters of practical necessity. 
Likewise, the attitude of the particular court must be taken 
into consideration. The admonitions found in some opinions, 
that these statutory tribunals must be recognized as co-
ordinate agencies in the administration of law and justice, 
are not accorded universal acquiescence. Courts are not 
35 In cases involving the delegation of judicial power, the various general 
rules are all quite inappropriate. 
36 Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936), 
invalidating the delegation of power to a majority of producers and mine 
workers to fix prices; and Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379 
(1939), and United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 
59 S. Ct. 993 (1939)-upholding a delegation of power to milk producers to 
decide whether an order should be put into effect. 
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equally receptive to this philosophy. By and large, state 
courts probably remain less willing to permit delegation of 
comparatively free discretionary powers than the federal 
courts. 
Despite all these difficulties, it seems possible to describe 
the most important factors that influence the decision by 
the courts as to the adequacy of standards employed to limit 
administrative discretion, in fields where such a limit is con-
stitutionally necessary. 
I. In cases where delegation of broad discretionary powers 
is traditional, almost any standard will be accepted as suffi-
cient. It is enough if the legislature, either expressly or by 
implication-and silence is sufficient implication-sets up a 
general standard of reasonableness. This, of course, is the 
same standard by which the legislature itself is controlled. 
Thus, the delegation of power to fix utility rates requires 
no standard more specific than the implied common-law 
requirement that the rates fixed must be reasonable.37 Simi-
larly, in the field of censorship, delegations are customarily 
sustained which place no definable limits on the discretion 
of the censors.38 Again, in a recent case sustaining the delega-
tion to an agency controlling certain lending activities of 
banks, the court pointed out that a less rigid standard was 
permissible in a field which is "one of the longest regulated 
and most closely supervised of public callings." 39 
2. A standard which is seemingly vague may always be 
shown to be, in fact, quite well defined when related to an 
established legal concept. Thus, the Federal Trade Com-
mission may be granted considerable powers in determining 
37 Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & 
Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (19o8); cf. Rohrer v. Milk Control 
Board, 322 Pa. 257, 186 Atl. 336 (1936). 
38 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 
35 S. Ct. 387 (1915). 
S9Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S. Ct. 1552 (1947). 
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what are unfair trade practices within a statutory prohibi-
tion; 40 but the granting of a similar power to identify fair 
trade practices is invalid.41 The meaning of the former phrase 
is fairly deducible from a long line of cases, and the standard 
is therefore more restrictive than might appear. But in the 
latter case, the agency was in fact left at large to exercise a 
rovmg comm1sswn. 
3. The degree of definiteness required in the standard 
varies with the extent to which the agency's determinations 
impinge importantly on rights of personal liberty, or sub-
stantial property rights. This general principle has many 
facets. In cases where the agency is the dispenser of favors 
which the government is free to grant or refuse, a very broad 
standard is sufficient; if, indeed, any is required.42 Where 
violations of an agency's rules may invqlve the imposition 
of criminal sanctions, per contra, an explicit standard is usu-
ally required.43 In license cases, much less discretion may be 
delegated as to revocation of licenses to engage in a pro-
fession (where the revocation would presumably carry in-
tensely disastrous personal consequences 44), or to carry on 
a substantial business/5 than in cases where the license re-
voked permits one to engage in activity of a type which 
the legislature might entirely prohibit (such as running a 
40 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1919), 
258 Fed. 307. 
41 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 
837 (1935). 
42 Cf. Cases involving traffic regulations: Smallwood v. District of Colum-
bia (App. D. C. 1927), 17 F. (zd) 210; Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 
32, 19 S. Ct. 317 (1899); tolls for the use of roads: Rogge v. United States 
(C.C.A. 9th 1942), 128 F. (2d) 8oo. 
43 People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. S. 74 (1934); United 
States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 (1892), where the statute was 
sustained by decision that violation of the administrative regulations was not 
subject to the criminal penalties that attended other violations of the statute; 
cf.In re Kollock, 165 u.s. 526, 17 s. Ct. 444 (1897). 
44 See 5 A. L. R. 94· 
45 State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court for Pierce County, 113 Wash. 296, 
193 Pac. 845 (1920); see 12 A. L. R. 1435· 
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poolroom 46 or a business which so immediately affects the 
general public welfare that close and continuous supervision 
is generally deemed desirable).47 
4· The extent to which the court conceives that there is a 
genuine need for expertise is probably a factor. In the case 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, the 
courts quite readily concede their incapacities to handle in 
a satisfactory manner the highly technical problems in-
volved/8 and in sustaining a broad grant of power to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to order divestiture of 
holding companies, the court pointed out that its approval 
constituted "a reflection of the necessities of modern legisla-
tion dealing with complex economic and social problems." 49 
But where the agency regulates the traffic on city streets 50 
or determines the "area of production" of agricultural proc-
essing/1 the court may feel there is much less need for tech-
nical competence, and therefore less need of sustaining broad 
standards. The court may accordingly well insist on a fairly 
explicit standard, and in the absence thereof either invalidate 
the statute or disregard the agency's rulings. 
5. Where there is ample provision for notice, hearing, and 
argument, and where it is thought these sufficiently guarantee 
a fair and intelligent disposition of the case by informed and 
impartial administrative action, broad standards are likely to 
be upheld.52 
46 State of Kansas v. Sherow, 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866 (1912); Mehlos 
v. City of Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882 ( 1914). 
47 Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 3 I S. Ct. 190 ( 1911); People of 
State of New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 26 S. Ct. 
144 (1905). 
48 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177,59 S. Ct. 16o (1938). 
49 American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 
U.S. go, 105, 67 S. Ct. 133 (1946). 
50 City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 ( 1925). 
51 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 32-2 U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. 
1215 (1944). 
52 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of 
Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941). 
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6. Where provisions for judicial review permit the court 
to exercise a large measure of superintending control over 
the agency, this reasoning is even more effective in persuad-
ing the courts to sustain statutes setting up a very vague 
standard. 53 
7. In cases involving the exercise of judicial power by 
administrative agencies, the courts on the whole insist on a 
stricter standard than in cases where the agency's powers 
are principally legislative in nature. Since the judicial process 
is primarily one of applying a standard, it is natural that this 
requirement exists. Just as a court refuses to treat as a justi-
ciable matter a controversy which cannot be determined by 
application of the so-called rules of law, so it insists that 
some rule or standard must be set up to guide the adjudi-
catory functions of an agency exercising judicial powers.54 
Then, too, the delegation of judicial powers to administrative 
agencies is always subject to attack on the grounds that the 
due process guaranties of the Constitution have been vio-
lated. In past years, courts have been by no means reluctant 
to discover a violation of due process, where judicial powers 
were delegated. 
It is these considerations that form the basis of decision, 
and rightly so. The law of administrative tribunals could not 
live and grow upon a logical extension of philosophical doc-
trine. Its growth must be empiric, based on experience. 
Judicial recognition of practical necessities, indeed, is the 
most typical characteristic of this branch of the law. 
Courts will therefore be little persuaded by an argument 
that a statute must be invalidated because it grants an admin-
istrative tribunal power to make law, rather than merely to 
53Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911). 
54 Many of the cases holding the statutory standard to be unconstitutionally 
broad are cases involving the issuance and revocation of licenses, where the 
agency's powers are in many respects judicial in nature. Seemingly, a much 
more explicit standard is insisted on in such cases than in those where the 
agency promulgates legislative rules. 
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exercise discretion in its enforcement, or because there are no 
definitely specified limits to which administrative discretion 
is subordinate. Nor will the language employed by a court 
in striking down a statute giving a board unbridled discretion 
in deciding whether or not to issue a building permit be ac-
cepted as persuasive when it is sought to be applied to a 
statute giving a similar measure of discretion to another board 
which issues or revokes saloon and dance-hall licenses. 
Not only is the decision in each case to be limited to the 
facts of the case, but the reasoning employed in one case will 
not be extended to another· case where considerations of 
statesmanship recommended a different judgment. 
(c) Cases where constitutional limitations are nonexistent. 
In some types of cases, the considerations above discussed 
recommend that delegation of virtually unlimited discretion-
ary powers be sustained. Typically these are cases where the 
activities of the tribunal will not directly impinge on consti-
tutionally recognized rights of property. Thus, where the ad-
ministrative discretion is directed to such matters as granting 
licenses to dredge for rocks in state-owned waters,55 or pro-
hibiting fishing in certain areas,56 or regulating the nontra:ffic 
uses of city streets,57 there is no difficulty in sustaining un-
limited grants of power. In such cases the result can easily 
be described by saying that there can be no invasion of private 
rights of person or property as a result of the rulings of 
the agencies. 
But it would seem that the true principle of such cases 
goes further. In some types of cases, unlimited discretionary 
powers may be delegated even though the activities of the 
agency may impinge directly on private rights. In such cases, 
a broader explanation is required. The true reason is sug-
55 State ex rel. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 
(t88g). 
56 McMillan v. Sims, 132. Wash. 2.65, 2.31 Pac. 943 (192.5). 
57Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32., 19 S. Ct. 317 (t8gg). 
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gested in the opinion of the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.57a In that case the Court 
sustained the delegation to the President of unfettered dis-
cretion to prohibit shipment of munitions to certain foreign 
countries, conditioned upon his judgment as to whether such 
prohibition would contribute to the re-establishment of peace. 
The Court assigned as the reason for its decision, not that 
such prohibitions would not affect private rights-for of 
course they would-but rather that to avoid "perhaps serious 
embarrassment," such legislation "must often accord to the 
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic 
affairs alone involved." The Court pointed out that such 
delegations of power were traditional in matters pertaining 
to foreign relations, that the President possessed more expert 
knowledge than did Congress, and that practical necessities 
could not be met by a more restricted delegation. 
Similarly, virtually unlimited discretion is frequently be-
stowed upon municipal corporations to adopt local ordinances. 
This cannot be explained on the theory that such ordinances 
will not substantially affect important private rights. It must 
be explained, if at all, on the basis that such delegations have 
been traditional and have proved expedient.58 
(d) Problems of draftsmanship in formulating standards. 
Obviously, effective administrative action may be expedited 
or hampered by the language adopted in the controlling 
statute as the standard by which its actions must be guided. 
Sometimes, as Dean Landis points out,59 legislative drafts-
men formulate too elaborate standards, under a misappre-
57a United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 
216 (1936). 
58 See Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S. Ct. 256 (1889); Brod-
bine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 6o7 (1903); cf. I 
McQuillin on MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (I 940) 422; Willis on CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1936) 137-138. 
59 Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 55 et seq. 
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hension as to the clarity of the outlines of the problem at 
hand, and condition administrative action in such detail as 
to make it difficult to dispose effectively of pressing problems. 
On the other hand, the legislature may sometimes be tempted 
to evade responsibility by an ill-defined transfer to an admin-
istrative agency of the duty to provide, by such regulations 
"as the public interest may require," a determination of 
fundamental policy in a highly controversial fi.eld.60 
A standard which attempts to anticipate every possible 
situation is likely to defeat the whole purpose of delegation. 
On the other hand, one which reflects the empty generalities 
of "reasonableness" or "public interest"-criteria which 
would be supplied by implication in any event-tends to 
substitute a government by men for one of laws. 
The tendency of the courts to sustain the delegation, how-
ever the standard be phrased, emphasizes the importance of 
wisely drafting the statutory standards. Relief from unsatis-
factory administrative action must often come through the 
legislature, rather than the courts. It may be necessary, upon 
venturing into a new field of governmental regulation, to 
grant the agency wide powers. It must, perhaps, have some 
authority to experiment. But as experience defines the con-
tours of the problem involved, opportunities may be afforded 
to redefine the standards which guide administrative action, 
terminating the agency's authority to perpetuate unsuccessful 
experiments.61 To the extent that it proves practicable or 
desirable for the legislature to specify standards that are 
60 E.g., at one stage the House of Representatives' version of the bill which 
later became the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, after requiring 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to take action to confine each holding 
company to a single integrated system, at the same time authorized the Com-
mission to exempt any holding company from this requirement if such exemp-
tion was found to be consistent with the public interest. 
61 E.g., the discretion vested in the National Labor Relations Board by the 
Wagner Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151) to include any combina-
tion of employees in a single collective bargaining unit was drastically curtailed 
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 
Supp. § 141). 
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definite and capable of objective proof, the courts are enabled 
to assert a greater power of review over administrative ac-
tion than they possess where the standards are cast in vague, 
subjective terminology. 
5. Delegation of Powers by an Agency to Its Employees 
The statute usually bestows authority upon a commission 
or the head of an agency, but these individuals cannot often 
perform personally the multifarious duties delegated to 
them. The Secretary of Agriculture, for example, is charged 
with the administration of more than seventy statutes. In 
this task, he is aided by a staff of several hundred assistants. 
There arises by clear necessity, in all the larger agencies, 
delegation of discretionary power within the personnel of 
the agency. 
The governing statutes often recognize this situation, and 
make appropriate provision therefor. Failure to do so has 
sometimes produced untoward results. The courts have been 
quite ready to invalidate unauthorized attempts of agency 
heads to delegate to their subordinates powers vested by 
statute in the heads of the agency.62 Sometimes, to be sure, 
the problem is avoided by reliance on the presumption of 
regularity that attends official action, which as here applied 
means merely that it is hard to prove that the responsible 
official did not personally perform his duty.6a And in many 
cases, the courts, appreciating the necessity of a limited degree 
62 This problem is discussed more fully infra, in connection particularly 
with the use of assistants in formulating decisions in judicial determinations. 
Examples in other fields include: Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 3 I 5 
U. S. 357, 62 S. Ct. 651 (1942)-denying the power of the Administrator 
of the Wage and Hour Division to delegate power to issue subpoenas; 
State v. The Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662 
( 1 8 55) -commissioners appointed to assess cost of improvement could not 
delegate this duty to the city surveyor; Dunn v. United States (C.C.A. 5th 
1917), 238 Fed. 508-denying the power of a court clerk to delegate the 
duty of selecting names for grand jury service; School Dist. No. 4, Town of 
Sigel, Wood County v. Industrial Commission, 194 Wis. 342, 216 N. W. 844 
( 1927 )-school district could not delegate power to employ part-time janitor. 
63 Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Cooley, 173 Wis. u8, 179 N. W. 590 
(1921). United States ex rel. Petach v. Phelps (C.C.A. zd 1930), 40 F. (2d) 
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of such delegation, find authority therefor implicit in the 
statutory language.64 Decision in each case depends on the 
court's judgment as to whether the nature of the particular 
power exercised is so important, requiring the exercise of 
judgment on matters of policy, as to preclude the likelihood 
that the legislature would have been willing to have the 
particular power exercised by any one other than the ultimate 
authority within the agency. 
Regardless of the limits on delegation to agency employees 
to pass finally upon matters of importance, the fact remains 
that power to recommend the decision in any matter can 
be and ordinarily is so delegated. The distinction is more 
technical than practical. The higher officers are so little in-
clined to reverse the determination of their subordinates that 
the latter's recommendation often carries the weight to sway 
and determine final agency action in any close case, especially 
where the determination relates not to a general policy but 
to the decision of a particular individual case.65 
A great danger resulting from this necessary practice of 
delegating within the agency the powers of the agency heads 
is that decision is often made by an employee whose com-
pelling personal interest is to make such a determination as 
he thinks will please his employer, in the hope of obtaining 
promotion .. If the employee is impressed with a belief that 
the agency likes decisions which find an employer guilty of 
unfair labor practices, or a commercial concern guilty of 
unfair trade practices, or an employee entitled to receive 
workmen's compensation, then great strength of mind and 
5oo. Sometimes, particularly where questions of jurisdiction are involved, the 
presumption will not be extended to administrative agencies: see e.g., Blount 
v. Forbes, 250 App. Div. 15, 293 N. Y. S. 319 ( 1937). 
64 United States ex ret. French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. p6, 42 S. Ct. sos 
(1922); Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 S. Ct. 
603 (19u); Plapao Laboratories, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F. 
(2d) 228. For an analysis of the general problem, see Grundstein, "Subdelega-
tion of Administrative Authority," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 144 (1945). 
65 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 recognizes this situa-
tion by setting up provisions whereby the decision of the hearing officer may 
stand (in the absence of an appeal) as the decision of the agency. 
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character is required to avoid the making of decisions which 
it is thought will please the officials who will pass upon the 
employee's personal advancement. The Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, creating an independent status for many 
hearing officers, goes far toward alleviating this problem in 
many of the federal agencies. 
Agency heads have the difficult problem of making free 
delegation as to matters where there is little need for close 
supervision by the agency heads-such as matters of internal 
management, disposition of routine matters, initiation of pro-
ceedings, disposition of matters by consent, executing binding 
stipulations of fact, etcetera-in order that they may devote 
more time and attention to reviewing the work of subordi-
nates in matters affecting the rights of parties appearing be-
fore the agency. In the latter connection, while it is admit-
tedly infeasible to attempt a review of every case, much 
might be accomplished by ( r) careful formulation, for the 
guidance of agency employees, of instructions for the appli-
cation of those policies which have been crystallized; ( 2) 
consideration by the agency heads of cases where the appli-
cation of established policies is difficult or where policies have 
not been definitely formulated (with encouragement for the 
referral by agency employees of cases thought to fall within 
this category); and (3) the requirement of periodic and 
informative reports by those employees entrusted with power 
to make decisions. 
B. EFFECT oF SEPARATION OF PowERS DocTRINE ON 
CoMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE, JunrcrAL, AND 
ExECUTIVE FuNCTIONS WITHIN A 
SINGLE AGENCY 
To the extent that the Constitution permits the delegation 
of judicial and legislative powers, there appears to be little · 
impediment to the granting of both such powers to a single 
agency. Thus it occurs that frequently a single agency will 
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exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It becomes 
lawmaker, prosecutor, and judge. The same agency legislates 
the rules that implement a general statute, then looks for 
violations of such rules, and (if it discovers a suspected viola-
tion) prosecutes a hearing at which it sits as judge to deter-
mine whether it has proved its allegations to its own satisfac-
tion. Contrary though this may be to the ancient maxim that 
no man should be judge in his own cause, there seems to be 
(in the federal courts, at least) no constitutional impediment 
to such combination of powers within a single agency. 
Yet it is this delegation of combinations of power, rather 
than the delegation of either legislative or judicial power 
alone to a single agency, which is at the bottom of much of 
the criticism to which the administrative agencies are subject. 
Many of the agencies, and exponents of administrative 
absolutism, argue that such combination of functions is de-
sirable, if not essential to the attainment of the best results. 
They argue that if the prosecuting functions were divorced 
from the judicial, those charged with instituting prosecutions 
could be expected to inaugurate formal proceedings in every 
case where there might be the slightest suspicion of some 
infraction of rules. To this it can properly be replied that 
while theoretically such a possibility cannot be eliminated, 
yet no untoward results have been observed in cases where 
the prosecuting body is without adjudicatory functions, as. 
in the case of the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor, or in the Internal Revenue Department. 
The argument has also been made that any separation of 
powers would interfere with informal settlement of cases 
and make it more difficult to achieve voluntary settlements. 
But experience has not indicated this to be the case. In many 
instances, the Department of Justice must appear before the 
courts to press its charges of violations of laws or regula-
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tions, but it has experienced no great difficulty in reaching 
settlements. 
The same advocates further point out-and it cannot be 
denied-that an agency is not a single person, and that the 
staff member who prosecutes a case is not usually the same 
staff member who decides whether a case has been proved. 
But this overlooks the friendly luncheon contacts between 
prosecutor and judge, whose offices may be in adjacent rooms, 
and likewise the esprit de corps which is so markedly a fac-
tor among employees of an administrative agency of this 
type. This argument also overlooks the fact that the admin-
istrative judge who adjudicates an issue must sometimes de-
pend for promotion upon the agency heads who have decided 
that a prosecution should be instituted, and who may have 
supervised the prosecution of the case. 
It is undoubtedly true that in some types of proceedings, 
administrative efficiency would be grossly impaired, without 
compensating advantages, by insistence on a rigid separation 
of functions. In some types of cases, adjudicatory functions 
are so closely related to other phases of the tribunal's work 
that separation of functions is not practical, nor indeed desir-
able. An example may be found in the field of rate making. A 
rate-making investigation ordinarily culminates in a hearing 
which has many of the characteristics of a judicial proceeding. 
Yet the prime purpose of such a hearing is not to determine 
justiciable questions of fact or law, but rather to gather in-
formation which will furnish a basis for the exercise of an 
informed judgment on matters which are fundamentally 
those of legislative policy.66 Other types of agencies act 
through the exercise of a number of interrelated powers, and 
66 This is recognized in § 5 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946, excepting from the general requirements for separation of func-
tions various rate-fixing proceedings. Cf. R. M. Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE oF NEw YoRK (1942) 67, 68. 
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complete isolation of all adjudicatory functions would not 
present compensatory advantages.67 
The problem is not one which can be solved by any general 
formula. Distinctions must be made between agencies, and 
between different functions of the same agency. Where the 
element of administrative discretion is properly dominant-
as in many cases of passing on license applications, or appli-
cations for benefits-fairness can ordinarily be achieved by 
an internal separation of functions within the agency. In 
license cases, for example, so long as the staff employees 
charged with discovering and presenting objections to the 
allowance of the application have nothing to do with the mak-
ing of the ultimate decision, little harm is done. But on the 
other hand, in cases where the prime function of an agency 
is to police an important segment of business activity-as in 
the case of the Federal Trade Commission or the National 
Labor Relations Board, where the agency devotes all its 
energies to preventing a certain type of activity and where the 
judicial question to be determined by agency employees is 
whether the agency is justified in its suspicions that a partic-
ular person has engaged in such activity-then it is doubtful 
whether any internal separation of functions can be sufficient 
to assure the fairness and, equally important, the manifesta-
tions of fairness, which the public can properly demand. In 
such cases, the adjudicatory authority should not be subject 
to the direct or indirect control of the heads of the agency 
which initiates prosecutions. 
Agencies are ordinarily created to meet an emergency 
situation, one presenting new problems which may at the 
outset require an experimental approach-where, perhaps, 
rules must be formulated only on the basis of experience 
67 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies"-Report of the 
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ( 1941) 58 et seq. 
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gained as a result of deciding cases for a while on an ad hoc 
basis. But in many cases where agencies were originally 
created to meet such emergency situations, and accordingly 
granted not only executive and legislative but judicial power 
as well, later experience has suggested a refinement of the 
early approach to the problem. On the basis of further 
studies, and in the light of experience, it has proved wise to 
create a special tribunal to exercise adjudicatory powers. 
Thus, adjudicatory functions of the Customs Bureau came 
after a time to be vested in a Customs Court. Similarly, the 
responsibilities of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in passing 
administratively on claims for refunds or objections to tax 
assessments were in later years vested in a separate Board of 
Tax Appeals which in due course became a Tax Court. The 
Court of Claims had similar origins. 
These lessons of history teach that, in fields where ad-
ministrative tribunals engage contentiously with the private 
parties appearing before them, it is in the interest of good 
government to eliminate combinations of prosecuting and 
judicial powers. The process is gradual. Change does not 
come overnight. But the highway of past experience points 
the way into the uncharted future.68 
68 See statement of "Additional Views and Recommendations of Messrs. 
McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt" in "Administrative Procedure in Govern-
ment Agencies"-Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
Procedure (r94r) 203 et seq. 
CHAPTER 4 
Notice and Hearing in 
Administrative Proceedings 
A. NEcESSITY OF GIVING NoTICE TO INTERESTED PARTIES 
r. Historical Development 
THE question as to the necessity of affording interested parties some advance notice of contemplated adminis-trative action, and an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety thereof, is one which has been considered fre-
quently both by the courts and the legislatures. Much of the 
difficulty revolves around the fact that administrative agen-
cies often treat cases individually, as do courts, but dispose 
of them on the basis of considerations of policy, acting as 
legislative agents. The affected party, looking at the ruling 
as an individual disposition of his particular case, demands a 
right to be heard fully; he feels he should have his "day in 
court." The agency, treating the ruling as only an incidental 
step in the development of a general policy, which it must 
determine on the basis of broad considerations that would be 
but little affected by the testimony of the individual as to the 
facts of his own case, often prefers to act legislatively on 
the basis of its own information and judgment, without grant-
ing a hearing. 
In cases where an agency acts judicially, deciding the 
asserted rights of claimants on the basis of an ascertainable 
rule, there is usually but little difficulty, since legislative 
requirements or established practices usually provide for 
ample notice and opportunity to be heard. The problem 
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becomes more acute in cases where the agency exercises a 
greater measure of executive or legislative discretion.1 
The fundamental legal problem involved in each case is 
one as to the requirements of due process of law: and the 
historical development of this broad constitutional require-
ment has been reflected in changing theories as to the re-
quirements to be imposed on administrative agencies. In the 
eighteenth century, English courts were strongly inclined to 
insist on notice and hearing in all administrative proceedings.2 
But as experience showed this requirement to be too strict 
for general application, various theories were evolved to 
permit such modification of the underlying rule as practical 
necessities required. 
In part, this evolution took the form of devising substi-
tutes effective to accomplish the underlying purpose. Thus, 
for example, the rule was early evolved in tax cases that 
constitutional requirements were satisfied if a hearing was 
given at any stage of the proceedings prior to the final non-
reviewable determination and collection of the tax. Similarly, 
in certain types of rate cases, the courts took it upon them-
selves to give hearings subsequent to the administrative de-
termination, on the basis of determining whether the admin-
istrative determination had been reasonable. In other types 
of cases, where it seemed desirable to permit summary action 
on the part of administrative officers, it was deemed sufficient 
if the offended party were given an opportunity to bring 
a subsequent damage action against the officer. 
1 But other factors may incline agencies to a denial of hearings. Sometimes 
an agency considers the suppression of individual hearings an effective pro-
cedural short cut, enabling an agency to dispose of a heavy case load of pend-
ing matters. The problem of giving hearings is often acute in cases where a 
particular administrative determination affects parties not immediately before 
it. The same problem arises in cases where the agency is concerned fundamen-
tally with formulating new rules, to be applied either generally or to a 
specific case. 
2 Mott, DuE PROCESS OF LAw (1926) 216-240. 
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But by and large, the courts until the last few years have 
overlooked the development of efficient substitutes for formal 
notice and hearing, and have on the whole been inclined to 
hold either that notice and hearing could be entirely dis-
pensed with, or that a formal courtlike procedure would be 
required. Instead of treating administrative proceedings as 
a distinctive genre, the courts have been inclined to view 
each agency as either a little court or a little legislature, and 
to determine on such basis the necessity of notice and hearing 
in each particular case. 
That the courts departed from the original path (which 
led toward the goal of devising in each type of case such 
procedure as fairly suited the problems of the particular 
agency) for a more arbitrary approach, is probably accounted 
for in large measure by the preoccupation of nineteenth-cen-
tury American courts with the problem of separation of 
powers. In reviewing administrative action, the courts would 
seek to catalogue the agency's activities as being either quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial. This feat accomplished, certain 
results thought to stem from such classification were applied 
more or less automatically (except where the result seemed 
plainly undesirable, in which case the path of logic would 
be forsaken). 
2. Necessity of Notice as Depending on Legislative or 
Judicial Nature of Agency's Activity 
A natural consequence of this formalistic approach was 
the development of the frequently suggested rule that a hear-
ing is required where the agency is exercising judicial func-
tions, and is not required where the agency is exercising 
legislative functions. 
But these labels play a much smaller part in judicial 
motivation than in opinion writing.8 In fact, hearings have 
3 Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative 
Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942). 
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been quite uniformly required in some types of cases where 
the agency's function is essentially rule making, or legisla-
tive, and conversely, hearings have been held unnecessary 
in some types of cases where the agency's role is essentially 
judicial. The difficulties encountered in attempting to apply 
this test are illustrated by the case where the determination 
to be made is that of identifying the boundaries of an "im-
provement district" over which there is to be prorated the 
cost of a public improvement. If such determination is made 
by certain types of agencies, it is said to be a legislative act 
that does not require advance notice to the affected parties; 4 
but if the same determination is made by different agencies, it 
is described as "judicial" in character, and notice is required.5 
Determination of whether a hearing will be required can-
not be made by deciding whether the agency's function is 
primarily legislative or primarily judicial. In the first place, 
the functions of many agencies defy attempts at any such 
neat classification. In the second place, even where the clas-
sification can fairly be made, the postulated result does not 
uniformly follow. 
Rather, decision depends primarily upon (I) the accepted 
traditions in the particular field; 6 and ( 2) certain ':lnderlying 
considerations of policy. The latter can be discussed most 
4 This seems to be the case where the determination is made by the legisla-
ture or the governing board of a municipality or other established govern-
mental agency. See Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 306 
U.S. 459, 59 S. Ct. 622 (1939); St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U. 
S. 157, 48 S. Ct. 438 (1928); Myles Salt Co. Ltd. v. Board of Com'rs Iberia 
& St. Mary Drain. Dist., 239 U.S. 478, 36 S. Ct. 204 (1916). 
5 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 u.s. II2, 17 s. Ct. 56 (1896) j 
Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., 240 U. S. 242, 36 
S. Ct. 317 (1916); cf., Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S. 396, 46 S. Ct. 141 
(1926). 
6 While the courts have been quite willing to permit the continuance of 
administrative practices which eliminate notice and hearing in cases wher~ 
such procedure has become time-honored, they have been reluctant to dispense 
with the requirement in analogous but less familiar cases. 
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readily in terms of typical case situations. Such a discussion 
follows. 
3· Ta~ Cases 
There is obviously an opportunity for a direct and substan-
tial deprivation of property rights if the administrative proc-
ess for assessing and collecting taxes is permitted to proceed 
without notice and hearing. At the same time, there is an 
equally obvious need that the collection of public revenues 
be permitted to proceed expeditiously, without the interrup-
tions and delays that might be caused by elaborate procedure 
of individual notice and lengthy hearings on questions of 
valuation. For these reasons, and as well the reason that it 
is one of the most ancient spheres of administrative action, 
the tax field is an interesting one in which to observe the in-
terplay of competing policies. 
In favor of requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard 
are the factors: (I) the private property of an individual is 
sing] ed out for specific action; ( 2) the pecuniary interest of 
the taxpayer is ordinarily substantial; and (3) the adminis-
trative authorities have but little occasion to exercise .expert 
discretion in fixing policies, for it is rather their duty to ap-
ply reasonably objective standards which are on the whole 
adaptable to judicial review. On the other hand, even more 
potent factors require that the assessors and tax collecting 
authorities be relieved of the burdens that would attend the 
giving of individual notice and a full hearing in each case: 
(I) there is the overpowering necessity for prompt collection 
of the necessary public revenues; ( 2) the large number of 
cases to be disposed of requires the use of summary pro-
cedures; (3) many of the issues involved, such as the ques-
tion of valuation of property, can better be determined by 
inspection, investigation, and the exercise of the assessor's 
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informed judgment, than by a judicial hearing at which the 
contradictory estimates of opposing expert witnesses on the 
question of valuation would be of little practical help; and 
(4) the fact that judicial review is usually available for issues 
affecting jurisdiction, construction of the statute, uniformity 
of the levy, and claims of fraud-that there may thus be a 
hearing after the event-is often thought to excuse a failure 
to give notice and hearing at the administrative stage. 
The result has been that requirements of notice and hear-
ing in the tax field are rather attenuated. While many deci-
sions declare that an owner is entitled to notice of a proceed-
ing against his property, and has a right to be heard/ yet it 
has become well settled that the requirements of due process 
are satisfied if there is an opportunity for the owner to present 
his objections before a competent tribunal at any stage of the 
proceedings before the command to pay becomes final and 
irrevocable.8 
"In general, . . . the protection accorded the taxpayer 
against arbitrary assessment is sporadic and uncertain." 9 The 
tendency of the courts is to sustain whatever form of proce-
dure has been adopted.10 
In cases where there seems to be but little practical need 
for notice and hearing, where the measure of the tax is fixed 
by mechanical standards, as in the case of a poll tax, or an 
7 See collection of cases, L. R. A. I9I6 E, p. 5, and see 33 ILL. L. REV. 575 
( I939) Comment. 
8 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743 ( I934). See 3 Cooley 
on TAXATION, 4th ed. (I924) 2269, § II20, 
9 Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 
(I927) 272. 
10 See Dows v. City of Chicago, II Wall. (78 U.S.) Io8, no (I87o): "it 
is of the utmost importance . . , that the modes adopted to enforce the 
taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible." Hagar v. Reclama-
tion Dist. No. Io8, III U.S. 70I, at 708,4 S. Ct. 663 (I884), holding that 
"where the taking of property is in the enforcement of a tax, the proceeding 
is necessarily less formal" than where life, liberty, or the title or possession of 
property are involved. 
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assessment measured by the size of the property, notice and 
hearing can apparently be dispensed with.11 
Notice need not be formal. It is enough if a statute gives 
general notice that taxes will be levied, 12 or if there is pub-
lished a general notice of a meeting of the tax board.13 
The taxpayer need not be heard by the administrative 
officials who make the assessment; he may be compelled to 
wait. Nor need he be granted hearings at all of the successive 
stages of administrative activity which precede the final levy 
of the tax. One hearing is sufficient to constitute due process.14 
It is sufficient if there is a right to a hearing before the assess-
ing officers, or in connection with administrative appeals, or 
before a court (either in a suit by the government to collect 
the tax or a suit by the taxpayer to enjoin collection thereof 
or to recover sums paid over to the collector). The right to 
a hearing does not involve the right to be heard before a 
court.15 
The extent to which the courts will go in finding compli-
ance with the requirements of procedural due process in tax 
cases is indicated by the decision in Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado.15a In that 
case, a state board of equalization had raised all the assess-
ments in the city of Denver by 40 per cent, to equalize the 
assessments in that city with those made elsewhere in the 
state. It was asserted that the property owners had no oppor-
11 Murray's Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 
(59 U.S.) 272 (1855); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. po, 
29 S. Ct. 671 (1909); 3 Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (1924), 2259, § 1114; 
56 A. L. R. 95 o. 
12 Merchants' & Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 1 
17 S. Ct. 829 (1897). 
13Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 21 S. Ct. 616 (1901). 
14 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245,26 S. Ct. 459 (1906); 
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421, 14 S. Ct. III4 
(1894). 
15 3 Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (1924), 2263, § 1u8. 
15a Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 
239 U.S. 441 1 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915). 
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tunity to be heard on the question as to whether such increase 
was truly necessary to equalize the assessments. The court 
said hearing would not be required. While suggesting that 
the situation was no different than it would have been had 
the state doubled the rate of taxation, in which event there 
would plainly be no hearing required/6 the court quite 
plainly put its decision on the ground that where the admin-
istrative determination "applies to more than a few people 
it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice 
in its adoption. . . . There must be a limit to individual 
argument in such matters if government is to go on." The 
court's opinion distinguished Londoner v. Denver 16a on the 
ground that in the cited case "A relatively small number 
of persons was concerned" in the question as to the correct-
ness of the assessment. 
Of course, the court would not accept in other fields the 
suggestion that notice and hearing could be dispensed with 
because the large number of persons concerned made it incon-
venient. But in the tax field, the courts have been accustomed 
for centuries to summary procedures-which no doubt were 
in existence when the concept of notice as an element of due 
process first developed-and the customary procedures are 
sustained, even though they would not be recognized as valid 
in newer fields of administrative activity. In the tax field, 
too, administrative activity is in many cases largely executive 
or ministerial, involving little judicial or legislative respon-
sibility. This circumstance likewise has contributed to the 
attenuated requirements as to notice and hearing which exist 
in the tax field. 
l6 This suggestion is unsound. An increase in tax rate would be borne by all 
taxpayers in the state on the basis of the assessments as fixed locally; there 
would be a state-wide increase, shared equally. But the result of changing the 
assessments in one city alone was that taxpayers there bore a bigger proportion 
of the total tax than they would have if the assessments had not been changed. 
16a Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708 ( 1907). 
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4· Other Cases Involving Conduct of Public Business 
In other fields where, as in the case of tax collections, 
the expeditious conduct of the public business requires speedy 
decision, with a minimum of time for individual argument, 
the normal requirements of notice in advance of hearing have 
been widely relaxed. 
Alien cases-exclusion and deportation. While holding 
that some semblance of notice and hearing must be afforded 
the immigrant whose entry into this country is challenged 
by immigration authorities, the courts (particularly in ex-
clusion cases) have not insisted upon any formal notice or 
judicial-type hearings.17 All that is insisted upon is that there 
be observance of the rudimentary requirements of fair play.18 
It is not necessary that the opportunity to be heard should be 
"according to the forms of judicial procedure"; the suffi-
ciency of the hearing is judged rather according to its aptness 
to "secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Con-
gress." 19 
These cases may depend in part on doubts as to whether 
the due process clause can be invoked on behalf of a person 
who is seeking entrance to the country. In cases where the 
question arises in connection with proceedings to deport an 
individual who had originally been admitted, hearings more 
17 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 12 S. Ct. 336 (1892)-
permitting the immigration officer to decide the question as to the right of 
the immigrant to land on the basis of his own inspection and examination, 
without taking testimony. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86, 23 S. Ct. 6ll 
(I 90 3) -where the fact that the petitioner was ignorant of the English lan-
guage, and at the time of the investigation did not know that it had reference 
to her deportation, was considered to be simply "her misfortune." 
18 Relief has been granted where it was alleged that the immigration of-
ficials had prevented the offering of relevant testimony of named witnesses: 
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 S. Ct. 201 (1908). Similarly, 
where it was asserted that important testimony was arbitrarily excluded from 
the formal record on the basis of which the determination was made, it was 
held that such action was improper. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U, S. 454, 
40 s. Ct. s66 (1 92o). 
19Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, IOI, 23 S. Ct. 6II (1903). 
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closely in accordance with the standards of a judicial trial 
are insisted upon.20 
Removal of public officers. Despite the substantial nature 
of the personal rights involved, and the fact that the issue 
presented often calls for a judicial-type determination, the 
overwhelming authority supports the power of the state to 
remove officers from office without notice or hearing.:J1 These 
decisions are sometimes explained by saying that the right 
to hold office is not a property right but a mere public trust.22 
But this cliche is misleading. It cannot be reconciled with the 
results obtained in the cases where courts of equity protect 
the property rights of an officeholder in his office. The true 
explanation lies in frank recognition that where the public 
interest in summary action-here, the interest in prompt 
elimination of suspected corruption in government-clearly 
outbalances the individual property interest involved, then, 
at least in cases where the accepted traditions in the particular 
field permit it, notice may be dispensed with. 
Eminent domain proceedings. On the question as to the 
existence of a public necessity for taking land (under statutory 
provisions authorizing condemnation only where there exists 
a public necessity therefor), it is held quite uniformly that 
no notice or opportunity to be heard need precede the making 
of a final, nonreviewable administrative determination that 
such necessity exists.23 Many factors relied upon in other types 
of cases as requiring a hearing are here present: a particular 
individual's property is singled out for specific action; sub-
stantial property interests are involved; the number of per-
sons affected is comparatively small; a public hearing might 
well be better calculated to ascertain the truth; and there is 
20 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492 (1922). 
21 See 99 A. L. R. 336. 
22 This is suggested in many opinions; e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Rich 
v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 6u (1894). 
23 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 45 S. Ct. 491 
(1925); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 43 S. Ct. 689 
(1923), 
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but seldom any crying public need for summary action. The 
type of action is well suited for judicial determination; in-
deed, in many states, the question is reserved for the con-
demnation court, by state constitution or statutory provision. 
Nevertheless, it seems plain that notice and hearing may be 
dispensed with. The result must apparently be explained on 
the basis of judicial recognition that in conducting those 
matters of public business which are primarily of executive 
concern, a degree of summary action should be permitted. 
Undoubtedly the result in the eminent domain cases is 
accounted for in part by the fact that "just compensation" 
must be paid for the taking. There has not been an absolute 
deprival of property where that of which one has been de-
prived is paid for. Where this guaranty of prompt and full 
restitution is lacking, notice is more likely to be required. 
In cases, for example, where the issue is not the taking of 
land for public improvement but rather the allocation among 
affected property owners of the cost of a public improvement 
(and where a property owner would have no relief if an 
administrative determination compelled him to pay for an 
improvement that did not benefit him), notice is often re-
quired.24 
Postal system. Generally, in dealing with administrative 
determinations made in connection with the execution of the 
postal laws, the courts have emphasized not the private rights 
affected but rather the necessities and convenience of carry-
ing on the public business.25 
It has been suggested that the use of the postal system 
is a mere privilege or public beneficence which the govern-
ment is free to grant or withhold on its own terms.26 Grant 
or denial of second-class mailing privileges is commonly 
24Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U, S. 112, 17 S. Ct. 56 
(1896); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 46 S. Ct. 141 (1926). 
25Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 (1904); 
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 6 (1912). 
26 See dissent of Justice Holmes in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 42 S. Ct. 
227 (1922). 
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made as a result of ex parte determination on the basis of a 
written application, rather than on the basis of a hearing.27 
It has been held that the denial of mailing privileges by the 
issuance of a fraud order is not "judicial" in character and is 
therefore not reviewable by certiorari proceedings.28 
All of these decisions suggested that hearings would not 
be required in connection with administrative revocation of 
mailing privileges (and this conclusion was stoutly defended 
by the postal authorities). However, when this particular 
issue was finally raised in the courts, it was held that a hearing 
was required. The severity of the penalty that follows de-
prival of the right to free use of the mails 29 persuaded the 
courts that considerations of the expeditious conduct of the 
public postal business were less important than the desiderata 
of assuring that any denial of such privileges has been based 
on a fair hearing. Accordingly, in Pike v. Walker 29a it was 
determined that fraud order proceedings must be conducted 
upon notice and hearing. The logic of past decisions was 
abandoned because the court, relying on the dissents voiced 
in earlier cases, was impressed with the arguments that other-
wise substantial property interests might be imperiled, there 
was no need for free administrative discretion, and there was 
no assurance that private investigation was better calculated 
to determine the truth than was an open hearing. 
Similarly, in Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley,29b a 
determination of the Postmaster General, annulling air mail 
27 Monograph of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure, Sen. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940). 
28 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S. Ct. 639 (1913). 
29 Most periodicals could not survive if denied second-class mailing privi-
lege. See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman (C. C. Mo. 1907), 152 Fed. 7871 
793; Kadin, "Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pic-
tures and Radio Broadcasting," 19 B. U. L. REV. 533, 538 (1939). 
29aPike v. Walker (App. D. C. 1941), 121 F. (2d) 37· 
29b Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C. 1935), 75 F. (zd) 
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contracts previously awarded, was held invalid where made 
without notice and hearing. While the determination could 
logically have been described as purely administrative or 
executive, and thus of a type where no notice need be given, 
yet the court was persuaded by the fact that a hearing was 
necessary to a fully informed determination, and the fact 
that clear deprivation of substantial property rights was in-
volved, and the fact that no governmental need for summary 
action could be shown. 
5· Necessity of Notice Where the Agency Exercises Rule-
Making Powers 
Legislative character of determination not controlling. In 
connection with cases where an agency exercises rule-making 
powers, the suggestion is frequently encountered that since 
such procedure is essentially legislative in character, rather 
than judicial, no notice need be given. As a rule of general 
application, this suggestion is too broad, and is shown by the 
cases to be unsound. The idea behind it is similarly unsound. 
The rule-making activities of an administrative agency 
should not be put on a parity with the law-making activities 
of a legislature. An agency does not represent a heterogene-
ous constituency, as does a legislature, but rather represents 
ordinarily a special interest group. An agency does not, as 
a legislature is generally thought to do, represent a cross 
section of prevailing public opinion. None of the safeguards 
which legislative procedure interpose against hasty, ill-con-
sidered action are present where an administrative agency 
formulates rules of general application and substantive con-
tent without giving affected parties an opportunity to be 
he~rd. The fact that an agency is usually formulating more 
detailed rules than those adopted by the legislature-rules 
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designed to control minutiae of conduct-only emphasizes 
the importance of this distinction.30 
General recognition of the fact that the best guaranty of 
wise and informed administrative action lies in making ample 
provision for notice, hearing, and full discussion of proposed 
rules prior to their promulgation, as well as a general reali-
zation that in this field there is no pressing public need for 
speedy action, has led to frequent statutory enactments re-
quiring that notice and hearing should precede the issuance 
of many types of rules. The legislature frequently inserts an 
express requirement of hearings in the controlling statute.31 
30 No case is known where a legislature has so far overlooked controlling 
factual situations in formulating a rule of conduct as did the Bureau of Ma-
rine Inspection and Navigation in publishing regulations governing oil-tankers. 
There, after the regulations had been promulgated, it was discovered that no 
provisions had been made for certain small oil-tankers, constructed partly of 
wood, that had been in operation for years in Southern bays and inlets. See 
report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ( 1941) 
p. 114. The agency did not know of the existence of this fleet; and the opera-
tors of the fleet did not know of the forthcoming issuance of rules. Perhaps 
part of the responsibility for this contretemps lies with a committee of repre-
sentatives of certain oil companies which is said to have assisted in the prepara-
tion of the regulations. 
31 Legislative provision may be of varied types. The simplest is a general 
requirement that a hearing be held. Going beyond this, provision may be made 
for investigation, publication of proposed rules, giving of such notice as to 
assure that the affected parties will be made generally aware of the content of 
the proposed rule, et cetera. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act ( § 4) 
requires general notice (by publication) as to the time and place of hearing, 
and requires that the notice either state the terms of the proposed rule or at 
least describe the subjects and issues involved. In some instances, such as the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (52 Stat. w6o, 29 U.S.C. §§ zo8, 210), the Bitu-
minous Coal Act (so Stat. 73, 15 U.S.C. § 829) and the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1055, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e)), Congress has gone still 
further and required that the administrative regulations be supported by find-
ings of fact which in turn must rest on evidence duly taken in a formal 
hearing before the agency. Such requirement is perhaps too rigorous. It has the 
advantage of imposing a healthy discipline on the mental processes of the 
administrators, who must in operating under such a statute reason closely and 
clearly in formulating their rules. But it fails perhaps sufficiently to take into 
account the fact that the issues in a rule-making proceeding are complex and 
numerous, and the fact that the parties are diverse and not always alignable 
into classes, and the fact that the final product represents not so much a deter-
mination based on existing facts as a judgment as to the future consequences 
of proposed rules. For a general discussion of the problem of notice and hear-
ing in rule-making proceedings, see Fuchs, "Procedure in Administrative 
Rule-Making," 52 HARV. L. REV. 259 (1938). The particular problems that 
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In cases where the statute is silent, it is common practice for 
the agencies to give some notice and an opportunity at least 
for discussion and informal exchange of views, before adopt-
ing any far-reaching rule of substantive effect. 
It is only in cases where the statute is silent and the agency 
prefers not to hold a hearing that the constitutional question 
arises. In such cases, decision depends essentially on the na-
ture of the rule. Some courts have camouflaged the distinction 
by calling the rule-making procedure judicial in nature in 
those cases where fairness seems to require a hearing, and 
thus squaring the result with the formula that a hearing is 
required in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, but not in 
the case of quasi-legislative proceedings.32 
arise under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act are discussed in Ginnane, 
"'Rule Making,' 'Adjudication' and Exemptions Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act," 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1947). 
32 An illustration of the difficulties encountered by a court enmeshed in the 
quagmire of distinctions between the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial is 
afforded by a series of early decisions in Massachusetts. In Ela v. Smith, 5 
Gray ( 71 Mass.) 12 r ( r8 55), the court had said that the action of a mayor 
in calling out the militia to prevent a riot was quasi-judicial. Apparently, the 
reason for this rather startling description of an executive act was the fear 
that unless so described, there might be a personal liability on the part of the 
mayor if it could be established that he had committed an error of judgment 
in calling out the militia. A little later, in City of Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 
Mass. 431 (1868), the court upheld the action of a board of health which 
(pursuant to a statute) had without notice or hearing ordered a person who had 
blocked a pond, to provide proper drainage. In so holding, the court inciden-
tally referred to the act of the board as a "quasi-judicial" act. The opinion 
suggested-in a neat reversal of the usual cliche--that notice was necessary 
in case of quasi-legislative proceedings; but not in case of quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings. However, when a litigant sought to take advantage of this theory 
in Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693 (1904), the 
court changed its terminology. In holding that notice and hearing need not 
precede the adoption of a health regulation forbidding swimming in a small 
lake which was the source of a city's water supply, the court said that notice 
was necessary in case of quasi-judicial proceedings involving the determination 
as to the existence of a nuisance in a particular case, but was not necessary in 
case of quasi-legislative proceedings involving the issuance of general regula-
tions. The suggestion of the prior decision was thus nicely reversed. But the 
court soon encountered further difficulties. In Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 
Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905), it appeared that the board of health, without 
a hearing, had found that certain activities did constitute a nuisance in a 
particular case, and had ordered an individual to take certain steps to abate 
it. This was, apparently, within the rule of the Nelson case, a quasi-judicial 
act, and one which required notice. But since (for various reasons discussed in 
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Procedural rules. In cases where the rule adopted by the 
agency is primarily procedural in nature, setting up rules of 
practice in proceedings before the agency, prescribing forms, 
setting a schedule of fees, et cetera, it would seem that no 
notice is required. The same result follows in cases where 
the agency's "rules" are in effect no more than legal opinions 
as to the proper interpretation of the governing statute, an-
nouncing the construction which, on the advice of its counsel, 
the agency will follow unless and until the courts should 
construe the statute otherwise. In neither of these types of 
cases is there any substantial need for a hearing. 
Substantive rules. Where the agency rule in effect com-
prises a substantive rule of law, the situation is less clear cut. 
Where the class to be affected is large, and the question to be 
resolved rests primarily on broad considerations of policy as 
to which a wide discretion has been committed to the rule-
making agency, there is no necessity of giving advance indi-
vidual notice to those affected. Nor is there necessity, in such 
cases, of giving an opportunity for a formal judicial-type 
hearing. Whatever degree of investigation and consultation 
the agency may have engaged in prior to the issuance of the 
rule will ordinarily be deemed to have satisfied the require-
ments of due process.33 
Where, however, the rule or order is directed specifically 
to a party or a compact group, and where the agency exer-
cises only a limited degree of discretion, actual notice and 
opportunity for hearing are ordinarily required.34 
the opinion) it seemed clearly undesirable to upset the order there involved 
because of the denial of a hearing, the court was constrained to further dif-
ferentiate between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceedings, and did so 
in a most confusing way, with an apparent result of excusing notice in many 
types of cases where under previous decisions, notice would be necessary. See 
discussion in 20 HARV. L. REV. II6 (1906). 
33 Guiseppi v. Walling (C.C.A. 2d 1944), 144 F. (2d) 6o8; cf., Gemsco 
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S. Ct. 6os (1945). 
34 Western U. Tel. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Minnesota (D. C. Minn. 
1938), 24 F. Supp. 370, where a three-judge court was of the opinion that a 
minimum-wage order would be invalid if made without notice and an adequate 
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Character of hearing. Even in those cases where notice 
and hearing are required as conditions precedent to the exer-
cise by an agency of its rule-making powers, the require-
ments as to the form of notice and scope of the hearing are 
far less rigorous than in cases where the agency exercises 
judicial powers. The agency, in exercising its rule-making 
powers, is not required "to conduct a quasi-judicial proceed-
ing." 35 It is enough if the hearing is "of the same order as 
had been given by congressional committees when the legis-
lative process was in the hands of Congress." 36 It need not 
be shown, in the absence of a specific statutory requirement, 
that the rule or order is supported by evidence taken at the 
hearing.37 
6. Necessity of Notice m Fixing Rates and Commodity 
Prices 
The fixing of utility rates is one of the most common forms 
of the exercise of rule-making powers by administrative 
agencies. Such activity has in comparatively recent years been 
broadened to include the fixing of prices in case of certain 
commodity sales. In considering the necessity of notice and 
hearing in such cases, however, the courts have not considered 
them simply as instances to be governed by a general rule 
applicable to all rule-making activities. Nor have the courts 
applied, in this instance, the suggestion that rule-making 
activities are legislative in character and that therefore notice 
is not required. Rather, the courts have required or excused 
opportunity to be heard. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Board of Railroad 
Commissioners, 76 Mont. 305, 247 Pac. 16z (19z6), holding unconstitutional 
a statute empowering an agency to order a railroad to erect a spur track, with-
out notice or hearing. 
35 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of. Wage and Hour Division of 
Department of Labor, JIZ U.S. 1z6, u8, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941), 
36 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, z88 U. S. 294, 305, 53 
S. Ct. 350 (1933). 
37 The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 47 S. Ct. 71.7 (191.7). 
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notice and hearing on the basis of far more practical consider-
ations. 
It seems fairly clear that in a case of fixing utility rates, 
there exists a right to a hearing, at least before the enforce-
ment of the rates.38 On the other hand, the Office of Price 
Administration in fixing rents and commodity price ceilings 
under war emergency powers was not required to give a 
hearing before fixing prices, and it was held that there was 
no denial of due process in the circumstance that the order 
became effective without the parties affected having an oppor-
tunity to be heard.39 State courts have reached similar re-
sults.40 
Here again, it is futile to explain the difference in result 
on the basis that one type of hearing is legislative and the 
other judicial in nature.41 A better explanation of the result 
is that afforded by the Supreme Court, which (in the rent-
fixing case above cited) quoted the language of Justice 
Holmes in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization of Colorado 41a that "Where a rule of conduct 
applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that 
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption." Not 
only is it impracticable to give every landlord in a large area 
an opportunity to be heard, but there is grave doubt as to 
38 United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 29 I U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 47 I 
( I934); Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 
U.S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334 (I938); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 
I34 U.S. 4I8, IO S. Ct. 462, 702 (I89o). 
39 Bowles v. Willingham, 32I U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 64I (I944). For a 
general discussion, see Bandy, "Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in Price 
Control Proceedings," 20 TEX. L. REV. 577 (I942). 
40 Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, II3 Wash. 359, I94 Pac. 595 (I92o)-
fixing wages; State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 
II8 N.J. Eq. 504, I79 Atl. II6 (I935)-milk prices. 
41 The Supreme Court has called rate making both judicial and legislative, 
and the federal courts now characterize it as a legislative function. See 34 CoL. 
L. REV. 332 (I934) and discussion in Freund, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER 
PERSONS AND PROPERTY (I928) IS· 
41a Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 
239 U.S. 44I at 445, 36 S. Ct. I4I (I9I5). 
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the utility of such a hearing. In fixing utility rates, on the 
other hand, the principal facts to be considered relate to the 
valuation of one company's property and its cost of opera-
tion. The best source of information on this question is found 
in the reports of the company and analyses of its accountants. 
The nature of the issue is such as to make the judicial-type 
hearing the most efficient way of discovering the truth. Per 
contra, in the rent-fixing case, the order depends not upon 
disputed facts which particularly concern individual parties 
but rather upon broad economic postulates best susceptible 
to investigation by the methods of skilled economists and 
statisticians. A judicial-type hearing would not be the 
best available method of assuring informed administrative 
action.42 
Type of hearing. In the price-fixing field, statutes fre-
quently require that a hearing be held even in cases where 
it would not be constitutionally necessary. In such instances, 
it would seem that a hearing which did no more than give 
interested parties an opportunity to present their general 
views (as in the typical case of a hearing before a legislative 
committee) should be sufficient. Some courts have so held.43 
But other courts, believing that the legislative purpose in 
providing for a hearing contemplated that the order must 
be based on evidence taken at the hearing, have reached a 
contrary result, requiring that the hearing must follow 
generally the course of a judicial trial.44 
In utility rate-fixing cases, where a hearing is required 
as a matter of constitutional right, the rule of the federal 
courts is that the determination must be based on evidence 
42 Cj., DAVIS, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Admin-
istrative Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942). 
43 Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665 (1940); Highland 
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew (D. C. Va. 1936), 16 F. Supp. 575· 
44 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 
332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775 (1938); McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 
Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 6o8 (1938). 
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taken at the hearing; the tribunal is prohibited from relying 
on its own asserted knowledge of facts not proved at the 
hearing.45 It would follow that in such cases, the hearing 
must be of a type conforming generally to basic requirements 
of a judicial hearing, involving opportunity to examine and 
cross-examine witnesses. 
7· Necessity of Notice and Hearing in Public Safety Cases 
In many types of cases, administrative or executive au-
thorities, acting under statutes passed in the exercise of the 
legislature's police power, proceed summarily to seize or 
confiscate property, order nuisances abated, order the instal-
lation of safety appliances, and sometimes require the hos-
pitalization or incarceration of persons, all without notice or 
opportunity to be heard. In these "public safety" cases, the 
underlying policy factors that motivate decisions come clearly 
to light. 
Immediacy of public danger. In such cases as the destruc-
tion of putrid food 46 or the quarantining of persons suffering 
from vile and contagious diseases/7 most courts agree that 
the administrative agency may proceed summarily, finding 
satisfaction of due process in the opportunity to bring a 
subsequent damage suit against the offending official. Where, 
on the other hand, it can be plainly shown that no over-
whelming public interest justifies such an arbitrary course, 
and where pursuit thereof would affect substantial property 
rights, advance notice and opportunity to be heard before 
the administrative action becomes final is usually required.48 
45 This question is discussed more fully, infra, pp. 207, 208. 
46 North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 
S. Ct. 101 (1908). 
47 Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S. W. (2d) 21 (1931); cf., Rock v. 
Carney, 216 Mich. 28o, 185 N. W. 798 (1921), citing many cases. 
48 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933), in-
validating an authorization to an agency to order a railroad, without notice or 
hearing, to construct an overhead crossing; cf., Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 
54, 159 Pac. 949 (1916). See comments, 43 YALE L. J. 840 (1934); 82 U. 
PA. L. REV. 400 (19J4). 
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Substantiality of property interest involved. Summary 
action is more often permitted where the dollar value of 
the seized property is small. The distinction made possesses 
advantages of empiricism rather than logic. This has been 
frankly recognized by the courts. In Lawton v. Steele/8a for 
example, the court in upholding summary destruction of fish 
nets maintained in alleged violation of a state statute, re-
marked that it would be "belittling the dignity of the ju-
diciary" to require the destruction of "property . . . of 
trifling value" to be "preceded by a solemn condemnation in 
a court of justice." Where the fisherman's boats rather than 
his nets were the subject of the statute, it was held that 
notice and a formal hearing were required before a seizure 
could be made, the court pointing out that the property 
involved might reach in value many thousands of dollars.49 
On the closely related theory that property-such as slot 
machines-which is incapable of being put to any lawful use 
does not deserve protection, the courts have similarly sus-
tained summary seizure of gambling equipment.50 As a result 
of a conceptualistic application of this theory, courts have 
often sustained summary proceedings as to property legis-
latively declared to be a nuisance, even though there might 
be doubt as to whether the particular property seized under 
the statute was in fact being so used as to constitute a nui-
sance.51 The result in such cases seems unfortunate. Summary 
proceedings should be justified only in cases of an overruling 
necessity.52 Several cases have been decided on this basis.53 
48a Lawton v. Steele, I 52 U. S. I 3 3, I4 S. Ct. 499 (I 894). 
49 Colon v. Lisk, I53 N.Y. I88, 47 N. E. 302 (1897). 
50 Police Commissioners for City of Baltimore v. Wagner, 93 Md. I 82, 48 
Atl. 455 (I901); and see Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police 
Power," 24 HARV. L. REv. 333 (I9I1). 
51 People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, I40 N. Y. 
1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893); King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305 (188I). 
52 See Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE }USTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 
(1927) 261. 
53 City of Paducah v. Hook Amusement Co., Inc., 257 Ky. 19, 77 S. W. 
(2d) 383 (1934); McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505 
(1904). 
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In some types of cases to be sure, where the facts can 
be ascertained by an objective standard, inspection by an 
expert offers a more reliable method than does a trial to 
determine the truth; and in such cases summary seizure is 
quite properly sustained, where there is any substantial public 
interest to justify it.54 
8. Necessity of Notice and Hearing in Granting and Revok-
ing Licenses 
(a) Granting licenses. When application is made to an 
administrative agency for the issuance of a license, there is 
of course no problem of notice, and ordinarily no question 
is presented as to the necessity of affording a hearing. The 
informal procedural technique of the administrative agencies 
is well adapted to the investigation of applications for li-
censes. The judicial technique of a hearing is displaced by 
the administrative mechanics of the questionnaire and written 
statement. Frequently, the license is allowed on the basis of 
the application as filed. If the application is deemed insuffi-
cient to present all the desired information, or if the agency 
wishes to demand additional assurances from the applicant, 
he may be informally advised of what must be added to his 
application to obtain favorable action. This is the common 
practice, for example, with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Usually, the only purpose of a hearing is to 
assure that the agency obtains the information and assurances 
that it insists upon as a prerequisite to the issuance of a 
license; and ordinarily the license seeker, approaching the 
agency in propitiatory mood, willingly suits his convenience 
to the agency's desires.55 
54 E.g., the conformity of food to certain standards; the conformity of a 
structure to building-code requirements, et cetera. 
55 These psychological factors, making for an attitude of deferential obei-
sance to the agency's will, account no doubt in large part for the great favor 
with which the agencies view licensing systems as a modus operandi. 
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Often, where the issuance of a license depends upon 
compliance with certain standards or passing certain tests, a 
hearing would indeed be less suitable than an inspection as 
a means of ascertaining the truth. In such cases as the 
inspection of grain by the Department of Agriculture, the 
approval of radio equipment by the Federal Communications 
Commission, or the determination by the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority of the skill of an aviator or of the safety of an 
airplane, it is clear that a hearing technique would be in-
appropriate. 
In cases where the statute sets up an objective standard 
that controls the granting of licenses, such as a license to 
keep a dog, the administrative activity in granting licenses 
is merely ministerial. Nonaction can ordinarily be remedied 
by mandamus, or similar procedural devices. 
\Vhere the statute vests a measure of discretion in the 
agency as to the granting or denial of a license, the question 
as to the necessity of a hearing arises only where an agency 
has denied an applicant's request for a license and denied 
his request for a hearing. The situation is substantially the 
same as that where a license is revoked, and although de-
cisions are few, it is believed that the determination would 
be governed by the same considerations as those discussed 
in the next section with respect to the revocation of licenses. 
Of course, if the agency's discretion is untrammeled, there 
is little reason for seeking a hearing, and probably no consti-
tutional right to one. But where the agency's discretion is 
limited by fairly ascertainable standards, there is apparently 
a right to a hearing.56 
56 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 46 
S. Ct. 215 (1926); Gage v. Censors of New Hampshire Eclectic Medical 
Society, 63 N. H. 92 ( 18 84). For a general discussion, see Stratton, "The 
Necessity of Notice, Hearing, and Judicial Review of Licensing by Adminis-
trative Bodies," 14 MISS. L. J. 510 (1942); Black, "Does Due Process of Law 
Require an Advance Notice and Hearing Before a License Is Issued Under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act1" 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 270 (1935). 
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(b) Revocation of licenses. Since the revocation of a li-
cense is ordinarily upon the ground that the licensee has 
failed to conform to prescribed standards of conduct, and 
hence involves a judicial inquiry, it could logically be argued 
that revocation must be preceded by notice and hearing. But 
in this field the principle that judicial determinations must 
be based upon a hearing (a principle that has been ignored 
as often as it has been stated) has been abandoned in favor 
of a terminology borrowed from the field of property law. 
The conveyancer's distinction between the grant of a mere 
terminable license, conveying no rights but only a revocable 
privilege to make temporary use of another's lands (as 
contrasted with the grant of a more substantial interest, 
capable of judicial protection as a property right) has devi-
ously affected the law of administrative tribunals. Courts 
have suggested that some licenses grant mere privileges, 
which may be revoked at the whim of the licensor, without 
notice or hearing, and that in other cases the grantee has a 
property right, of which he cannot be deprived except in 
accordance with the course of judicial proceedings. Obvi-
ously, there is no connection between a license to walk across 
another's lands and a license to conduct a business, but failure 
to emphasize this clear distinction has led to much confusion 
of language and perhaps some confusion of thinking. 
Licenses as conferring privilege. The doctrine that some 
licenses to engage in business or professional activity grant 
to the licensee only a revocable privilege, short of the status 
of a right, is unsound. While this suggestion is found in 
many cases, few can be found where this is the real basis of 
decision. It appears usually as a dictum, and close examina-
tion ordinarily shows the dictum to be a poor description 
of the result in the particular case.57 In principle and policy, 
57 E.g., People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of City of New York, 
189 N.Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907), where it appeared there had been a full 
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the suggestion is unsound, as has been pointed out repeat-
edly.58 It has not motivated judicial decision and cannot be 
adopted as a test. 
Rather, the factors that determine whether a license may 
be revoked without hearing are the same as those that control 
in other fields where the question is presented as to the 
necessity of a hearing in advance of definitive administrative 
action. 
Hearing normally required. Normally, notice and an op-
portunity to be heard is required as a condition precedent 
to the revocation of a license. Inasmuch as the basis for the 
revocation is ordinarily asserted misconduct on the part of 
the licensee, the situation is one where a hearing is normally 
the most appropriate method for ascertaining the truth. 
Recognizing this, the courts have been inclined to insist that 
opportunity for a hearing be afforded. This predilection in 
favor of a requirement that there be a hearing is further 
supported by the fact that in revoking licenses, an agency 
usually is vested with but little discretion; normally, revoca-
tion must be supported by a determination of misconduct . 
.i\tlore important still is the fact that a revocation of a license 
involves specific action directed toward a particular individ-
ual, and the effect upon that individual is often catastrophic. 
Recognition of these factors can be found in many of the 
decisions which require a hearing in case of license revoca-
tions. In cases where the licensee has invested a substantial 
sum of money in the licensed activity, reluctance to permit 
revocation of the license without a hearing is particularly 
hearing, de novo, on an application to compel reinstatement of the license; 
State ex rel. Nowotnv v. City of Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N. W. 658 
( 1909) ; other cases discussed in Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to 
be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942); and 
Hale, "Hearings: The Right to a Trial, with Special Reference to Administra-
tive Powers," 42 ILL. L. REV. 7 49 ( r 948). 
58 See Gellhorn, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940) 378. 
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marked.59 To some extent, the right to a hearing seems to 
depend upon the amount of investment in the undertaking 
which has been licensed. The courts have quite uniformly 
(but not unanimously) insisted upon a hearing in connection 
with revocation of a license to practice a profession. In these 
cases, revocation is normally a major personal catastrophe.60 
The fact that fear of precipitate and ill-advised administra-
tive action is a factor sometimes affecting the decision is 
indicated by the great reluctance of courts to permit revoca-
tion without a hearing in case of activities which have but 
recently come into the sphere of licensed activities. The 
legislatures often share this fear, and require the revocation 
to be based upon findings of fact supported by substantial 
evidence taken at a public hearing. Section 9 (b) of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 goes some-
what further, providing that the licensee shall be accorded 
an opportunity "to demonstrate or achieve" compliance with 
all lawful requirements, prior to the revocation of a license. 
Sometimes statutes are construed as implying a requirement 
of hearing, and decision sometimes rests upon an interpreta-
tion of legislative intent. If the statute is ambiguous, it is 
usually construed in favor of a notice and hearing.61 
Revocation permitted without hearing. But in some types 
of cases, revocation of a license without a hearing is per-
59 Compare City of Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29 
( 1895), indicating that hearing prior to revocation of a license as a junk 
dealer would be required in the absence at least of the express reservation of a 
power to revoke; and Vernakes v. City of South Haven, I86 Mich. 595, I52 
N. W. 9I9 (19I5), where hearing was not required in connection with the 
revocation of a license to run a popcorn stand. 
60 E.g., disbarment of an attorney (or disciplinary suspension of the right 
to practice): In re Noell (C.C.A. 8th I937), 93 F. (zd) 5; Garfield v. United 
States ex rel. Spalding, 32 App. D. C. 153 (1908); revocation of a doctor's 
license: People v. McCoy, I25 Ill. 289, I7 N. E. 786 (I888); State v. Schultz, 
II Mont. 429, 28 Pac. 643 (I892); dentist's license: Kalman v. Walsh, 355 
Ill. 34I, I89 N. E. 3I5 (I934); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532> 207 Pac. 724 
(I922). See also Tuttrup, "Necessity of Notice and Hearing in the Revocation 
of Occupational Licenses," 4 Wis. L. REV. I8o (I927). 
6l Tanguay v. State Board of Public Roads, 46 R. I. 134, 125 Atl. 293 
(I924). 
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mitted. To a large degree, these cases simply reflect judicial 
deference to accepted traditions in a particular field. Where 
the carrying on of particular types of enterprises was his-
torically permitted only by the special indulgence of the 
sovereign, the exercise of free executive discretion in grant-
ing or revoking a license to conduct such enterprise long 
ago became an accustomed part of our mores, and no deprival 
of due process is perceived in permitting the revocation of 
such licenses without a hearing. The result is often explained 
by saying that the conduct of such enterprises involves a 
high degree of risk to public morality, and that because of 
the general undesirability of such activities as the conduct 
of saloons, poolrooms, public dance halls, and the like, it is 
proper to give administrative officials a free executive power 
to control the conduct of licensees engaged in such activities, 
embracing even the power to put them speedily out of 
business.62 But the lack of respectability of the business is 
not the controlling test, for similar results obtain in other 
fields where there is no such moral question involved but 
where there is an accepted tradition of discretionary revoca-
tion of licenses.63 
In cases where a clear need of speedy action to protect 
the public health is shown, summary revocation of licenses 
is sometimes permitted on the same grounds as in other 
cases involving action to preserve the public safety. Typical 
of this sort of case is a license to peddle milk.64 This principle 
has been pressed far, even to permitting the revocation of 
62 Commonwealth v. Kinsley, I33 Mass. 578 (I882); Mehlos v. City of 
Milwaukee, I56 Wis. 59I, I46 N. W. 882 (I9I4); People ex rel. Ritter v. 
Wallace, I6o App. Div. 787, I45 N.Y. S. 104I (I9I4); Bungalow Amuse-
ment Co. v. City of Seattle, I48 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. I043 (I928). 
63 Child v. Bemus, 17 R.I. 230, 21 Atl. 539 (I89I)-hackney license. 
64 State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee, I40 Wis. 38, I2 I N. W. 658 
(I 909) ; People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of City of New York, 
I89 N.Y. 187, 82 N. E. I87 (I9o7)-both these cases containing dicta, as 
above noted, going beyond the actual decision and suggesting improperly that 
the right conferred upon the licensee was not a property right but a mere 
revocable license. 
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a license to operate a motion picture theater where inspectors 
found the structure to be in dangerous condition.65 
The courts are more ready to permit deprival of a hearing 
in license revocation cases where the amount invested by the 
licensee is small, because little harm will be caused even if 
administrative action is based on mistake. 
In some types of cases, of course, a license is issued on 
an express or clearly implied condition that it is subject to 
revocation at the whim of the licensing sovereign-for ex-
ample, a license to fish commercially in state-owned waters, 
or a license to conduct a business on city-owned property. 
And in these cases there is no difficulty in revoking a license 
in accordance with the reserved power. Such cases fall beyond 
the ambit of the problem. 
Likewise there must be distinguished cases where there 
is a wholesale revocation of licenses as a method of effect-
uating a proper legislative determination that henceforward 
a certain type of business shall be prohibited-for example, 
if a state validly prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquor, 
saloonkeepers are not entitled to a hearing on the question 
as to the revocation of their licenses.66 
Suspension of licenses. Revocation of a license to carry on 
any type of business, without giving the licensee an oppor-
tunity to be heard as to his innocence of the charge on which 
the revocation proceedings are based, is unfortunate. The 
public interest could be adequately preserved, and a much 
wider assurance of individual justice obtained, by adopting 
a device of permitting temporary suspension of a license 
without a hearing, at the same time prohibiting actual revo-
cation except after a trial of the licensee on the charges 
which have been preferred. This device is sometimes pro-
65 Genesee Recreation Co. of Rochester v. Edgerton, 172 App. Div. 464, 158 
N.Y. S. 421 (1916). · 
66 Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Brockton, 235 Mass. 9.S> 126 
N. E. 456 (1920), where an ordinance was adopted putting an end to the 
jitney business as a means of public transportation in that city. 
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vided for in recent statutes.67 Some agencies are developing 
this technique, independently of statutory provisions, as a 
means of meeting the difficult license revocation problem. 
It offers wide opportunities. 
9· Effect of Statutes 
Statutory requirement frequent. Frequently, statutes re-
quire notice and hearing in cases where such requirement 
would not be implied from the due process clause.68 In 
many cases, such statutory requirement appears to reflect 
legislative disapprobation of the result of judicial decision 
that, independent of statute, no hearing was required.69 In 
other cases, the statutes are apparently aimed chiefly at as-
suring the adequacy of notice and an opportunity for full 
hearing. There is frequently a requirement (which in the 
absence of statute would not in all cases be implied) that 
.the agency's action must be based on and fully supported 
by the evidence taken at the hearing. 
67 Civil Aeronautics Act of I938, 52 Stat. 973, Ch. 6oi, § 6o9; 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40 I; Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. I 64 (I 92 I) Ch. 64, § 306; 7 
U.S.C. § I 8 I; Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. I 517 (I 92 3) Ch. 2 8 8, § 3; 
7 U.S.C. § 5 I; Grain Standards Act, 3 9 Stat. 484 (I 9 I 6) Ch. 3 I 3, § 7; 7 
U.S.C. § 7I; United States Warehouse Act, 46 Stat. I464 (I931) Ch. 366, §§ 7 
and 8; 7 U.S.C. § 24I. Cf., § 9 (b) of the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act of I946. 
68 E.g., the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, requires "rea-
sonable notice" and an "opportunity for hearing" in "any contested case." 
69 Thus, in many states the landowner is given a right to a hearing on the 
question as to the necessity of taking his property for a public use, although it 
seems well settled that otherwise no hearing is required. The effect of the deci-
sion in Commonwealth v. Sisson, I89 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 6I9 (I905) (note 
32, supra), was obliterated the following year by an amendment to the statute 
there involved, the amendment requiring that the health commissioners give 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before making an order forbidding the 
discharge of sawdust into streams-exactly what the court had held was not 
necessary, in the absence of statutory requirement. Ch. 3 56, Mass. Acts, I 906. 
Many states by statute impose requirements as to hearings in connection with 
executive proceedings to remove public officers. As above noted, a hearing is 
not required in such case, in the absence of statute. See 99 A. L. R. 336. 
Amendments to the federal immigration laws have broadened the immigrant's 
right to a hearing. See Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JusTICE AND THE Su-
PREMACY OF LAW ( I927) 295; and Act of I907, 34 Stat. 906, Ch. I 134, § 25. 
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The multiplicity of these legislative admonitions suggests 
clearly a general realization that as a matter of sound admin-
istrative practice, there should be afforded, wherever practi-
cable and regardless of constitutional requirements, adequate 
notice to all interested parties and an opportunity to be 
heard fully as to contemplated administrative actions. Many 
agencies, sharing this view, regularly consult with interested 
parties on problems of general concern, and make it almost 
a rule never to take final action directly affecting any par-
ticular party or group without first inviting the party or 
parties to discuss the matter.70 
Failure of statute to require notice. Sometimes a statute, 
authorizing administrative activities in a particular field, 
fails to impose any affirmative requirement as to notice and 
hearing, even in a type of case where these are constitution-
ally required. May the statute be declared void because of 
such omission? As the result of a dictum in Stuart v. 
Palmer/0a declaring that the validity of a statute must de-
pend not on what is in fact done as to giving notice, but 
on what may be done under the statute, a number of courts 
have held that even though an administrative agency has 
"by chance" given notice and a hearing to a respondent, 
nevertheless its action may be set aside because the statute 
under which it was operating did not in terms require the 
giving of such notice.71 The much sounder ruling, supported 
by the clear weight of authority, holds that there is no dep-
rivation of due process if notice and hearing were in fact 
afforded by the administrative authorities, even though the 
statutes do not specifically require such procedure. This result 
70 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provides a general 
broadening of the legislative requirements for hearings in cases involving the 
exercise of rule-making powers. 
70a Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183 ( 1878). 
71 E.g., Lacy v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 Pac. 949 (1916); Central of 
Georgia Ry. v. Georgia R.R. Commission (D. C. Ga. 1914), 215 Fed. 421; 
People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N. E. 757 (1920); Northern Cedar Co. 
v. French, 131 Wash. 394,230 Pac. 837 (1924). 
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is achieved frequently by construing statutes as "implying" 
a requirement of notice and hearing where the constitution 
so requires; sometimes, the result is explained on the pre-
sumption that official action has been taken legally. But the 
soundest basis appears to be that one who has in fact received 
notice and has been heard has not been deprived of notice 
and hearing. Nor is there any good reason for enjoining 
administrative action under a statute which is silent as to 
the requirement of notice, upon a party's speculative or 
conjectural fear that the agency might take some action 
against him without giving prior notice.72 
1 o. Hearing by Judicial Review 
In some cases, where an agency acts without giving notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, in situations where a hearing 
is required, it is possible to obtain a subsequent hearing by 
appealing the administrative determination to the courts. Is 
it sufficient if relief is forthcoming via this circuitous route? 
In cases where personal liberty is involved, the answer would 
seem plainly to be no. But where only property rights are 
at stake, it is quite generally held that "mere postponement 
of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the 
opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of 
the liability is adequate." 73 Where, however, the court is 
72 People v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N. E. 786 (r888); Armory Realty 
Co. v. Olsen, 210 Wis. 281, 246 N. W. 513 (1933); Toombs v. Citizens' Bank 
of Waynesboro, 281 U. S. 643, 50 S. Ct. 434 (1930); State ex rel. Powell v. 
State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238 (r884); Rail-
road Commissioners v. Columbia, N. & L. R. Co., 82 S. C. 418, 64 S. E. 240 
(1909); Abrams v. Daugherty, 6o Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac. 942 (r922); City 
of San Jose v. Railroad Commission of State of California, r 7 5 Cal. 2 84, r 6 5 
Pac. 967 (1917); Corcoran v. Board of Aldermen of Cambridge, 199 Mass. 
5, 85 N. E. 155 (r9o8); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 
U.S. 405, 21 S. Ct. 206 (r9oo). Other cases are collected in Stason, THE LAW 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 2d ed. (1947) 187. 
73 Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597, 
51 S. Ct. 6o8 (1931); and see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 
641 (1944); Springer v. United States, ro2 U.S. 586 (r88o); Scottish Union 
& National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 6rr, 25 S. Ct. 345 (1905). 
86 UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
not satisfied that the remedies available in the courts are 
adequate, the opposite result is reached.74 
In many of the cases where an opportunity to obtain an 
ex post facto hearing, through judicial review, has been held 
sufficient, there has been no showing of particular harm to 
the respondent as a result of being compelled to go into the 
courts to obtain relief. In a tax case involving disputed 
liability for a sum of money, for example, it can fairly be 
expected that a determination on the question would ulti-
mately be a matter for the courts in any event; and, further, 
in such cases the courts are swayed by imponderable con-
siderations as to the public desirability of assuring speedy 
and efficient operation of the tax-collection procedure. But 
if the rule established in such decisions were to be applied 
in case situations (like workmen's compensation) where the 
party affected could not normally afford to carry his case 
into court, or in situations where the private injury (e. g., 
deprival of a license to do business) that would result from 
the immediate effectiveness of the administrative order out-
weighs the public necessity for prompt administrative action, 
this doctrine could produce most untoward results. The doc-
trine has not been applied in such cases; and the doctrine 
should not be so extended. The constantly increasing sphere 
of administrative actability, and the continuing withdrawal 
of the courts from detailed examination of administrative 
rulings, are further reasons for the conclusiori. that in many 
types of cases the theoretical availability of judicial review 
should not be deemed a ground for permitting agencies to 
deny private parties the privilege of notice and hearing at 
the early stages of the proceeding. 
74 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933); 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 
S. Ct. 206 (1938). 
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I I. Effect of Failure to Demand Notice and Hearing 
Where notice is required, by constitution or statute, to 
precede administrative action, and no notice is given, the 
proceedings are of course defective, unless the error is waived 
by the party's appearance before the agency.75 Similarly, the 
respondent may waive his right of a hearing, and waiver is 
readily inferred from failure to make a prompt and insistent 
demand therefor. Especially is this true in such fields as 
taxation.76 
I 2. Conclusions 
No general formula can be relied upon to determine 
whether or not, in a given situation, notice and hearing must 
precede administrative action. The line has not been drawn 
according to a distinction between judicial and legislative 
activities. Although there is some tendency to require notice 
in the former type of case and not in the latter, yet this 
tendency has frequently been overcome by extraneous con-
siderations deemed to be controlling in a particular case. 
Nor can statements of principle made in a case involving 
one administrative function safely be applied in predicting 
what result will be reached in a case involving a different 
agency performing its work in a different field. The courts 
tend not only to follow the accepted tradition in a particular 
field, they tend also to restrict their rulings to the particular 
field in which the ruling was made. Factual distinctions 
assume great importance. The doctrine permitting summary 
75 Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 1932), 59 F. (2d) 879; 
Harris v. Hoage (App. D. C. 1933), 66 F. (2d) 801. But there is some dis-
agreement as to this. See Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 229 Mass. 208, 
II8 N. E. 347 (1918). There is no waiver where the objection is based on 
failure to give notice to other interested parties. City of Los Angeles v. Glassell, 
203 Cal. 44, 262 Pac. 1084 (1928); cf., Romeo v. Campbell (C.C.A. 2d 
1929), 35 F. (2d) 704. 
76 McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.S. 234, 44 S. Ct. 50 (1923); cf., Central of 
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47 (1907). 
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confiscation of a net used illegally by a fisherman does not 
permit similar seizure of a fleet of ships which he uses to 
conduct his illegal fishing operations, for example. More 
important, the fact that the requirements of notice and hear-
ing may have become attenuated in a particular field, by a 
gradual process of judicial erosion, does not mean that the 
same flexibility of procedure will be tolerated in an analogous 
field where administrative supervision is an unaccustomed 
innovation. 
But the divergent traditions obtaining in various fields of 
administrative activities can be rationalized, and the warp 
and woof of seemingly conflicting decisions spun into whole 
cloth, by reference to the underlying policy factors which 
motivate decisions more frequently than judicial opinions 
indicate. The essential problem in every case is that of weigh-
ing the relative merits of a public interest in prompt action 
against the respondent's private interest that the hand of 
the law be stayed until he has fully argued the equities of 
his particular position. Sometimes the balance is plain-for 
example, the public necessity of expeditious collection of the 
public revenues obviously outweighs the individual taxpay-
er's desire to avoid payment of a contested tax until the 
validity thereof has been finally determined by a court of 
last resort. Conversely, the right of a doctor to continue the 
practice of his profession, pending determination of charges 
that he improperly advertised, clearly outweighs the public 
interest in curtailing such instances of asserted unethical 
conduct. 
But in other cases the scales are more evenly balanced. 
Then other considerations of policy must be taken into 
account. 
First among these, perhaps, is the extent to which the 
administrative agency has been vested with discretion to pre-
mise its determinations upon ad hoc considerations of what 
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is generally desirable in a particular case. If an agency has 
free discretion, notice and hearing could serve no controlling 
purpose, and may be dispensed with if the agency so desires. 
But the extent of administrative freedom of action is 
ordinarily the result of, rather than the basis of, judicial 
determination. The courts ordinarily decide what degree of 
discretion is to be accorded the agency. In reaching this 
decision, the courts probe into considerations lying far be-
neath the surface of the readily seen. 
One such consideration is the importance to the private 
party involved of the repercussions of a particular adminis-
trative activity, and the immediacy of the effect. Where 
private property of a particular person is singled out for 
specific action, notice and hearing are ordinarily deemed 
appropriate. More particularly is this the case where the 
property interest involved is of substantial value. Where the 
number of persons affected by the administrative determina-
tion is large, on the other hand, requirement of notice and 
hearing is less persuasively indicated. This result is prompted 
in part by the practical difficulties involved in hearing large 
numbers of parties before taking action; further, the courts 
sense the difficulty of aligning the interests of thousands of 
parties and resolving many individual complaints into clear-
cut issues. 
Closely related to this factor is another. As a result of 
judicial experience, courts know that in some inquiries, a 
formal hearing is less well calculated to reveal the truth 
than is private investigation and inspection. In such cases, 
notice and hearing will not ordinarily be required. 
Decision is influenced somewhat by the court's confidence 
in the agency. A court that views with doubts and misgivings 
the functioning of a given agency is naturally inclined to 
repress that agency's freedom of discretionary action. It can 
often be most efficiently repressed by insistence that the 
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agency must proceed only on the basis of a record which is 
shown to contain substantial evidence to support the agency's 
conclusions. Coupled with this is a countertendency (particu-
larly in cases where it is believed administrative action is not 
likely to be ill-advised or, even if in error, not likely to be 
a cause of irreparable injury) to waive insistence upon a 
hearing in advance of administrative action, where there is 
adequate opportunity for correcting administrative mistakes 
upon judicial review. 
B. REQUIREMENTS AS TO SERVICE oF NoTICE 
I. Constitutional and Statutory Questions Involved 
In cases where notice is required to precede administrative 
action, questions arise as to who is entitled to receive notice, 
and what formalities must be complied with in serving 
notice. The problems thus presented may have both a con-
stitutional and statutory background. 
From the viewpoint of meeting constitutional require-
ments, there is little difficulty. The due process clause is 
not concerned with procedural niceties. Generally, notice 
need be given only those parties who will be directly and 
substantially affected by the administrative determination. 
The form of notice is immaterial, so long as it is calculated 
to acquaint the respondent with the necessary information 
as to the date and place of hearing in time to give him a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his case, and 
so long as it apprises him of the nature of the claim with 
sufficient particularity to enable him to know what evidence 
he must prepare to meet it.71 
Statutes often require more of the agencies as to these 
matters than the Constitution demands. Frequently, notice 
must be given to collaterally interested parties. Sometimes, 
77 The question as to the adequacy of notice, from the viewpoint of the de-
gree of definiteness and particularity required, is treated infra. 
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the statute specifies with particularity to whom notice must 
be given; 78 and sometimes, the statute requires the agency 
to seek out all interested parties and give them appropriate 
notice.79 The latter requirement theoretically imposes a heavy 
burden on administrative intuition, but in practice the mere 
giving of a general notice of proposed administrative action 
is sufficient to bring the matter to the attention of interested 
parties, since those subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of 
the various agencies are generally watchful of the agencies' 
activities. 
Similarly, the statutes frequently prescribe in some detail 
the contents of the required notice and the mode in which 
service of notice is to be perfected. 
2. Who Is Entitled to Notice 
Generally, except as statutes may impose broader require-
ments, those parties whose legal rights will be affected by 
the administrative determination, and who would be deemed 
"indispensable parties" in equitable proceedings in the courts, 
are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard thereon 
(assuming, of course, that the determination is of such a na-
ture that notice and an opportunity to be heard are required). 
The problem becomes troublesome as it involves the rights 
of those whose interests will be collaterally affected by a 
determination. For example, the granting to a radio station 
of the right to change its assigned frequency and power, or 
the grant of a license to erect and operate a new station, 
may substantially affect the value of a franchise previously 
granted to another station. Or an order directing an em-
ployer to discontinue an unfair labor practice which has 
78 In federal legislation regulating public utilities, it is sometimes required 
that notice of certain proceedings be given to the states in which the property 
of the utilities is located; e.g., § 214 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 151; § 203 (a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791. 
79 E.g., § 14 (a) of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 8oq §19 (c) of the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901. 
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injured a particular union may adversely affect the rights 
of a competing union. 
To what extent must the agency seek out and discover 
those whose interest may be collaterally affected? No clear-
cut answer is afforded by the cases. Decision is affected in 
part by the language of applicable statutes and by the back-
ground of accepted practices in particular fields. 80 Generally, 
however, there is little duty cast upon the agency to trace 
down those who may be able to show that the order has some 
substantial but collateral effect on their legal rights. It is 
enough if the agency serves notice on those whose direct 
concern should be reasonably anticipated by one who is an 
expert in the particular field of activity. 
No duty exists, it is believed, of notifying all those who 
might have a right to appeal.81 Nor should it be said that 
such advance notice must be served on every party who may 
have sufficient interest to be entitled to intervene in the 
administrative proceedings as an "interested party"; it may 
be quite impossible to determine in advance the identity of 
every potential intervenor. 
Seeming inconsistencies in the decision of particular cases 
largely disappear when attention is given to the significance 
80 Compare Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion (App. D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 517, with Clarksburg-Columbus Short 
Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring (App. D. C. 1937), 89 F. (2d) 788. 
8l Thus, it seems that a rival radio station, even though not entitled to ad-
vance notice, can appeal from an order of the Federal Communications Com-
mission. See Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting 
Co., 319 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 1035 (1943), noted in 42 MICH. L. REV. 329 
( 1943) ; Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 
309 U.S. 470, 6oS. Ct. 693 (1940), noted in 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 121 (1940); 
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc. v. Federal Communications Commission 
(App. D. C. 1939), 105 F. (2d) 75; Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Commis-
sion (App. D. C. 1931), 48 F. (2d) 461. Cf. Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co. (App. 
D. C. 1935), 78 F. (2d) 729. In some of these cases, it appears that the 
Commission had not given advance notice to the appellant of its intention to 
consider the application filed by another radio station. Nor does it appear that 
in these cases any claim was made that such advance notice was required. The 
present statute contains some requirements as to holding public hearings where 
conflicting claims appear. See 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 516 (1946). 
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of attendant factual circumstances. Thus, in certain proceed-
ings of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, notice 
must be given to the individual employee whose contract of 
employment may be affected by the outcome of the case,82 
while in proceedings before the National Labor Relations 
Board, notice need not be given those employees whose in-
dividual contracts of employment are attacked as having 
been consummated by the employer in violation of law.83 But 
in the former case the administrative order might necessarily 
deprive the employee of his job, whereas in the latter case 
the Board's order could be shaped so as to preserve the 
rights of the individuals not before the Board-by providing 
that the Board's order would not preclude the employees 
from asserting valid individual rights conferred upon them 
under the contracts. In the former case, it was only reason-
able to assume that the Board should have anticipated and 
protected the interest of the employees in danger of losing 
their jobs. 
Similarly, a state public utilities commission presumably 
need not, precedent to a rate hearing, give notice to all 
holders of power contracts whose rates might be affected by 
its order; 84 this would impose too onerous a burden. But 
where it is obvious that proceedings to fix the tolls of one 
of two competing bridges will directly and substantially 
affect the business of the other bridge, it is not unreasonable 
to require that advance notice must be given both bridge 
companies.85 Again, the National Labor Relations Board is 
required to give notice to a bona fide labor union before 
82 Nord v. Griffin (C.C.A. 7th 1936), 86 F. (zd) 481; Estes v. Union 
Terminal Co. (C.C.A. 5th 1937), 89 F. (zd) 768. 
83 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350, 
6o S. Ct. 569 ( 1940). 
84 RePublic Service Elec. Co., P.U.R. 1918 E, p. 898-New Jersey Board of 
Public Utility Commissioners (r9r8). 
85 Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring (App. D. C. 
1937), 89 F. (zd) 788. 
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entering an order setting aside a collective contract in which 
the union asserts rights,86 but need not give such notice to 
a union which is incapable of acting as the bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees.87 
3· Class Suits 
In cases where the number of interested parties is unduly 
large, agencies can sometimes solve the problem of giving 
adequate notice by bringing what is in effect a class suit, 
which may be used under approximately the same conditions 
as in equity proceedings in the courts.88 
4· Form of Notice and Mechanics of Service 
In many types of cases, notice may be served by general 
publication. In tax cases, indeed, it is deemed sufficient notice 
if the statutes provide that the assessing agencies are to meet 
at designated times and places to take certain actions that 
may affect every taxpayer on the roll.89 In cases where pub-
lication of notice is all that is required, any form that is 
reasonably adopted to inform the public generally will be 
deemed sufficient.90 The courts have quite generally sus-
tained the sufficiency of notice even where the medium of 
publication and format of the notice was not calculated to 
attract the attention of numerous parties who might be 
interested. 91 
Where the statute does not authorize service by publica-
tion, and the proceedings are not in rem, it is doubtful 
86 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 
197, 59 S. Ct. w6 (1938). 
87 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
303 U.S. 261,58 S. Ct. 571 (1938). 
88 Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission 
(C.C.A. 8th 1926), 13 F. (2d) 673. See 89 U. PA. L. REV. 8o8 (1941). 
89Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421, 14 S. Ct. 
111.4- (1894). 
9°0ttinger v. Arena! Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 371,178 N. E. 665 (1931). 
91 See Carusi v. Hazen (App. D. C. 1935), 76 F. (zd) 444; but compare 
In rePetition of Auditor General, 275 Mich. 462, z66 N. W. 464 (1936). 
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whether notice by publication would be deemed sufficient, 
in cases where a constitutional right to notice exists. But it 
would seem that any form of personal notice is sufficient. 
Service by mail is probably acceptable.92 
92 Unity School of Christianity v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 
1933), 64 F. (2d) 550. 
PART THREE 
PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION 
OF CASES 
CHAPTER 5 
Parties and Pleading 
A. PARTIES 
I. The Agency as a Party 
EVERY phase of the administrative adjudication of cases-whether by informal conference or formal hearing 1-is affected by the circumstance that the 
agency itself is a principal party. Unlike judges, administra-
tive officers are almost always concerned with the outcome of 
the case as parties in interest. 
The agency's direct interest in the outcome is obvious in 
cases where the proceeding is entitled in the name of the 
agency (or the Government) against a respondent, such as 
proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. Moreover, the same tendency 
is present in many types of cases where the agency is not 
1 As pointed out in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (I 94 I), 
most of the activity of administrative agencies in disposing of cases judicially 
is concerned with informal disposition of matters, by conference and consulta-
tion, without formal hearing and often without any regularized proceedings of 
any kind. While this circumstance is of fundamental importance, and is the 
primary point to be considered in connection with legislative imposition of 
standards of administrative procedure; yet the very flexibility of these informal 
methods of disposing of cases precludes any extended discussion thereof. Since 
the informal cases are almost always those closed by consent, as a result of 
a mutual agreement between the parties, their disposition is governed by no set 
rules or standards but rather by the inclination of the negotiators in each par-
ticular case. It is in such cases, if any, that justification can be found for the 
cynical observation that practice before administrative tribunals does not in-
volve knowing the law, but rather knowing the administrators. While no 
separate treatment of the informal methods of administrative procedure is here 
undertaken, yet frequent references thereto will be made in the following chap-
ters. The opportunity of resorting to the informal procedure at any stage of 
a formally conducted case-which is simply the option of terminating the 
proceedings by negotiating an agreed settlement-somewhat conditions the 
conduct of the agencies, and their practices, in handling matters which are 
formally adjudicated. 
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formally a party. Quite generally, for example, workmen's 
compensation commissions feel that it is a part of their func-
tion to aid the claimant in obtaining compensation. Similarly, 
unemployment compensation commissions are conscious of 
a desire to stretch statutory interpretation to the furthest 
possible point, in favor of allowing claims. Many other 
examples could be cited.2 
The simple fact that the agency is usually directly inter-
ested in the final disposition of the case is probably the chief 
factor differentiating administrative from judicial procedure. 
An agency's rules as to intervention, its rules of pleading, 
and its method of conducting hearings, are all likely to be 
affected by the desire to achieve a procedure that will most 
effectively aid the agency in reaching what it deems desir-
able results. 
2. Indispensable and Permissive Parties 
Traditional rules of joinder and of necessary or indis-· 
pensable parties play but little part in administrative pro-
ceedings.3 Ordinarily, the only indispensable parties are those 
who, as a matter of due process or because of specific statutory 
requirements, must be given notice of contemplated action 
and an opportunity to be heard thereon.4 Parties with dis-
similar or even conflicting and competing interests may be 
joined in a single proceeding, or the proceeding may con-
tinue without joinder of parties who might appropriately be 
brought into the proceeding, and parties may be dropped 
or new parties added, as administrative convenience suggests, 
2 There are some instances where probably no such tendency is present. For 
example, the Interstate Commerce Commission probably has no partisan inter-
est in the disposition of the reparations cases which it decides-and incidentally, 
it has expressed its desire of being relieved of the duty of deciding such cases. 
3 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350, 
6o S. Ct. 569 (1940); cf., Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)-holding that the Board 
could not void a contract, when one of the parties thereto had not been joined 
in the administrative proceedings. 
4 See Chapter 4, supra, p. 91. 
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ordinarily subject to no restriction except occasional statutory 
provision or particular agency rules. 
3· Intervention 
Provision is frequently made, either in statutes or in the 
agency's rules of procedure, for intervention of interested 
parties. Intervention is usually permissive and is granted or 
denied at the discretion of the agency.5 Many agencies, moti-
vated by a desire for expeditious handling of cases or some-
times perhaps by a desire to exclude potential troublemakers, 
exhibit a tendency to deny such petitions, thus narrowing the 
issues and excluding competing interests from an opportunity 
to play their part in shaping the course of administrative 
determination.6 
Ordinarily, denial of a petition to intervene is not appeal-
able. 7 In cases where administrative discretion has clearly 
been abused, or where a clear statutory right exists, denial 
of a petition to intervene may sometimes be remedied in 
subsequent judicial proceedings.8 But on the whole, the 
courts show little disposition to interfere. 
Not infrequently, administrative agencies permit limited 
participation in a case by one who is not allowed to intervene. 
Sometimes the status of such a party is substantially like that 
of an amicus curiae in judicial proceedings; sometimes he is 
permitted to introduce testimony, cross-examine witnesses, 
and even (under some statutory provisions creating a right 
of appeal in any aggrieved party) to seek judicial review 
of the order. Between these two extremes, many intermediate 
5 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 434, 35 S. Ct. 337 (I9I5); 
Sunshine Broadcasting Co. v. Fly (D. C. D. C. I94o), 33 F. Supp. 56o. 
6 E.g., In the Matter of Matheson Radio Co., Inc., 8 F. C. C. 397 (I94I); 
In the Matter of Vail-Ballous Press, Inc., IS N. L. R. B. 378 ( I939); North-
west Airlines, Inc., et al., 6 C. A. B. 2 I 7 ( I944). 
7 Alston Coal Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A. Ioth I943), 137 
F. (zd) 740. 
8 Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 3 I9 
U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. I035 (I943); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United 
States (D. C. Pa. I944), 56 F. Supp. I. 
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solutions may be worked out as a means of enabling the 
agency to have the benefit of the views of collaterally inter-
ested parties.9 
These devices offer wide opportunities in the way of 
permitting effective participation in administrative proceed-
ings by collaterally interested parties, thus securing valuable 
contributions making for better informed administrative ac-
tion, without involving difficulties that sometimes attend 
formal intervention, such as the prolonging of hearings, and 
the undue enlargement of the record, or the introduction 
of extraneous issues. 
B. PLEADING 
I. General Requirements 
The mode of pleading to be adopted by an administrative 
agency is a matter to be settled by the agency. Save as 
occasional statutory provisions or agency rules may impose 
some requirements,10 the tribunals are permitted to conduct 
their proceedings in such manner as they may deem will be 
most conducive to the effective disposition of business.11 Ap-
parently, if an agency so desired, it could proceed to hearing 
without filing a complaint, relying on informal conferences 
to advise the other parties to the case as to the claims and 
contemplated action of the agency; indeed, this is substan-
tially the practice of several agencies, which employ con-
plaints that recite little more than the names of the parties 
and the language of the statute involved.12 It has not been 
required, in any event, that the pleadings conform to any of 
the accepted common-law standards by which the sufficiency 
9 See In the Matter of United Light & Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Company 
Act Release No. 2531 (1941). 
10 E.g., the very detailed rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
11 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (C.C.A. 5th 
1923), 295 Fed. 53, aff'd 269 U.S. 217, 46 S. Ct. 73 (1925). 
12 For criticism of the practice, see "Administrative Procedure in Government 
Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 63. 
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of pleadings in judicial proceedings are judged/3 although 
Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 may 
be construed as imposing some requirements as to definite-
ness in pleadings. Section 5 provides that where some other 
statute requires the agency to act only after holding a 
hearing, there must be notice not only of the time and place 
of hearing, but also as to "the matters of fact and law 
asserted." 
The pervasive tendency of administrative tribunals to 
adopt rules that are primarily defensive in character, de-
signed to protect the agency's procedure from attack rather 
than to define the practice before the agency,14 has militated 
against the voluntary adoption of any strict requirements 
with reference to pleadings. If an agency adopted a rule 
providing for the furnishing of bills of particulars, upon 
cause shown, for example, it might lay itself open to attack 
on the ground that in denying such a motion in a particular 
case, it had violated its own rule. It is much the easier 
course for the agency to provide by rule that bills of par-
ticulars may not be required. Then the agency is free to 
furnish statements of particulars as often as it serves its 
purposes to do so; and at the same time it may with im-
punity deny a request for particulars whenever this appears 
the more convenient course. 
But it is a shortsighted policy which prompts some agencies 
to adopt modes of pleading which neither apprise the re-
spondent of the factual issues in dispute nor put him on 
notice of the real nature of the claim. Not only does this 
13 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States (D. C. Pa. 1923), 288 Fed. 88; 
Farmers' Livestock Commission Co. v. United States (D. C. Ill. 1931), 54 
F. (2d) 375· The decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 
421, 40 S. Ct. 572 (192o), to the extent that it indicated that an administra-
tive complaint must state a cause of action, has had but little effect. See Chis-
holm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 57 S. Ct. 65 (1936), and Honeyman v. Hanan, 
302 U.S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 273 (1937). 
14 See Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YoRK (1942) 38. 
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practice make it difficult for the respondent to prepare his 
case, but it often results in wasting the time of the agency. 
The generality of a complaint, or notice of hearing, may 
serve to put formally in issue a host of matters on which 
there is really no question. On an application for issuance of 
a license, for example, the applicant must sometimes put in 
lengthy proofs on such broad issues as public convenience, 
interest, and necessity, although there may be but one narrow 
issue with which the agency is concerned. 
There can be no question but that a complaint which sets 
out allegations of alleged wrongdoing in general form, sub-
stantially in the language of the statute, puts the respondent 
to unnecessary difficulty in ascertaining the gist of the actual 
complaint and thus renders it difficult for him adequately 
to prepare his defense. 
Not only would the rights of the respondents be better 
protected, but the agencies themselves could act more effi-
ciently, if they voluntarily adopted the suggestions as to 
particularity in pleading made by the Attorney General's 
Committee.15 
Much of the difficulty could be solved by agency insistence 
on careful investigation and consideration prior to the institu-
tion of formal proceedings. This would have many collateral 
advantages. It would tend to eliminate the inauguration of 
proceedings in cases where the challenged party was in fact 
not guilty of wrong. It would facilitate the satisfactory ad-
justment, without contest, of cases where the respondent 
would, upon learning precisely what charge was made and 
what action was proposed, admit the facts and agree to the 
entry of a consent order disposing of the case. Finally, by 
making possible a better statement of the case in the initial 
pleadings, it would facilitate the trial of contested matters. 
l5 Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 234. 
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The initial notice should be the crucial one. While the re-
quirements of due process can be satisfied in many cases by 
a specification of the charges during prehearing conferences 
or even by the device of posthearing notice of contentions 
and issues (coupled with an opportunity for further hearings 
if requested by the respondent), yet these are at best time 
consuming and inefficient. The entire course of administrative 
adjudication can proceed most efficiently, most fairly, and 
with greatest assurance of doing justice, if at the outset of 
the case the parties are advised fully and with particularity 
of the nature of the claims to be made and the issues to be 
argued. 
2. Sufficiency of Complaint: Apprisal of What Is to Be 
Heard 
Procedural due process requires that the respondent in 
administrative proceedings shall be duly informed of the 
nature of the charge made against him, in order that he 
shall have ample opportunity to present an appropriate de-
fense to the case that may be made against him. 
However, the courts have not generally required that such 
information be contained in the complaint or other moving 
papers which institute the administrative proceedings. In 
many types of cases it is enough if the respondent is apprised 
of the agency's claims, and the issues involved, at any stage 
of the proceedings, provided always that after such infor-
mation becomes available an opportunity remains to the 
respondent to present his defense to such claims before the 
issuance of the final order. It has been suggested that four 
means, at least, may be appropriate in various types of pro-
ceedings as a means of apprising the parties of the issues: 
( 1) a specific complaint; ( 2) an examiner's tentative find-
ings, to which exceptions may be taken; (3) an issue-defining 
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oral argument; and (4) the filing of briefs in which definite 
points are stated.16 
The absence of all four of these devices would invalidate 
the administrative procedure (in cases where its function is 
fundamentally judicial in nature). But it is not required 
that all four be utilized in every case. The absence of a 
specific complaint may often be remedied by the subsequent 
employment of alternative devices as a means of advising 
the respondent of the agency's claims and the issues. Whether 
or not an insufficiently definite complaint has been satisfac-
torily remedied by the subsequent proceedings is an inquiry 
that rests largely upon the facts of the individual case. If in 
fact the parties are fully acquainted with the basis of the 
agency's claims, for example, a formal objection to the in-
adequacy of the agency's complaint will be unsuccessful.17 
If the hearings are held at intermittent intervals and the 
respondent has sufficient time, after learning the basis of the 
agency's claims when it is putting in its evidence, to prepare 
and present his defenses, then the lack of particularity in 
the complaint is immaterial.18 If the respondent elects to 
proceed with the defense, without objecting to the insuffi-
ciency of the complaint, he may be held to have waived 
the point.19 
In cases where decision is not affected by the course of 
developments subsequent to the issuance of the complaint, 
and where the court must pass upon the sufficiency of the 
complaint, standing alone, the court must undertake to de-
termine whether the respondent is in fact likely to be 
prejudiced by the vagueness of the complaint. To some 
16 Morgan v. United States, 304 u.s. I, 58 s. Ct. 773> 999 (1938). 
17 National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co. 
(C.C.A. 6th 194o), 109 F. (2d) ssz, 557· 
18 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A. zd 
1938), 94 F. (zd) 862. 
19Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 1932), 59 F. (2d) 879. 
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extent, this determination is affected by the character of 
the administrative proceeding. 
Where the scope and nature of the administrative decision 
which may be made at the hearing is ascertainable in ad-
vance-where it will be an order granting or denying a 
license, or ordering a respondent to cease and desist from 
particular practices-it is more frequently required, and 
properly so, that the initial pleadings must indicate the issues 
which are to be considered at the hearing. If the agency 
contemplates revocation of a license on particular grounds, 
the respondent is in fairness entitled to know in advance of 
the hearing what those grounds are. On the other hand, 
where the character of the administrative decision which may 
follow the hearing is not fixed and certain, it is often not 
practical to define the issues with great particularity in the 
initial pleadings, and a very general notice of the subject 
matter to be considered will be deemed sufficient.20 
20 Thus, in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 
S. Ct. 220 ( 1930), where market agencies had filed proposed tariff schedules 
increasing their rates, and the administrative authorities, after suspending the 
proposed rate schedules, gave notice that at statutory hearings they would con-
sider whether a further order should be made as to the rates, it was held that 
this sufficiently apprised the parties of the possibility that the administrative 
authorities might prescribe a new schedule of rates even lower than those under 
which the agencies had been operating before an increase was proposed. The 
court relied in part upon the circumstance that the statute was deemed to put 
the parties on notice as to the type of order which might ensue; and the court 
was impressed by the fact that there was no showing that the market agencies 
had been misled or that they had failed to put in evidence anything which 
would have been adduced had the notice stated more particularly the nature 
of the contemplated order. The difficulty of knowing in advance what type of 
order might be deemed proper was also adverted to. Similar considerations are 
reflected by the decision in Pearson v. Walling (C.C.A. 8th 1943), r38 F. 
(2d) 655. In that case, the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of 
the U. S. Department of Labor had published general notice as to the meetings 
to be held by a statutory "Industry Committee," which would be charged in 
part with the duty of defining the "Lumber and Timber Products" industry, 
and establishing a minimum wage to be paid to certain employees in that 
industry. A definition was promulgated broad enough to include manufacturers 
of bows and arrows, and it was held that there was no deprival of due process 
because a manufacturer engaged in that particular business had not been ap-
prised in advance that the definition might be made broad enough to include 
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Despite the difficulty of giving in advance an accurate 
description of the issues which may arise in the course of 
the administrative proceeding, if the failure sufficiently to 
describe the issues has in fact caused actual prejudice to the 
respondent, relief may be afforded. The same result is some-
times reached where it seems entirely probable that such 
prejudice would follow.21 
Unless it can be shown that actual prejudice has been 
suffered, or that it can be fairly presumed that it will in-
evitably result, the courts are little inclined to insist that 
the administrative agencies use their pleadings as a means 
of apprising the respondent of what is to be heard.22 
3. Bills of Particulars 
One reason why administrative agencies prefer to restrict 
their complaints and charges to vague generalities is that at 
the time of the issuance of such documents, the particulars 
his enterprise. There was no showing that the particular manufacturer was 
injured because of the very general character of the notice as to the convening 
of the committee. Further, it would obviously be extremely difficult to specify 
what particular types of enterprise might be deemed to fall within the lumber 
and timber products industry. The precise scope and character of the adminis-
trative order could not be foreseen. 
21 In Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States (C.C.P.A. I935), 76 F. (2d) 4I2, the 
Tariff Commission gave notice that it intended to investigate difference in cost 
of production of "optical instruments 'of a class or type used by Army, Navy 
or Air Forces for fire control.'" The Zeiss Company was not interested in the 
particular types of optical instruments then in use, but was vitally interested in 
related types of optical instruments which were suitable for such use. It did not 
participate in the hearings. At the conclusion thereof, a determination was made 
that applied to all types of optical instruments suitable for such use by the 
Army and Navy. The notice was held insufficient, the court saying that informa-
tion as to an investigation of optical instruments of a class or type used by the 
Army and Navy did not suggest to interested parties the holding of an investi-
gation relative to optical instruments suitable to be used by such armed forces. 
Many of the state courts are more inclined to insist on definiteness and par-
ticularity in administrative pleadings (from the viewpoint of accurately appris-
ing the parties of what is to be heard) than are the federal courts. See, e.g., 
Abrams v. Daugherty, 6o Cal. App. 297, 2I2 Pac. 942 (I922); Kalman v. 
Walsh, 355 Ill. HI, I89 N. E. 3I5 (I934). 
22 Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 6th 
I94o), 113 F. (2d) 38; Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 107 F. (2d) 472; Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper 
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th I94o), III F. (2d) 869. 
PARTIES AND PLEADING 
of the case may not yet be known. But before the hearing 
is reached, or at least before it is completed, the attorney 
handling the case for the agency must learn such particulars; 
and accordingly some agencies have adopted fairly liberal 
practices as to the furnishing on request of further statements 
of details and particulars. Other agencies, unfortunately, ap-
pear to have a fixed rule against it.23 
Much would be gained by a further development of the 
practice of furnishing bills of particulars, wherever practicaP4 
Such a practice would eliminate most of the vice inherent 
in the vagueness and incompleteness so often found in 
the original complaint. Needless litigation might often be 
avoided by providing in rule or statute for the issuance of 
bills of particulars on the same basis as that on which they 
are available in judicial proceedings. 
But the granting of such relief rests largely within the 
discretion of the agency. Denial of a request for particulars 
cannot be attacked successfully unless it is clear that actual 
prejudice has resulted. The courts will not presume preju-
dice.25 
23 Beer, FEDERAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE 
CoMMISSION (1942) 194. 
24 The degree of particularity which can be achieved varies, of course, in 
accordance with the nature of the proceeding. Where the hearing is directed 
to the determination of justiciable questions (as in most license revocation cases 
and many unfair labor practice or trade practice cases) detailed specification is 
ordinarily feasible. But in other types of cases, particularly where the hearing 
is directed primarily to the establishment of a mass of factual data which will 
guide the agency in reaching a decision that is largely a matter of policy-as in 
some cases before utility commissions-it is frequently impractical to do more 
at the outset than to indicate the general subject to be investigated. In this type 
of case, where the specification of particular issues of fact and law may be left 
to be developed at the hearing itself, opportunity should be given for supple-
mentary presentation of evidence and further argument. See Benjamin, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942) 78. 
25 On the contrary, it is assumed that no actual prejudice would result from 
a denial of particulars, where the administrative hearing was conducted at 
intervals. National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A. 
2d 1938), 94 F. (2d) 862. See also Locomotive Finished Material Co. v. 
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. roth 1944), 142 F. (2d) 8o2; and 
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 
7th 1940), Ill F. (2d) 869. 
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Even in cases where it is conceded that simple fairness 
would have required the furnishing of the requested par-
ticulars, it has been held that the respondent can have no 
relief other than to apply for leave to adduce additional 
testimony.26 
4· Amendments of Pleadings; Variances 
No problem is presented by amendments of a formal 
or technical character, correcting mistaken averments as to 
names, dates, places, figures, or other minutiae of pleading. 
Such amendments can be made with little if any formality, 
and no prejudice results. 
Nor is much difficulty encountered from the allowance 
of amendments, which enlarge or otherwise alter the sub-
stance of the charge, if they are made on due notice prior 
to the hearing. Even though such amendments may incorpo-
rate matters arising subsequent to the institution of the 
administrative proceedings,27 yet no harm comes from the 
allowance thereof so long as adequate time is given the 
parties to prepare and meet the additional charges. 
Not infrequently, amendments raising new issues are pro-
posed at the hearing itself. Then the question is whether 
or not a continuance will be granted to enable the respondent 
26E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I944), 
142 F. (zd) 5"· Such holdings, it might be said, overlook the fact that the 
whole course of a hearing and the entire complexion of the case is quite differ-
ent where the respondent must feel his way along in the dark than where he 
knows in advance exactly what claims and issues he must meet. Putting in 
additional evidence, after the hearing has been completed, does not correct the 
harm that has been done. Where this harm can be clearly demonstrated-as 
where the refusal of particulars has in effect deprived the respondent of a right 
of cross-examination-relief is sometimes granted, and the administrative pro-
ceedings set aside. Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes ( C.C.A. 6th I 94 I), I I 8 
F. (2d) 105. 
27 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350, 
6o S. Ct. 5 69 ( 1940) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua Munising 
Wood Products Co. (C.C.A. 6th I94o), I09 F. (2d) 552; Lehigh Valley R. 
Co. v. American Hay Co. (C.C.A. 2d I9I4), 2I9 Fed. 539· 
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to prepare his proofs on the new issue. Continuances should 
be freely granted, on a claim that a party requires additional 
time to prepare his case.28 But there seems to be no clear 
right to such a continuance; a large measure of discretion is 
vested in the administrative agency.29 
Where a variance between the complaint and the proof 
is not corrected at the hearing, a question arises as to whether 
an order may nevertheless be entered appropriate to the 
factual situation disclosed at the hearing. The modern trend 
toward the allowance of amendments to the pleadings to 
conform to the proofs, even in court proceedings, is quite 
properly reflected in the decisions which permit at least an 
equal degree of flexibility in the procedure of administrative 
agencies.30 But this liberality should not be relied upon to 
permit an administrative order to stand where it appears that 
the departure at the hearing from the issues raised in the 
pleadings probably prevented the parties from having a full 
and fair hearing.31 In this type of case, no clear demonstration 
of prejudice should be required. Because of difficulties of 
proof, a convincing showing of probable prejudice should 
28 It is incumbent upon the party seeking a continuance to demand it 
promptly. Harris v. Hoage (App. D. C. I933), 66 F. (2d) 8or. 
29 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 
I97> 59 S. Ct. 206 (I938); Jefferson Elec. Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 7th I939), I02 F. (2d) 949· If it is clear that the denial of 
a continuance is an abuse of discretion, the courts may grant relief. Wallace 
v. Allen, II5 Pa. Super. Ct. 347, I75 At!. 878 (I934), where the complaint 
in a workmen's compensation case alleged physical injuries, and the claimant 
at the hearing sought to establish that he was suffering from traumatic hysteria. 
30 Armand Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 2d I936), 84 
F. (2d) 973; National Labor Relations Board v. Swift & Co. (C.C.A. 7th 
I94o), Io8 F. (2d) 988; M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 7th I94o), II4 F. (2d) 432; Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Maples, 
ISS Okla. Io5, 8 P. (2d) 46 (I9J2); Sears v. Peytral, 15I La. 971, 92 So. 
56I (I922); Felix Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 Ky. I9o, 71 S. W. (2d) 430 
(I934). 
31 Alton & Southern Railroad v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 3 I 6 Ill. 
625, I47 N. E. 417 (I925); Deadwyler v. Consolidated Paper Co., 260 Mich. 
IJO, 244 N. W. 484 (I9J2); Vaughn v. Solvay Process Co. (La. Ct. of App.), 
176 So. 241 (I937). 
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be sufficient. As noted from the decisions cited, the cases on 
this point exhibit considerable contrariety of result, reflecting 
in part different factual situations and, in part, differences of 
judicial philosophy. 
5. Respondent's Answer; Subsequent Pleadings 
The generality of the initial pleadings, so typical of ad-
ministrative procedure, begets a like generality in the answer, 
in cases where an answer is filed. Often, the answer amounts 
to little more than a plea of the general issue, with notice of 
special defenses frequently appended. The transmutation 
from the common-law art of issue pleading to the code plead-
ing of facts and thence to so-called notice pleading (inappro-
priately named, since the theory proceeds largely on the 
assumption that the respondent has actual knowledge or 
notice of the claims and accordingly need not be particularly 
notified thereof in the pleadings), which has largely affected 
the pleading practices of the administrative agencies, is thus 
seen to be far from an unmixed blessing. While it eliminates 
technicalities, it sometimes produces a situation where the 
pleadings serve no useful purpose-where, for example, the 
respondent does not know the exact claim of the agency and 
the agency is not aware of the respondent's defense, until a 
prehearing conference is held or until the matter comes on 
for hearing. 
Administrative agencies frequently pay but little attention 
to the respondent's pleadings. Replications and rejoinders, or 
their equivalents, are uncommon in administrative procedure. 
A vague complaint and a general denial are typical. 
Where, however, a respondent presents, by way of defense 
in his answer, allegations of matters which he seeks to prove 
but which in the opinion of the agency are irrelevant to the 
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issues tendered by the complaint, the agency may strike such 
allegations from the answer.32 This is done where the agency 
believes that the hearing of the proposed proofs might un-
necessarily delay the case, or if it appears that the prime 
motive of the pleader is to confuse the issues. 
32 International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 35 v. 
National Labor Relations Board (App. D. C. 1939), 110 F. (2d) 29, aff'd 
311 u.s. 72, 61 s. Ct. 83 (1940), 
CHAPTER 6 
Prehearing Conferences and 
Informal Procedures 
THE essential difference in character between court proceedings and the administrative process is epito-mized by the contrast in the nature of the activities 
which follow the filing of pleadings. In a court case, after the 
pleadings have been filed and the case brought to issue, it is 
placed on the docket of cases ready for trial, and there it rests 
until trial day. The court has little if any concern with the 
case prior to the opening of the triaP In the case of proceed-
ings before an administrative agency, on the other hand, the 
crucial point of official action is typically reached in the in-
terim between the filing of pleadings and the hearing. The 
trial procedure is, in many cases, reserved as a method of 
last resort for disposing of cases which cannot be otherwise 
terminated. 
I . Purposes of Prehearing Procedure 
From the viewpoint of the administrative agency, informal 
negotiations concerning pending cases offer many advantages. 
First and foremost, it is only by use of such informal pro-
cedures that the agencies can keep abreast of their heavy case 
loads. Many agencies dispose of nine tenths or more of all 
matters instituted before them without trial. In some cases, 
1 Sometimes, of course, preliminary motions must be disposed of; but these 
ordinarily involve only a ruling on subsidiary legal issues-they are, so to 
speak, "little trials." In many jurisdictions, too, pre-trial hearings are be-
coming common. But even in such cases, the court's concern is principally with 
such formal points as the settlement of the pleadings, the fixing of a trial date, 
and related matters designed to facilitate the holding of the trial, which re-
mains the important focal point. 
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the percentage is even higher.2 The agencies would be com-
pelled to neglect many cases requiring attention if it were 
necessary to adopt the hearing-and-adjudication technique 
in each case. Imbued as they are by a desire to fulfill what 
they deem to be their broad social missions, the agencies find 
other reasons for preferring the informal procedure. They 
can sometimes persuade a party to adopt a course of action 
which he perhaps could not be compelled to adopt if he re-
sisted formal proceedings directed to such end, or they can 
obtain agreements that something be done which it would be 
beyond their powers to compel. An effective means is thus 
afforded for reforming marketing practices, financial prac-
tices, or labor relations practices along the general lines 
deemed desirable by the agencies concerned. In working 
toward these broad ends, the agencies, so long as they restrict 
their activities to the informal procedures, can operate in 
an atmosphere of uncontrolled discretion, bound by no sub-
stantive or procedural rules. 
From the viewpoint of the private parties concerned, these 
informal proceedings are important for other reasons. The 
respondent faces a practical necessity of discussing his case 
informally with the agency in order that he may learn exact-
ly what is involved. It is often the only practical means of 
learning, in advance of the hearing, the actual claims of the 
agency and the true issues involved. Similarly, consultation 
2 In a recent ten-year period, the Interstate Commerce Commission arranged 
settlements in all but five of some 3,5oo demurrage complaints filed with it. 
The National Labor Relations Board, over a period of several years, settled 
more than 90 per cent of all unfair labor practice complaints without issuance 
of formal proceedings; and of cases where formal proceedings were instituted 
only about so per cent proceeded to a final formal determination. The various 
bureaus and divisions of the United States Department of Labor accomplish 
most of their business informally. In one recent year, the Department of 
Agriculture, which administers twenty-odd regulatory statutes, involving thou-
sands of cases annually, found that only some 250 went to formal hearing, and 
of these only about one seventh proceeded beyond the state of exceptions to 
the examiner's intermediate report. 
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and conference are frequently the only methods of ascertain-
ing the existence and content of various unpublished rulings 
and general counsel opinions which may be determinative of 
the administrative ruling: instead of briefing judicial de-
cisions in his library, the attorney must learn of the agency's 
precedents by interviews with the agency's representatives. 
Despite the fact that the informal procedures are primarily 
designed to permit the agency to avoid the trial of cases, the 
respondent can thus advantageously utilize such procedures 
as an effective means of trial preparation. 
Other advantages are offered the respondent. Consultation 
and conference with agency representatives offer him an 
opportunity to convince the agency of the fairness of his 
position; and if this can be done his worries are very nearly 
at an end. Furthermore, negotiation with agency attorneys 
often serves to disclose alternative bases of settlement; coun-
sel for respondent can learn of various formulas, stipulations, 
or agreements which the agency will sometimes consent to 
as a means of disposing of the case. Such alternative solutions 
often afford, so far as the respondent is concerned, an easy 
way out. Sometimes the agency will be satisfied with a con-
cession which the respondent is entirely willing to make. 
These possibilities can be explored only by intelligent use 
of the informal procedure, for the agency rules do not ordi-
narily disclose these alternative possibilities, and agency rep-
resentatives are likely at the outset to suggest only such 
modes of settlement as are most favorable to the agency, 
rather than those which are most favorable to the respondent. 
2. Need for Rules Regulating Prehearing Procedures 
The advantages inherent in the informal procedures of 
administrative tribunals are so important as t.o discourage any 
suggestion that they should be eliminated. They are, in fact, 
the very lifeblood of the administrative process, and the 
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problem is to discover means of minimizing certain inherent 
difficulties without losing the great advantages that the prac-
tice offers. 
The central difficulty is that the situation offers opportuni-
ties for abuse of power. Citizens who are accustomed to con-
sult attorneys only in connection with court matters often 
undertake to deal with representatives of administrative 
agencies without first obtaining advice as to their legal rights. 
They often rely on the representatives of the agency to learn 
what the law requires of them. This of course heightens the 
importance of scrupulous fairness on the part of the admin-
istrators and their assistants. Granting the existence of this, 
it still remains inevitable that in negotiations looking toward 
a possible settlement, the government agency has many 
advantages.3 A private party has no desire to be in the bad 
graces of the agency which administers a law affecting his 
business. There is a tendency on the part of the respondent 
to make the best bargain he can with the agency rather than 
carry the matter to a formal hearing. This tendency may be 
almost impelling in cases where time is of the essence-as 
where the applicant seeks a license to issue an offering of 
securities or to continue the operation of a radio station, or 
where the respondent's challenged course of action consti-
tutes, if illegal, a continuing offense entailing daily increasing 
penalties. Then, too, the expense of conducting an action and 
carrying an appeal through the courts is a factor which weighs 
heavily with the private party and which sometimes prompts 
him to sacrifice his legal rights in favor of accepting a settle-
ment offered by the government. 
If an agency is so inclined, it can make use of these in-
nominate sanctions which attend the informal administrative 
procedures in such a way as to nullify largely the formal 
3 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 12. 
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safeguards which the principles of procedural due process 
have erected as a shield against arbitrary administrative ac-
tion.4 
While it is impossible to eliminate this possibility of abuse, 
much could be done to ameliorate the situation through the 
adoption of definite rules that would crystallize administra-
tive procedure. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act of I 946 goes a great distance in this direction, so far as 
the federal agencies are concerned. While the flexibilities of 
the informal procedures should not be sacrificed, yet they 
could be regularized without serious injury to any valid ad-
ministrative purpose. Adoption of adequate rules of proce-
dure, not conceived in any narrow sense but covering the 
important steps to be taken, would make available to the 
parties affected by quasi-judicial action a guide to practice 
and assistance in adequate preparation for the hearing. Such 
rules would enable the parties to know what alternative solu-
tions were available. They would enable the parties to know 
in advance the general policies which would control admin-
istrative action. They would enable the parties to know 
exactly what procedures were open to them, and with whom 
the case could be discussed. More important, they would 
tend to accomplish uniformity of procedure in like proceed-
ings within an agency, so that the manner in which a proceed-
ing was conducted, and the determination reached, would not 
depend on the particular administrative officer who happened 
to conduct it.5 
Quite apart from the tendency to reduce the possibilities 
for unfairness, adoption of procedural rules would otherwise 
aid in developing the efficiency of the informal procedures 
of administrative agencies. 
4 Idem., 86. 
5 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
( 194Z) J6. 
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3. Prehearing Narrowing of Issues 
Adoption of procedural rules setting up a regular method 
of prehearing conferences designed to narrow the issues and 
explore possibilities of settlement would be of great practical 
aid to the agencies and the parties appearing before them. 
Under conditions that prevail in most agencies, it is diffi-
cult for the parties even to ascertain with whom such possi-
bilities may be discussed. Not infrequently, no one save the 
head of the agency has power to make any binding stipula-
tions as to the facts or as to the issues; and the agency heads 
ordinarily are unable to take any part in informal prehearing 
conferences, because their whole time and attention is con-
sumed with matters of intra-agency administration, with con-
sidering general policies, and with the decision of cases that 
have been fully heard. Even if no formal stipulation is 
sought, and the desire is only for informal discussion, this 
frequently necessitates a trip to the central offices of. the 
agency, which may be hundreds of miles away from the re-
spondent's place of business. If such a trip be undertaken, 
the agency representative, as likely as not, will be required 
to take the position that he has no authority to make any 
bargain and that he cannot, on behalf of the agency, agree 
to forego any of the formal demands which have been made, 
in favor of reaching a compromise agreement. Further, any 
such conferences must be undertaken as a matter of private 
negotiations, without the aid that could be given if a hearing 
officer presided over the conference, just as a judge presides 
over the pre-trial hearing of a lawsuit, at which counsel for 
the parties discuss just such issues-the possibility of settle-
ment, simplification of issues, amendments to the pleadings, 
stipulations as to facts and documents, limitations of the 
number of expert witnesses, and such other matters as may 
aid in the efficient disposition of the case. Ordinarily, the 
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private parties are unable to have any contact with the hear-
ing officer before the hearing opens. In some agencies, there 
is consultation in advance of the hearing between the hearing 
officer and the representative of the agency who is to present 
the agency's case at the hearing. Whether or not this results 
in actual prejudice to the respondent, it creates at least an 
appearance of unfairness which is sufficient to condemn the 
practice.6 
All these difficulties could be avoided by adoption of pro-
cedural rules designed to set up a regular system of pre-trial 
hearings. This has been recommended by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure.7 Such a de-
vice would not rob the prehearing procedures of their flexi-
bility or informality. It would simply improve their effective-
ness. Provision could be made by rule for a prehearing 
conference to be conducted well in advance of the hearing, 
at a ·place convenient to the parties, and before a hearing 
officer, who would consult with representatives of the agency 
and representatives of the private parties in order to ascertain 
exactly what issues were in dispute, and what stipulations 
could be made as to the facts, and what compromise agree-
ments might be feasible. Power could be given to authorized 
representatives of the agency to make binding stipulations 
and firm commitments as to settlement. 
Such procedure would go far to remove many of the justi-
fied criticisms directed toward the present unsystematized 
practice by parties who are caught in its meshes. It would, 
further, facilitate rather than hinder the effective disposition 
of the agency's business, as has been demonstrated by the 
6 Cf., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YoRK ( 1942.) 112.. 
7 Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., ISt Sess. ( 1941) 67· 
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success with which such innovation has been met in the cases 
where it has been tried.8 
4· Use of Informal Procedure in Disposing of Case by Con-
sent 
The difficulty that is inherently present in the situation 
where an automobile driver undertakes to bargain with a 
traffic policeman on the question as to whether or not a 
ticket will be issued is also present, in greater or less degree, 
in most cases where negotiations are undertaken between 
representatives of an administrative agency and a respondent 
with the hope of discovering a means of disposing of the case 
by consent. But, as above indicated, in many types of cases 
there is room for bargaining, without any sacrifice to the 
public interest which the agency must uphold and enforce. 
The central problem in practice is whether or not, in cases 
where a mutually satisfactory means of disposing of the case 
can be found, the agency will insist on an admission of guilt 
before the issuance of a consent order. Some agencies do so 
insist. For example, the Federal Trade Commission long 
followed the rule that, after a formal complaint was issued, 
the respondent must formally admit at least one of the 
8 Stipulation procedures are used quite widely by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in reparations cases, by the Civil Aeronal)tics Board, and in pro-
ceedings under federal workmen's compensation laws. A few agencies provide 
for stipulations by rule-e. g., the Bituminous Coal Division, the Federal Power 
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the United States 
Maritime Commission. While obvious factors make it more difficult to reach 
settlements or compromise agreements in cases before administrative agencies 
than in private civil actions, yet there is often considerable basis for bargain-
ing. For example, in case of proceedings under the Wage Stabilization Law, 
56 Stat. 765, Ch. 578, the matter of agreeing on the amount of penalty to be 
imposed for unauthorized wage or salary adjustments was different only in 
emphasis from the matter of agreeing on the amount of damages to be allowed 
in a personal injury case. In other types of cases, it can sometimes be agreed 
that asserted past violations may be disregarded if the respondent adopts and 
agrees to adhere in the future to a course of conduct meeting the requirements 
and standards imposed by the agency. 
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charges before any consent order could be entered. Frequent-
ly, the respondent, although willing to comply with the 
course of action of which the Commission is desirous, feels 
he cannot make an insincere admission of guilt because of 
the prospect that it might afford a basis for a subsequent 
civil damage action. Other agencies have not imposed this 
requirement. For example, the National Labor Relations 
Board requires only that the respondent admit that his 
business substantially affects interstate commerce. Then, on 
a finding that the respondent is engaged in commerce, that 
a complaint has been issued, and that a stipulation has been 
made, the Board issues the order agreed on in the stipulation.9 
There appears to be no compelling reason to require an 
admission of guilt as a condition precedent to the issuance of 
a consent order. Often, the respondent in good faith asserts 
his complete innocence of the charge, but is willing to submit 
to the entry of an order enjoining a specified course of future 
conduct. The latter is, often, all that the agency or the 
public interest requires. The rules of the agencies should per-
mit the entry of consent orders, on stipulation, without ad-
: nission of guilt. 
This device of a consent order has even greater usefulness 
.• 1 cases where the parties informally consult with the agency 
before any actual formal complaint is issued. Some agencies 
nevertheless require the respondent to make certain admis-
sions of fact as a condition of the entry of a consent order, 
even in these cases where no formal complaint has been filed. 
9 The National War Labor Board developed an interesting practice, in con-
nection with its duty of penalizing violations of the Wage Stabilization Law. 
Thereunder, the alleged offender could submit a proposed statement of facts-
the truth of which he was not compelled to admit; on the contrary, he could 
expressly deny that the facts were such-and stipulate that if the Board fixed 
the penalty in a named amount, he would waive his rights to a hearing and 
consent to the entry of findings in accordance with the statement as submitted. 
If the proposed settlement was satisfactory to the Board, it would so find the 
facts, and issue an order imposing the agreed penalty. If it was unsatisfactory, 
the stipulation was rejected and could not thereafter be used for any purpose. 
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Surely, the better practice is that of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, under which the agreement is reduced to 
writing, and the charges withdrawn. 
Another important utility of the informal procedure, when 
availed of as a means of settling a case without resorting 
to formal proceedings, is the possibility of avoiding concomi-
tant hardships that follow from the issuance of a formal com-
plaint or order. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission issues deficiency letters, indicating what amend-
ments will be required in registration statements as a condi-
tion of avoiding a stop order which would formally put in 
contest the right of an issuer to market a security offering. 
Issuance of a stop order, in view of the sensitivity of market 
conditions, would normally (whatever the outcome of formal 
proceedings as to the propriety or sufficiency of the prospec-
tus) render it impossible to market the securities-the offer-
ing would be for practical purposes an impossible venture. 
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board consults with 
the parties while it is considering the issuance of a complaint 
charging unfair labor practices; and if a satisfactory adjust-
ment is reached, the employer avoids the stigma that in some 
measure attaches to the issuance of a complaint. It is well 
known that the issuance of a complaint by many federal 
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, to cite a 
typical example, is frequently a cause of substantial hardship 
to the accused (particularly in view of the wide publicity 
given the issuance of the complaint), even if the Commission 
subsequently finds that no illegal practices had been com-
mitted. 
Statutory recognition and regulation of the practice of 
"informal disposition," and development of procedural rules 
to facilitate the usefulness of the informal prehearing pro-
cedures (achieving the desirable end of avoiding unnecessary 
hardship in cases that do not involve any intentional viola-
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tion), would go far toward meeting criticism of administra-
tive absolutism. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
moves in this direction. Section 5 (b) requires the giving of 
an opportunity to present such proposals, in cases where a 
hearing is required by statute. Section 4 operates to promote 
informal dispositions in cases of rule making. In other cases, 
Section 6 (a) and Section 6 (d), supplemented by the appli-
cation of Section 9 and Section IO, indicate the general scope 
of informal procedures. 
5. Inspections and Tests 
In cases where the administrative adjudication is based on 
inspections or tests, informal methods afford private interests 
perhaps even greater protection than would formal hearing 
procedures. For example, when the issue involved is the 
fitness of food, the seaworthiness of a ship, or the ability of 
an individual to fly an airplane, no form of hearing would 
be as well calculated to reveal the truth as an actual inspec-
tion or test. 
But even here a problem is involved, for ordinarily in 
such a proceeding no record can be made on which a party can 
appeal to the courts for relief from what he deems to be a 
clearly erroneous administrative determination. In cases 
where an administrative agency denies a license on the basis 
of an informal inspection or test, great good could be achieved 
by the adoption of rules providing that after such denial, 
the applicant could obtain an administrative redetermination 
of the same issue, on the basis of a formal hearing. This 
would render it possible for the applicant to obtain a judicial 
review of any claims that the administrative determination 
exceeded the permissible bounds of discretion and was ca-
pricious and arbitrary. 
CHAPTER 7 
Powers to Compel Furnishing 
of Information 
A. AGENCY PowERS TO CoMPEL FuRNISHING oF 
INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATIVE agencies normally possess many 
fi methods of obtaining evidence which are not available 
to private litigants. Indeed, they possess powers in 
this connection not exercised by any other government offi-
cers. The fact that the agencies are often able to learn, in 
advance of hearing, the facts on which the respondent may 
rely in his defense (and as well many facts and circumstances 
which he might never be forced to reveal were it not for the 
agencies' extraordinary powers of discovery) is one of the 
principal reasons why the whole tone and character of judicial 
proceedings before administrative agencies are entirely dif-
ferent than in the case of proceedings in the courts. 
Thus, the agencies, if they utilize the facilities commonly 
afforded them by statute, frequently can be better prepaJ;"ed 
on the facts of the case than are the parties appearing before 
them. In addition to the information which the agency has 
obtained from the respondent, it may have obtained a great 
quantity of factual data from sources not available to the 
respondent. While it can often compel the respondent to 
reveal his case in advance, it is not under any requirement 
to afford a reciprocal privilege to the respondent. The ad-
vantages thus inherent in the agency's position, if unfairly 
used, could be utilized to deprive the opposite party of much 
of what is intended to be assured him by the general guar-
antee of a fair trial. Aside from this possibility of abuse of 
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power, there remains an inequality of position which affects 
the character of the entire proceedings. 
One result is that, in the case of many agencies, the hearing 
officer normally looks primarily to counsel for the agency 
for the information which he needs to decide the case. This of 
course is beneficial to the extent that it leads to an assumption 
of responsibility by the agency to make sure that all the im-
portant facts of each case are presented at the hearing. But 
to the extent that it may produce a predisposition on the part 
of the hearing officer to rely on the evidence presented by 
the agency more heavily than on that presented by the oppo-
site party, the tendency may lead unfortunately to an er-
roneous decision. 
Another result is a temptation to decide the case on the 
basis of the agency's private information rather than on the 
basis of the evidence produced at the hearing. An agency 
obtains information for many general purposes not specifi-
cally related to any particular case, and there is a natural 
tendency on the part of agency representatives to rely on 
the contents of secret investigational files in reaching the de-
termination in any particular case, if the contents of such 
secret files may seem relevant. There is a possibility that 
information which the administrator has gathered for the 
purpose of recommending legislation may subconsciously in-
fluence him in deciding what weight should be given, or what 
interpretation should be placed on, evidence appearing in 
the record of a particular contested case. 
The responsibility which the agencies assume to determine 
independently the true facts of the case, rather than follow-
ing the traditional judicial approach which shifts that re-
sponsibility to parties independent of the tribunal that decides 
the case, is thus far-reaching in its implications. It colors 
the proceedings as well in cases where an agency is more or 
less a disinterested judge in a contest between opposed pri-
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vate parties, as in cases where the agency is an active party 
in interest. 
In obtaining information, the agencies normally have 
available at least four methods of discovery: (I) investiga-
tion and examination of books and records; ( 2) requiring the 
appearance of witnesses and the production of documents by 
subpoena; (3) requiring the furnishing of reports; and (4) 
physical inspections. 
I. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS 
Many statutes creating administrative agencies bestow 
upon them broad powers to examine the books, papers, 
records, and other documents of the parties subject to the 
regulatory activities of the agency (but the agencies have 
no independent investigatory powers except such as may be 
delegated to them by statute-cj., Section 6(b) of the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act of 1 946). Such investiga-
tions may be either for the purpose of gathering general in-
formation or for the purpose of ascertaining whether or. not 
there exist infractions of legislative or administrative rules. 
While important as establishing broad patterns of public 
policy, these provisions have but little mandatory effect in 
compelling disclosure of information, for except as power is 
given to compel the production of papers (by enforcement of 
a subpoena or proceedings in the nature of mandamus) the 
power to inspect is one which can be exercised only with the 
consent of the party whose papers are to be inspected.1 If a 
party refuses to grant representatives of the agency access 
to the desired information, the agency must ask the court 
for aid in enforcing its demand. 
When such application is made to the courts, the issues 
presented are substantially the same as in case of an appli-
1 Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 62. S. Ct. 651 
(1942.). 
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cation to enforce a subpoena issued during the course of an 
administrative proceeding. The question as to judicial en-
forcement of requests by administrative agencies to compel 
disclosure of books and records for examination by the 
agency, therefore, will be discussed below in connection with 
the question as to enforcement of administrative subpoenas. 
There is wide variation in respect to the breadth of powers 
of inspection granted the various agencies, ranging from the 
almost unlimited visitorial rights of some state agencies to 
examine into the affairs of corporations franchised by the 
state 2 to the somewhat closely circumscribed grants of in-
vestigatory powers found in some of the earlier federal stat-
utes. The general validity of a grant of such power is estab-
lished beyond question; and decisions, as to whether or not 
the furnishing of the requested information will be compelled 
in a particular case, are based generally on the construction 
of particular statutes, rather than on broad constitutional 
grounds. But in construing statutes, the courts have been 
influenced by considerations as to the reasonableness of the 
agency's demands, as will be discussed more fully below in 
connection with cases involving applications to enforce sub-
poenas. 
II. ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENAS 
I. Right to Issue Dependent on Statute 
An agency's powers as to the issuance of subpoenas are 
regulated by statute. In the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion, an agency has no such power. Statutes granting the 
power are rather strictly construed. For example, it has been 
held that if the power is granted to the head of an agency, 
it may not be delegated by him to his subordinates, unless 
the statute also provides for delegation of such power.3 
2 See, for example, State ex ret. Public Utilities Commission v. Atchison, 
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., II5 Kan. 3, 221 Pac. 259 (1923). 
3 Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 62 S. Ct. 651 
( 1942), holding that delegation was not permitted under the Wage Hour 
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Granting the existence of the power, the conditions upon 
which subpoenas will be issued are within the control of the 
respective agencies, and widely variant practices have been 
adopted as to the showing required in an application for the 
·issuance of a subpoena, as to the identity of the officials pass-
ing upon such applications, as to service of the papers, and 
as to the general availability of the device. This is another 
of the many situations in which the heterogeneity of agency 
rules causes needless confusion.4 
'2. Methods of Enforcement 
The traditional and most effective method for enforcing 
obedience to the command of a subpoena, imprisonment for 
contempt, is one which the courts have been unwilling to 
permit administrative agencies to exercise. Occasionally, a 
legislature has undertaken to grant such a power to an admin-
istrative agency, but the view of most courts is that such 
grant of power is invalid.5 The reason ordinarily assigned in 
support of this conclusion is that the power to punish for 
contempt is exclusively judicial. But clearly such is not the 
true character of the power, for it is conceded that Congress 
and state legislatures, exercising no judicial powers, may 
punish for contempt,6 and in several cases it has been h~ld 
Law. Cj., Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 3 31 U. S. III, 67 
S. Ct. 1129 (1947), finding authority for such delegation in the Emergency 
Price Control Act. For general discussion, see note 19 TENN. L. REV. 544 
(1946); 42 ILL. L. REV. 672 (1947). 
4 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen, Doc. No, 8, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 414 et seq. 
5Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471 1 31 N. E. 190 {1892), which cites 
several cases. See Sherwood, "The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas," 
44 CoL. L. REV. 531 (1944). See also 54 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1940); 35 
CoL, L. REv. 578 (1935). A few courts have reached a contrary result, and 
have upheld the constitutionality of such provisions. E.g., In re Hayes, 200 
N.c. 133, 156 s. E. 791 (1931). 
6 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 {1927); Jurney v. 
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S. Ct. 375 (1935). 
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that such power may be conferred upon notaries public.7 The 
real reasons for the unwillingness of the courts, in the absence 
of express constitutional provision, to permit administrative 
agencies to exercise the power to punish for contempt are 
deeper reaching. They lie in the traditional distrust of any 
proposal to vest in any agency other than the legislature 
itself or the courts, the power to interfere with personal 
liberty. It is felt that the hazards of reposing such powers 
in the partisan hands of the agencies would exceed the advan-
tages that might be gained thereby. Such being the under-
lying reasons, there is a possibility that with the further 
acceptance of agencies as co-ordinate judicial agencies with 
the courts there may in future years be a relaxation of the 
doctrines now generally prevailing. 
Aside from occasional statutory provisions attaching penal 
sanctions to refusal to obey an administrative subpoena,8 the 
usual method provided for enforcement is by application to 
a court for an order directing obedience to the command 
of the subpoena.9 The statutes ordinarily make it discretion-
ary with the court whether or not the requested order shall be 
entered. Occasionally, the statute seems to make it mandatory 
upon the court to issue the requested order, but such pro-
visions are construed as granting a wide measure of discretion 
in the court to refuse to enforce the subpoena if it appears 
unreasonable.10 While somewhat cumbersome, and theoreti-
7 Noell v. Bender, 317 Mo. 392,295 S. W. 532 (1927). The courts divide 
on this particular question. See 35 CoL. L. REV. 578, 582 (1935). 
8 E.g., Federal Alcohol Administration; Department of Agriculture (Packers 
and Stockyards Act). 
9 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 
115 ( 1908). The typical provision is along the lines which seemingly origi-
nated with the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 49 U.S.C. § u. 
10 Matter of Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118 (1901). But there are 
limits to the Court's discretion. In Penfield Co. of California v. Securities & 
Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947), it was held that 
the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a witness, convicted of 
contempt for failure to obey a subpoena, to purge himself of contempt by pay-
ing a $50 fine. Under such circumstances, it was held, an answer should have 
been compelled. 
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cally subject to the objection that it imposes a heavy burden 
on the agencies to satisfy the court as to reasonableness and 
propriety of the subpoena, still, in view of the judicial tend-
ency to grant the agencies the benefit of any doubts on this 
score, the method has worked very well. Indeed, there are 
very few cases where administrative subpoenas are contested. 
Partly because of the disinclination of the party subpoenaed 
to suggest, by contumacious behavior, that he may have 
something to hide, and partly because of the readiness of 
the courts to enforce obedience, a subpoena issued by an ad-
ministrative agency is usually as effective as a judicial sub-
poena. It is essentially the power to punish for contempt that 
is reserved to the courts. 
3· Objections to Enforcement of Subpoena, or Other De-
mand for Revelation of Information 
General requirements as to validity. The general restric-
tions developed in the common-law courts as to the use of 
subpoenas in connection with the trial of cases are ordinarily 
applicable to subpoenas issued by administrative agencies, 
subject to such modifications as are suggested by the analogy 
between administrative subpoenas and those of a grand jury. 
The relevancy of the information sought to the matter 
under investigation must be shown, if a question is raised as 
to this,11 but the rigor of this requirement is attenuated by 
the readiness of the courts to assume that sufficient relevancy 
exists, unless it can be clearly shown that it does not. 
Similarly, the general requirement that the documents 
sought must be appropriately described, while recognized as 
a limitation, has not been construed in such a way as to 
interfere with the effective exercise by agencies of their sub-
11 Sinclair v. United States, 1.79 U.S. 263, 49 S. Ct. z68 (191.9); McGrain 
v. Daugherty, 1.73 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 (191.7); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 
103 U. S. 168 (188o); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S. Ct. 448 
(1917). 
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poena powers.12 Subpoenas requiring the production of all 
documents relative to a specified inquiry have been often 
sustained by the courts. 13 
Privilege. The same rules as to privilege applicable to 
judicial proceedings ordinarily apply to efforts by administra-
tive agencies to enforce the production of information.14 Ob-
jections based on the privilege against self-incrimination are 
thus recognized, although the practical effect of this is mini-
mized in two ways: (I) by the frequency of statutory pro-
visions eliminating this privilege upon a grant of immunity 
from prosecution based upon the information adduced; and 
( 2) by the unavailability of this objection where the subpoena 
is directed to a corporation.15 
Jurisdiction of agency. Not infrequently, an administra-
tive agency desires to compel the furnishing of information 
upon the basis of which it can be determined whether or not 
the agency has jurisdiction to proceed further. The respond-
ent, contending that he is not engaged in activities which 
the agency is authorized to supervise, may contest the sub-
poena on the grounds that the agency has no jurisdiction. 
In such cases,- obviously, the agency would find itself in a 
dilemma if it were required to prove its jurisdiction over the 
case before it could get the information which would enable 
it to determine whether jurisdiction existed. Influenced by 
these practical considerations, and in part by the suggestion 
that decision on the jurisdictional issue is primarily for the 
agency, the courts have generally held that the subpoena 
will be enforced, despite the denial of jurisdiction, if the 
agency asserts that it has reasonable ground to believe that 
12Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134,48 S. Ct. 288 (1928). 
13 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178 
(1908); Consolidated Mines of California v. Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 97 F. (2d) 704; cf., Shotkin v. Nelson (C.C.A. 1oth 
1944), 146 F. (2d) 402. 
14 United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 236 U. S. p8, 35 S. Ct. 363 
(1915). 
15 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644 (1896). 
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the necessary jurisdictional facts are present.16 But respondent 
should be, and seemingly is, entitled to a hearing on the 
narrower issue as to whether such reasonable belief exists.17 
The statutes empowering agencies to issue subpoenas or 
otherwise require disclosure of information are not ordinarily 
limited by any requirement that the agency can proceed 
only where it has probable cause to believe that a violation of 
law exists; and objections based on this ground have been 
unsuccessful.18 
Invasion of privacy. The principal objection raised to the 
enforcement of agency subpoenas is that based on the ground 
that the particular demand is unreasonable in scope, inter-
fering unjustifiably with the respondent's privilege of pri-
vacy, and constituting a mere fishing expedition. 
At this point, a clear distinction is apparent between de-
mands for the production of documents and demands ad-
dressed to oral testimony. 
In the case of a subpoena duces tecum, or a demand for 
the production of records for examination, the guarantee of 
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures presents difficulties which can often be avoided where 
16 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. sor, 63 S. Ct. 339 ( 1943), 
discussed in 41 MICH. L. REv. 959 ( 1943); 43 CoL. L. REV. 254 ( 1943); 52 
YALE L. J. 175 (1942); National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Trust 
Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1945), 148 F. (zd) 24; Walling v. Benson (C.C.A. 8th 
1943), 137 F. (2d) sor. Somewhat stricter requirements were imposed in 
General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming (C.C.A. 6th 1942), 125 F. (zd) 
596; but see the later decision of the same court in Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co. 
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945), 148 F. (2d) 198. 
17 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tung Corporation of America (D. 
C. Ill. 1940), 32 F. Supp. 371; and see dictum in Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49, 58 S. Ct. 459 (r938). But the point is not 
entirely clear; in Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th 
1940), 114 F. (2d) 384, respondent was denied the privilege of introducing 
evidence that the agency had no reasonable cause to believe that the respondent 
was subject to the act. 
18Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th 1940), II4 F. 
(zd) 384; National Labor Relations Board v. Barrett Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 
r 20 F. ( zd) 58 3; Consolidated Mines of California v. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 97 F. (zd) 704. See 40 MICH. L. REV. 78 
(1941); 29 GEO. L. ]. 328 (1940), 
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the demand is merely that a witness answer a particular 
question or furnish specified information. Further, in the 
case of a subpoena duces tecum, the courts cannot be insensi-
tive to the practical difficulties involved in complying with 
a demand that a large mass of records be collected and trans-
ported to the place of the hearing, where they may remain 
for quite a period of time, inaccessible to individuals having 
occasion to use them in the normal conduct of their daily 
business.19 For these reasons, the considerations that some-
times persuade the courts to deny enforcement of admin-
istrative subpoenas when challenged on this ground, are 
given greater weight in cases involving demands for the 
production of voluminous records than in cases of subpoenas 
ad testificandum. 
The difference, however, is essentially one of degree. The 
same broad considerations of public policy are relied on, 
whether the demand is that a party produce a certain paper 
or that he answer a certain question. In either case, the court 
in determining whether the subpoena should be enforced 
will take into account: (a) the nature of the proceeding; 
(b) the form of the particular request; and (c) the balance 
of interests, in terms of the particular case, between the 
public interest in disclosure and the private interest in sup-
pressing public knowledge of the facts. 
(a) The nature of the proceeding. The demand of the 
agency for information may be made in the course of a 
judicial-type proceeding, or as part of a legislative inquiry, 
or in connection with a general inquisitorial investigation. 
Where the information is desired for use in a proceeding 
where the agency must pass on a judicial question affecting 
the party upon whom the demand is made, the courts are 
19 Federal Trade Commission v. Smith (D. C. N. Y. 1929), 34 F. (2d) 
323; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas (App. D. C. 
1939), 105 F. (2d) too. 
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inclined to grant enforcement of the demand. In such cases-
typically, where a hearing is to be had on a complaint-the 
issues are ordinarily defined at least in general terms, and 
there is but little reason why any information pertinent to 
such issues should be withheld. 
For somewhat different reasons, the courts quite readily 
enforce demands for information desired in the course of 
a legislative inquiry, undertaken to obtain information on the 
basis of which a statute is to be written or amended. Where 
such inquiry is undertaken by a legislative committee, or by 
an agency pursuant to a specific request from the legislature, 
the courts are inclined to presume (at least in the absence of 
a clear contrary showing) that the inquiry is properly related 
to the legislative purpose. A somewhat different situation is 
presented, however, where an administrative agency on its 
own initiative undertakes a general investigation on the basis 
of which it contemplates making recommendations to the 
legislature as to possible statutory amendments. It is hard 
to distinguish this from the broad inquisitorial investigations 
which have received but little favor from the courts. 
In the latter type of case, where an administrative agency 
is conducting a general investigation better to advise itself 
of conditions existing in the field wherein its regulatory 
activities are exercised, enforcement of the demand for infor-
mation exhibits more clearly a tendency to violate the as-
sumed right of the law-abiding citizen or corporation to be 
free of "officious intermeddling"; and accordingly it is in 
these cases that the courts have sometimes been more reluc-
tant to enforce the administrative subpoena. Until recent 
years, at least, the demand for information, when made under 
such circumstances, has often been denied on the theory that 
there exists a right of privacy which cannot be invaded unless 
there clearly appears a compelling public interest in dis-
closure. 
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(b) Form of demand. The particular form of the de-
mand-the way a question is put or the manner in which 
the desired documents are described-is also a factor. If 
the inquiry is grossly impertinent, as if the question is directed 
more to the personal affairs of the witness than to his business 
practices, the courts are somewhat reluctant to compel dis-
closure. Such considerations (at least equally with the argu-
ment based on a somewhat minor change in the language of 
the controlling statute), led the Supreme Court to deny the 
right of the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel the 
president of the Union Pacific Railroad to answer questions 
as to his personal investments in railroad stocks,20 but to 
enforce the Commission's demand that the president of the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad testify as to the amounts 
expended by his company in political activities.21 
(c) Public and private interest. The courts try to prick 
out a line between mere scandalmongering inquiries, and 
cases where the requested information is necessary for the 
enlightened discharge of the agency's functions. For a long 
time, the courts felt that the rights of privacy were to be 
respected unless the competing public interest in disclosure 
was clearly the more compelling.22 Many decisions appeared 
to create a privilege, linked with the protective rights 
against compulsory self-accusation and unlawful searches 
and seizures, against unreasonable inquisitorial investigations. 
However, more recent decisions, while not denying such a 
privilege, indicate that it is now much more difficult than 
it had been in former years to convince the courts as to the 
20 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 I 1 U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 
II5 (I908). 
21 Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30 
(I9I7). 
22 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 I I U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 
II5 (I9o8); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 
298, 44 S. Ct. 336 (I924); Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 298 
u.s. I, 56 s. Ct. 654 (I936). 
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unreasonableness of the demand. Recently, the Supreme 
Court indicated that if (a) the agency is authorized by law 
to make the inquiry it proposes, and if (b) the information 
sought is relevant to that inquiry, then the subpoena should 
be enforced unless it is so broad and indefinite as to be plainly 
a case of "officious intermeddling." Only then is it to be 
called unreasonable, because the private interests to be pro-
tected "are not identical with those protected against invasion 
by actual search and seizure." 23 
The real problem always is balancing the public interest 
against private security. The question is whether the demand 
for information "is out of proportion to the end sought." 24 
Since the question is thus one of axiology, of balancing com-
peting values, it is not surprising that the factual elements 
of each particular case may sway the balance in one direction 
or the other. A demand by an agency to examine a broker's 
records may be either "a violation of the natural law of 
privacy in one's own affairs," or "unobjectionable," depend-
ing on the court's appraisal of the general morals of the 
particular situation.25 
In drawing the dividing line between the permissible and 
the illicit, the courts are influenced by the apparent reasona-
bleness of the request, its apparent relevancy to a clearly 
proper and important administrative purpose,26 the degree to 
23 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213, 66 S. Ct. 494 
(1946), commented on in 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6oz (1946); cf., Fleming 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 114 F. (zd) 384; 
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Vacuum Can Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1946), 
157 F. (zd) 530. The current trend of the federal courts to grant enforcement 
of administrative subpoenas in almost every case is discussed in Davis, "The 
Administrative Power of Investigation," 56 YALE L. J. 1II1 (1947). 
24 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1937), 87 F. 
(zd) 377,379• 
25 Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1936), 81 F. (zd) 847, 849. Later, 
after the agency alleged that it wished to examine the records to uncover sus-
pected fraud, the examination which had at first been denied was subsequently 
permitted. Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 105 F. (zd) 583. 
26 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1937 ), 87 F. 
(zd) 377· 
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which the business in question is affected by a public interest, 
and the apparent intent of the legislature as to the breadth of 
the inquiry authorized.27 
4· Compelling Production of Documents m Possession of 
Disinterested Parties 
Not infrequently, the records of a bank or a stockbroker 
revealing the financial dealings of a customer, or a telegraph 
company's copies of messages sent over its wires, may be a 
productive source of information for an administrative agen-
cy. May an agency, by subpoena or other demand directed 
to the company, require it to permit an examination of all 
its records which may throw some light on the activities of 
the company's customers? 
If the company itself objects, the question of course is 
determinable on the same basis as in any other case where 
the owner of records objects that a broad demand for dis-
closure thereof is unreasonable. But frequently the company 
has no objection to producing the records in question save 
for a general desire to protect the customer's good will by 
respecting his wishes for privacy; and this is not often a 
sufficient incentive to compel the company to contest vigor-
ously the demand of the agency. 
In such cases, has the company's customer, whose affairs 
are the ultimate object of the investigation, any grounds to 
complain? Since the search is not directed to the customer's 
own records, he apparently cannot invoke the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches; 28 nor 
27 In addition to the cases above cited, see Smith v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 245 U.S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30 (1917); Federal Trade Commission 
v. Baltimore Grain Co. (D. C. Md. 1922), 284 Fed. 886, aff'd 267 U.S. 586, 
45 S. Ct. 461 (1924); Federal Trade Commission v. National Biscuit Co. 
(D. C. N.Y. 1937), 18 F. Supp. 667; Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States 
(C.C.A. 7th 1926), 15 F. (2d) 133. 
28 Newfield v. Ryan (C.C.A. 5th 1937), 91 F. (2d) 7oo; Zimmerman v. 
Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 105 F. (2d) 583-this decision citing many cases; 
McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1937), 87 F. (2d) 
377· 
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can he ordinarily show that any privilege prohibits the dis-
closure of the information (as would be true in the case of 
communications to counsel).29 
He does, however, seem to be accorded a derivative right 
to insist that the company assert, and to assert on the com-
pany's behalf, any objection to the disclosure that could 
properly be urged by the company.30 But this amounts to 
little, for ordinarily the company has no grounds for com-
plaining that the search is unreasonable.31 
Despite the fact that the person whose activities are the 
subject of the search is not immediately involved, he is never-
theless the real party in interest. Should he not have a 
standing to object to a procedure that would compel disclos-
ure by a disinterested third party of its duplicate records, 
in cases where he could resist a similar demand directed to 
him personally? If his private copies of telegrams which he 
has sent, or his own record of his banking transactions or 
deposits in a stockbroker's accounts, are protected as against 
a general inquisitorial search, should not the protection be 
extended to counterparts of such records in the hands of 
the banker, broker, or telegraph company? Decisions in some 
cases, and dicta in others, recognize that the person being in-
vestigated should be regarded as the real party in interest, 
and should have a right to injunctive relief to prevent the 
opening of the records of his agent to an unreasonably broad 
search.32 The fact that such records are not strictly private 
doubtless inclines the courts to view with greater complai-
sance a rather broad demand. Again, the question is funda-
mentally one calling for the court's judgment as to the 
29 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1937), 87 F. 
(2d) 377· 
30 This is conceded by dicta in the McMann case, supra. 
31 United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile (D. C. Ala. 1924), 295 Fed. 
142, aif'd sub nom. First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United States, 267 U. S. 
576, 45 S. Ct. 231 (1925). 
82 Hearst v. Black (App. D. C. 1936), 87 F. (2d) 68; Newfield v. Ryan 
(C.C.A. 5th 1937), 91 F. (2d) 7oo. 
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reasonableness of the demand, under all the circumstances 
of the case. 33 
5. Remedy Against Improper Demand for Production of 
Information 
Where a subpoena, or other demand for production of 
information, is improper (on the basis of any of the objec-
tions above discussed) ordinarily the only course open to the 
party objecting to the demand is to refuse to obey it, and 
challenge its validity in the course of proceedings brought 
by the administrative agency to enforce it. Ordinarily, mo-
tions to quash the subpoena or to enjoin the enforcement 
thereof are not available as a means of obtaining in advance a 
judicial determination of the propriety of the demand.34 If 
violation of the subpoena entails criminal penalties, equitable 
remedies may be available.35 Similarly, injunctive relief is 
available in situations where the objection is not only to the 
enforcement of the subpoena, but to the public disclosure of 
the information demanded; 36 and also in situations of the 
sort discussed in the preceding section, where the objection 
is addressed to compliance on the part of a disinterested third 
party with unreasonable requirements for disclosure of con-
fidential information. 
A judicial order directing obedience to a subpoena is 
'-'J:lpealable.37 
33 Cf., Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1936), 81 F. (:z.d) 847; and 
the Court's later decisiqn in a subsequent phase of the same case in Zimmerman 
v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 11939), 105 F. (:z.d) 583. 
34 Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 3 7 5, 
58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' National Federa-
tion (App. D. C. 1931), 47 F. (:z.d) 42.8; Fleming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp. 
(D. C. N.Y. 194o), 38 F. Supp. 675. 
35 Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' Nat. Federation (App. D. C. 
1927), 23 F. (zd) 968. 
36 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas (App. D. C. 
1939), 105 F. (2d) 1oo. 
37 Brownson v. United States (C.C.A. 8th 1929), 32. F. (:z.d) 844. 
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III. REQUIRING REPORTS 
Administrative agencies are frequently granted power to 
require the filing of reports by those whose activities are 
subject to the agency's jurisdiction. In the absence of statu-
tory authorization, it is very doubtful whether the filing of 
reports could be compelled; but even in the absence of such 
authorization, a suggestion that a report be filed in lieu of 
submitting to a demand, backed by a subpoena, for produc-
tion of books and records, is to say the least highly persuasive. 
While the preparation of such reports involves practical 
difficulties in connection with attempting accurately to com-
press voluminous information into tailor-made forms that 
sometimes do not well fit the situation, yet there are few 
legal difficulties involved. The Fourth Amendment is inap-
plicable.38 Any invasion of asserted rights of privacy which 
may be involved is not likely to be embarrassing. Because 
of the opportunity to reconcile figures and report legal con-
clusions, the filing of reports does not lay open one's affairs 
to such soul-searching scrutiny as does the revelation of 
private records and correspondence. 
The desire of the agencies for a wealth of information as 
to topics connected only collaterally with matters within the 
agencies' jurisdiction is sometimes met by refusal to furnish 
information called for in the report form. In such cases, the 
furnishing of the information is generally required if it has a 
substantial bearing on matters falling within the agency's 
jurisdiction.39 
Closely related to the power to require the filing of re-
ports is the power to prescribe accounting systems, which by 
38 Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., Inc. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 57 S. Ct. 407 
(1937). 
89 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., Z24 U. S. 194, 
32 S. Ct. 436 (1912); Terminal Taxi Cab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252., 36 
S. Ct. 583 (1916); United States v. Clyde S.S. Co. (C.C.A. 2d 1929), 36 F. 
(2d) 691; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co. (App. D. C. 
1923), 285 Fed. 936, rev'd 274 U.S. r6o, 47 S. Ct. 553 (1927). 
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statute is vested in some agencies. Compliance with require-
ments as to the form of accounting prescribed has been quite 
consistently enforced.40 Objections as to the soundness of 
the accounting system preferred by the agency will be con-
sidered only if the system adopted by the agency is so entirely 
at odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting as 
to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of 
judgment.41 
IV. PHYSICAL INSPECTIONS 
Whether or not the controlling statute gives such power, 
representatives of administrative agencies (exhibiting the 
layman's preference, which is in many types of cases entirely 
justifiable, for getting facts by firsthand investigation rather 
than on the basis of testimony) frequently rely on personal 
inspections as a means of obtaining information. 
Of course, if an inspection of the premises affords an 
opportunity to obtain accurate firsthand knowledge of physi-
cal facts affecting the determination of a case, there is no 
sound reason why an administrative tribunal should not rely 
on information thus gained. But the question in each case is 
whether or not the inspection does afford such opportunity. 
The agency's investigators may not see all that there is to be 
seen. They may report inaccurately to the officers in whom 
resides the ultimate power of decision. The physical situation 
may not be the same at the time of the inspection as at the 
time to which the determination relates. 
Reliance by an agency on such inspection of course narrows 
the sphere of effective judicial review, and in cases where 
40 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 
32 S. Ct. 436 (1912); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134, 
53 S. Ct. 52 ( 1932). 
41 American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 
57 S. Ct. 170 (1936). For discussion of the general problem, see Kripke, "A 
Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Accounts 
100.5 and 107,'' 57 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1944-); Morehouse, "Innovations in 
Public Utility Accounting Regulation," 46 YALE L. J. 955 (1937). 
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an agency must decide on the basis of a hearing and support 
its conclusion by a record containing substantial evidence 
tending to prove the facts found, reliance by the agency on 
such a physical inspection may be invalid as depriving the 
respondent of a hearing. He may be deprived of his right of 
cross-examination and of the means of showing that there 
is no substantial evidence to support the agency's findings.42 
On the other hand, in cases where the agency is not com-
pelled to grant a hearing, or where there is no provision for 
direct judicial review of the case on the basis of the record 
made by the agency, the agency is free to decide a case on 
the basis of its own inspection.43 
B. RIGHT oF DEFENDANT TO CoMPULSORY PRocEss 
I. Where Agency Has No Power to Issue Subpoena 
Many agencies have no powers to issue subpoenas. In pro-
ceedings conducted before such tribunals, counsel for both 
parties, the agency as well as the respondent, must rely on 
informal arrangments to induce witnesses to appear and tes-
tify. While the burden thus imposed may weigh more heavily 
on counsel for the private party than on counsel for the 
agency, yet the mere fact that compulsory process is not 
available to the respondent does not, at least in the absence 
of a clear showing of actual prejudice and deprival of an 
opportunity for a full and fair hearing, invalidate the ad-
ministrative proceedings.44 Significantly, almost all the cases 
42 Farmers' Elevator Co. of Yorkville v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., z66 
Ill. 567, 107 N. E. 841 (1915). 
43 People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 
I, 35 N. E. po (1893). · 
44 Low Wah Suey v. Backus, zzs U. S. 460, 3z S. Ct. 734 ( 19u); Missouri 
ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, Z7I U.S. 40, 46 S. Ct. 384 (19z6); Brinkley v. 
Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 Pac. 64 (1930), appeal dismissed z8z U.S. 8oo, 
51 S. Ct. 39 (1930): In Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191, 116 N. E. 4Z 
(I 9 I 7), which apparently holds the contrary, the decision was placed on the 
somewhat broader grounds that the statute vested in the agency none of the 
powers essential to the conduct of a hearing. 
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so holding pomt out that the respondent in the administrative 
proceedings, who was objecting to the unavailability of com-
pulsory process, did not show that this lack actually preju-
diced the presentation of his case. It would be a rare case 
where such a showing could be made, for ordinarily a hostile 
witness who refuses to testify voluntarily cannot be depended 
upon to give any helpful testimony, except as to matters of 
a formal nature which most often can be otherwise proved. 
But circumstances can be conceived where the inability to 
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of 
documents would actually operate to deprive a party of an 
opportunity for a full and fair hearing. In such cases it is 
probable that appropriate relief could be obtained. 
2. Conditions on Issuance of Subpoena 
In cases where the agency does have power to issue a 
subpoena, a different question is presented. To what extent 
may the agency attach conditions to the issuance of subpoenas 
requested by a private party appearing as respondent in pro-
ceedings before the agency? 
The sounder administrative practice is to place the issuance 
of subpoenas on a ministerial basis, making them readily 
available to all parties, and (this particularly) making them 
as easily obtainable by counsel for private parties as by coun-
sel for the agency. This conforms with established judicial 
traditions, under which subpoenas are ordinarily issued in 
blank by the clerk of the court, to be used by counsel as occa-
sion requires. It is, if anything, more important in adminis-
trative proceedings than in judicial proceedings that sub-
poenas be readily available to the private parties, for the 
practice of entrusting the agency-one of the parties in 
interest-with the responsibility to decide whether the ad-
verse party should be aided in preparing his case for trial, 
creates at least a suspicion if not an appearance of unfairness. 
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It has been suggested that to avoid any possibility of abuse 
of this power, it should be transferred from the litigant 
agency to some independent o:ffi.ce.45 This may be unnecessary, 
but at least the agencies should take pains to avoid making 
their subpoenas more easily obtainable by agency counsel than 
by private parties.46 
However, many agencies (with laudable motives but 
unfortunate shortsightedness) do impose various conditions 
upon the issuance of subpoenas to respondents, which are not 
imposed where the staff of the agency seeks a subpoena. 
While such requirement has been criticized as "unreasonable 
and unfair," 47 the federal courts have generally held that 
in the absence of clear showing of actual prejudice, imposition 
of such requirements will be sustained.48 Since actual preju-
dice may be suffered in cases where its existence is not sus-
ceptible to precise demonstration, there is much to be said 
for the view that the burden should be on the agency to 
prove lack of prejudice, and at least one state court has taken 
this position.49 Section 6 of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of I 946 requires federal agencies to issue sub-
poenas to any party upon a statement showing the general 
relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence, and further 
45 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JuDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (194z) 2.5. 
46 See comments of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) u4; and further statement of concurring members, 
idem., ZZI. 
47 Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 
109 F. (zd) 9, zo, where the court held that in view of this and other matters 
respondent had been denied a fair trial. 
48 North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. National Labor Relations :Board 
(C.C.A. 9th 1940), 109 F. (zd) 76; National Labor Relations Board v. Dahl-
strom Metallic Door Co. (C.C.A. zd 194o), 112. F. (:~.d) 756; National Labor 
Relations Board v. Blackstone Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. zd 1941), u3 F. (:~.d) 633. 
49 Coney Island Dairy Products Corp. v. Baldwin, 2.43 App. Div. 178, z76 
N. Y. S. 6 8 2. ( 19 3 5), setting aside an order revoking a milk dealer's license 
because of the refusal of the commissioner to furnish subpoenas to a respondent 
who refused to state whom he wished to subpoena. As to the general problem 
of the respondent's statutory right to subpoena, see 53 HARV. L. REV. 842. 
(1940). 
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requires that a denial of such an application must be accom-
panied by a statement of the reasons therefor. 
The reluctance of many agencies to make subpoenas read-
ily available to respondents is based upon a fear that attempts 
would be made to impede the expeditious progress of hear-
ings by calling too many witnesses, or by calling witnesses 
to testify to irrelevant or immaterial matters, in the hope 
of possibly confusing the issue or at least delaying the issu-
ance of the order. Such abuses are well known, but there are 
many devices to meet them which serve the purpose more 
aptly than does a conditional refusal to issue the subpoena. 
Hearing officers, generally, are not without power to exclude 
immaterial testimony. Where it becomes obvious that the 
purpose of the respondent is to waste time, administrative 
agencies can employ the same devices as do the courts to cut 
the hearing short. The danger that an unlimited right to sub-
poena witnesses might operate unfairly to the witnesses (as 
where competitors are subpoenaed to testify on an issue that 
is clearly irrelevant) can be met by making provision for 
quashing subpoenas at the instance of the witness.50 
While there may be sounder grounds for limiting the 
issuance of subpoenas duces tecum than subpoenas ad testi-
ficandum, in view of the substantially greater burden of pro-
ducing documentary evidence, yet the admonition of Chief 
Justice Marshall in the Burr case,51 that "the opposite party 
can . . . take no more interest in the awarding of a sub-
poena duces tecum than in the awarding of an ordinary 
subpoena," applies as aptly to administrative agencies as to 
courts. 
A useful purpose would be served by a requirement, equal-
ly applicable to agency representatives and to private parties, 
50 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(1942) 162-164. 
5l 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 35 (Case No. 14,692d). 
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that the application for a subpoena need state only the general 
reason for the request (and this could be shown without iden-
tifying the witness or outlining his testimony). No more 
should be required. 
3· Subpoena to Agency Representatives 
The files of an agency may contain matters which, if made 
a part of the record at the hearing, would be helpful to the 
respondent's case, but which the agency for tactical reasons 
does not care to introduce in evidence. Similarly, members 
of the agency's staff occasionally are potentially valuable 
witnesses as to occurrences which the agency has no wish to 
make a matter of record. Since the respondent in such a case 
must in effect ask the agency to compel itself to testify, he is 
ordinarily without a remedy to compel the production of any 
information which the agency does not wish to produce volun-
tarily, and the agencies quite properly are reluctant to open 
their files in all cases to the parties appearing before them. 
Agency staffs welcome fishing expeditions no more than do 
private parties. Further, the agency's files often contain 
matters which are privileged from compulsory disclosure. 
But where the proceedings are being conducted before a 
tribunal other than that of the agency to which the request 
is directed, a subpoena may properly issue to require disclos-
ure of specified, relevant factual data 52 (unless the agency 
has by rule prohibited the production of official records in 
court proceedings on the ground that to do so would be prej-
udicial to the public interest) 53 and, in some cases, of certain 
information as to agency practices and procedures.54 Inquiry 
directed to the mental processes of members of the adminis-
52 Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220,48 S. Ct. 87 (1927). 
53 Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States (C.C.A. zd 1947), 163 F. (2d) 133· 
54 National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. sth 
1938), 98 F. (zd) 444· 
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trative staff, however, is ordinarily forbidden on the same 
grounds which preclude cross-examination of a judge or 
jury as to the basis on which a certain decision was reached.1111 
55 United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 ( 1941); National 
Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, Inc. (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 106 
F. (zd) z63; National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. 
(C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (zd) 16. For a general discussion, see Pike and 
Fischer, "Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies," s6 HARV. L. 
REV. IUS (1943). 
CHAPTER 8 
Right to a Fair Trial 
I. General Tests of Fairness of Trial 
THE granting of a fair trial is the one sine qua non of administrative procedure. It is the one fixed criterion of judicial review. Although the courts may decline to 
review an agency's findings of fact and in some cases at least 
its conclusions of law, there is always the opportunity for ju-
dicial review of the issue as to whether an administrative 
determination was made without giving an opportunity for 
full presentation of a party's case or without fair consideration 
of the just rights of the party.1 
But provisions for judicial review are not an appropriate 
means for achieving and guaranteeing fairness in administra-
tion. Even if an agency were stripped of every vestige of 
judicial power, and its determinations thus removed from 
the ambit of judicial review, the problem of administrative 
fair play would remain substantially undiminished.2 
The achievement of the goal is fundamentally a task com-
mitted to the agencies themselves. As the agencies attain the 
stability and poise of maturity, their attention is increasingly 
devoted to refining the procedural devices which they have 
worked out in their specific fields, adding safeguards where-
ever the need appears, to the end of assuring not only the 
effective enforcement of the social or economic policies whose 
implementation is entrusted to their care, but assuring also 
that fair consideration be given the individual rights of the 
1 Final Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 78; Hale, "Administrative Hearings under the Federal 
Constitution," 30 KY. L. J. 137 (1942.). 
2 Chester Lane, Address before the Association of American Law Schools, 
Handbook of Proceedings, 36th annual meeting (1938) 184, 199. 
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parties involved, to the end that adjudication be not only 
prompt but just. 
The requirement of a fair trial is commonly associated 
with the hearing procedure itself. This association probably 
springs from the identification of hearing and trial in the 
common-law courts, where they constitute the essence of the 
adjudicatory process; and from the fact that the formal 
hearing constitutes the most dramatic step in administrative 
procedure. But because of deep-seated differences between 
judicial and administrative techniques, many of the require-
ments encompassed in the constitutional guaranty of a fair 
trial are to be applied, in administrative proceedings, to ac-
tivities that either precede or follow the actual hearing. The 
question as to whether a fair trial has been granted cannot 
be answered by looking to the hearing procedure alone. 
Thus, one of the three fundamental requisites of a fair 
trial-an opportunity to be fully informed of the nature of 
the charge in time to prepare to meet it-has only a collateral 
connection with the hearing procedure proper. The notice 
may, as above discussed, either precede or follow the hear-
ing. Sometimes the hearing procedure itself is utilized as 
the means of giving this information to the respondent. But 
whatever device may be appropriate in the operations of a 
particular agency, as a means of informing the respondent of 
the nature of the agency's claim, this requirement has no 
direct connection with the hearing procedure itself. It is 
rather a part of the general problem of the adequacy of 
notice, discussed above. 
A second basic requirement of a fair trial-that the one 
who decides must hear, i.e., that the actual decision must 
be that of the officer or board to whom the responsibility 
has been delegated by the legislature and who must reach 
that decision on the basis of a personal knowledge of the 
evidence-is likewise disassociated from the hearing proce-
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dure proper. Contrary to normal judicial practice, where the 
initial decision is ordinarily that of the officer before whom 
the testimony is taken, the actual process of determination in 
administrative agencies is normally a posthearing procedure. 
The requirement is spoken of as part of the general guaranty 
of a fair trial because of the intimate association between 
hearing and decision in the courts, where indeed (as in jury 
trials) the decision is often the final step of the trial or 
hearing procedure. But in administrative proceedings, the 
process of determination is to a large extent divorced from 
the hearing procedure proper. This second requirement is 
therefore treated separately, infra. 
The third general requirement of a fair trial-that the 
party on trial be granted an opportunity fully to present his 
contentions, by adducing testimony and arguing thereon be-
fore an unbiased tribunal-is the only aspect of this general 
guaranty which, in administrative procedure, is directly con-
nected with the hearing itself. It is this particular portion 
of the general problem that is here discussed. 
In addressing the problem as to what is and should be 
required of administrative tribunals as a means of safeguard-
ing individual rights at the formal hearing, there is one 
fundamental to be borne in mind. The basic characteristics 
of trial procedure in the courts (which are largely a reflection 
of a particular Anglo-American historical development, in-
fluenced by many diverse factors, prominent among which 
has been the rather narrowly defined range of judicial ac-
tivity) are not imposed on administrative tribunals, 3 which 
represent an outgrowth of conditions far different from those 
which influenced the course of the judicial procedures of 
the courts.4 While the requirements imposed with respect 
3 Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 
U.S. 134, 6oS. Ct. 437 (1940). 
4 See Maitland, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908) 415-
418; Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, passim. 
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to hearings conducted by administrative agencies have been 
worked out with reference to judicial standards, yet the anal-
ogy is not to be taken in any technical sense. The fundamental 
principle is only that the rudimentary requirements of fair 
play be observed.5 Lawyers who have objected long and 
bitterly to many aspects of customary court procedure, so far 
as its application in the courts is concerned, have had a tend-
ency to enshrine this procedure as sacrosanct when adminis-
trative tribunals set out boldly on new and unfamiliar courses. 
But the courts see no immutable perfections in court-type 
procedure which administrative agencies must, at their peril, 
follow. Rather, the agencies are free to work out any type of 
hearing procedure which appears reasonably apt to the re-
quirements of their particular task, subject only to the one 
requirement that the technique adopted must not violate the 
fundamental requirements of fair play and common decency. 
Little more is required than that the one who decides shall 
be bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, and to 
be guided essentially by what the evidence discloses, rather 
than by extraneous considerations which in other fields might 
control purely executive action.6 
The reason for allowing wide departures from normal 
hearing procedures is said to be that such departures may 
make for brevity and speed. These ideals, however, are sel-
dom realized. Records comprising several thousand pages 
are not unusual. Hearings before such bodies as the Federal 
Trade Commission are protracted not infrequently over a 
period of months if not years. Indeed, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has found it desirable in one branch 
of its work to resort to the federal courts for the trial of 
5 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938). Among 
the many law review articles discussing the Morgan cases, the following are 
noteworthy: 27 GEO. L. J. 351 (1939); 47 YALE L. J. 647 (1938); 10 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 43 (1941); 30 KY. L. J. 408 (1942). 
6 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936). 
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its cases, utilization of the administrative hearing having been 
found to be slower and more expensive.7 
In cases where the reason for the rule is lacking, the rule 
should have but little application. In lengthy hearings on 
closely contested technical issues of fact and law, where the 
contentions of the opposing parties are presented by skilled 
attorneys, the cause of good administration is furthered by 
the adoption of customary judicial techniques in conducting 
the trial of cases. In other instances, as where a ·wounded 
veteran seeks disability benefits, or an aged applicant seeks 
an old-age allowance under the Social Security Act, or an 
unemployed worker seeks unemployment benefits, an atmos-
phere of sympathetic conversation is perhaps best conducive 
to proper administration. There, the rule that informal hear-
ing procedures are proper, so long as the rudimentary re-
quirements of fair play are observed, has just and fitting 
application. But the rule does not so well fit the case of 
proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, state or 
federal utility commissions, the National Labor Relations 
Board, and other bodies before which experienced attorneys 
present evidence in heated controversies involving highly 
complex issues of law and fact. In such cases, formality is 
desirable, not only as a means of assuring dignity and de-
corum, but as the most effective means of assuring that the 
administrative officers presiding at the hearing shall not be 
misled by extraneous distractions. 
Even in such cases, however, undesirable though it is, 
unrestrained informality does not void the administrative 
proceedings. The niceties of judicial procedure cannot be 
insisted upon. It is the responsibility of the agencies so to 
shape hearing techniques in these cases as to utilize the 
merits of the procedures that have developed in the courts. 
7 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 81 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1941) 61. 
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2. The Requirement of Impartiality 
(a) The general problem. It is frequently said that the 
complete impartiality of the tribunal which hears and decides 
the case is one of the prerequisites of a fair trial. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that the requirement of an impartial 
tribunal, unconcerned with the result, applies with even 
greater rigidity to administrative officers than to judges; 8 
and it has been said that an administrative body exercising 
quasi-judicial powers "must, from the very nature of its 
duties, act with entire impartiality"; 9 because "Judgment 
ceases to be judicial if there is condemnation in advance of 
trial." 10 
But this requirement of impartiality should not be taken 
as meaning that the administrative agency must be indifferent 
to the result. So far as constitutional requirements are con-
cerned, an agency may approach a hearing with a strong hope 
that a record may be built up which will permit the agency 
to enter and enforce an order, the desirability of which is to 
the agency a matter of predetermined conviction. 
This is the very core of the problem as to the practical 
connotations of the requirement of impartiality. In view of 
the frequent tendency of the agencies to make decisions on 
the basis of preformed opinions and prejudices, and the re-
lated tendency of many administrative officials to feel they 
are appointed to perform a mission and intentionally to direct 
their determinations accordingly,11 the parties whose interests 
are adverse to those of the agency assail as prejudice an 
attitude of mind which on closer examination proves to be no 
8 National Labor Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. 5th 1943), 136 F. 
(2d) 562. 
9 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 624, 55 S. Ct. 869 
(1935). 
10 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 494, 55 S. Ct. 8r8 (1935) l see also, 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927); Jordan v. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, 225 U.S. r67, 32 S. Ct. 651 (1912). 
11 See instances cited in r 9 3 8 report of American Bar Association Committee 
on Administrative Tribunals, 63 A. B. A. REP. 331, 349· 
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more than a permissible interest in enforcing a legislatively 
declared policy. 
This problem is inherent in the very nature of administra-
tive tribunals. Charged as they are with responsibility for the 
advancement of a particular public policy, their desire to 
enforce that policy renders it difficult for them to appraise 
with impassive objectivity the evidence adduced at the hear-
ing. Their special experience and conviction may lead them 
to find claims clearly established on a record which would 
leave a disinterested judge in doubt.12 Ideally, the adminis-
trator should concern himself with his public duty to further 
broad statutory policies only when formulating regulations 
and general interpretative rulings, and should drop this 
attitude in favor of a strictly impartial, disinterested judicial 
approach in weighing the evidence presented at the hearing 
of a particular case.13 But this idealism is rarely found. Ad-
ministrative officers may strive for it/4 but in practice it is 
not easy to lay aside the role of the legislator for that of 
the judge when walking from the committee room to the 
hearing room. The administrator is only a man. Often, he 
is a man without legal training, and the distinction between 
creating rules and applying them may not be so clear to 
him as to the counsel who argues before him. Or, for 
example, if the administrator sees that a cease and desist 
order would further the policy in which he is interested, he 
cannot easily perceive why, if a respondent's protestations of 
intent to comply with the law are sincere, the respondent 
should object to the entry of such an order. He sees but little 
point in respondent's protestations that the evidence pre-
12 Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 1201 (1939). 
13 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORit 
( 1942) 22. Cf., Davis, "Bias of Administrative Officers," 32 MINN. L. REV. 
199 (1948). 
H See opinions in In Matter of Segal & Smith, 5 F. C. C. 3 (1937); In 
Matter of Express Pub. Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 16:z. (1938). 
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sented does not justify a finding of facts which the statute 
makes a condition precedent to the entry of the order. 
Erroneous and unjust determinations too often result from 
this predilection of administrative agencies to determine cases 
and appraise facts in the light of predetermined policy mo-
tives. But the remedy lies rather with the agencies and the 
legislatures than with the courts. A significant step toward 
the amelioration of this condition would be a separation of 
the policy-making and fact-finding functions within the agen-
cies. The individuals who make the rules and enforce them 
should not ordinarily be permitted to determine whether a 
violation of the rules has been proved. The decision on this 
question, preferably, should be left to individuals quite in-
dependent of the policy-making officials, so that the latter 
could not overrule the expert conclusions of the fact-finding 
officer in order to further executive policies or curry favor 
with the appropriating agencies at whose mercies the agency 
heads are often placed.15 
In some cases, of course, although the hearing is judicial 
in form the decision is largely legislative in nature. This is 
often true where the agency instead of laying down broad 
rules in advance prefers to work out rules of policy a step 
at a time, by exercising its administrative or legislative dis-
cretion in deciding the result that should be reached in the 
various factual situations presented in a large number of 
cases. Here, the ideal of a disinterested appraisal of the evi-
dence is even more difficult of achievement. In such cases, 
accepted concepts of administrative discretion permit deci-
sions to be rooted in the agency's bias in favor of postulated 
ends. This must be accepted as part of the price to be paid 
for the advantages of administrative enforcement of the laws. 
15 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 79· Cf., provisions of Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act for appointment of trial examiners. 
RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL 157 
The fact that an agency's interest in implementing prede-
termined policies may dictate the result in particular cases-
and dictate, in such cases, a different result than would be 
reached on the same facts by a judge who was completely 
disinterested in the result--does not constitute the type of 
bias and prejudice which invalidates an administrative deter-
mination. This exists, generally, only where the agency or 
a responsible official thereof has a personal or pecuniary 
interest in a particular case, or where there exists a personal 
prejudice against a particular respondent, or where the in-
temperate conduct of the hearing officer has made it impossi-
ble for a respondent fairly to present his case. 
(b) Personal or pecuniary interest. Where a representative 
of an agency has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome 
of a case pending before the agency, he is of course dis-
qualified to participate in the decision of the case. Where his 
interest is indirect, the same principle applies, but considera-
tions of de minimis may be invoked where a collateral interest 
is so unsubstantial that it is unlikely it would affect the 
decision. The situation is similar to that where a judge is a 
stockholder of a corporation involved in a lawsuit.16 An 
interesting and typical situation was presented to the Supreme 
Court of Michigan/7 in a case involving the fixing of milk 
prices by a board, four fifths of whose members were engaged 
in the business of producing or distributing milk. The order 
was protested by a distributor whose business methods dif-
fered from those of the distributors and producers repre-
sented on the board, and the court held that the statute 
creating the agency was fatally defective in failing to provide 
for a fair and impartial board. The facts of the case disclosing 
16 See I CYC. OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (Perm. ed.) § I 8. 
17 Milk Marketing Board v. Johnson, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N. W. 346 
(I94o), commented on in 89 U. PA. L. REV. 977 (I94I), 
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a somewhat direct interest on the part of the board members, 
some of whom at least were in a sense business competitors 
of the petitioner, the result seems eminently fair and well 
calculated to preserve public respect for the work of admin-
istrative agencies. But it would not seem that the same result 
should follow necessarily in every case where the members 
of an agency are engaged in the same line of business as that 
falling within the jurisdiction of the agency. A manufacturer 
engaged in the aviation industry, for example, should not 
be deemed disqualified to act as a member of an agency 
charged with the responsibility for prescribing regulations 
governing the use of safety devices on airships. 
(c) Personal prejudice. If an officer participating in the 
decision has a personal prejudice against a party appearing 
as a petitioner or respondent before the agency, the agency's 
action is void or at least voidable on proper petition by the 
party affected.18 While the principle is clear, its application 
involves the same difficulties which plague the courts in cases 
involving recused judges.19 In the first place, the existence 
of such personal prejudice is more easily asserted than 
proved. There is not ordinarily any statutory provision of 
the sort commonly found in judicature acts giving automatic 
effect to an affidavit alleging, in proper form, the existence 
of such personal prejudice (e. g., Section 7 (a) of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provides that upon 
the filing of such an affidavit, the agency shall determine the 
claim of disqualification as a part of the decision in the case). 
Claims of unfair trial based on the asserted prejudice of the 
18 Narragansett Racing Ass'n v. Kiernan, 59 R.I. 90, I94 At!. 692. (I937); 
Clark v. Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 54 R. I. 12.6, I 70 Atl. 79 ( I934). 
See Scott, "Administrative Law: Bias of Trial Examiner and Due Process of 
Law," 30 GEo. L. J. 54 (I94I); also, "The Disqualification of Administra-
tive Officials," 4 I CoL. L. REV. I 3 84 (I 94 I). 
19 See 4 I HARV. L. REv. 7 8 (I 92.7) ; Kramer "Judges--Appointment of 
Substitute for Recused Judges-Disqualification of Judges," 36 MICH. L. REV. 
985 (I938); Godman, "Disqualification for Bias of Judicial and Administra-
tive Officers," 23 N.Y. U. L. Q. REv. I09 (I948). 
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administrative officers frequently fail for lack of proo£.20 
Secondly, and more important, there is involved here the 
difficulty above referred to of distinguishing between, on the 
one hand, those strong convictions of probable guilt, based 
on prior experience in situations involving a particular party 
or particular situations, which do not disqualify an adminis-
trator any more than they disqualify a trial judge; 21 and, 
on the other hand, a predisposition against a particular party 
founded on purely personal dislike or mistrust, which consti-
tutes improper prejudice. 
(d) Interference with presentation of evidence. The proc-
ess of presenting evidence in hearings before administrative 
tribunals must be kept free from forces generating bias or 
intimidation.22 At times an administrative officer, who though 
appointed by law is misguided by inexperience, so conducts 
himself at a hearing as to violate this wise precept. In some 
cases, which fortunately are comparatively few, a hearing 
officer adopts so partisan a manner and exhibits so obvious 
an attitude of bias as to interfere unfairly with the presenta-
tion of evidence, to the end that the record does not fairly 
reflect the true factual situation. Such interference may take 
the form of iri.terrogating witnesses in a manner so hostile 
as to intimidate them, or interrupting the examination of a 
witness so frequently as to interfere with the orderly presen-
tation of his testimony, or interfering unfairly with the cross-
examination of witnesses, or exhibiting an abusive attitude 
toward witnesses or counsel or both, or sometimes, indeed, 
ordering the exclusion from the record of colloquies which 
show the general tone and character of the proceeding. 
20 Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission of Montana (D. C. 
Mont. 1935), 12 F. Supp. 946; Georgia Continental Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub-
lic Service Commission (D. C. Ga. 1934), 8 F. Supp. 434· 
21 See Craven v. United States (C.C.A. 1st 1927), 22 F. (2d) 6oss Parker 
v. New England Oil Corp. (D. C. Mass. 1926), 13 F. (zd) 4971 Johnson v. 
United States (D. C. Wash. 1929), 35 F. (zd) 355· 
22 National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & M. Elec. Co., 3 18 U. S. 9, 
6 3 s. Ct. 3 94 ( I 94 3) . 
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Of course, if such conduct can be shown to have affected 
the result, the objection of bias and prejudice is well taken. 
But ordinarily, the effect cannot be precisely measured, nor 
can it be demonstrated that actual harm resulted. At best, 
there is an inference, tenuous or persuasive in the particular 
case, that the result might have been otherwise if the trial 
had been properly conducted. How far must the respondent 
go in establishing that he has been harmed? The prevailing 
view is that unless the inference of probable injury to the 
respondent is so strained as to be completely unimpressive, 
the burden is on the agency to show that posthearing pro-
cedures were effective to obliterate the effect of the injudi-
cious conduct of the hearing officer. 
In the court decisions reviewing such cases, the opinions 
reveal a variety of judicial utterances which may be mis-
leading unless considered in view of all the facts of the 
case as presented to the court. Thus, it may be said that so 
long as the result reached was right, it is no grounds for 
voiding the administrative order that the hearing was im-
properly conducted, where the evidence amply supports the 
conclusion of the agency; 23 or on the other hand, it may be 
said that the existence of evidence in support of the agency's 
conclusions is immaterial, since, once partiality appears, it 
taints and vitiates all the proceedings.24 The conflict between 
the decisions, however, is more seeming than real. Decisions 
supported by statements to the effect that once partiality 
appears, prejudice will be presumed,25 are not really incon-
sistent with the decisions wherein statements are made that 
23 National Labor Relations Board v. Western Cartridge Co., Winchester 
Repeating Arms Co. Division (C.C.A. zd 1943), 138 F. (zd) 551. 
24 National Labor Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. sth 1943), 136 F. 
(zd) s6z. 
25 Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 
109 F. (zd) 9· 
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material prejudice to the complaining litigant must clearly 
appear, before the court will set aside an administrative order 
because of the misconduct of the hearing officer.26 Each de-
cision is based on the peculiar facts of the case involved, and 
the kind and degree of the impropriety.27 If the case against 
the respondent is a close one, and it appears that the agency 
made no effective effort to correct the hearing officer's misbe-
havior, justice may require the granting of a new hearing.28 
On the other hand, if it fairly appears that the respondent 
was able to get into the record enough evidence to establish 
fairly the defenses on which he relied, and if the agency was 
apparently able to decide the case uninfluenced by the be-
havior of the hearing officer, and if it quite clearly appears 
that the granting of a new trial would not affect the final 
result, the administrative order is allowed to stand, regardless 
of the harm done to the cause of good administration. 
(e) Where the only officers with power to act are preju-
diced; doctrine of necessity. Where an administrative agency, 
or a majority of the members thereof, is disqualified by 
reason of prejudice from proceeding to hear and determine 
a pending case, a situation sometimes ensues where an alleged 
lawbreaker must be permitted to escape standing trial unless 
the agency is allowed to proceed notwithstanding its bias. The 
great majority of decisions sustain the proposition that in 
such cases what has been called "the stern rule of necessity" 
26 National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co. (C.C.A. 6th 1940), 
II4 F. (:~.d) 905. 
27 Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board 
(Mutual Relations Ass'n) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 106 F. (:~.d) roo; National 
Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co. (C.C.A. 9th 
1941), II8 F. (:~.d) 980. 
28 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (Union of 
Ward Employees) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 103 F. (:r.d) 147; and see National 
Labor Relations Board v. Western Cartridge Co., Winchester Repeating Arms 
Co. Division (C.C.A. 2.d 1943), 138 F. (zd) 551. 
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requires the agency to act.29 Inasmuch as the doctrine dis-
qualifying a tribunal for prejudice is based on the mere 
likelihood of an erroneous determination, the result seems 
clearly proper. It does not necessarily follow that a biased 
tribunal will decide a case incorrectly. The officers will be 
presumed to make an honest effort to carry out their sworn 
obligation to decide the case fairly; and the reviewing court 
will be diligent to examine the record with particular care. 
Of course, if there is anyone else who can act in the place 
of the disqualified persons, such substitution of personnel 
will be required. In such cases, the doctrine of necessity has 
no application.30 
Since furtherance of the cause of good administration 
requires the avoidance of all appearances of unfairness, many 
agencies very properly strive to avoid reliance on this doc-
trine of necessity. While legislative authorization for substi-
tution of pro hac board members temporarily to fill the places 
of the recused members would be required to eliminate the 
problem, much can be done even in the absence of statute by 
the appointing of a special panel or hearing officer to receive 
the evidence and make recommendations to the board mem-
bers as to the proper disposition of the case. By utilizing such 
procedure in cases where the members of the board are 
prejudiced, it is possible to afford the respondent the oppor-
tunity of presenting his evidence and arguing his case before 
officers who do not share this prejudice. Their recommenda-
29 Brinkley v. Hassig (C.C.A. 1oth 1936), 83 F. (2d) 351; Loughran v. 
Federal Trade Commission ( C.C.A. 8th 1944), 143 F. (2d) 431; Marquette 
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1945), 147 F. 
(2d) 589, aff'd sub nom. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, et 
al., 333 U.S. 683, 68 S. Ct. 793 (1948); and see many cases collected in 39 
A. L. R. 1476. A few cases reach a contrary result. Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 
532,207 Pac. 724 (1922); State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 66o, 103 
So. 835 (1925). The problem is discussed in Fischer, "Should Prejudgment 
Before Hearing in a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding Disqualify an Administrative 
Agency?" 33 GEo. L. J. 311 (1945). 
30 Cases collected in 39 A. L. R. 1476. 
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tions to the board members who must decide would be 
unaffected by any improper interest, and by relying on such 
recommendations the members of the board can more easily 
overcome the effect of their personal prejudices in the matter. 
3· Time, Place, and Manner of Holding the Hearing 
(a) Time. Requirements as to the time of holding a hear-
ing are ordinarily a subject for the rules of a particular 
agency. It is required, to be sure, that the respondent be 
given sufficient advance notice of the time of hearing in order 
to enable him properly to prepare his case. In practice, how-
ever, little difficulty arises on this score because of the general 
tendency of administrative agencies to hold hearings at inter-
vals. If the respondent is not fully prepared to present his 
case when the hearing is called, the representatives of the 
agency will put in their proofs, and an adjournment will 
ordinarily be granted to enable the respondent to prepare 
his evidence. Refusal to grant a respondent a reasonable 
amount of time to prepare and present his case would un-
doubtedly constitute a deprival of a fair trial, vitiating the 
administrative proceedings. Section 5 of the Federal Admin-
istrative Act provides (as to cases where federal agencies are 
required by statute to hold hearings) that in fixing the time 
and place of hearing "due regard shall be had" for the 
convenience and necessity of the parties or their representa-
ti-ves. 
(b) Place of hearin~. Administrative tribunals are fre-
quently ambulatory, holding the hearing at such place as 
will be most convenient for the majority of the witnesses 
and will afford most convenient access to the records which 
the agency desires to examine. Frequently, successive hear-
ings are held in a single case at widely separated localities. 
Selection of the place of hearing and the removal of the 
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hearing from one place to another is within the prerogative 
of the agency, subject to the requirement that ample notice 
be given the parties affected as to the removal of the hearing 
from one place to another.31 
While agencies have asserted an uncontrolled discretion 
as to the selection of the place where the hearing will be 
held, it would seem that they must be able to show at least 
a sound reason of administrative convenience to justify the 
holding of the hearing in a locality other than that where it 
would normally be held. If it appears that the selection of 
the place of the hearing was motivated by a desire to handicap 
the respondent, or to escape the process of a particular court, 
it may be held that deprival of a fair trial has resulted.32 The 
power to hold hearings any place within the country is con-
ferred not alone for the benefit of the agency but also for 
the convenience of those subject to the provisions of the 
statute which the agency administers; and in the case last 
cited it was held that fair play requires an agency to hold 
hearings at a place convenient to each of the parties. 
(c) Public v. private hearing. It is difficult to conceive of 
a case where an agency's refusal to disclose to the public 
information obtained by an agency (either at a hearing or 
in the course of ex parte investigations) could be made the 
basis of a claim of deprival of the right to a fair trial. The 
only adverse effect of such a policy of making hearings pri-
vate would be to deprive a collaterally interested party of 
an opportunity to learn the details of another party's case 
in which he might be interested; and this opportunity does 
not fall within the scope of the constitutional guaranty. If an 
agency wishes to conduct the hearing in private, it has the 
31 Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1940), II2 
F. (zd) 89. 
32National Labor Relations Board v. Prettyman (C.C.A. 6th 1941), 117 F. 
(zd) 786. 
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privilege of so ordering, so long as the parties directly af-
fected are afforded adequate opportunity to participate. 
Normally, administrative hearings are public; and this is 
often required by statute. May insistence by the agency upon 
a public hearing deprive a respondent of a fair trial? In 
occasional cases, this result may obtain, as where the fair 
presentation of the respondent's case requires the disclosure 
of trade secrets or closely guarded secrets of business prac-
tices, and where the respondent could not afford to make 
public disclosure of such properly confidential matters. In 
such cases, it would seem to be the duty of the agency to 
protect the respondent's privilege of privacy by some method 
appropriate to the particular case.88 
(d) Representation by counsel. The zealousness with 
which the courts in criminal cases have insisted upon pro-
tecting the right of defendants to be aided by counsel 84 is 
based upon a philosophy that by logical implication also 
requires administrative agencies to permit any party to be 
represented by counsel in a proceeding in which the agency 
passes upon judicial questions. Such proceedings have many 
of the qualities of criminal prosecutions, in that they typically 
involve a determination as to the truth of an allegation by 
the government that the respondent has violated the law of 
the land. While the Sixth Amendment is not applicable, its 
spirit is. As declared in broad language in Powell v. Ala-
bama,S5 the right to a hearing "has always included the right 
to the aid of counsel. . . . If in any case, civil or criminal, 
88 Cf., American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (App. D. C. 1937), 93 F. (zd) 2.36; E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission (App. D. C. 1933), 63 F. (zd) 362.. 
84 E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938); Williams 
v. Kaiser, 32.3 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363 (1945). 
35 2.87 U.S. 45 at 68, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932.). The quoted phrase is dictum. 
See Green, "The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment, and The Su-
preme Court," 46 MICH. L. REV. 869 ( 1948) for a discussion of this general 
problem. 
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a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a 
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it 
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be 
a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the 
constitutional sense." 
The right to be heard by counsel has been recognized by 
the Department of Justice 36 as a necessary ingredient of a 
fair hearing in administrative proceedings, and is specifically 
provided for in Section 6 (a) of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946. Numerous decisions in state courts 
are to the same effect.37 
But the right is no broader than the need requires. 
Where, for example, it fairly appears that the party's 
failure to be represented by counsel was attributable to the 
party himself, or his attorney, rather than to the adminis-
trative tribunal, the agency may continue its hearings in the 
absence of counsel, even over the protest of respondent.38 
Further, the right to representation by counsel does not 
apply to cases where the agency is not engaged in the deter-
mination of a judicial question, but is merely conducting an 
investigation or taking testimony to aid it in reaching a 
purely executive decision.89 
In proceedings where elements of wide administrative or 
executive discretion are inextricably intertwined with the 
adjudication of justiciable rights, doubts should be resolved 
in favor of allowing representation by counsel. This, gen-
erally, is the result in the alienage cases, where the rule 
36 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 17, 19 (1921). 
37 People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582 (t88o); People ex rel. 
Rea v. Nokomis Coal Co., 308 Ill. 45, 139 N. E. 41 (1923); Christy v. City 
of Kingfisher, 13 Okla. 585, 76 Pac. 135 (1904). 
38 National Labor Relations Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp. 
(C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (2d) 488; Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Ott 
(D. C. W.Va. 1914), 215 Fed. 940. 
39Bowles v. Baer (C.C.A. 7th 1944), 142 F. (2d) 787; Avery v. Studley, 
74 Conn. zp, 50 Atl. 752 (1901). 
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allowing counsel in deportation cases seems fairly well estab-
lished, 40 although the decisions in this particular field exhibit 
a great contrariety of result, reflecting in large part the doubt 
as to the applicability of the constitutional guaranties to aliens 
"knocking at the door." 41 
(e) Fallowing agency rules. Administrative agencies have 
no greater rights than do courts to depart from their accus-
tomed procedural rules and practices, in order to facilitate 
the achievement of a desired result in a particular case. If 
such departure is shown to have prejudiced, or seems likely 
to have prejudiced, the rights of a party appearing before 
the agency, it will be held that such departure deprived the 
party of a fair trial and vitiated the administrative pro-
ceeding. 
This general principle has many ramifications. 
At one extreme, there are occasional cases where there is 
at least a suggestion or colorable inference that a change in 
an agency's rule was of a temporal nature, and adopted for 
the purpose of affecting the outcome of a particular case. 
The reprehensibility of such conduct needs no arguing and 
has been made a basis for setting aside administrative action.42 
40Whitfield v. Ranges (C.C.A. 8th 1915), 2.22. Fed. 745; Low Wah Suey v. 
Backus, 2.25 U.S. 46o, 32 S. Ct. 734 (1912). 
41 Brownlow v. Miers (C.C.A. 5th 1928), 28 F. (2d) 653. Among decisions 
insisting strongly on the right to counsel in this type of case are: Chew Hoy 
Quong v. White (C.C.A. 9th 1918), 2.49 Fed. 869; Ex parte Lam Pui (D. C. 
N.C. 1914), 217 Fed. 456; Ex parte Plastina (D. C. Wash. 1916), 236 Fed. 
295; E." parte Radivoeff (D. C. Mont. 192.2), 278 Fed. 227. Other cases, per-
mitting some restrictions on the right to representation by counsel in the prelim-
inary stages of the administrative proceeding, include Chin Shee v. White 
(C.C.A. 9th 1921), 273 Fed. Sot; Plane v. Carr (C.C.A. 9th 1927), 19 F. 
(2d) 470; United States ex rei. Buccino v. Williams (C. C. N.Y. 1911), 190 
Fed. 897; United States ex rei. Ivanow v. Greenawalt (D. C. Pa. 1914), 2.13 
Fed. 901; Ex parte Cahan aff'd sub nom. Cahan v. Carr (C.C.A. 9th 1931), 
47 F. (2d) 604. 
42 Sibray v. United States (C.C.A. 3d 1922), 28z Fed. 795; Colyer v. Skef-
fington (D. C. Mass. 1920), 265 Fed. 17; Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, 
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 15. 
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At the opposite extreme, if it can be shown that the failure 
to observe the departmental regulation had no effect on the 
result, the administrative proceeding will not be invalidated.43 
Between these two extremes lie the vast bulk of cases, 
where it is plain that the failure to follow the usual proce-
dural devices caused a more or less substantial degree of in-
convenience to the party appearing before the agency, but 
it is uncertain whether or not the irregularity affected the 
final result. The courts have been strongly inclined to resolve 
the doubt in favor of the party protesting the failure to fol-
low the rules. Where the rules which were disregarded had 
been promulgated for the purpose of safeguarding the rights 
of the persons affected by administrative action, this result 
is of course to be expected.44 In such cases, the departmental 
or agency rules may properly be considered as setting mini-
mum standards of fair procedure, and any departure there-
from is not to be tolerated. 
But the same result has been reached in other cases where 
the rule in question was apparently designed rather for the 
convenience of the agency than for the protection of the par-
ties appearing before it.45 In such cases, there is doubt whether 
the administrative proceedings should be invalidated unless 
prejudice is fairly indicated. But even where the nonobserv-
ance of administrative regulations is not, standing alone, of 
any seeming great significance, it may nevertheless be an im-
portant element giving color to a claim that other irregu-
larities of procedure, when considered together with the 
43 United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (2d) 
166. 
44 Mah Shee v. White ( C.C.A. 9th 1917), 242 Fed. 8 6 8 ; Ex parte Radivoeff 
(D. C. Mont. 1922), 278 Fed. 227; United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins 
(C.C.A. 2d 1935), 79 F. (2d) 533; United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v. 
Dunton (D. C. N.Y. 1923), 288 Fed. 959· 
45 Erie R. Co. v. City of Paterson, 79 N.J. L. 5121 76 Atl. 1065 (1910). 
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departure from the agency's customary rules, had a combined 
or cumulative effect of depriving a party of a fair trial.(~~ 
4· Right to Meet the Agency's Case 
One of the indispensable requisites of a fair hearing is that 
the course of the proceedings shall be such that the party 
appearing before the agency "shall have an opportunity to 
be heard and cross-examine the witnesses against him and 
shall have time and opportunity at a convenient place, after 
the evidence against him is produced and known to him, to 
produce evidence and witnesses to refute the charges." 47 The 
principle is plain; and in cases where the administrative deter-
mination rests fundamentally upon the testimony of witnesses 
taken at an open hearing, there is no difficulty in its applica-
tion. But because administrative agencies so often base their 
findings and conclusions upon data otherwise obtained, the 
exact requirements of this rule are a source of perennial 
difficulty. Administrative bodies typically carry out many 
other functions in addition to their purely judicial duties; and 
in conducting their normal business they come into the pos-
session of vast compilations of data which have some general 
bearing on a great number of cases and which they cannot 
intelligently disregard in the decision of any particular in-
dividual case. Sometimes the data represents the results of 
general fact-gathering activities; the agency has perhaps 
received reports from a group of persons or companies over 
a period of years, or it may have itself compiled official rec-
ords which are a valuable source of information in specific 
cases. In other instances, and especially where the agency's 
function is that of enforcing a general legislative policy, or 
46E.g., People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, 194 App. Div. 9z1, 184 N.Y. S. 943 
(192.0). 
47 National Labor Relations Board v. Prettyman (C.C.A. 6th 1941), 117 
F. (zd) 786, 790. 
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policing a particular industry or particular type of activity, 
the agency may employ a corps of investigators to gather 
facts concerning a particular case. Insofar as the agency's case 
against a respondent rests in part upon information derived 
from such sources, to what extent must the respondent be 
permitted to delve into the files of the agency, or seek to 
discredit the information therein contained? In general terms, 
it can be said that he must be granted an opportunity to learn 
what the agency relies on, to investigate and rebut (by oral 
cross-examination of witnesses or otherwise) the accuracy of 
the information so relied on, and to present all the eviden-
tiary data in his possession which may call for a different 
conclusion or different inference from that suggested by the 
agency's information. 
(a) Right to examine opposing evidence. The party ap-
pearing before an agency may insist that the agency advise 
him, by specific reference, of those parts of its general files 
and records on which it intends to rely in reaching a decision 
in the particular adversary proceeding with which he is con-
cerned.48 He does not have a right to delve and pry into all 
the records of the agency, or to examine secret reports of the 
agency's investigators, but all material upon which an agency 
proposes to rely as establishing a fact should be open for 
inspection.49 
In enforcing this requirement, reliance must necessarily 
be placed on the integrity of the agencies. It is quite possible 
for an agency, should it so desire, to rely sub silentio on secret 
information, accurate or otherwise, which it does not disclose 
to the respondent. But to the extent that the agency's findings 
must be supported by the record of the proceedings before it, 
the agency is bound to introduce into the record at least 
48 United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene & S. Ry. 
Co., 265 u.s. 274,44 s. Ct. 565 (1924). 
49 United States ex rel. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 264 U. S. 64, 44 S. Ct. 294 ( 1924). 
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enough of its information to afford substantial support for 
its findings. More than this, the courts cannot require. In 
appraising the facts appearing in the record, an agency may 
be subconsciously influenced by a general background of in-
formation or belief which the respondent might be able to 
show to be inaccurate, but there is no practical way of giving 
the respondent an opportunity to essay this task. It must be 
hoped that the agency will desire the grounds of its tentative 
conclusions to be subjected to searching tests, and will thus 
make available for respondent's information all pertinent in-
formation. 
(b) Right to cross-examine opposing witnesses. The right 
to cross-examine an opposing witness is a substantial part of 
the guaranty of a fair trial. There can be no doubt that where 
a witness is called to testify vive voce, the respondent must 
have an opportunity to cross-examine that witness. Nor can 
this right be defeated merely by permitting a witness to put 
his testimony in writing in advance of trial, and introducing 
his affidavit or report in lieu of calling him to the stand. 
But on the other hand, the respondent has no right to insist 
that every bit of information on which the agency relies must 
be proved by oral testimony of a witness subject to cross-ex-
amination. Were the rule pushed so far, it would obviously 
collide with the principle that enables agencies to receive 
hearsay proof, and would in fact make it practically impossi-
ble for most agencies to conduct their business. 
It is at this point that the difference between courts and 
administrative agencies in respect to fact-finding techniques 
produces a real difficulty in setting standards to determine 
when a party's right to a fair trial has been infringed.50 The 
general theory is clear-the agency is not to be permitted to 
accept as evidence anything which is devoid of evidential 
50 Cj., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YoRK (I942) I96, I98; and Gellhorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEED-
INGS (I 94 I) I oo, I I I, 
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value, and the party concerned must be given a fair opportu-
nity to demonstrate the unreliability of the proffered proof. 51 
In some cases, the only adequate way to undertake such a 
demonstration is by oral cross-examination of the party who is 
the author of the statement, but in others, an opportunity to 
rebut the accuracy of the statement, or demonstrate that it 
does not rest on reliable sources of information, is sufficient. 
The general test is well phrased in Section 7 (c) of the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, providing (in 
case of certain proceedings before federal agencies) a right 
"to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for 
a full and true disclosure of the facts." A great deal depends 
on the court's judgment as to what constitutes, in the circum-
stances of a particular case, a reasonable substitute or equiva-
lent for the typical judicial cross-examination procedure; and 
it is not unnatural that courts exhibit some differences of 
opinion in specific case situations. 
But several general propositions may reasonably and safely 
be accepted. If a letter, affidavit, or other written report is 
offered as a substitute for the oral testimony of an individual 
witness as to what he has seen, or believes, or concludes, the 
other party (at least if the contents of the writing are of any 
importance) must be given an opportunity to cross-examine 
the author.52 
Similarly, where the only means of attacking the accuracy 
of the proffered evidence is by cross-examination of the au-
thor, that opportunity must be afforded.53 
Again, where the credibility of the author is in issue, the 
opportunity for cross-examination must be afforded. 
51 Pacific Livestock Co. v. State Water Board of Oregon, 241 U. S. 440, 36 
S. Ct. 637 (1916). 
52 Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 27 5 Ill. 514, 114 N. E. 
275 (1916). 
53 United States v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern R. Co., 226 U. S. 14, 33 S. 
Ct. 5 (1912). 
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Where the testimony relates to a specific factual dispute 
at issue in a particular case, cross-examination is more gen-
erally insisted upon than in cases where the testimony relates 
to matters of general information. 
But on the other hand, where an agency desires to rely on 
information gathered in the course of a general investigation, 
or on data revealed by hundreds of reports filed by disinter-
ested parties, the rights intended to be guaranteed by the 
privilege of cross-examination can ordinarily be safeguarded 
so long as the affected party is given full opportunity to rebut 
the prima-facie showing made by the reports. The impractica-
bility of calling a large number of witnesses for cross-exam-
ination as to a variety of issues related only collaterally to the 
specific question before the agency, coupled with the apparent 
unlikelihood that such cross-examination would affect the 
statements or reports in question, make it unwise to insist 
upon a literal application of the general right of cross-exam-
ination. 
The apparent reliability of the hearsay received without 
privilege of cross-examination and the weight attached to it 
by the agency, are both important factors. Sometimes, there 
is little real controversy as to the factual question involved; 
in such cases, deprival of the right of cross-examination is 
likely to be deemed unimportant. And if the administrative 
decision can be supported by reliance on other evidence, as to 
which there was afforded an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion, the denial of cross-examination is harmless. 
Generally, the respondent must be accorded an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the authors of the information on which 
the agency relies, except in cases where the nature of the 
statement is such that its asserted unreliability can be just as 
well demonstrated by rebutting proofs as by actual cross-ex-
amination. 
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In cases where the agency's function is legislative or exec-
utive rather than judicial, of course, the right to cross-exam-
ination does not exist. 54 
The question as to how far the right of cross-examination 
may be abridged without denying a fair trial is intimately re-
lated to the question as to the extent to which agencies may 
rely on official notice of facts not proved, a question which is 
discussed more fully, infra. 
(c) The right to introduce evidence. The right to a full 
hearing implies the privilege of introducing all evidence 
which is competent, material, and relevant to the issues.55 
Exclusion of evidence which should have been received and 
considered may be a fatal error.56 However, a party com-
plaining of the exclusion of proffered evidence must exhaust 
every remedy to get the matter before the tribunal, if he is 
to rely on this ground as an attack upon an administrative 
determination. If, for example, the governing statute makes 
available the device of petitioning the appellate court for an 
order granting leave to adduce the additional evidence before 
the agency, he must resort to this device; and his failure to 
make such an effort estops him from raising the point.57 
5. Timeliness of Hearing; Rehearing 
Administrative adjudication ordinarily differs from the 
typical court decision in that it is not directed principally to 
a determination of rights and liabilities arising out of a closed 
54 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 53 S. 
Ct. 350 (1933). 
55 Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. 
Ct. 185 (1913); State of Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad and Navigation 
Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 32 S. Ct. 535 (1912); West Ohio Gas Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 55 S. Ct. 316 (1935); and 
see § 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 
56 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of State of 
Idaho, 274 U. S. 344, 47 S. Ct. 604 ( 1927); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63,55 S. Ct. 316 (1935). 
57 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938). 
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situation, but rather is chiefly significant as a mandate to gov-
ern a continuing course of action. Any material changes in the 
factual situation that may occur between the time of the hear-
ing and the time when the order is drafted should be made 
known to the agency, so that it may fashion its remedy to fit 
the current situation. 
The problem arises frequently because of the lapse of time 
which occurs between the date of the hearing and the date 
when the order is prepared. After the testimony has been 
completed, the trial examiner writes his report, copies of this 
document are sent to the parties, they file exceptions thereto, 
and there is an argument on these exceptions before the 
agency. Such, at least, is the typical course of procedure in 
many tribunals. But this process, especially in cases where 
the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consid-
eration of the case deliberate and careful, often consumes a 
half year or more; and (such being the nature of human ac-
tivities in many of the fields committed to the supervision of 
administrative agencies) during these six months there often 
occur significant changes in the factual situation. 
If the case is set down for a new hearing before a trial 
examiner, the whole process is put into operation a second 
time; and by the time the case again reaches the agency heads, 
there ma:y have been further changes in the factual situation. 
In order to permit the eventual completion of the adminis-
trative process, it is necessary for the agency heads either to 
hear the new evidence personally, or to cut the matter short 
by deciding the case without reference to the recent changes 
in the factual situation. 
The choice between these two alternatives is that of the 
agency. Its discretion in the matter will not ordinarily be re-
viewed by the courts. 58 In making the choice, the agency must 
consider: the apparent importance of the new facts (there 
58 Interstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City, 3u. U. S. 503, 64 
S. Ct. 112 9 ( 1 944) • 
176 PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES 
may be but little indication that they would affect the result) ; 
the need for speedy action; and the likelihood that the plea 
for a rehearing is premised principally on the hope of stalling 
enforcement of the administrative order. In some cases, are-
hearing before a trial examiner or before the agency heads 
themselves may appear to be justified, but in other cases, 
justification does not appear. Denial of a rehearing cannot, 
except in an extraordinary case of clear abuse of discretion, be 
considered a deprival of a fair triaP9 
In some cases, however, abuse of discretion has been estab-
lished, as where the petition for a rehearing showed persua-
sively that economic conditions had so altered since the close 
of the prior hearing (two and a half years before) that the 
administrative record was irresponsive to present conditions 
and so could not be made a proper basis for administrative 
application of the statutory mandate.60 
6. The Hearing Officer 
The right to a fair trial does not include the privilege of 
insisting that the hearing be conducted before the members of 
the agency who are to make the decision in the case. The ob-
vious practical necessity of delegating to hearing officers the 
duty of taking the evidence has long been recognized and 
uniformly upheld.61 Employment of examiners to preside 
over the hearing at which will be made the record for sub-
sequent decision by administrative officials and review by the 
courts, is almost the universal practice, although Section 5 of 
59 Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. z8z, 54 S. 
Ct. 692 (1934); United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co., z88 U. S. 490, 53 
S. Ct. 406 (1933); Acker v. United States, 2.98 U. S. 426, 56 S. Ct. 82.4 
(1936). 
60 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 2.84 U. S. 248, 52 S. Ct. 146 
(1932). 
61 E.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936); 
Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 346 ( 1927); Anniston 
Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); California Lumber-
men's Council v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 9th 1940), us F. (zd) 
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the Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 provides that, 
where federal agencies are required by statute to hold hear-
ings, the hearing officer shall make the initial or recom-
mended decision. 
The actual conduct of the hearing-its fairness and ade-
quacy-is thus committed to the hands of the hearing officer. 
It is important that this official shall command public confi-
dence both by his capacity to grasp the matter at issue and by 
his impartiality in dealing with it.62 He should have the 
status, responsibility, and powers of a trial judge. But nor-
mally his position is far different. Frequently, the hearing 
officer is no more than a monitor, without effective power 
even to keep order at the hearing or to supervise the record-
ing of the evidence, his position in some instances being shock-
ingly similar to that of a notary public before whom a deposi-
tion is taken. In most agencies, he does have some powers to 
rule on questions arising in connection with the hearing and 
has the responsibility of preparing tentative findings (the 
weight of which varies in different agencies) or of recom-
mending the decision in the case. Octasionally, wide powers 
are vested in the hearing officer-and the trend of develop-
ment is increasingly in this direction (see Section 7 of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946)-but on the 
whole his position has been ministerial in nature. 
The insignificant position of the hearing officer has re-
sulted in the paradox that the conduct of the official who 
should be primarily responsible for the fairness of the hear-
ing is ordinarily held to have but little effect in determining 
whether a fair trial has been accorded. Unless his conduct 
is such as to intimidate witnesses or to make it impossible for 
one of the parties to get his evidence into the record, the as-
sumption of an unfair attitude on his part, it is reasoned, does 
62 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist 
Sess. (1941) 43· 
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not result in the deprival of a fair trial, because his attitude 
will not contaminate the review of the record and the making 
of the decision by the responsible officers of the agency. But 
as the reason for the rule disappears, the rule itself will un-
doubtedly be modified. As greater powers and more substan-
tial responsibilities are vested in the hearing officers, unjudi-
cial conduct on their part will come more and more to be 
regarded as a deprival of the right of a fair trial. 
The responsibility of the agencies to further the cause of 
good administration, furthermore, requires insistence that the 
hearing officer approach the hearing with an open mind, with-
out bias and without prejudgment of the issues, and without 
any fear that his chances for promotion in the agency may be 
affected by his recommendations (see Section 5 (c) of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946). His chief 
purpose should be to afford to each party an adequate oppor-
tunity to present his case and to meet the case against him. 
This is required not only in the interests of fairness but in 
the interests of assuring a proper basis for informed and cor-
rect administrative action.63 
The hearing officer, like a trial judge, should participate 
sparingly in the examination of witnesses, except where such 
participation is necessary to a full development of the sig-
nificant facts. 
He should see to it that the record of the hearing is clear 
and meaningful. The informality of administrative hearings, 
and unskillful employment of the device of going "off the 
record," 64 frequently results in the production of transcripts 
that are almost unreadable and of limited helpfulness either· 
to the responsible heads of the agencies or to reviewing courts. 
63 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(194z) 108. 
64 Benjamin, op. cit., 140. 
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In order that he properly execute these responsibilities, it is 
obviously necessary that the hearing officer be an individual 
who is trained in the law and who has had an ample back-
ground of instructive experience. The fact that this is not in 
practice required 65 has much to do with the current need for 
general improvement in this aspect of administrative practice. 
If the initial decision of the hearing officer can carry the 
hallmark of fairness and ability, a great part of the criticism 
directed against the hearing procedures of administrative 
agencies will have been met. The recommendations of the 
Attorney General's Committee 66 indicate the direction which 
future development will take. To assure the fairness and 
efficiency of the hearing procedure, the hearing officer must be 
an official who is fully trained in law, in administration, and 
in the particular field in which the agency operates. The posi-
tion must carry substantial compensation-sufficient to attract 
very able men. It must carry also full power to direct the 
conduct of the hearing, and to make decisions which will be 
accorded, within the agency, the status which in the judicial 
system is possessed by the decision of the trial judge. Finally, 
the position should carry the security of tenure and freedom 
from political pressure which is necessary to guarantee the 
impartiality and dignity of any judicial officer. Great progress 
toward this end is made by Section 11 of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of r 946. 
65 As to the training and experience of the hearing officers of many federal 
agencies, see report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 375· 
66 Idem. 45· 
CHAPTER 9 
Presentation of Evidence 
THE power of administrative tribunals to disregard the common-law exclusionary rules of evidence has not resulted, as is often erroneously assumed, in their being 
utterly ignored in administrative proceedings involving the 
adjudication of judicial questions. In cases involving the dis-
charge of legislative or executive functions, to be sure, the 
common-law rules of evidence have no more application than 
they do to proceedings before a legislature or in a conference 
with an executive officer. But in cases where agencies exercise 
judicial functions, the nature of the proof-taking procedure 
is often almost indistinguishable from the taking of proofs in 
nonjury cases in the courts. 
While often freed by statutory provision from the ne-
cessity of following the common-law rules of evidence-or, 
as it is not infrequently expressed, the technical rules of evi-
dence-most agencies in practice, and often by specific agency 
rule, apply the fundamental principles of relevancy, mate-
riality, and probative force in a manner not unlike that of 
equity courts. Partly, this results from their constant con-
sciousness of the necessity of supporting all findings by 
"substantial evidence," in order to avoid the possibilities of 
judicial reversals of their determinations, and partly, the 
tendency is a reflection of their appreciation of the innate 
wisdom of the general rules as worked out in the courts.1 
1 Wigmore found a "general and instructive use" of the common-law rules of 
evidence in contested cases deemed important. 1 Wigmore on EviDENCE, 3d ed. 
( 1940) 44· See also, Wigmore, "Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are 
the Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries?" 17 ILL. L. 
REv. 2.63 ( 192.2.); Stephan, "The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should 
be Bound by Rules of Evidence," 2.4 A. B. A. J. 630 (1938). 
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Although disregarding many of the subtleties of jury-trial 
evidentiary requirements which are coming to be regarded 
as archaic even in the courts, the agencies as they develop 
and mature are trending significantly in the direction of the 
general rule recommended by the concurring members of 
the Attorney General's Committee,2 which would require 
that immaterial, irrelevant, and unduly repetitious evidence 
be excluded from the record of any hearing and that the 
basic principles of relevancy, materiality, and probative force, 
as recognized in federal judicial proceedings of an equitable 
nature, govern the proof of all questions of fact, except that 
such principles be (I) broadly interpreted in such manner 
as to make effective the adjudicative powers of administrative 
agencies; ( 2) adapted to the legislative policy under which 
adjudications are made; and (3) administered in such a way 
as to assure that testimony of reasonably probative value will 
not be excluded, as to any pertinent fact. 
As expressed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
practice of the hearing officer "in taking evidence and ruling 
upon objections thereto should be that which applies to 
special masters in equity proceedings." 3 
He should know the exclusionary rules and when he re-
frains from applying them he should have a cogent reason 
for refraining. Conversely, he should have the courage to 
refrain from applying them where the nature of a particular 
issue or proceeding requires such departure. 4 
In thus following the basic rules of evidence, the agencies 
have power to exclude immaterial or incompetent evidence.'1 
2 Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 241. 
3 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 8th 
1940), 113 F. (zd) 698, 702. 
4 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(1942) 179. Sec. 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
requires federal agencies "as a matter of policy" to exclude irrelevant and im-
material evidence. 
li Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A. 
8th 1944), 143 F. (zd) 488. 
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Logically, it would seem that this principle would authorize 
the exclusion of any testimony affecting issues which it was 
not within the power of the agency to determine, and it has 
been so held.6 But it would seem that in many cases the better 
administrative practice is to receive all evidence which is 
pertinent to the case, even though consideration of some 
phases of the proofs must be deferred until the case comes 
before the courts. Where, for example, the constitutionality 
of the statute under which the agency is operating depends 
in part upon questions of fact, the agency should permit the 
respondent in proceedings before it to introduce evidence 
bearing on such factual issues. Even though the agency 
may not determine the constitutional issues, nevertheless 
consideration of such factual matters may influence the de-
termination of the agency as to matters within its competence. 
Furthermore, when the issue of constitutionality subsequently 
reaches the courts, it is much more convenient if all the facts 
which the court must consider are found in a single record. 
1. Legally Incompetent Evidence: Types Admissible 
The practice of general adherence to the underlying rules 
of evidence is ordinarily a matter of administrative choice, 
rather than of legal requirement.7 It was early recognized 
by the Supreme Court that administrative agencies should 
not be "narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the 
6 Engineers Public Service Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (App. 
D. C. 1943), 138 F. (2d) 936. 
7 But there is a recent trend to require by statute that the agencies follow, in 
the main, the fundamental rules of evidence. Thus, § 7 (c) of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act provides that, in hearings held pursuant to a 
statutory requirement, the agencies shall "as a matter of policy provide for the 
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.'' The Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, goes 
further in requiring the National Labor Relations Board to follow court rules 
of evidence "so far as practicable." For law review comment, see Hoyt, "Some 
Practical Problems Met in the Trial of Cases Before Administrative Tribunals," 
:1.5 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1941); Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence 
in the Administrative Process," 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942); Norwood, "Ad-
ministrative Evidence in Practice," 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 15 (1941). 
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admissibility of proof." 8 The mere admission by an adminis-
trative tribunal of matter which under the rules of evidence 
applicable to judicial proceedings would be deemed incom-
petent does not invalidate its order.9 So long as the evidence 
is "of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the 
conduct of their daily and more important affairs," 10 it may 
be received and considered by the agency, even though it is 
technically incompetent. 
Hearsay is often received, if the attendant circumstances 
persuasively indicate its reliability, but this is the trend of 
the courts.11 
Opinion evidence, and statements by expert witnesses 
whose qualifications have been but sketchily established, is 
sometimes received. 
Likewise, if the agency chooses to disregard the best evi-
dence rule, it is not error for it to do so.12 
But this does not mean that it is typical of administrative 
procedure to receive, carelessly, whatever statements of hear-
8 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. zs, 44, 2.4 S. Ct. 563 
( 1904). This remark was dictum, the actual decision in the case being that the 
commission was entitled to require the production of certain evidence, the rele-
vancy of which was challenged but which was held to be proper and relevant 
evidence. The remark, however, has been widely quoted and followed not only 
as to questions involving the relevancy of evidence, but also as to cases involving 
the competency of evidence. The cited case is the first in a series of five Supreme 
Court decisions involving the admissibility of evidence in proceedings before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, which are significant as marking the origin 
of the rules which have since been generally applied to other agencies. The 
other cases, all of which are carefully analyzed in Stephens, ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933) 2.1, et seq., include: Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 22.7 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 
185 (1913); Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 2.53 U.S. 117,40 S. Ct. 
466 (192.0); United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene & 
Southern Ry. Co., z65 U.S. 2.74, 44 S. Ct. 565 (192.4); Western Paper Makers' 
Chemical Co. v. United States, z71 U.S. z68, 46 S. Ct. soo (192.6). 
9 United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene & Southern 
Ry. Co., z65 u.s. Z74> 44 s. Ct. s6s (19Z4). 
10 John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 192.4), 
2.99 Fed. 468, 471. 
11 E.g., Rules 503-530, American Law Institute, MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 
(1942.). 
12 Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 2.53 U.S. II7, 133, 40 S. Ct. 466 
(192.0). 
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say or opinion a witness may offer, or to disregard the prin-
ciple of the best evidence doctrine (which even in court cases 
is coming with great frequency to be stated as requiring only 
the best evidence which the nature of the case permits). Nor 
does it mean that the other exclusionary rules are quite for-
gotten. On the contrary, it is quite as common to hear objec-
tions to testimonial offers made and argued in administrative 
proceedings as in the courtroom. The point is that the mere 
reception of legally incompetent evidence, whether or not 
objected to (of course, if received without objection, objec-
tionable evidence may be and is considered even in court 
cases), is not normally a ground for attacking the adminis-
trative determination, unless prejudice can be shown. 
2. Legally Incompetent Evidence: Restrictions on Admission 
While the exclusion of incompetent and immaterial evi-
dence matter ordinarily depends upon the exercise of self-
restraint by the administrative agency, there are some types 
of cases where such a mandate is judicially imposed. 
Thus, agencies are required to recognize the privileges 
which the law attaches to communications to priests, attor-
neys, physicians, and other confidential disclosures.13 
The admission of hearsay under such circumstances as to 
infringe substantially the right of cross-examination may 
amount to a denial of a fair hearing.14 
Reception of evidence which is not only without probative 
force but is prejudicial in effect is similarly sometimes made 
a basis for invalidating an administrative determination.15 
13 Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( C.C.A. 9th 1942), u 5 
F. (2d) 812; Matter of City Council of City of New York v. Goldwater, 284 
N.Y. 296, 31 N. E. (2d) 31 (1940). 
14 Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes (C.C.A. 6th 1941), II8 F. (2d) 105; 
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. 
C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 564; United States v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern R. 
Co., 226 U.S. 14, 33 S. Ct. 5 (t912). 
15 People ex rel. Shiels v. Greene, 179 N. Y. 195, 71 N. E. 777 (1904); 
People ex rel. Moynihan v. Greene, 179 N. Y. 253, 72 N. E. 99 (1904); 
Bridgesv. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,65 S. Ct. 1443 (1945). 
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The power given the agencies to receive incompetent evi-
dence is conditioned on the premise that it must be done 
fairly.16 
3. Exclusion of Proper Evidence 
The exclusion of proper evidence may VItiate a quasi-
judicial determination of an administrative agency. Refusal 
to receive competent and material evidence is a denial of 
due process.17 The requirement that evidence be received is 
a necessary counterpart of the rule that the agency must also 
give due weight to all the evidence before it; refusal to 
consider evidence properly introduced or proffered falls 
within the condemnation that voids arbitrary administrative 
action.18 
The wisdom of this rule is not controverted by the agen-
cies. On the contrary, there are instances wherein an agency 
has dismissed charges because of the hearing officer's violation 
of this cardinal principle.19 
If it appears that the excluded evidence could not mate-
rially have affected the outcome of the case-if a remand 
to receive and consider the evidence improperly excluded 
would amount to nothing more than "a postponement of the 
inevitable" 20 the error committed is not prejudicial. But 
normally it is impossible for a reviewing court to be assured 
that the outcome could not have been affected by the con-
sideration of the excluded testimony, and in the usual case 
the necessary result of the exclusion of proper testimony is 
to void the administrative order. 
16 John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 192.4), 
2.99 Fed. 468, 47 I, 
17 The authorities are reviewed in Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board (C.C.A. 8th 1941), 12.3 F. (zd) 2.15. 
1s Chicago Junction Case, z64 U.S. zs8, 44 S. Ct. 317 (19:t4). 
19 E.g., In the Matter of Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 
912. ( 1 944). 
20 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 
146,61 S. Ct. 908 (1941); idem., (C.C.A. 8th 1940) II3 F. (zd) 698, 702.. 
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4· Practices of the Agencies 
Perhaps the best recommendation of the wisdom of apply-
ing rules of evidence to proceedings before administrative 
agencies is that the agencies a!e coming more and more to 
turn to these rules voluntarily, and often develop elaborate 
codes of their own to govern questions relating to the proof 
of specific types of questions. Even in the case of the agencies 
whose function is primarily the distribution of governmental 
largess, such as pensions and old age benefits (where ordi-
narily there is encountered the greatest relaxation of the 
rules of evidence in order to permit claimants ignorant of 
the law and unaided by counsel to present their cases), the 
regulations contain extensive rules governing the modes of 
proving such crucial issues as birth, death, years of service, 
and the like. 
Some agencies provide in considerable detail what rules 
of evidence shall be followed. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission is perhaps an outstanding example, its rules of 
practice 21 covering such topics as the admissibility of evi-
dence, restrictions as to cumulative evidence, reading pre-
pared statements into the record, introduction of official 
records, introduction of business entries, rules regarding 
immaterial portions of documents, reference to documents 
in Commission's files, records in other Commission proceed-
ings, abstracts of documents, exhibits, making objections to 
evidence, submission of further evidence subsequent to the 
hearing, et cetera. 
The Federal Communications Commission provides that, 
saving exceptional cases where the ends of justice will be 
better served by relaxing the rules, the rules of evidence 
governing civil proceedings in matters not involving trial by 
jury in the federal courts shall be followed in formal pro-
21 I.C.C. Rules 75-87. 
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ceedings before the Commission.22 A similar provision is 
found in the Maritime Commission's Rules of Procedure,23 
and the general practice of the Civil Service Commission is 
the same.24 While the rules of the Federal Trade Commission 
are indefinite as to the standards to be followed in the recep-
tion of evidence,25 that Commission informally announced 
some time ago that in practice it has "intended to receive only 
legally competent evidence." 26 
While there is much disagreement between the various 
agencies and commissions as to just what rules of evidence 
should be made to apply to their proceedings, it is very 
common to find some general provisions made in agency 
rules setting up certain standards to be followed in receiving 
evidence,27 and on the whole there is no general pattern of 
departure from the basic principles of evidence.28 
A great deal depends, of course, on the training and native 
abilities of the hearing officer. These officials are often lawyers 
by training and, being accustomed to the application of the 
rules of evidence in court proceedings, find it natural to fol-
low them during the administrative hearing.29 In some cases, 
the choice of hearing officers is less fortunate, and there are 
of course instances wherein poorly trained or incompetent 
22F.C.C. Regulations,§§ I.2l2.-I.2I7• 
23 U.S.M.C. Rules, § 8.10. 
24 In re J. M. Procter, et al., Docket No. 115, Jan. 22, 1944. 
25 F.T.C. Rule XVII. 
26 Stephens, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
(1933) 82. 
27 Blachly and Oatman, "A New Approach to the Reform of Regulatory 
Procedure," 32 GEo. L. J. 325 (1944), reviewing the rules of many agencies; 
I Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) § 4C. 
28 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., xst 
Sess. ( 1941) 70. Some authors believe that an exception has been, or should be, 
made in workmen's compensation proceedings. Aniong law review articles or 
notes as to this, see 21 IND. L. J. 473 ( 1946); 10 Wis. L. REV. 340, 431 
(1935); 36 HARV. L. REV. 263 (1923); 68 u. PA. L. REV. 203 (1920); 24 
lA. L. REV. 576 (1939). 
29 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 22, 
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hearing officers admit much irrelevant and unreliable evi-
dence, largely because of their inability to distinguish the 
good from the bad. But adherence to higher standards in the 
selection of hearing officers has in recent years done much 
to improve this situation. The trend is away from the loose 
habit of receiving almost any testimonial offer "for what it 
is worth," a practice which results in unduly swelling records 
by incorporation of much that is clearly worth nothing, and 
toward the practice of receiving only material, relevant evi-
dence of reliable probative value.30 
5· Utilization of Written Evidence 
In many types of administrative proceedings, the utiliza-
tion of written evidence as a substitute for oral examination 
of witnesses, is effective to expedite the consideration of cases, 
without injury to the justice of the result. In certain types of 
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
for example, a so-called "shortened procedure" is made 
available, under which, with the consent of the affected 
parties, a case may be decided upon stipulations, depositions, 
and briefs.31 Over a period of time, this procedure has been 
chosen by the parties in approximately one third of the cases 
wherein it is applicable. Because of the circumstance that in 
many cases before the agencies there is but little argument 
over the facts, which are often chiefly statistical in nature-
the argument being as to the significance or proper inter-
pretation of a technical and complex factual situation-there 
is every indication that similar procedures could well be 
adopted more generally. While in some types of proceed-
30 For typical administrative rulings excluding proffered evidence, see In the 
Matter of Lindeman Power & Equipment Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 868 ( 1939), and 
In re Riemer and the State of Illinois, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Docket 
No. 56, July 7> 1943. For law review comment, see Vanderbilt, "The Tech-
nique of Proof Before Administrative Bodies," 24 IA. L. REV. 464 (1939). 
31 Monograph No. 1 I of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. IO, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 23· 
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ings, such as cases before the National Labor Relations Board 
involving charges of unfair labor practices, it would be quite 
out of the question to attempt to decide the cases on the basis 
of ex parte affidavits, still there are many opportunities for 
profitable expansion of this practice. 
Without the necessity of any changes in present rules, it 
is possible by informal co-operation between attorneys for 
the agency and for the respondent to approximate this result. 
Often, an agency assigns a case for hearing before its staff 
members have become familiar with the factual data in-
volved; and the submission by the respondent's attorney of 
a carefully prepared statement covering the significant facts 
of the case may become the basis for a stipulation of facts, on 
which the case may be disposed of. Utilization of this in-
formal device is obviously advantageous for the respondent 
as well as for the public interests served by the agency. 
6. Presumptions and Inferences; Burden of Proof 
In theory at least, it is true as well in the case of adminis-
trative proceedings as in the case of proceedings in courts 
that the party seeking relief has the burden of proof, even 
though that party be the administrative agency; and it has 
been held that administrative agencies have no general au-
thority by regulation to shift the fundamental burden of 
proof.32 But in practice it is easy for the agency, acting as 
judge as well as plaintiff, to satisfy itself that it has sustained 
the burden of proof which formally is imposed upon it. While 
the burden of going forward with the proofs rests indeed on 
the agency, in many senses the burden of ultimately convinc-
ing the tribunal that the respondent is not guilty as charged 
rests upon the respondent. 
This is so, largely because of the fact that the ultimate 
finding by the administrative agency frequently depends on 
32 Petition of Warszawski (D. C. Mich. 1936), 16 F. Supp. 43· And note 
provisions of Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 
190 PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES 
inference. It must determine, for example, whether a gift 
was made in contemplation of death, or what the intent was 
which motivated an employer in discharging an employee. 
Where the important question is not a matter of primary 
fact but of inference, it is inevitable that an agency approach-
ing a case (as many administrative agencies do) with a desire 
to reach one result, if possible, rather than another, will often 
find it easy to make an inference on facts which to a totally 
disinterested judge would not preponderate in support of the 
inference. 
This situation gives rise to a question which has a long 
history in the field of administrative law. In cases where the 
evidence equally supports an inference imposing liability and 
likewise a contrary inference exonerating of liability, must 
the agency dismiss the case, or may it choose the inference 
it desires? In the earlier days, there was a strong tendency 
in the courts to rule that where the evidence equally sup-
ported either inference, the agency would not be permitted 
to make the inference that would impose liability.33 
Dissatisfied with the result of such decisions (which fre-
quently made it impossible, for example, to award workmen's 
compensation to the family of a worker killed while at work, 
but under circumstances which rendered it impossible to 
establish clearly whether the death was due to accident or 
suicide), the state legislatures and Congress as well, sought 
to change the rule by adopting various "presumption" stat-
utes. They were principally of two types: first, creating a 
presumption effective on appeal in favor of the correctness 
of the administrative decision; and second, a presumption in 
favor of one party that would operate throughout the admin-
istrative proceedings (for example, a presumption that a 
workmen's compensation claim came within the statute, that 
33 See, for example, Chaudier v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 2.06 Mich. 
433, 173 N. W. 198 (1919); Sparks v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 195 
Iowa 334, 190 N. W. 593 (192.2.). Many state courts follow this rule. 
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the injury did not result from negligence or intoxication, 
that death was not suicide, et cetera). 
Some state courts quite ignored these presumption statutes, 
construing them so as to deprive them of any substantial 
operative effect.34 But it has now been established at least for 
the federal agencies that such presumptions are valid; and 
while their force vanishes upon the introduction of any 
countervailing evidence, it is indicated that in the absence 
thereof, the statutory presumption satisfies the requirement 
that the finding be supported by evidence.35 
7. The Requirement of Substantial Evidence 
A further limitation on the power of administrative tri-
bunals to exercise free discretion in making inferences as 
to facts not specifically established, is the provision so fre-
quently found in the statutes (and imposed by the courts 
themselves where the statute is silent) that the findings of 
the administrative body are binding and conclusive only if 
supported by substantial evidence. So used, the term is chiefly 
significant as a criterion of the scope of judicial review. As 
hereinafter discussed, the term in such connection has no fixed 
meaning. The extent to which the courts will examine the 
reasonableness of the inferences made by an agency, in ascer-
taining whether there is substantial evidence to support those 
inferences, varies widely from agency to agency, if not from 
court to court. The extent to which the inferences are exam-
ined is influenced by many factors, and the characterization 
of the supporting evidence as substantial or otherwise, ordi-
34 See e.g., Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N.Y. S. 
700 (1921). 
35 See Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. z8o, 56 S. Ct. 190 (1935), com-
mented on in 34 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1936); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 
463, 63 S. Ct. 1241 (1943), commented on in 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1943); 
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); Webre 
Steib Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U. S. 164, 65 S. Ct. 
578 ( 1945). 
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narily reflects the result attained rather than the tests em-
ployed. 
However, the existence of this vague requirement that a 
finding may be revised, if not supported by substantial evi-
dence, has influenced the proof-taking processes of the agen-
cies. In making a record in a case which may be subjected 
to judicial review, an administrative agency is assiduous in 
its effort to make sure that substantial evidence can be pointed 
to in support of its findings. 
One particular aspect of the requirement of substantial 
evidence is particularly significant in this connection. This is 
the so-called legal residuum rule.36 Under this rule, it is said 
that a finding cannot be deemed to be supported by substan-
tial evidence unless there is at least a residuum of legally 
competent evidence to support it. This would mean, for 
example, that no matter how convincing the record might 
be, the courts would have the power to set aside the findings 
of fact on the sole ground that nowhere in the record was 
there a residuum of technically competent proof which sup-
ported the finding. 
The artificiality of this legal residuum rule seems clear. 
The administrative officers reach their decision upon a consid-
eration of all the evidence received, be it hearsay or other-
wise. Their decision is influenced by the preponderance of the 
testimony, not by the residuum thereof. The fact that there is 
some residuum of proof pointing in one direction or another 
has nothing to do with the making of the administrative 
finding. As observed by Wigmore, "it is obviously fallacious 
to assume that one or more pieces of 'legal' evidence are 
36 The legal residuum rule is sometimes spoken of as a rule separate from 
and in fact opposed to the substantial evidence rule. Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942) 189. It is true that many 
courts which apply the substantial evidence requirement have repudiated the 
legal residuum rule, but it would seem that the two rules are but a broader and 
narrower aspect of the same general requirement. 
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'per se' a sufficient guarantee of truth." 31 The only beneficial 
effect which the rule has had lies in the influence that has 
been exerted upon administrative tribunals to follow gen-
erally the basic principles of evidence so far as it is practical 
to do so. 
Despite the artificiality of the rule, it has been of some 
indirect value in this way, and has at least done no substantial 
amount of harm. For better or worse, the rule is still in 
effect in apparently a majority of the state courts.38 
The extent to which the legal residuum rule will be fol-
lowed in the federal courts is not so clear. The different 
circuits are not in complete agreement, and the Supreme 
Court has not spoken with finality. 
Some of the circuit courts of appeal insist that there must 
be a residuum at least of legally competent proof to sup-
port the finding of an administrative agency. Thus, the 
Fifth Circuit declared on one occasion that a statutory pro-
vision that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and 
equity will not control an administrative agency means that 
it is not error for the Board to "hear incompetent evidence, 
but does not mean that a finding of fact may rest solely on 
such evidence." 39 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has declared 
that the relaxation of the strict rules of evidence in the case 
of proceedings before administrative agencies "was done for 
the sole purpose of expediting administrative procedure, and 
not to limit in any manner the well-known rules relating to 
311 Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) 41. 
38 Many cases are cited in 1 Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) 83 et 
seq.; Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., :u8 N.Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 
(1916); Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 Cal. 793, 151 
Pac. 421 (1915); Jensen v. Wheeler & England, 51 Idaho 91, I P. (2d) 62.4 
(1931); Selz-Schwab & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 326 Ill. no, 156 N. E. 
763 ( 1927); Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 148 N. W. 247 ( 1914); 
Smith v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 284 Pa. 35, 130 Atl. 265 
(1925). 
39 National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co. (C.C.A. sth 1938), 
98 F. (2d) 870. 
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the weight or the applicability, or the materiality of the 
evidence." 40 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has declared that where 
improper, immaterial, or hearsay testimony "is the only 
foundation for the findings . . . [then it cannot be said 
that] they are supported by such substantial evidence as the 
law requires." 41 The position of the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia is not so clear, but in at least one 
case it has applied a similar rule.42 
In other circuits, however, it has been specifically ruled 
that the evidence in support of a finding may be "substan-
tial," so as to render that finding unassailable, even though 
there is no residuum of technically competent proof. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken clearly, declaring 
that while mere rumor would doubtless not be sufficient to 
support a finding, yet "hearsay may do so, at least if more 
is not conveniently available and if, in the end, the finding 
is supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible 
persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs." 43 
40 National Labor Relations Board v. Illinois Tool Works (C.C.A. 7th 
1941), 119 F. (zd) 356, 363, 364; the court added: 
"We think Congress presupposed that the trier of facts would weigh and 
apply the evidence as before and use only that which was competent and 
material, and disregard that which was not. The effect of the statute is 
to shorten trial procedure by permitting the trier, if he chooses, to admit 
all evidence of doubtful materiality and thus eliminate delays caused by 
arguments. The statute does not attempt to define competent and material 
evidence. That is still left to the determination of the trier. The statute 
merely gives him a longer time in which to make his decision, and at the 
same time shortens the trial. There is nothing new in this formula, for 
courts have used it from time immemorial in cases not triable by juries. 
They could always, in their findings, guard against errors in the admission 
of evidence, and when they did, the reviewing court would regard such 
errors as harmless. What was heretofore permitted by the courts has like-
wise been authorized by this statute in cases of this character." 
41 National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co. 
(C.C.A. 9th 1941), 118 F. (zd) 98o. 
42 Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. 
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (zd) 564-a decision on which Wigmore commented, "No 
wonder the administrative agencies chafe under such unpractical control." 
I Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. ( 1940) 34· 
43 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A. zd 
1938), 94 F. (zd) 862, 864; see also Art Metals Const. Co. v. National Labor 
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Similarly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that since an administrative agency is not bound by technical 
rules of evidence, and may admit evidence, such as hearsay, 
which would be inadmissible in a court, it need not single 
out this evidence for special treatment but may make it the 
basis for findings, if the evidence is such as would normally 
be relied on by reasonable people.44 
Again, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
has declared that "it is only convincing, not lawyers' evidence 
which is required." 45 
Many other cases could be cited from these and other 
circuits, but the resulting picture would be the same. There 
is no consistent trend, and remarks found in one opinion of 
a given court are sometimes seemingly at odds with remarks 
found in other decisions by the same court. 
The test toward which the federal courts are apparently 
moving is to say that a finding may be deemed to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence, even though there is no 
residuum of legally competent proof, so long as the evidence 
on which the Board relied was the best that was conveniently 
available and was of a kind on which responsible persons are 
accustomed to rely in serious affairs; but to say that tech-
nically incompetent proof, such as hearsay, is not sufficient 
to constitute substantial evidence in a case where it is substi-
Relations Board (C.C.A. 2d 194o), 110 F. (2d) 148, 149-150, where the 
court said: 
"We cannot see any basis to challenge the competency of this evidence, or 
its sufficiency to support the finding, even though common law evidence 
alone were competent, which is not the case." 
In an earlier decision, John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 
(C.C.A. 2d 1924), 299 Fed. 468, the court held it proper for an agency to 
consider legally incompetent evidence so long as it was evidence of a kind that 
would affect fairminded men in the conduct of important affairs. 
44 National Labor Relations Board v. Service Wood Heel Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 
ISt 1941), 124 F. (2d) 470. 
45 International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 35 v. 
National Labor Relations Board (App. D. C. 1939), 110 F. (zd) 2.9, 35, aff'd 
3ll u.s. 71.. 61 s. Ct. 83 (1940). 
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tuted for direct evidence that is conveniently available-and 
particularly where there is a denial of the hearsay.46 
The Supreme Court declared in Consolidated Edison Co. 
v. National Labor Relations Board: 41 "Mere uncorroborated 
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence." 
This may properly be taken as suggesting that hearsay which 
rises above the level of rumor and is corroborated by circum-
stantial indication of its reliability, may constitute substantial 
evidence. In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of 
Wage and Hour Division of Department of Labor/8 the 
court found that statistical studies by a government depart-
ment, which would not be legally competent, were sufficient 
to constitute substantial support for the agency's findings. 
The opinion strongly indicates that evidence which would 
not be competent in a court of law may be substantial evidence 
to support a finding of an administrative board. However, 
the court did not squarely face the question, since it appeared 
that the documents in question were received in evidence 
without objection, and that accordingly, even in a court of 
law, such evidence could have been considered and accorded 
its natural probative effect, as if it were admissible. 
Ordinarily, it cannot be said that evidence is substantial 
unless at least a substantial portion of the evidence relied 
upon is technically competent. The administrative agencies 
have refused to make findings on the basis of charts made 
by witnesses who were not examined, on the basis of letters, 
et cetera.49 But in rare cases, such incompetent testimony may 
be the best that is available, and if it is persuasive, many 
46 Martel Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th 1940), 
114 F. (2d) 624. 
47 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S. Ct. 2o6 (1938). 
48 3 12 U. S. 12 6, 61 S. Ct. 524 ( 1941). This case has been the subject of 
extensive law review comment, e. g., 27 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1941); 35 ILL. L. 
REv. 84o (1941); 29 GEo. L. J. 882 (1941); ro GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 219 
( 1941). 
49 See In the Matter of W. H. B. Broadcasting Co., 3 F. C. C. 592 (1936); 
In re Queensboro Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 86o (1937). 
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courts can be expected to rule that there is substantial evi-
dence to support the finding, even though there is no re-
siduum of leg~lly competent proof. 
In many cases, the requirement that there be substantial 
evidence in order to render the findings unassailable, is said 
to be approximately the same test as that applied by appellate 
courts in determining whether or not a jury verdict must be 
set aside-the test then being, generally, whether the finding 
is so contrary to the evidence that no reasonable group acting 
reasonably could have reached the conclusion assailed.50 The 
suggestion cannot be taken technically because in a jury trial, 
if there is not at least a residuum of legal evidence to support 
the verdict, a directed verdict must be entered by the court. 
The rule, rather, should be construed broadly to mean that 
such substantial evidence as confers finality upon the admin-
istrative decision on the facts exists when the evidence is such 
that a reasonable man acting reasonably might have reached 
the decision which is assailed. 
The rule is then not much different from saying, as the 
courts sometimes do, that substantial evidence exists if there 
is a rational basis for the decision. The general spirit of this 
requirement is illustrated by the provisions of Section 7 of 
50 E. B. Stason, "'Substantial Evidence' in Administrative Law," 89 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941). Among the numerous cases in which "substantial 
evidence" is equated to the directed verdict rule in jury trial are the following: 
National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 
U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. sth 1940), 112 F. (2d) S4H 
National Labor Relations Board v. Goshen Rubber & Manufacturing Co., 
(C.C.A. 7th 1940), IIO F. (2d) 432; National Labor Relations Board v. 
Sterling Electric Motors, Inc. (C.C.A. 9th 1940), 109 F. (2d) 194; National 
Labor Relations Board v. Asheville Hosiery Co. (C.C.A. 4th 1939), 108 F. 
(2d) 288; National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co. {C.C.A. sth 
1938), 98 F. (2d) 406; National Labor Relations Board v. Wallace Mfg. Co. 
{C.C.A. 4th 1938), 95 F. (2d) 818; Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. 
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th 1938), 93 F. (zd) 985. That 
the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act somewhat enlarge 
the powers of the courts to hold evidence not "substantial" is indicated by 
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B. (Feb. z6, 1951, No. 40, Oct. 1950 
term). The precise extent of the enlargement has not been precisely defined. See 
citations inn. zs, Ch. 16, at p. 313, infra. 
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the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 that de-
cision must be based on the whole record and "in accordance 
with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." See 
the cases cited below.51 
Thus the substantial evidence rule is a strong inducement 
to administrative agencies to insist upon a general adherence 
to the basic principles of evidence; but it is doubtful that this 
requirement will continue to be available as a basis for set-
ting aside an administrative determination on the sole ground 
that it is not supported in part, at least, by proof which ts 
technically "competent" under common-law standards. 
51 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 12.5, 59 S. Ct. 754 
(1939); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 54 
S. Ct. 692 ( 1934); Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A. 
gth 1940), 112 F. (2d) 371; Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission (App. D. C. 1939), 107 F. (2d) 212. 
CHAPTER 10 
Official Notice 
I. In General 
ONE of the principal reasons for entrusting to admin-istrative tribunals the determination of specialized classes of justiciable controversies is the belief that 
through their extensive experience in a particular field they 
gain information, knowledge, and wisdom which enable them 
to decide cases of a highly technical or specialized nature 
more wisely than could a court of general jurisdiction. Limi-
tations on their power to utilize the breadth of knowledge 
gained through intensive experience in their particular fields, 
therefore, can be imposed only at the cost of reducing pro-
portionately one of the prime benefits sought through the 
creation of such tribunals. But some limitations are nonethe-
less necessary, in the interests of assuring fair and just deter-
minations, for the simple reason that without them there 
would be no means of correcting an administrative deter-
mination which was erroneous because the agency's experience 
had convinced it of certain conclusions which could be shown 
to an impartial tribunal to be without foundation. To the 
extent that an agency is permitted to notice officially the 
existence of alleged facts, its conclusions with respect thereto 
(whether or not supported by any evidence) become final 
and unassailable. Determinations may thus be based not on 
the evidence produced at the hearing, but on conclusions 
reached dehors the record. The hearing can accordingly be 
reduced to a mere talisman. But such reduction, of course, 
cannot be permitted in cases where hearings are required. 
And so the courts have been compelled to work out methods 
whereby the special experience and knowledge of adminis-
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trative tribunals can be fully utilized under conditions which 
will safeguard the right of the parties to contest the accuracy 
and correctness of the conclusions which the tribunal's ex-
perience has taught it to believe. 
This is the general problem of "official notice." So stated, 
it involves a variety of related but separable inquiries, which 
may be reduced to clearer focus by narrowing the general 
definition to exclude the related subsidiary questions. 
2. Use of Expert Knowledge in Drawing Inferences 
In the process of decision, as distinguished from the process 
of proof, agency officials are at liberty to give the fullest play 
to their expert knowledge and experience in evaluating the 
evidence that is in the record and drawing conclusions there-
from. Such utilization is not only permissible, but is desir-
able.1 This, of course, is quite a different thing than the 
utilization of special experience and asserted knowledge as 
a substitute for evidence and as a basis for making factual 
determinations as to matters not proved by evidence in the 
record. 
The difference is one of degree rather than of kind, to 
be sure. If a certain conclusion has become firmly fixed in 
the administrator's mind, he will find it easy to discredit 
evidence tending to support a contrary conclusion and will, 
on the other hand, be easily persuaded to make inferences 
consonant with his prepossessed ideas, and this on the basis 
of evidence which to another would not seem to justify any 
such inference. But so long as the factual conclusion must 
be supportable by evidence in the record, and cannot be 
premised upon the asserted independent knowledge of the 
agency, the tendency of the agencies to rely heavily on their 
special experience (and the predilections induced thereby) in 
1 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(1942) 209, 210; Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 71· 
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drawing inferences from the evidence, does not present any 
insurmountable problems. The court may set the conclusion 
aside unless it appears that the inference so drawn can rea-
sonably be premised upon the record evidence. By and large, 
this is a sufficient protection against the danger that asserted 
expertness may become a euphemistic label concealing actual 
arbitrary decision. Any further safeguards would interfere 
with the fullest utilization of the admitted expertness which . . 
agencies acquire. 
Closely related to the problems posed by the tendency 
of agencies to rely on their special information and experience 
in evaluating and drawing inferences from the evidence be-
fore them, is the question arising out of an agency's refusal 
(induced by its special experience) to accept as true the 
uncontradicted evidence of witnesses testifying in support of 
a given conclusion. 
Where the burden is on the party appearing before the 
agency to convince it of a certain conclusion, there is no 
reason why an agency should not have at least as much 
power as that of a common-law jury to refuse to accept testi-
mony which its experience shows to be incredible. The need 
of such a power is particularly great in the case of adminis-
trative agencies, because so often the testimony offered is 
opinion evidence-the ideas of experts as to the value of 
property, the cause of a hernia, the safety of a mechanical 
device, and the like. Hearings before administrative agencies 
frequently involve a situation where a board of experts is 
called upon to pass judgment upon the opinions of other 
experts representing the parties. Quite properly, the agency 
is usually held to have the power to refuse to accept the 
opinions of the experts who testify. 
A typical case is that where, in a claim for workmen's 
compensation, the issue is whether a hernia is traumatic. 
Claimant's doctors give their opinion that it was. There is 
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no direct contradictory evidence, but the Board is convinced 
that the physicians' opinion is so at odds with the physical 
facts of the case as to be incredible. The Board may dis-
believe the expert witness.2 
Similarly, where an agency is called upon to fix a valuation 
on property, it may rely on its own knowledge as to values 
in refusing to accept an expert's estimate, even though be-
cause of the ex parte nature of many valuation proceedings 
there is no directly contrary evidence before the agency.3 In 
this case again, the problem involved is different than that 
of an agency's officially noticing facts as to which there is 
no evidence; for in many instances there is no requirement 
in assessment proceedings that the agency's determination be 
supported by substantial evidence. In cases where this re-
quirement does exist, it is of course held that the agency 
may not arbitrarily substitute a different value than that 
indicated by the testimony.4 
3· Notice of "Litigation" Facts 
The principle of official notice is based on the premise that 
administrative tribunals should be permitted to utilize their 
special information and knowledge built up over many years 
of intensive study of a specialized field, and not be required 
to treat each case as an isolated phenomenon in the considera-
tion of which their accumulated knowledge must be excluded. 
This premise does not apply to a case where an agency may 
be inclined to rely on ex parte reports of investigators as to 
particular factual details peculiar to a given case. Information 
2 McCarthy v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, I 94 Wis. I 9 8, 2 I 5 
N. W. 824 (I927). See Pillsbury, "Review of Decisions of Administrative Tri-
bunals-Industrial Accident Commission," I9 CAL. L. REV. 282 (I9JI). 
3 Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 2d 
I932), 55 F. (2d) 893; Gloyd v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 
8th I933), 63 F. (2d) 649. 
4 Boggs & Buhl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 3d 
I929), 34 F. (zd) 859; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue (C.C.A. 2d I9JI), 53 F. (zd) 381. 
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gathered privately by an agency with reference solely to a 
particular case at hand, does not bear the hallmark of expert 
knowledge. It is rather to be compared, from the standpoint 
of reliability, with the report of a private detective agency. 
There is no reason to permit an agency to rely on such reports 
as a basis for decision. Rather, there is every reason to insist 
that such reports should be subjected to the searching light 
of cross-examination. Such information should be adduced 
only by the ordinary process of proof, and should be con-
sidered only it it is in the record and if there has been 
adequate opportunity to examine the ability and credibility 
of the investigator. 
It is only when the information in question has been 
developed over a period of years in the usual course of the 
business of the agency, and has emerged from a coterie of 
facts established indisputably in numerous cases, that there 
is a basis for permitting an agency to utilize its knowledge in 
noticing facts,. even though not all the sources thereof are 
reproduced in full detail in the record. It is only where truly 
expert knowledge is involved that the doctrine of official 
notice applies. Asserted testimonial knowledge based on pri-
vate investigations as to the particular facts in litigation in 
an individual case is not expert knowledge. The doctrine of 
official notice does not permit an agency to rely on it. 
Here again, just as in the case of the distinction between 
utilization of expert knowledge as a substitute for evidence 
and the utilization thereof as a basis for evaluating evidence, 
the difference is only a matter of degree. A report by an 
expert accountant employed by an agency, for example, may 
inextricably intertwine matters representing the accumulated 
expert knowledge of the agency with other matters repre-
senting an opinion as to the "litigation" facts of a particular 
case. It is the responsibility of the agency to refuse to give 
undue weight to the latter aspects of the report, for there 
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is usually no way of proving that the agency has relied un-
duly on the results of its ex parte investigation into the 
"litigation" facts. 
4· Use of Record in Another Proceeding 
Not infrequently, administrative agencies incorporate into 
the record of a particular proceeding, either by introduction 
of bulky exhibits or by reference to the agency's files and 
records, a transcript of the proceedings in another case. The 
agency thus relies on what it heard and what it concluded 
in another case, as a basis for its decision in the instant case. 
But here again, there is really no problem of official notice 
involved, for it is open to the parties to examine the files of 
the cases referred to and to meet by their own proofs what-
ever adverse factual data such files may contain. 
Reliance upon the records made in other cases, specifically 
referred to, involves primarily the question as to whether 
the party appearing before the agency has been unfairly 
deprived of the right to cross-examine the witnesses who 
testified in the other proceeding. Ordinarily, in accordance 
with the principles discussed supra, opportunity to rebut the 
testimony offered in the prior proceeding is deemed to be a 
satisfactory substitute for the actual cross-examination of the 
witnesses therein.5 
It is only where the agency relies on its records in other 
proceedings as a basis for reaching a conclusion in a particular 
5 Lakemore Co. v. Brown (Emergency Ct. of App. 1943), 137 F. (2d) 355· 
In immigration cases, the courts have been noticeably liberal in permitting 
utilization of records in other proceedings; e. g., Jung See v. Nash (C.C.A. 8th 
1925), 4 F. (2d) 639; Lui Tse Chew v. Nagle (C.C.A. 9th 1926), 15 F. (2d) 
636; SooHoo Yen ex rel. SooHoo Do Yim v. Tillinghast (C.C.A. 1st 1928), 
24 F. (2d) 163; Yong Yung See v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1937), 92 F. 
(2d) 700. In Interstate Commerce Commission cases, less liberality is permitted, 
e. g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States (D. C. Ky. 1915), 225 Fed. 571, 
aff'd 245 U.S. 463, 38 S. Ct. 141 (1918). The general problem is discussed 
by J. F. Davison in 25 IA. L. REv. 555 (1940). 
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case, without giving the parties adequate notice of the records 
so to be relied on, and an adequate opportunity to examine 
and rebut them, that a problem of official notice is involved. 
5. Where Agency Is Not Exercising Judicial Function 
Since the problem of official notice is concerned funda-
mentally with the extent to which an agency may substitute 
its own knowledge or conclusions for evidence, it is clear 
that the problem cannot arise in cases where there is no 
requirement that the agency act on the basis of evidence. 
Where an agency exercises legislative or executive functions, 
it is not ordinarily required to show any basis of substantial 
evidence to support its findings and conclusions (except where 
a statute imposes such a requirement) and therefore in mak-
ing findings it may rely as fully on its own experience as on 
any other factor. It could be said that in such cases there is 
no limit to what an agency may officially notice. More ac-
curately, it should be concluded that the doctrine of official 
notice is not involved where an agency exercises executive 
or legislative functions. 
Thus, in cases where no hearing need be given, the agency 
is at liberty to determine the case without reference to the 
testimony adduced at any hearing which may be held; and 
the doctrine limiting the extent to which an agency may 
officially notice facts is inapplicable. 
Similarly, in cases where there is no judicial review of 
the factual findings (as in many ad valorem tax-assessment 
cases, where ordinarily the assessors are not required to 
support their judgment of values by a formal record con-
taining substantial evidence tending to establish the accuracy 
of the assessment) the doctrine of official notice is really 
inapplicable.6 
6 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, zo4 U.S. 585, Z7 S. Ct. 3z6 (I907); 
Olympia Water Works v. Gelbach, I6 Wash. 48z, 48 Pac. zs I (I 897). 
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6. Official Notice Redefined 
The real crux of the problem, then, after all the subsidiary 
inquiries are put to one side, is simply this: To what extent 
may an administrative tribunal, in the exercise of its judicial 
functions, rely on conclusions developed as a result of its 
intensive experience in its specialized field of activity, as a 
basis for factual findings as to matters of a general nature 
which are not fully established by evidence in the record 
made in a particular case? 
7. When Notice Freely Permitted 
The rule is now clearly emerging (see, e. g., Section 7 (d) 
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946) that 
an administrative agency may take official notice not only of 
such factual matters as courts judicially notice/ but also of 
any factual matter of a general nature which its experience 
has shown to be true, subject always to the proviso that the 
parties must be given adequate advance notice of the facts 
which the agency proposes to note, and given adequate op-
portunity to show the inaccuracy of the facts or the fallacy 
of the conclusions which the agency proposes tentatively to 
accept without proof. Such official notice, therefore, has only 
prima-facie effect. The agency is permitted to announce any 
reasonable presumption it proposes to make as to factual 
matters of a general nature within the field of its special 
knowledge, but the presumption may be substituted for evi-
dence only so long as it is not rebutted. Often, the party 
against whom the notice is asserted will seek to show not 
7 This is commonly said to be restricted to matters of common knowledge 
aild notoriety. But the courts have been exceedingly liberal in their interpreta-
tiOn of what constitutes common knowledge; and have in fact been willing to 
11otice a wide variety of facts which are deemed to be readily susceptible to ob-
jective ascertainment, noticing such facts as the height of the tallest man in 
history; that dynamic radio completely superseded the magnetic; that pneuma-
tic tires are more damaging to highways than hard rubber tires. See E. D. 
Ransom, comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 610 (1938). 
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that the general fact of which the commission proposes to 
take notice is entirely wrong, 'but only that the generality 
should be somehow modified because of conditions present 
in his particular case. Often, the area of disagreement con-
cerns only the significance of the facts to be noticed, and 
the deductions to be drawn from them. 
So long as adequate notice is given, at the hearing or prior 
thereto, of what generalities the agency proposes to notice, 
and so long as the parties have adequate opportunity to meet 
and rebut the inference which the agency proposes to make, 
wide latitude should be given. For example, if the issuance of 
a license to operate a common or contract carrier depends on 
whether or not public convenience requires such service be-
tween two cities, the commission should be able to rely on 
conclusions reached in a recent hearing on a similar applica-
tion as to the same route, and should not be required to put 
into the record again all the information it had heard a few 
weeks previously.8 
But if the agency fails to advise the parties as to the as-
sumed facts which it proposes to notice, or fails to give the 
parties adequate opportunity to examine their accuracy and 
rebut or explain them, there has been a denial of due process.9 
Thus, there are two limitations imposed on the power of 
administrative agencies to notice officially as facts certain gen-
eralities which their special experience has taught them to 
believe. They are: ( 1) the facts noticed must be incorporated 
into the record, or there must be citation of the source rna-
8 Railroad Commission v. McDonald (Tex. Civ. App. I936), 90S. W. (zd) 
s8I; PennsylvaniaR. Co. v. United States (D. c. Pa. I93o), 40 F. (zd) 92.Ij 
Gellhorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ( I94 I) 89-92.. 
9 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 30I U. S. 2.92., 
57 S. Ct. 7 2.4 (I 9 3 7) ; United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., z65 U.S. 2.74, 44 S. Ct. 565 (I92.4); West Ohio 
Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (D. C. Ohio I92.8), 42. F. 
(zd) 899· See Smith, "Practice and Procedure Before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 404 (I937). 
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terial on which the agency relies; and ( 2) this source material 
must be made available to the parties for their examination.10 
8. Relaxation of Requirements Where Risk of Error Is 
Slight 
Ordinarily, disregard of either of the two last-mentioned 
requirements is fatal to the validity of the administrative de-
termination, but in cases where the risk of error seems plainly 
small, some relaxation of the requirements is permitted. 
Thus, agencies have been permitted to notice such matters as 
the average earnings of a day laborer,11 or an individual's 
earning capacity.12 For somewhat similar reasons, notice is 
freely permitted in alienage cases.13 Where an agency notices 
a party's own prior reports, no reversible error exists, at least 
in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice.14 
Some state courts have suggested that public utility com-
missions have almost unlimited powers to notice officially 
anything in their files, and rely on any report contained 
therein, without notice to the parties.15 But to the extent that 
such decisions appear to permit a broader scope to the exer-
cise of official notice than do the Supreme Court cases above 
cited, it would seem clear (in view of the constitutional basis 
of the federal decisions in the guaranties of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment) that they cannot be 
regarded as authoritative. Further, examination of many of 
10 The following law review articles discnss this general problem: Gellhorn, 
"Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication," 20 TEX. L. REv. 131 
( 1941) ; Faris, "Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies," 4 IND. L. J. 167 
( 19 2 8) ; Merrill, "Rules of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings," 14 OKLA. 
BAR A. J. 1934 (194J). 
11 Walsh's Case, 227 Mass. J41, II6 N. E. 496 (1917). 
12 O'Reilly's Case, 265 Mass. 456, 164 N. E. 440 (1929). 
13 E. g., Jung See v. Nash (C.C.A. 8th, 1925), 4 F. (2d) 639. 
14 Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 
U.S. 548, 65 S. Ct. 770 (1945), commented on in 6o HARV. L. REV. 620 
(1947). 
15 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 156 Wis. 
47, 145 N. W. 216, 974 (1914); City of Elizabeth v. Board of Public Utility 
Commissioners, 99 N.J. L. 496, 123 Atl. 358 (1924). 
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the decisions containing such broad remarks as to the powers 
of agencies to take official notice of facts not incorporated in 
the record indicates that the requirements of the rule as above 
stated had been satisfied, the parties having in fact been given 
adequate opportunity to learn what facts a commission pro-
posed to notice and adequate opportunity to rebut them.16 
l6 E. g., Duluth Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 161 Wis. 245, 
152 N. W. 887 (1915); Steamboat Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185 
Pac. 801 (1919), 1119 (1920); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 
150 Ark. 586, 235 S. W. 1003 (1921). See Hanft, "Utilities Commissions as 
Expert Courts," 15 N. C. L. REv. 12 (1936); Brown, "Public Service Com-




I. The Nature of the Problem 
SOME separation of hearing procedure and decision pro-cedure is characteristic of administrative agencies. The hearings are but rarely conducted by an officer with 
power to make any effective decision. Rather, the decision 
is frequently made by an officer who was not present at the 
hearing. The resulting effects on the actual process of case 
determination can be visualized by comparing the situation 
with that which would exist if, in the courts, the trial judges, 
at the termination of the hearing in every lawsuit, simply 
submitted a summary or memorandum as to the contentions 
of the parties to an appellate court, which without hearing 
the parties or reading the evidence, then proceeded to decide 
all the cases assigned for trial before all the trial judges, 
relying only on a short oral argument and advice from their 
law clerks as to the contents of the record and of briefs filed 
by counsel to determine the facts and law of each case. 
While the postulated hypothetical situation represents an 
extreme, yet it fairly describes a procedure which could be 
followed by most federal agencies and many state agencies; 
and it is indicative of the type of procedure actually followed 
by a number of agencies. 
A mere description of the process is suggestive of the dif-
ficulties that inhere. As pointed out by the Attorney General's 
Committee/ two undesirable consequences ensue as the con-
duct of the hearing becomes divorced from responsibility for 
decision: (I) the hearing itself tends to degenerate; and ( 2) 
1 Sen. Doc. No.8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 45· 
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the decision becomes anonymous, and therefore less 
respected. 
Of course the procedural mechanics employed vary widely 
from agency to agency, and changes occur frequently within 
each agency as attempts are made to devise methods that will 
meet, so far as possible, the difficulties encountered by the 
agencies in their attempts to decide wisely and justly the 
multitude of cases which they can study so little. But the 
typical course of procedure, recognized in Section 8 (b) of 
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, calls for 
the making of an intermediate report and recommendation 
by the hearing officer, which is served on the parties, who then 
submit exceptions thereto (together with supporting briefs) 
to the agency, which (with copious assistance of law clerks) 
proceeds to learn the high spots of the case and then renders 
its decision. Oral arguments are usually utilized when re-
quested by the parties, but they are typically too short to 
enable counsel to do more than acquaint the agency with the 
barest outline of the case. 
The system which has evolved owes its existence to practi-
cal exigencies rather than to any theory of jurisprudence. 
Faced with a necessity of deciding a staggering number of 
cases annually, it has been simply a matter of necessity for the 
agencies to delegate to assistants, so far as possible, the tasks 
of hearing and weighing the evidence. Constitutional and 
statutory proscriptions have ordinarily made it impossible for 
the agencies to carry this process to its ultimate logical con-
clusion, by appointing responsible staff members and giving 
them power to decide cases. Where an agency is given the 
power to decide cases, it has been held to be the duty of the 
agency itself (in the sense of the board of three or four or six 
members appointed by law as members of the agency) to 
make the decisions and enter the orders. 
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Many administrators contend ably that this process of de-
cision has worked well and achieved just results. But it is of 
course impossible to determine whether the decisions would 
have been otherwise had they been made on the basis of an 
intensive knowledge of the case, such as that possessed by a 
trial judge when he makes his decision; and it is likewise 
impossible to determine whether the decisions as made are on 
the whole as fair, just, and well considered as would be true 
if conventional judicial methods were employed. While it 
serves current exigencies, there can be little defense of this 
method as a jurisprudential model. It has been quite gen-
erally agreed that future development should be in the direc-
tion of endowing the hearing officer with substantially the 
responsibilities and powers of a trial judge, so that the initial 
decision in the case is by him, and his decision becomes the 
decision of the agency, unless on an appeal to the agency 
heads (which would be conducted generally in the manner 
characteristic of appeals from trial to appellate courts) his 
decision is reversed.2 Some agencies have been seeking sua 
sponte to move in this direction, so far as existing statutory 
provisions permit. 
The procedure which has developed has arisen from the 
necessities of the situation. The number of cases which the 
agencies are required to dispose of has required delegation. 
Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board frequently dispose of 500 to 
700 cases a year. The Interstate Commerce Commission may 
dispose of 6,ooo or more.3 Transcripts in individual cases 
frequently run J,ooo to s,ooo pages in length and may be 
accompanied by several volumes of exhibits. It is obvious that 
hearing examiners must be employed to take the testimony. 
2 See report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 
Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 45-46, 51. 
3 2 B. N. A. Smith Investigating Committee Verbatim Record 36o; Exhibit 
No. 18, Official Hearings, 2731. 
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Normally, after a hearing has been completed, the hearing 
officer submits an intermediate report. In the case of the fed-
eral agencies, Section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act of I 946 provides (where a hearing is required by statute) 
that the officer hearing the evidence shall make the recom-
mended decision or initial decision, except in cases where the 
record is transferred to the agency heads for initial deter-
mination. The nature and effect of this report vary widely in 
different agencies. In some cases, it is little more than a sum-
mary of the contentions of one or both of the parties. In other 
cases, it embraces a fair summary of the testimony, concluded 
by findings of fact, conclusions of law, and detailed recom-
mendations as to the disposition of the case. Between these 
two extremes, of course, there are encountered many inter-
mediate forms. The preparation of the report may represent 
a diligent and conscientious study of the case by the hearing 
officer; or, on the other hand, it may be prepared not by the 
hearing officer but by other employees of the agency-per-
haps the attorney who tried the case for the agency.4 
In agencies where the intermediate reports are typically 
prepared in careless fashion, they serve little other purpose 
than to state the respective contentions of the parties. In such 
cases, the agency heads place but little reliance on the reports. 
On the other hand, where the general level of performance 
by the hearing officers is on a higher plane, their reports car-
ry greater weight with the heads of the agency, and are some-
times viewed informally as representing a sort of nisi-prius 
decision of the agency. Section 8 (a) of the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of I 946 contemplates this result. 
But whatever the status of the intermediate report (and 
there is in fact no requirement that such reports be issued or 
4 Cf., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YoRK (1942) 112. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 5 (c), goes 
some distance toward prohibiting this practice in the case of some of the judi-
cial functions of the federal agencies. 
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served on the parties, so long as other appropriate means are 
employed to advise the parties of the agency's contentions) 
it is necessary, when the case is presented to the agency for 
actual decision, for the agency heads to learn enough of the 
case to be able to make their own decision as to its proper 
disposition. The only way in which it is possible for them to 
do this is to rely heavily on the assistance of staff employees 
whose job it is to digest records and briefs and then consult 
informally with the agency heads, who thus get the case 
more or less at second hand. 
Necessary though this practice may be, and conceding that 
the staff members to whom are entrusted these heavy respon-
sibilities are on the whole fairly competent, yet it seems clear 
that full public confidence in administrative procedures can-
not be gained until there are eliminated the possibilities of 
gross maladministration which inhere in this system. The 
public knows that the staff assistants who thus recommend 
decision and often write the opinion are frequently inexperi-
enced and untrained. It knows that the positions are generally 
not such as to attract large numbers of mature and competent 
men. It suspects that recommendations are sometimes based 
on a desire to pick and choose from the record something that 
will support a desired result, rather than on a conscientious 
analysis of the record. It suspects that portions of testimony 
or matters of argument which are hard to meet are conveni-
ently ignored, and suspects that it is unduly difficult for 
counsel to convince an agency on oral argument of the con-
trolling importance of such overlooked portions of the record, 
when the staff employees assure the agency heads that the 
record "as a whole" does not support what counsel claims, 
and when the agency heads do not have time to determine 
this for themselves. 
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Many able administrators have pointed out the defects of 
the current practice.5 There is a plain need for improvement 
of administrative procedure at this point. The cure seems to 
be in the direction, which has so often been suggested and is 
adopted-for the federal agencies-by Section 11 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of I 946, of making the posi-
tion of hearing officer sufficiently attractive (by endowing it 
with large powers of decision and the security of assured 
tenure and liberal compensation) to render it possible to fill 
these positions with experienced and highly competent pro-
fessional men, whose initial dispositions of cases will carry 
sufficient weight to command public confidence and be of such 
a character that they can safely be accepted as the decision of 
the agency (subject to limited rights of intra-agency appeal). 
2. The Rule That the One Who Decides Must Hear 
Under most statutes creating administrative tribunals with 
judicial powers, power of decision is vested in the agency. It 
is the agency, and not some staff assistant or employee, who 
must decide the case. The authority to make the decision can-
not be delegated. 
But one of the fundamental requirements of a fair trial, 
previously adverted to 6 is that the one who decides must 
hear. Such was the phraseology of the Supreme Court in the 
first of the celebrated Morgan cases.7 The agency, in which 
alone is vested authority and responsibility to make the deci-
sion, must hear the evidence. This, of course, does not require 
that the agency must listen to all the witnesses, but only that 
the agency which makes the determinations "must consider 
5 Various criticisms by authors with a wealth of administrative experience 
are cited in Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 MICH. L. 
REV. 501, 514 (1942). 
6 Page 150, supra. 
7 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 481, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936). 
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and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 8 The reason 
for this requirement, as the court further explained in the 
case cited, lies in the fact that the weight ascribed by the law 
to administrative findings-their conclusiveness when made 
within the sphere of the authority conferred on the agency-
rests on the assumption that the officer or body who makes 
the findings has considered the evidence and upon that evi-
dence has conscientiously reached a conclusion deemed to be 
justified thereby. 
Limiting the rule thus enunciated by the reason given as 
its basis, this celebrated decision means little more than this: 
An agency in deciding a case is required to master the record 
made in the administrative proceedings to the same degree as 
a trial judge is required to master the record in a case referred 
to a referee for the taking of testimony, before reaching his 
decision.9 So stated, the rule of the Morgan case did not come 
as a startling innovation. The principle had been previously 
applied in a variety of cases.10 But the vigorous language of 
the opinion, and the attention which the case received as a 
cause celebre, served to bring into sharp focus the question as 
to whether administrative agencies, operating under the pro-
cedures discussed in the preceding section, were sufficiently 
mastering the records in the cases they were deciding. The 
opinion of course did not state (nor could there be enunci-
ated) any precise measuring stick which could be utilized in 
determining whether an agency had sufficiently performed its 
duty in this respect. But the case did raise many questions as 
to just what was required. Most of these questions remain 
8 298 U.S. 468 at 482, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936). 
9 This probably contemplates a greater familiarity with the details of evi-
dence than is ordinarily required of an appellate court, which except possibly 
in cases of equitable reviews de novo is not ordinarily required to make evi-
dentiary determinations. 
10 See, e. g., United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins (C. C. A. 2d 1935), 79 
F. (2d) 533; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage 
Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933). 
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unanswered; and, for reasons discussed below, it is doubtful 
whether the answers will ever be afforded. 
A few cases, decided shortly after the first Morgan case, 
intimated that the requirement was that all the members of 
an agency must personally review the entire record of a case.11 
But this would impose a greater burden on members of ad-
ministrative agencies than is imposed on courts composed of 
several judges, and hence goes too far, for it has been sug-
gested in many cases that there is no legal reason and no 
practical justification for requiring agencies to do more than 
courts do in mastering the evidence in the record of the case.12 
While many of the questions raised by the decision in the 
Morgan case remain unanswered, the general application of 
the principle there declared can be roughly defined-and by 
way of exclusion, rather than inclusion-by examining cases 
where it has been held that the procedure adopted by the 
agency was not improper. 
Thus, it is not required that all the members of the agency 
sit in each case.13 Nor is it necessary that any member of the 
agency be present at the taking of testimony; hearing exam-
iners may be appointed.14 A change in the personnel of an 
agency during the pendency of proceedings in a particular 
11 State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, 2.31 Wis. 147, z85 N. W. 
504 (1939); Joyce v. Bruckman, 2.57 App. Div. 795, 15 N.Y. S. (zd) 679 
( 1 939). 
12 In some decisions, the duty of the administrative agency in respect to mas-
tering the record is made analogous to the duty of an appellate court. Logically, 
this is unsound, for the administrative agency makes an original determination, 
rather than an appellate review; and its mastery of the record should be equated 
to that of a trial judge who decides a case upon a record made before a master 
or referee. But as a practical matter, this theoretical distinction will presum-
ably exercise but little influence, because of the fact that, as noted below, the 
courts generally refuse to undertake the task of determining the extent to which 
the members of an agency have studied the record of a case. 
13Frischer & Co. v. Elting (C.C.A. zd 19p), 6o F. (zd) 711; Frischer & 
Co. v. Bakelite Corp. (C.C.P.A. 193o), 39 F. (zd) 2.47. 
14 California Lumbermen's Council v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 
9th 1940), 115 F. (zd) 178; Plapao Laboratories, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C. 
1937), 92. F. (zd) :uS; Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 2.73 U.S. 352., 47 S. Ct. 
346 (192.7). 
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case does not require that a fresh start be made.15 The agency 
members need not personally examine the record; they may 
employ assistants to sift and analyze the evidence.16 
The second Morgan case 17 is one of the comparatively few 
cases in which any affirmative showing was made as to the 
extent to which the deciding authority (in that case a single 
officer) had examined the record. In that case, the Secretary 
of Agriculture testified that the bulky transcript of testi-
mony, some IO,ooo pages exclusive of exhibits, was placed 
on his desk and he dipped into it from time to time to 
get its drift. He read the respondent's brief and a transcript 
of the oral argument. He conferred with his subordinates 
who had sifted and analyzed the evidence, and discussed the 
proposed findings. He said that his order represented his own 
"independent reactions to the findings" of the men in the 
Bureau. The court said (by way of dictum) that it would 
assume that the Secretary sufficiently understood the evi-
dence, and the case was decided on the point that the respond-
ents had not been properly advised of the nature of the claims 
made by the government. It is not clear whether the court's 
assumption was based on the supposition that such a study of 
a record was sufficient, or whether it was based on the propo-
sition that it was improper for the courts to probe the mental 
processes of administrative officials. The significance of the 
case is thus obscured. Nevertheless, it is generally indicative 
of what is permitted. 
In any event, due process does not require that the mem-
bers of an agency hear or read a transcript of the testimony/8 
15 United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (2d) 
166; Eastland Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. 1937), 
92 F. (2d) 467; Vogeley v. Detroit Lumber Co., 196 Mich. 516, 162 N. W. 
975 (1917). 
16 Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 ( 1936). 
17 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938). 
18 Sec. 10 of the Model State Act provides that the officials who are to render 
the decision "shall personally consider the whole record or such portions thereof 
as may be cited by the parties." Similarly, Section 7 (c) of the Federal Admin-
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but only that they sufficiently familiarize themselves with the 
evidence to be able to render a decision based thereon. So 
stating the requirement, it becomes obvious that it is exceed-
ingly difficult to determine, in any particular case, whether 
the members of the agency did in fact perform their duty of 
mastering the record. Ordinarily, the only source of informa-
tion on this critical point would be the testimony of the agency 
members. Unless they can be compelled to testify as to the 
extent to which they familiarized themselves with the record 
in deciding a case, there is ordinarily no method of raising 
the question. 
It quite clearly appears that the courts will not permit 
agency members to be summoned for cross-examination as to 
this. The impropriety of such examination, suggested in the 
second Morgan case, supra, was strongly emphasized in a 
later opinion.19 Similarly, attempts to require members of 
agencies to answer depositions raising particular questions as 
to their consideration of a specific case have been almost 
uniformly unsuccessful.20 
Thus (except where specific statutory requirements exist), 
the broad requirement that the members of an agency in de-
ciding a case must sufficiently master the record made therein 
so as to be able to reach an independent decision based on the 
evidence taken in the case, is one which for most practical 
istrative Procedure Act in terms requires agencies to consider the whole record 
or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party. 
19 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941). 
20 In National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. 5th 
1938), 98 F. (zd) 444, interrogatories were allowed; but the court relied 
largely on particular factors deemed to indicate unfair administrative handling 
of the case; and this decision was distinguished and limited in a later decision 
of the same court, denying the issuance of interrogatories. National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Lane Cotton Mills Co. (C.C.A. 5th 194o), 108 F. (zd) 568. 
Other cases refusing to permit similar inquiries are: National Labor Relations 
Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (zd) 16; 
Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 
8th 1939), 103 F. (zd) 953; National Labor Relations Board v. Botany 
Worsted Mills, Inc. (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 106 F. (zd) 263; Inland Steel Co. 
v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1939), 105 F. (zd) 246. 
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purposes is committed to the consciences of agency members. 
And this of course is in keeping with the spirit which recog-
nizes administrative agencies as independent instrumentalities 
of justice, collaborative with the courts, whose independence 
and integrity must be respected.21 
3· Necessity of Intermediate Findings by Hearing Officers 
In fulfilling their duty to master the essence of the record 
in each individual case decided judicially, agencies have 
found that ordinarily the most effective and expeditious aid 
toward this end is to require the officer who hears the testi-
mony to prepare an intermediate report which at least sum-
marizes the claims of the parties and normally contains at 
least some suggestion as to what findings the hearing officer 
believes should be made by the agency (in cases where Sec-
tion 8 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act applies, 
the hearing officer must submit a recommendation as to what 
the decision should be). Even if it serves only to narrow the 
focus of argument before the agency itself, such a report is 
obviously of great value. 
So common has the practice become, and so dismayed is the 
litigant who is deprived of the advantages of receiving such 
an intermediate report, that it has been urged that failure to 
provide some statement as to the findings and recommenda-
tions of the hearing officer, to guide the parties in their fur-
ther presentation of the case before the agency, is in itself 
tantamount to a denial of a fair trial. 
As to this, the rule adopted by the courts has been that 
if no alternative device is employed to apprise the parties 
fairly of the claims and contentions made by the agency, then 
the absence of the intermediate report may be fatal. But it is 
considered as only one of several alternative devices which 
may perform this function; and if the respondents are other-
wise fully advised of the issues on which the agency will 
2l See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941). 
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decide the case, the absence of an intermediate report is not 
fatal.22 
4· The Adjudication of Cases and the Separation of Powers 
It is, of course, at the stage of actual decision that there is 
brought into sharp focus the question as to the effect of com-
bining in a single agency the powers of witness, prosecutor, 
judge, and executioner. This general problem is primarily a 
matter involving constitutional questions as to the separation 
of powers.23 The effect of such combination characterizes the 
whole administrative process, and the stage of decision is only 
one point of impact. 
However, one extreme consequence of the hazards in-
herent in complete combination of powers within an agency 
appears intimately as a part of the actual process and me-
chanics of decision-making. It occurs where a staff member 
who investigated a case ex parte, or the agency's attorney who 
handled the trial of the case, is permitted to write the find-
ings, opinion, or decision of the agency-or to collaborate to 
a large degree in the writing thereof. There can be no valid 
reason for such practice, and Section 5 (c) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act of I 946 goes far toward eliminating it in 
the case of the federal agencies. But here again, the reponsi-
bility for avoiding this situation is one which must be en-
trusted to the agencies. 
5. Requirement That Final Decision Be Supported by 
Findings 
It is often required by statute, and perhaps by the Consti-
tution 24 that the determination of an administrative agency 
22 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938); Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 
333, 58 S. Ct. 904 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst (C.C.A. 
9th 1939), 102 F. (2d) 658. 
23 See, supra, p. 5o et seq. 
24 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). 
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must be supported by findings. This requirement presents 
greater difficulties in cases where the administrative order is 
primarily legislative in character than in cases where the de-
termination is essentially judicial in nature. In the latter type 
of case, established administrative practice (recognizing the 
practical necessity of a statement of findings as a matter of 
sound administration, as a condition precedent to effective 
judicial review, and perhaps as a constitutional requirement) 
is to rest each determination on definite findings.25 
25 On the broad question as to the necessity of findings, see many cases col-
lected in Vom Bauer, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 535 et seq., Gell-
horn, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( r 942.) 770 et seq.; 146 A. L. R. 2.09. 
CHAPTER 12 
Administrative Ad judi cation 
and the Role of Discretion 
THE decisions of administrative tribunals are made by administrators, not by judges. Viewing their function as basically that of administering and implementing 
a stated legislative purpose, administrators adopt as their 
model not the judicial attitude of deciding impartially be-
tween opposed litigants, but rather the attitude of an execu-
tive who wants to get a job done. It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that the agencies, while using essentially the same 
materials of decision as do the courts (i.e., constitutions, 
statutes, prior decisions, and testimony), do not deal with 
these materials in the same way that judges do. 
To the objection that an agency should construe statutes 
and evaluate evidence on the basis of the same canons and 
standards as are employed by courts, the administrators reply 
that one of the prime purposes in the creation of an agency is, 
frequently, to enable the clarification of policy in a new and 
perplexing field by putting decision on a basis of ad hoc dis-
cretion. To achieve this end, it is said, agencies must depart 
from the normal standards of decision that guide the courts. 
Justifiable or not as this answer may be, it is at least a fair 
description of the general approach of the agencies to the 
jurisprudential aspects of the problem of decision-making. 
While the extent of departure from judicial norms varies 
considerably as between different agencies, there is a per-
vasive tendency, which can be noted in all administrative 
agencies, to base decision of ju,dicial questions on general 
considerations of policy to a far greater extent than is 
true in the courts, wherein decision is ordinarily based on 
223 
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the provisions of a statute or a common-law doctrine.1 This 
tendency has been encouraged by the plain intimations found 
in many judicial opinions that an administrative decision 
based on the experience and peculiar competence of the 
agency will command far more respect, and be much less 
subject to judicial reversal, than a decision based on legal 
grounds.2 The implication seems to be that when an agency's 
decision is based on purely judicial questions presented in 
the record before it, the courts will exercise their superior 
competency in reviewing such questions of law; but when, 
on the other hand, decision is rested on imponderable con-
siderations of a policy which can be known fully only to 
the agency, then the courts will but seldom venture to inter-
fere with the result of the administrative determination. It 
is not surprising that the agencies, which rarely welcome 
judicial review of their decisions, seize upon the opportunity 
to rest every decision, so far as possible, on general grounds 
of policy. 
1 Cf., the observation in Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JuDICIAL 
FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (I 942) 2 I 6: "The dis-
tinction between an agency acting judicially and a court is largely in the extent 
to which policy is determined by decision or previously defined by statute or 
common law." 
2 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 3 I 8 U. S. 8o, 63 
S. Ct. 454 (I943). In that case, the Commission said that under general princi-
ples of equity law, stock acquired by officers of a corporation during a period 
of reorganization could not be permitted to share in the reorganization on an 
equal footing with other stock of the same class. Pointing out (as conceded by 
counsel for the Commission) that this decision involved a misunderstanding of 
the court decisions in question, the court reversed the Commission, but pointed 
out that the result might have been quite the opposite if the Commission had 
seen fit to promulgate its own rule of policy as the governing factor in its 
decision. The case was remanded to the Commission for further consideration. 
On remand, as the Supreme Court later said, "the Commission re-examined the 
problem, recast its rationale and reached the same result." The Supreme Court 
on a second appeal affirmed the Commission, pointing out (332 U. S. I94, I99> 
67 S. Ct. I575 (I947)): 
"The latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of 
relying on judicial precedents which do not sustain it. . . . It has 
drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility 
reorganizations." 
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But in many cases the agencies cannot escape the necessity 
of passing on issues involving the interpretation of the gov-
erning statute, the evaluation of conflicting evidence, the 
effect to be given prior decisions involving the same or other 
parties, and other similar issues, where the question pre-
sented involves the use of the same techniques as those 
employed by lawyers and judges in court cases. It is here 
that the unique jurisprudential approach of the agencies 
most clearly appears. 
1. Interpretation of Statutes 
Two frequently noted tendencies of administrative tri-
bunals are of far-reaching effect in coloring administrative 
interpretation of statutes. The first is the natural tendency 
of an agency to emphasize (if not magnify) its own stature 
and importance by seeking to extend its jurisdiction and 
power to the furthest possible limits. The second is the 
tendency to broaden, by successive steps of administrative 
implementation, the policy of the statute which the agency 
is administering. Frequently, the statement of policy as con-
tained in the legislative enactment is considered to be only 
a starting point from which the agency can develop policies 
and programs deemed to further the general objectives which 
motivated the enactment of the law. Such development, 
which frequently in recent years has assumed the guise of 
"economic interpretation" sometimes pushes the policy of 
the statute far afield. 
(a) Enlarging jurisdiction of agency. Whether or not any 
particular decision on a jurisdictional question amounts to 
an enlargement of the agency's powers involves a point of 
argument that cannot be conclusively settled except where 
an administrative determination as to the existence of juris-
diction has been reversed upon court review. Several such 
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cases could be noted. But any mention of them should not 
overlook the existence of other cases where a gradual ex-
pansion of jurisdiction was accomplished, step by step, with-
out being subjected to the test of judicial review; and where 
after such expanded jurisdiction had in fact been exercised 
for several years before being challenged in the courts, it 
was in effect held that the lapse of time coupled with silent 
legislative acquiescence had developed a power which per-
haps the court could not otherwise have read into the origi-
nal statute.3 Nor should there be overlooked cases where an 
expanded jurisdiction, gradually developed, has never been 
tested in the courts. The citation of cases reversing adminis-
trative findings of jurisdiction does not tell the whole story. 
Characteristic of this tendency of the agencies to enlarge 
their jurisdiction was the determination of the Federal Trade 
Commission (after it had unsuccessfully attempted to per-
suade Congress to enlarge its jurisdiction beyond the preven-
tion of unfair methods of competition in commerce, to include 
the prevention of unfair methods of competition in trans-
actions affecting commerce) that it had power even under 
the more restrictive phraseology, to enjoin allegedly unfair 
sales methods in purely intrastate sales. The theory was that 
the power to prevent the use of unfair methods of compe-
tition in interstate commerce embraced a power to prevent 
the use of unfair methods in intrastate sales, where the result 
3 E.g., the long series of steps by which the National Labor Relations Board 
obtained judicial acceptance of its claims to a constantly broadened jurisdiction; 
asserting it first in cases of large corporations with integrated multi-state 
activities, and gradually pushing it to the point of including retail stores-
although in the earlier days of the administration of the act, the agency refused 
to assert jurisdiction over retail stores, thinking that the intimations of the 
comparatively early case of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National 
Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 95 F. (2d) 390, 393, aiPd 305 
U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938), indicated that such claims of jurisdiction 
would not then have been accepted. 
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was to handicap interstate competitors. But this theory was 
rejected by the court.4 
Similarly, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor (which under the explicit provision of the 
controlling statute had no jurisdiction over employees with 
respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
"power" to establish maximum hours of service) concluded 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had such "power" 
only in cases where it had exercised it by prescribing 
maximum hours, and that until such regulations were pro-
mulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, such 
employees were within the jurisdiction of the Wage and 
Hour Division.5 This extension of jurisdiction, similarly, 
was voided by the Supreme Court.6 
Another example of the same tendency can be seen in 
the assertion by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
a continuing jurisdiction to conduct "stop order" proceedings 
despite the fact that the registration statement, proposing 
the issuance and offering of certain securities, had been with-
drawn. Here again, the court found jurisdiction did not exist.7 
Examples need not be multiplied to illustrate further the 
general tendency. It is a part of administrative jurisprudence 
that statutory grants of power are to be broadly construed, 
and every doubt resolved in favor of the existence of juris-
diction on the part of the agency. This trend is in part no 
4 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 3 IZ U. S. 349, 6 I S. Ct. 
s8o (1941). 
5 Interpretative Bulletin No.9, 194z Wage Hour Manual, 377, 379· 
6Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, JI9 U.S. 44,63 S. Ct. 917 (1943). 
In a more recent case involving substantially the same question, the court 
(overruling a claim by the Wage Hour Division that it had jurisdiction over 
part-time truck drivers), said in part: "This position no doubt arose from 
a desire to give wide effect to the Fair Labor Standards Act." Levinson v. 
Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 682, 67 S. Ct. 931 (1947). 
7 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Z98 u. s. I, s6 s. Ct. 654 
(1936). 
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doubt a reaction to the efforts of private litigants who seek 
unfairly to limit and narrow an agency's jurisdiction. An 
atmosphere of litigious hostility is created in which the agency 
plays the part of its own advocate. And all this is a reflection 
of the newness of many of the agencies. As the agencies 
achieve a greater degree of maturity, and become more 
thoroughly integrated into a general plan whereby the ad-
ministration of the law is divided between courts and agen-
cies, this tendency should gradually diminish. Indeed, in the 
case of some of the older agencies, the trend has already 
largely disappeared.8 
(b) Broadening policy of act. Here again, in discussing 
administrative decisions as to the substantive requirements 
of the statute which an agency administers, no positive asser-
tion of improperly extensive interpretations can be made 
except in cases where such interpretations have been set aside 
by the courts, as going too far beyond the realm wherein an 
agency's interpretation as to the meaning of a statute will 
carry highly persuasive weight. Such examples can be found 
in plenty, but they do not fully cover the field. There re-
mains a much broader territory, the exact extent of which 
can be only conjectured, where the broadening of the origi-
nally announced legislative purpose or policy (as a result of 
administrative development) has been accepted by the courts, 
and has led to the creation of rules of conduct which might 
never have been reached had the interpretation of the statutes 
been left to the less colorful imagination of the courts. Yet 
it is precisely at this point that the process of free interpreta-
tion by administrative agencies has its greatest effects. 
An example or two will illumine the thought. The pro-
scription of unfair labor practices on the part of employers 
8 The Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, has been reversed for 
failing to accept jurisdiction in cases where the court found it existed. Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 
224 U.S. 474, 32 S. Ct. 556 (1912). 
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as against their employees, as contained in the National Labor 
Relations Act,9 might well never have been extended to 
embrace the employment of such practices on the part of 
an employing unit when directed against an independent 
contractor, had the interpretation of the statute been left to 
the courts.10 But when administrative ingenuity discovered 
that independent contractors could, for purposes of the par-
ticular statute, be treated as employees, the court accepted 
this administrative development of the statute.11 A somewhat 
similar situation was presented with the enactment of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of r9J8/2 requiring the payment 
of at least time-and-one-half overtime compensation to em-
ployees engaged in occupations necessary to the production 
of goods for commerce. The question of course arose as to 
the effect of the statute in the case of a salaried employee, 
whose salary (established by a contractual agreement ante-
dating the adoption of the law) was stated to cover compen-
sation for a certain number of hours of work per week, in 
excess of the maximum which could be w~rked without pay-
ment of overtime compensation. In such a case, could the 
contract legally be continued, so long as the amount due 
was in excess of what the law required as a minimum wage 
plus overtime? The original administrative suggestion, that 
perhaps such an arrangement would satisfy the law/8 was 
the same as the conclusion of a number of lower courts, 
which early considered the question and so held.14 But the 
original suggestion of the agency was speedily replaced by 
9 49 Stat. 449, ::9 U.S.C. § ISI. 
10 See Columbia River Packers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hinton, 3 IS U. S. 143, 6:: 
s. Ct. szo (I94Z). 
11 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 3u U. S. 
III, 64 s. Ct. 8SI (I944). 
12 sz Stat. 106o, z9 U.S.C. § zoi. 
13 I W. H. Ref. Man. 6o (I939); 3 Wage and Hour Reporter ::8 (I938). 
14 E.g., Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. (D. C. Md. 1941), 40 
F. Supp. I74; Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co. (D. C. Tex. 1940). 
33 F. Supp. 90. 
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an interpretation definitely requiring the enlargement of such 
salaries/5 and the revised administrative interpretation ulti-
mately gained judicial acceptance.16 
The tendency of the taxing authorities to interpret tax 
statutes to the end of achieving the largest possible tax 
revenue scarcely needs documentation; and the effect of the 
decision in the famous Dobson case 17 tends in some degree 
to give the administrative agencies free play in this particular 
field. 
More significant, perhaps, than the trend of the agencies 
to broaden legislative policies within limits which the courts 
find sustainable, is the large number of cases where courts 
have found that agencies have carried interpretation to a 
point of legislation, and the courts have accordingly set aside 
administrative determinations as being incompatible with the 
requirements of the statute which the agency was created to 
administer. These cases reveal an administrative tendency to 
set up and give effect to policies beyond or even at variance 
with the statutes or the general law governing the action of 
the administrative agency.18 
Many examples could be cited. The Supreme Court has 
more than once had occasion to condemn administrative de-
terminations of the taxing officials as being invalid attempts 
to "add a supplementary legislative provision" to a statute.19 
In furtherance of a policy which was quite understandable, 
but unwarranted by law, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
15 1 W. H. Ref. Man. 197 (1939). 
16 Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 
1216( 1942). 
17 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 321 U. S. 231, 64 S. Ct. 
495 (1944). 
18 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 70-73. 
19 E.g., Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Credit Alliance 
Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 113, 62 S. Ct. 989 (1942). See also Helvering, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 63 S. Ct. 
5 77 ( 1943 ), where the court reversed an administrative determination that 
a gift would not be accorded the statutory exemption from tax unless it was 
proved that the motives for making the gift were solely altruism and generosity. 
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sion declined to issue a certificate as a motor carrier to a 
railroad which operated a co-ordinated rail-motor freight 
service, on the grounds that such certificate should go only 
to one who exercised complete direction and control of the 
motor-truck operation and assumed full responsibility to 
the shipper and public. But the statute did not permit denial 
of a certificate on this ground of policy, and the administra-
tive decision was accordingly reversed.20 
The same trend has been observed in the administration 
of the labor laws. In one such instance, the Wage and Hour 
Division of the United States Department of Labor, being 
empowered by the statute to define the "area of production" 
for purposes of an exemption relieving canneries located 
within such areas from the necessity of paying overtime 
compensation, so defined the term as to exclude larger can-
neries. The theory was that the boundaries of a given "area 
of production" could be so drawn as to stop at the walls of 
any cannery employing more than a certain number of per-
sons. This was held invalid.21 
Earlier, the Wage and Hour Division had argued that 
the statutory requirement of paying one and one half of an 
employee's regular rate of pay for overtime work had the 
effect of invalidating any agreement to reduce an employee's 
20 Thomson, Trustee v. United States, 32 I U. S. I9, 64 S. Ct. 392 ( I944). 
In the I946 term, the Supreme Court twice reversed the Interstate Commerce 
Commission for giving effect to policies unwarranted by the governing statute. 
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567, 67 S. Ct. 894 
(I947); United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424, 429, 67 S. Ct. 
435 (I947). In the latter case the court said: 
"Thus it seems apparent that the Seatrain proceedings were reopened not 
to correct a mere clerical error, but to execute the new policy announced 
in the Foss case." 
A dramatic instance of administrative extension of statutory policies by a state 
agency, is Puhl v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, I39 Pa. Super. I 52, 
II A. (zd) so8 (I939), where an application for a carrier permit had been 
denied by the Commission on the grounds that a married woman could not 
qualify as a bona fide owner and operator of a business venture, where she 
employed her husband to assist in the business. 
21 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. u 15 
(I944). 
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regular rate. These interpretations likewise were not sus-
tained.22 The National Labor Relations Board, empowered 
by statute to require employers to correct unfair labor prac-
tices, reasoned that an effective corrective would be the 
imposition of punitive measures against offending employers, 
and in effect required the payment of fines until the Supreme 
Court held that the Board's powers were only remedial and 
not punitive.23 
The Federal Trade Commission has similarly sought 
over a long period of years to extend the concept of "unfair 
methods of competition"; 24 and it has indeed in large meas-
ure been successful. But it has frequently attempted to go 
further than the courts would permit.25 
The general trend is, then, for the agency to create a 
program or policy which it conceives to be in furtherance 
of the general purposes or objectives of the law it admin-
isters (and which frequently is not merely in furtherance of, 
but indeed goes further than the law so that there is "added 
a requirement not included or authorized by the statute") .26 
The general aim having been crystallized, the agency then 
interprets the statute in such a way as to achieve the agency-
conceived policies. 
In cases where the statute has financial implications (em-
bracing a policy, colloquially expressed, to "soak the rich" 
or "aid the needy," for example) one particular avenue of 
approach is that of the so-called "economic interpretation" 
of the statute. This is but another manifestation of the same 
22 General Mills v. Williams (C.C.A. 6th 1942), 132 F. (2d) 367; Walling 
v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 62 S. Ct. 1223 (1942). 
23 Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 7, 61 
S. Ct. 7 7 ( 1940), denying the power of the Board to compel an employer to 
refund to public relief agencies sums which such agencies had paid strikers. 
24 38 Stat. 717, 15 U.S.C. § 41. 
25 E.g., see Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 
572 (1920); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 
463, 43 S. Ct. 450 (1923); many Court of Appeals cases could be cited. 
26 Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179, 189, 6 5 S. Ct. 1504 
(1945). 
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general trend. An illustration-somewhat a caricature-is 
the suggestion by the Wage and Hour Division that a 
gardener tending the flowers and cutting the lawns in front 
of a factory was engaged in a process necessary to the pro-
duction of the goods made in the factory. Since a janitor 
sweeping floors or stoking furnaces within the factory was 
deemed to be so engaged, it was apparently felt that it would 
be unfair to deny the gardener the economic benefits of 
overtime pay enjoyed by his co-employee working within 
the plant.27 
In cases where an agency is empowered to issue a license, 
without which engagement in a certain line of activity is 
prohibited, the door to the imposition of extrastatutory re-
quirements as conditions to the issuance of a license is invit-
ingly opened. This is so in large part because the applicant 
for the license is often willing to comply with almost any 
condition, in order to get a permit to start his business. But 
the practice of insisting on more than the statute requires 
in these licensing situations is only a manifestation of the 
broader trend. 
This predilection toward interpretations which accomplish 
results "in the right direction" (which to the agency is often 
along a road leading somewhat farther than the statute goes) 
sometimes leads agencies to play loose and fast with estab-
lished legal principles which may require a different inter-
pretation. As C. K. Allen said of the administrator, "His 
business is to get things done . . . and when principles 
of law are put in his way, he is apt to be impatient of them 
as mere pedantic obstructions." 28 Thus, in order to assess a 
greater tax, the federal revenue authorities have insisted that 
a transfer of stock incident to the consolidation of banks, 
which was not evidenced by any instrument of conveyance 
27 4 Wage and Hour Reporter 196 (1941). 
28 C. K. Allen, "Some Aspects of Administrative Law," J. Soc. PuB. TEACH. 
OF LAW (1929) 10, 16, 
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or other document, was nevertheless not accomplished wholly 
by operation of law, because the consolidation agreement re-
cited that the assets of each constituent bank would pass to 
the consolidated organization.29 Disregard of opinions of the 
agency's own counsel is not an unknown phenomenon, where 
such disregard permits an interpretation in furtherance of 
the agency's general purposes.30 
Where an agency thinks that what it deems a desirable 
result can be rested on "established judicial principles"-
thereby enabling the agency to deny that it is doing anything 
more than its plain legal duty requires-it sometimes reads 
into prior decisions more than the courts can find therein.31 
A somewhat unique misapplication of established legal doc-
trine was the argument of one of the federal agencies that 
an amendment to a statute, adopted to preclude the contin-
uance of a prior administrative interpretation, had the effect 
of indicating congressional approval of the precluded inter-
pretation, for all periods up to the effective date of the 
amendatory law.32 
These related tendencies-to enlarge the scope of the 
statute by construction, to find unwarranted sanctions for 
administrative orders, to place interpretation on an economic 
rather than a legalistic basis, to pervert common-law doctrine 
to suit the agency's own ends-are all manifestations of the 
position of advocate-litigant which the agencies so often 
occupy. It is as natural for them to argue a doubtful point 
of statutory construction in their own favor as it is for coun-
sel in private litigation to urge· his client's. argument to the 
furthermost position which appears in any way tenable. Their 
29 This decision was reversed in United States v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 32.1 
U.S. 583, 64 S. Ct. 713 (1944). 
30 Taft v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 II U. S. 195, 61 
S. Ct. 2.44 (1940). 
31 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. So, 63 
s. Ct. 454 (1943). 
32 Haggar Co. v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 
389, 6oS. Ct. 337 (1940). 
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interpretation of statutes is essentially not judicial, but rather 
that of a party in interest. 
2. Evaluation of Evidence 
Since agency heads often feel a distinct professional interest 
in achieving a particular result in cases decided by them, they 
are apt to be "convicting judges." Tax agencies feel their 
work is more successful when the decision involves the im-
position of a tax liability; many labor agencies would rather 
decide for unions than against them; public service commis-
sions are happier when they can order rate reductions; un-
employment compensation commissions deem it their mission 
to disburse the greatest possible amount of benefit payments; 
trade commissions prefer if possible to sustain the charges 
of the existence of unfair trade practices. While there are 
exceptions, to be sure, and while there are many instances 
where it is immaterial to the agency what result may be 
reached in a particular case, yet the tendency is in the oppo-
site direction. 
This attitude, and this striving for results, inevitably affect 
an agency's evaluation of the evidence presented before it. 
Under such circumstances, it would be extremely difficult 
even for a professionally trained judge to weigh the evidence 
impartially; and most agency heads do not have the benefit 
of the long professional training, and the discipline of con-
tinuous professional criticism of their judgments, which as-
sist the judge in the task of evaluating evidence. 
Therefore, the activity of most agencies in the appraisal 
of evidence leaves something to be desired, from the view-
point of achieving a scrupulously impartial determination of 
facts. 
One of the most common tendencies is that of resting 
decision on the basis of preformed ideas. Often, this takes 
the form of reliance on "official notice" of matters which in 
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fairness (see Chapter I o, supra) should be left to proofs. 83 
In other cases, it leads agencies to rest decision on what the 
courts describe, in setting the findings aside, as mere con-
jecture and speculation.34 Sometimes, in their zeal to support 
a certain finding, agencies adopt in toto testimony of a wit-
ness, failing to note that his testimony was modified on cross-
examination, or improperly disregarding other credible evi-
dence in the record which compels the conclusion that the 
testimony in chief cannot be accepted in whole at face value.35 
The number of cases annually in which the federal appel-
late courts reject factual findings of administrative agencies-
despite their insulation from attack (in all except the most 
flagrant cases of error) by the doctrine that the finding must 
be accepted if there is any substantial evidence to support 
it-lends weight to the suggestion that this tendency has 
far-reaching untoward results. There is some evidence, in-
deed, that hearing officers have been selected on the basis 
of their willingness to champion the agency policies and their 
ability to discover a means of supporting a desired finding.36 
A second tendency is the inclination to decide a case with-
out a hearing, or without hearing both sides. Many cases 
could be cited. Typical is the attempt of a price-fixing agency 
to make minimum price orders, without affording a notice 
or hearing to interested parties, and without making any 
findings of fact.37 Even so highly respected an agency as 
33 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301 U. S. z9z, 
57 S. Ct. 724 (1937 ). 
34 E.g., Ohio Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 6th 
1940), 115 F. (zd) 839; Doran v. Eisenberg (C.C.A. 3d 1929), 30 F. (zd) 
503, 
35 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Union Pacific Stages (C.C.A. 9th 
1938), 99 F. (zd) 153. Cf., the admonition of§ 7 (c) of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, that no order is to be made except on consideration of 
the whole record. 
36 See the testimony set forth in National Labor Relations Board v. Cudahy 
Packing Co. (D. C. Kan. 1940), 34 F. Supp. 53, 59· 
37 Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App. 
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (zd) 517. 
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the Interstate Commerce Commission has had to be reminded 
that "there is no hearing when the party does not know 
what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an 
opportunity to test, explain, or refute." 38 Not long ago the 
Supreme Court was compelled to point out that a Concilia-
tion Commissioner, making a reappraisal of a debtor's prop-
erty pursuant to Section 75 (s) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act,38a 
erred in basing his valuation partly on evidence obtained by 
his personal investigation without the knowledge or consent 
of the parties.39 An interesting example is that of a state 
public utilities commission, which was empowered to annul 
new tariff schedules only after a full public hearing, but 
which (after adjourning a hearing in order to obtain further 
evidence necessary to permit it to consider the case fully) 
ordered that the tariff should stand annulled pending the 
renewal of the hearing.40 
Closely related is the tendency to make determinations 
upon the basis of consultations had in private or on the basis 
of reports which are not disclosed. Many agencies have yet 
to take to heart the admonition of Scott, L. J., in Cooper v. 
Wilson 41 that "when a tribunal considers its decision behind 
closed doors it has no right to invite one party in and shut 
the other out." 
Animated by excessive zeal, and convinced of the great 
importance of their missions, many agencies see their task 
38 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 
93> 33 s. Ct. I85 (I9IJ). 
38a I I U.S.C. § 203. 
39 Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243, 64 S. Ct. I (I943). Cf., § 7 (d) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, providing that in the case of certain 
proceedings before federal agencies, the "exclusive record for decision" shall 
comprise the transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with the papers and 
requests filed in the proceeding. 
40 In re Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.'s Protest of Rates, 44 N. M. 6o8, 107 
P. (2d) I23 (I94o). Many other examples are cited in Pound, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW (I942) 68-72. 
41 Cooper v. Wilson, [I9J7] 2 K. B. 309, 345· 
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out of true proportion. The seeming desirability of obtaining 
a particular result in an instant case, as a step toward further-
ing a broad general program, leads them sometimes to pay 
too little attention to the stubborn facts which interfere with 
the desired disposition of a particular case,.42 
3. Stare Decisis 
Both from the viewpoint of history and that of logic, there 
is but little room to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to 
determinations of administrative tribunals. Agencies are ordi-
narily created for the very reason that it appears unsatisfac-
tory to attempt to dispose of disputes in a particular field by 
strict application of a rule of law. They are not expected 
to apply fixed or unyielding rules or policies, but to exercise 
discretion and ingenuity in working out a satisfactory solution 
for each new case. Further, the announcement of a decision 
by an administrative tribunal does not establish a rule of law, 
as does a court's judgment. Its basis is rather that of an 
ad hoc determination. Therefore to the extent at least that 
the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the notion that the 
law is unchanging, the classical doctrine of stare decisis does 
not square with the theory and practice of the agencies. 
It is well es~ablished that an administrative agency may 
depart from the principle of its former rulings and establish 
a new r~le.43 Not only may it change its theory of decision 
and depart from what might be called the "common law" 
of the agency's rulings, but it may amend or set aside its 
own formally established rules, if in its discretion such action 
appears fair and proper in a particular case.44 
42 Doran v. Eisenberg (C.C.A. 3d 1929), 30 F. (2d) 503. 
43 Shawmut Ass'n v. Securities and Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 1st 
1945), 146 F. (2d) 791; American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 
450,62 S. Ct. 1144 (1942). 
44 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Kenan ( C.C.A. 
sth 1937), 87 F. (2d) 651. 
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But despite the unquestioned freedom enjoyed by the 
agencies in this respect, many agencies, motivated in part 
no doubt by practical considerations and arguments of con-
venience, have adopted the practice of relying heavily on 
their decisions in former cases. 
Thus, the research staff of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure found, after extensive 
interviews with the staff members of the federal agencies, 
that "in almost every instance the agencies' officers who were 
interviewed expressed the belief that they accorded to the 
precedents of their respective agencies as much weight as is 
thought to be given by the highest court of a state to its 
own prior decisions." 45 Many statements of such a policy are 
found in agency decisions. The impulse is particularly strong 
in such fields as taxation and public lands administration, 
where precedents are easy to find and where the agency is 
conscious of the fact that hundreds of important transactions 
are consummated in reliance on rules announced in particular 
cases. Similarly, in the agencies which have been longer 
established, the principle of reliance on precedent plays an 
important part in agency jurisprudence. This is true, for 
example, of the Interstate Commerce Commission.46 The 
Federal Trade Commission, too, is said to regard as an 
authoritative precedent every case in which the Commission 
has determined, after investigation, that a particular trade 
practice was not an unfair or deceptive act.47 
Expressions of this policy are frequent in the decisions of 
the agencies. Thus the Federal Power Commission has de-
45 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, 
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I94I) 466. See McClintock, "The Administrative De-
termination of Public Land Controversies," 9 MINN. L. REV. 638 (I925). 
46 See Pittman, "The Doctrine of Precedents and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 543 (I937); and Pittman, "The Doctrine 
of Precedents and Public Service Commissions," I I Mo. L. REV. 3 I ( I946). 
41 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, 
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I94I) 468. 
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dared that "as a matter of principle" it should follow a 
former decision.48 Similarly, the United States Civil Service 
Commission has declared that "to the extent that determining 
factors in two cases are the same, results should be the same. 
Consistency of decision should prevail in quasi-judicial as 
well as in judicial fields." 49 
Other agencies, however, as noted by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee, refuse to regard their adjudications as 
building up any body of precedents which should be con-
sidered as guides in the decision of subsequent cases. 
Further, in all the agencies, there is no feeling of com-
pulsion to follow precedents. The agencies do not feel, as 
do the courts, that the following of precedents as a means 
of establishing stability in the law is an end in itself, and that 
a principle once firmly established should be followed unless 
overpowering reasons compel its abandonment. Rather, the 
agencies are inclined to follow their precedents chiefly as a 
matter of convenience, and regard all their statements of 
principle and policy as subject to change or modification 
upon further consideration of the matter.50 There is no 
feeling that a change of policy requires an apology, or an 
explanation of the overwhelming necessity of changing a 
previously established rule. Thus, the doctrine of precedents 
plays quite a different role in the jurisprudence of adminis-
trative tribunals than in that of the courts.51 
Another limitation upon the effective use of the doctrine 
of stare decisis in administrative adjudication is found in the 
practices of the agencies as to writing opinions. Many agencies 
48 In the Matter of Pacific Power & Light Co., 2 F. P. C. 508 (1941). 
49 In the Matter of Arrington, et al., Docket No. 120 (1944). 
50 American Glue Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., et al., 191 I. C. C. 37 (1932); 
In the Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943). 
51 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 62-63; Davis, "Res Judicata in Adminis-
trative Law," 25 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1947); Parker, "Administrative Res 
Judicata," 40 ILL. L. REV. 56 (1945). 
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dispose of hundreds of cases without written opinion. Others, 
even in important or leading cases, restrict their findings to 
formal pronouncements couched in statutory language, with-
out explanation of the facts in any detail and without a 
statement of the reasons leading to the conclusions an-
nounced. It is accordingly difficult to discover what rules 
of policy or of statutory construction are embraced in the 
decision. In other cases, opinions consist largely of a minutely 
detailed statement of facts, concluded by a formal order. In 
such cases likewise, the absence of any rationally developed 
statement of rules and policies renders it difficult to ascertain 
exactly what the case stands for. It is accordingly easy for 
an agency to alter or modify its policies to a considerable 
extent without having the change apparent. The absence from 
the decisions of precise statements of rules and policies ren-
ders it correspondingly easy for the agency to distinguish 
any prior decision which may be urged upon it. 
\Vhile agencies do exhibit the natural tendency to decide 
similar cases consistently, and do quite frequently profess 
reliance on their own precedents, yet the doctrine of stare 
decisis has, as such, no application to their adjudications; and 
in practice the asserted consistency of opinion is often quite 
debatable, and the extent of actual reliance on precedent a 
matter of argument. 
4· The Doctrine of Res Judicata 
(a) Effect of agency determination on subsequent deter-
minations of same agency. The doctrine of res judicata-that 
a question of fact or of legal right determined by a judgment 
cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the parties 
thereto or their privies-does not apply, in any strict or 
technical sense, to the decisions of administrative agencies. 
They are not courts, and their determinations are not judg-
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ments.52 There are, further, obvious practical reasons why 
the doctrine should not be applied to many types of adminis-
trative determinations. Agency determinations often combine 
an exercise of delegated legislative power, or the exercise of 
executive discretion, with the decision of quasi-judicial ques-
tions; and of course in cases where legislative or otherwise 
discretionary powers are exercised, an agency should be as 
free to change its mind as is a legislature. 
Where, however, the determination is essentially judicial 
in nature, severe individual hardships might be incurred if 
agencies were free to unsettle decisions which parties had in 
good faith accepted as settling their rights. To forestall such 
untoward results, there has been applied in a variety of cases 
a species of equitable estoppel which produces approximately 
the same result as would application of the rules of res 
judicata-and which has indeed been referred to, both by 
courts and by the agencies themseloves, by the term res 
judicata. 
Cases involving grant. Perhaps the clearest case for the 
proposition that an agency's determination of a question of 
private right, unappealed from, should be treated as dis-
posing finally of the question involved, is the case where 
the agency's order involves a grant of some right or privilege. 
Thus, it has been held that the Secretary of the Interior 
has no authority to annul the action of a predecessor approv-
ing a grant of public lands.53 The same principle doubtless 
applies in cases involving the grant of a patent or of a 
license. 54 
Ruling on nonrecurring factual situations. Similar consid-
erations of policy also apply where an agency has made a 
52Pearson v. Williams, zoz U.S. z81, z6 S. Ct. 6o8 (1906); Arizona 
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., z84 U. S. 370, sz S. Ct. 183 
(19p). 
53 United States v. Minor, 114 U.S. z33, 5 S. Ct. 836 (1885); Noble v. 
Union River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S. Ct. z71 (1893). 
54 See Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. 8th 1917), 243 Fed. 503, 
and note in 31 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1918). 
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ruling, relied on by private parties, as to their rights in a 
particular situation, where the issue involved arises out of a 
single nonrecurring transaction. Aptly illustrating the reac-
tion of the courts to this type of situation is the decision in 
Woodworth v. Kales.55 In that case, the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue had, on request of a stockholder, fixed the 
value of stock of the Ford Motor Car Company as of a 
certain date. Income taxes were paid on the basis of the 
values so computed, and the income tax return was confirmed 
by the Commissioner. Later, the Treasury Department fixed 
a new valuation on the stock as of the date in question, and 
deficiency assessments were levied on the basis of the new 
valuation. It was held that there was no authority for such 
action; and the court, referring to the dangerous possibilities 
of official oppression inherent in the situation, ruled in effect 
that by analogy to the doctrine of res judicata, the matter 
must be considered closed. 
In other types of tax cases, the policy of giving effect to 
final administrative determinations of tax liability, by appli-
cation of the principles of res judicata, has been widely recog-
nized. Thus, the Tax Court speaks of its decisions as res 
judicata/6 and it has held that the plea of res judicata is 
good although intervening Supreme Court decisions show 
the earlier decision to have been erroneous.57 
55 (C.C.A. 6th 1928), 26 F. (2d) 178. 
56 J. B. Barber, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, I T. C. 726 
(1943), 
57 Pryor & Lockhart Development Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
34 B. T. A. 687 ( I9J6). See comments in I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW (1942) 247. "Res Judicata in Tax Litigation," 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 692 (1933). In some tax cases it has been held that where the agency's 
determination is based on a mistake of law in construing a statute, the erro-
neous decision may be reopened by the agency, and a tax assessed. National 
Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young (App. D. C. 1943), I34 F. (2d) 524; Utah 
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, I07 Utah 24, 15I P. (2d) 467 (I944). 
While this may be harsh, it is not without judicial analogy. See Johnson v. 
Cadillac Motor Car Co. (C.C.A. zd 1919), 261 Fed. 878, discussed in Car-
dozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 159. 
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Another case showing the basis on which the courts, by 
application of doctrines akin to those of estoppel, follow the 
rule of res judicata as to agency determinations involving 
matters of private right in a nonrecurring, past transaction, 
is Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way Co.58 In that case, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
had fixed reasonable rates to be charged by the railroad on 
certain hauls, and the railroad put them into effect. Some 
years later, the Commission (in reparations proceedings) de-
termined that because of changing conditions the rates fixed 
in 1921 had become unreasonable in 1922, and ordered that 
reparations be paid. In setting aside this order, the Supreme 
Court declared that "while not bound by the rule of res 
judicata," the Commission "was bound to recognize the va-
lidity of the rule of conduct prescribed by it and not to repeal 
its own enactment with retroactive effect." 59 
This doctrine of adjudicatory estoppel applies only to 
official actions of the agency. Reliance on mere oral advice 
of an administrative officer does not ordinarily furnish a 
basis of a later claim that the agency is estopped from taking 
a position inconsistent with the informal, unofficial ruling.60 
T¥ here order affects continuing course of conduct. The 
Arizona Grocery Company case illustrates the distinction be-
tween cases where the courts hold an agency bound by its 
prior determination, and those where an opposite result is 
reached. For the court, adding to the pronouncement above 
quoted, observed that the Commission "could repeal the 
order as it affected future action, and substitute a new rule 
of conduct as often as occasion might require." 61 
58 284 U.S. 37o, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932). 
59 284 U.S. 370, 389, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932). 
60 Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C.C.A. 1st 1942), 131 F. 
(2d) 651; same case (C.C.A. xst 1943), 136 F. (2d) 503; Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Torr (D. C. N.Y. 1938), 22 F. Supp. 6o2; United 
States v. Globe Indemnity Co. (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 94 F. (2d) 576. 
61 284 U.S. 370, 389, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932). The distinction is developed, 
with reference to Interstate Commerce Commission cases, in a comment, 34 
MICH. L. REV. 672 (1936). 
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In other words, where an agency's decision is based on 
factors which may change during the course of time, and 
pertains to a subject matter over which the agency has a 
continuing jurisdiction,62 it is not bound by its prior decision, 
but may reopen and modify it from time to time.63 For 
example, the dismissal of a complaint by the Federal Trade 
Commission does not preclude that agency from later re-
opening the case and taking further proceedings therein.64 
The policy factors deemed to be controlling in such cases 
are illustrated by the decision in United States v. Stone & 
Downer Company.65 There, the Court of Customs Appeals 
had decided adversely to the government a question as to 
the classification, for customs purposes, of certain imported 
commodities. In a subsequent case between the same parties, 
involving the same questions and importations of similar 
merchandise, the same court reached a contrary conclusion. 
In rejecting the claim that by application of principles anal-
ogous to those of res judicata, the first judgment should be 
held controlling, the Supreme Court declared that circum-
stances justified limiting the finality of the conclusion in 
customs controversies to the identical importation, pointing 
out that the business of importing was carried on by large 
houses between which and the government there are con-
stant. differences as to proper classifications of similar impor-
tations, and that injustice and confusion would result if one 
importer could rely for years on an early decision rendered 
as to him which permitted low customs duties on a com-
modity which had been ruled in other cases, involving com-
peting importers, to be subject to a higher rate. It was 
necessary to effective administration of the customs laws that 
a decision which rested on the evidentiary facts presented 
62 This is true in the case of most of the so-called regulatory agencies. 
63 See, generally, I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (194z) 16z 
et seq., 244 et seq. 
64 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (App. D. C, 
1929) 32 F. (2d) 966. 
65 274 U.S. zzs, 47 S. Ct. 616 (1927). 
246 PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES 
in one particular case should not be binding upon the recur-
rence of a similar importation, when further evidentiary facts 
might be available. 
For similar reasons, decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission as to the status of a carrier under particular 
statutory definitions may be reopened and changed, when 
changing conditions show the wisdom of revising the former 
decision, insofar as it affects continuing and future opera-
tions.66 
Although, as above noted, an administrative decision ap-
proving a land grant is nonreversible, the opposite result is 
reached where such an application had once been rejected, 
and where, on rehearing, the agency decides to reverse its 
former decision. In the latter type of case, the agency has 
retained its control over the subject matter and exercises a 
continuing jurisdiction over the lands.67 Similarly, where a 
grant of annuity rights to Indians does not represent a closed 
transaction, but is rather a ruling of a continuing nature, the 
grant may be revised as to the continuing rights of heirs to 
share in the grant.68 
In alienage cases, the doctrine of the right of the agency 
to revise orders made in the exercise of a continuing jurisdic-
tion has been carried to an extent seemingly inconsistent 
with the results reached in cases holding decisions awarding 
various grants to be nonrevocable-the difference being es-
sentially accounted for, no doubt, by the considerations which 
in other respects sustain a great degree of free administrative 
discretion for immigration authorities.69 
66 In re Chicago, N. S. & M. R. Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1942), 131 F. (2d) 458; 
Sprague v. Woll (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 122 F. (2d) 128. 
67 Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 18 S. Ct. 354 (1898); West v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 278 U.S. zoo, 49 S. Ct. 138 (1929). 
68 Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 28 I U. S. 206, so S. Ct. 320 
(1930). 
69 Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 28 r, 26 S. Ct. 6o8 ( 1906); Lum Mon 
Sing v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1941), 124 F. (zd) 21, both holding that 
an earlier decision admitting an immigrant could be later revoked in subsequent 
independent proceedings. 
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In many types of cases, of course, it is difficult to balance 
the competing public interest in effective administration and 
the individual's interest in being free from repeated litigation. 
Thus, where the Post Office classifies a publication as being 
entitled to second-class mailing privileges, and in reliance 
thereon a substantial business is built up, should the agency 
be permitted later to change its ruling? A reversal would 
cause pecuniary hardship to the publisher, but a continuance 
of the original ruling would harm his competitors who under 
revised administrative interpretations of the statute have 
been denied similar privileges. In one such case, the balance 
of interests was found to favor the right of repudiation of 
the prior decision. 70 A similar conflict in interests causes a 
diversity of result in workmen's compensation cases.71 
It becomes, in final analysis, another phase of the problem 
of choosing between the public interest in free administrative 
action and the private interest in security.72 
Administrative recognition of doctrine. There is substantial 
recognition by the agencies of the rule that a prior determina-
tion will not be reversed to the detriment of an individual 
who fairly relied on an earlier ruling.73 
Where an agency refuses to reopen a case, or to change 
its decision in rehearing proceedings, it is sometimes said that 
70 Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 24 S. Ct. 590 (1904). 
71 Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 203 Cal. 522, 
1.65 Pac. 195 (1928); F. Jarka Co. v. Monahan (D. C. Mass. 1928), 29 
F. (2d) 741; 41 YALE L. J. 148 (1931). 
72 National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young, et al. (App. D. C. 1943) 134 
F. (2d) 524, cf., 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 268 (1941), 
73 E.g., In the Matter of Baltimore Transit Co., 47 N. L. R. B. 109 (1943), 
holding that where in 1937 a Regional Director of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had dismissed charges of unfair labor practices against a company 
on the grounds that the company did not fall within the agency's jurisdiction, 
while this decision was not res judicata to prevent the subsequent institution of 
proceedings, still in the exercise of administrative discretion the provisions of 
the order (in the subsequently instituted proceedings) as to reimbursement 
of certain funds to employees, would be limited to the period since the filing 
of the complaint by the agency in the second proceedings. The Wage and Hour 
Division of the United States Department of Labor has adopted similar prac-
tices. 
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principles of res judicata make it appropriate to follow the 
original decision.74 
(b) Effect of administrative determination on determina-
tions of other agencies. Except as the contrary is provided by 
statute, the decision of a particular agency is not ordinarily 
binding on another agency which may be called upon to pass 
on the same issues, or substantially similar issues, in a matter 
falling within its own competence.75 
(c) Effect of administrative determination on subsequent 
judicial actions. While, for reasons above noted, an adminis-
trative determination is not technically res judicata, so as to 
preclude collateral attack on the determination in appropriate 
judicial proceedings,76 still the courts are inclined to accept 
administrative determinations of a factual or technical nature, 
particularly where the collateral reversal of the decision 
might produce harsh results; 77 and in some cases, prior ad-
ministrative determinations are apparently regarded as res 
judicata.78 Of course, where the court is reviewing the ad-
ministrative determination, either by direct appeal or by 
some other available statutory or common-law method, the 
administrative order does not bind the rights of the parties 
in court.79 
(d) E fleet of judicial determination on subsequent ad-
ministrative action. On orthodox principles, a judgment in 
a judicial action involving the government is binding in 
subsequent proceedings between that party and the same or 
74 In the Matter of Columbia Railway & Navigation Co., I F. P. C. 78 
(1933); In re Barratt's Appeal, I4 App. D. C. 2.55 (I899). 
75 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. I77, 59 S. Ct. I6o (I938); 
I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 2.46, 
76 Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc. (D. C. N. Y. 192.3), 2.95 Fed. 72.9. 
77 Morgan v. Daniels, I 53 U. S. 120, 14 S. Ct. 772 (I 894); Pennsylvania 
R. Co. v. Stineman Coal Mining Co., 242. U.S. 298, 37 S. Ct. 118 (1916); 
New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Frank, 314 U.S. 36o, 62 S. Ct. 258 (I941). 
78 Grey lock Mills v. White (D. C. Mass. 1932), 55 F. (2.d) 704; United 
States v. Willard Tablet Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1944), 141 F. (2d) 141. 
79 1 Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 2.46-2.47• 
THE ROLE OF DISCRETION 249 
another representative of the government.80 Where, there-
fore, a question presented to an administrative agency is 
res judicata as the result of a prior judgment of a competent 
court, the judgment is binding on the agency.81 This principle 
is, however, subject to the usual limitations as to identity of 
issues and parties. For example, an acquittal in criminal 
proceedings does not bar administrative action to recover 
penalties based on the same alleged wrong, because the dif-
ference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil 
cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata.82 
80 Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., z89 U. S. 6zo, 53 S. Ct. 706 ( 1933); 
George H. Lee Co. v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1930), 41 F. (zd) 460. 
81 George H. Lee Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 8th 1940), IIJ 
F. (zd) 583. Cases cited in 1 Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(194z) Z50. 
82 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 




Practice and Procedure in 
the Making of Rules 
I. Development of Rule-Making Activities 
THE adoption of rules by administrative agencies to implement general provisions of statutes was a familiar part of the governmental process in America long be-
fore the development of the comparatively recent practice 
of entrusting substantial adjudicatory responsibilities to such 
agencies. The first Congress authorized the President to 
promulgate rules and regulations concerning trading with 
the Indian tribes.1 The duty of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to prescribe regulations under internal revenue laws goes 
back to 1813.2 
But until the twentieth century, administrative rule-
making powers were ordinarily exercised only in connection 
with the conduct of the public business--customs, taxes, 
postal affairs, administration of the public lands, protection 
of the public health, and similar matters. It was only with 
the expansion of governmental controls over the fields of 
trade, business, and finance, and with the development of 
the now familiar technique of drafting regulatory statutes in 
purposely vague and broad terms, delegating to an agency 
the power to fill in the legislative details, that the problem 
of administrative legislation assumed its present importance. 
Today, the power to promulgate regulations having the force 
of law covers a vast range of activities which had long been 
comparatively immune from governmental control. For ex-
ample, power is delegated to various agencies to legislate on 
1 1 Stat. 137 (1790). 
2 3 Stat. 2. 6 ( 1813). 
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such diverse matters as maximum interest rates, margin re-
quirements on security trading, minimum and maximum 
prices on commodities, and various elements of private em-
ployment contracts. The list could be extended indefinitely. 
It is in connection with the exercise of delegated legislative 
powers in fields regulating the conduct of private business 
that the problems as to the procedure to be followed in the 
promulgation of the rules, as to the legal effect of such rules, 
and as to their legal validity, become important. 
2. Classification of Rules 
Before considering the various types of rule-making activi-
ties, it is necessary to note at the outset the variable nature 
of the distinction between rule making and adjudication. This 
is but natural, for agencies often adopt adjudicatory tech-
niques in making rules (e.g., a hearing before a public utility 
commission to fix electric rates); or adopt rule-making tech-
niques in adjudicating cases (e.g., some licensing procedures). 
The distinction between rule making and adjudication is not 
fixed; it is largely a matter of emphasis. Under the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act, a functional distinction is 
adopted, whereby "rule making" includes such matters as 
price fixing, wage fixing, approval of corporate reorganiza-
tions, et cetera, and other types of cases where only a single 
party is involved and adjudicatory techniques are often em-
ployed.3 But in the classical or traditional sense, rule making 
is regarded as a function of laying down general regulations, 
as distinguished from making orders that apply only to 
named persons or specific situations. It is only in connection 
with this latter type of rule making that there arise the prob-
lems discussed in the following pages. 
S Sec. z. As to the distinction, under the act, between "rule making" and 
"adjudication," see 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1947) and 61 HARV. L. REV. 389, 
6u (1948). 
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Administrative rules and regulations of general applica-
tion cover a wide range, from details of agency organization 
to legislative enactments having the force of law. Within 
these broad limits, there is a general line of division between 
procedural rules and those whose effect is primarily sub-
stantive. 
(a) Procedural rules. The issuance and publication of 
procedural rules involve principally the development of a 
working compromise between the agency's interest in un-
regulated fluidity of procedure, and the public's interest in 
being able to ascertain in advance the mechanics which will 
govern the disposition of a case. As every lawyer knows, the 
rules of procedure are not infrequently determinative of the 
outcome of a case. 
Even so simple a matter as a statement of an agency's 
organization may be important. If this is unpublished, it is 
in many cases almost impossible for persons interested in a 
matter pending before the agency to discover where to go 
in order to be heard, or whom to see-yet frequently there 
may be some particular branch within the agency which alone 
will lend an attentive ear to a certain plea. Recognizing this, 
Congress has required in Section 3 (a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act that each federal agency publish a description 
of the agency's organization, including a statement of dele-
gations of authority within the agency and the established 
methods whereby information may be secured and requests 
submitted. 
The same is true as to rules of practice and procedure. 
Frequently, available statements covering these points are 
sketchy and incomplete, failing to reveal the whole process 
of administration, or the various alternative procedures which 
may in fact be utilized. Sometimes through mere inertia, and 
more frequently perhaps through a desire to avoid commit-
ment to any set course of procedure (for once a definite rule 
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of procedure is established, a person appearing before the 
agency may justifiably complain of departures therefrom), 
many agencies have been loathe to adopt or publish detailed 
procedural rules. So far as federal agencies are concerned, the 
Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 serves to correct any 
such tendency. Section 3 of that act requires the publication 
of a description of the nature and requirements of all formal 
and informal procedures, together with forms and instruc-
tions. Promulgation of definite and explicit rules of practice 
helps substantially to improve the level of agency perform-
ance and to promote public confidence in the fairness and 
justice of administrative procedures. In the words of the Su-
preme Court, "The history of American freedom is, in no 
small measure, the history of procedure." 4 
(b) Legislative regulations. But the bulk of administra-
tive rule making deals with regulations implementing the 
substantive provisions of statutory law. While these take 
many forms, from advisory opinions written in response to 
individual inquiries, to formal enactments written in the form 
and style of statutes, yet running through this heterogeneous 
mass of quasi-legislative activity there is one fairly definite 
dividing line. It involves the distinction between interpreta-
tive regulations and legislative regulations. The difference 
is in some respects a matter of form, but it is not without its 
consequences. If the statute provides a sanction for violation 
of the regulation, and it is written pursuant to specific delega-
tion of power, then the regulation is legislative. If, on the 
other hand, the statute does not provide for such delegation 
of legislative power, and the regulation represents only the 
agency's opinion as to what the statute requires, then the 
regulation is interpretative. 
(c) Interpretative regulations. An interpretative regula-
tion frequently takes the form of an opinion construing the 
4 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,414, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945). 
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applicable statute. In such cases, while a great deal of weight 
may be attached to the interpretation, particularly if it is of 
long standing and if it represents the results of accumulated 
experience and technical know ledge in a· particular field, yet 
the regulation does not possess any greater authority than 
that of a well-supported argument in favor of a particular 
interpretation of a statute. Sometimes, however, a regulation 
which in legal effect is only interpretative is written as a 
positive legislative command. Perusal of a regulation may 
leave a doubt as to whether it is intended to have legislative 
effect or not. The answer in such cases may be ascertained by 
an examination of the statute. If the statute fails to delegate 
express power to make the regulation and provides no sanc-
tion for violation of the regulation, then it is merely inter-
pretative, even though cast in the form of a positive require-
ment of designated action. 
From this it is obvious that the general classification of 
interpretative regulations could be subdivided into many 
categories. At least three deserve particular mention. 
(I) One is the type of regulation that requires the filing 
of reports, the keeping of records, or the taking of other steps 
designated to assist the agency in its task of administration. 
The agencies must depend on various informal and some-
times extralegal sanctions to enforce these requirements. 
While ordinarily the agency is given specific power to make 
such regulations (under a general grant of authority to make 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry the statute into 
effect) yet the regulation is properly classifiable as adminis-
trative or interpretative.5 
( z) More obviously interpretative are such regulations as 
the Interpretative Bulletins issued by the Wage and Hour 
and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor, 
5 See F. P. Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," z9 GEO. L. J. 
1 ( 1940); Davis, "Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Ret-
roactive," 57 YALE L. J. 919 (1948). 
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many of the income tax regulations, and other similar state-
ments which in effect do no more than state the particular 
statutory interpretation which will be followed by the agency 
unless and until the statute is otherwise authoritatively in-
terpreted by the courts. 
(3) A third class of interpretative regulations are those 
which state general discretionary policies to be followed by 
the agency. For example, an agency given broad discretionary 
powers in respect to the granting of licenses may formulate 
a statement of the conditions which must be met in order to 
obtain a license. In many cases, agencies have thus worked 
out standards and policies, which in effect control the admin-
istrative decision in a wide variety of cases where the agencies 
have freedom of choice. These various alternatives do not 
reflect interpretations of a statute; rather, they represent 
extrastatutory policies. 
Judicious use of the power to make interpretative rulings 
offers an opportunity to correct a woeful lack of adequate 
public information concerning both the procedure of admin-
istrative tribunals and the substance of administrative policies. 
Despite the flow of rules, regulations, press releases, and 
interpretative bulletins-which are issued in such abundance 
that a year's output of federal agencies' regulations may fill 
more pages than are required for the compilation of all fed-
eral statute law-lawyers and laymen alike are ba:ffied by the 
difficulty of ascertaining from any official source, when con-
fronted with the institution of agency proceedings, just what 
remedies are open to them, and what ruling the agency 
may be expected to make in the case. Inability to learn by 
what procedural rules the case will be heard, or by what 
process of decision the final determination will be made, 
breeds general dissatisfaction and leads to charges of unre-
strained delegation of authority and star-chamber proceed-
ings. The problem of public information is thus an important 
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one with the agencies, and it can best be solved by the careful 
preparation and publication of rules. 
An agency of any size cannot very well function without 
rules of procedure, and it may be supposed that every agency 
has such rules, at least at a level of interoffice memoranda. 
But in too frequent cases, the only rules published and made 
generally available contain so little information as to the 
actual procedural steps, and the various alternative proce-
dures which may be available, that a person having a case 
before the agency is at a loss as to how to proceed except upon 
seeking advice of a representative of the agency, and then 
because of the partisan position necessarily assumed by agen-
cies in many matters, the person seeking information may 
entertain understandable doubts as to whether the advice he 
has received is entirely disinterested. It is for this reason that 
the Attorney General's Committee strongly urged 6 that each 
agency be required to make available, and to maintain cur-
rent, statements describing both formal and informal proce-
dures available in various types of cases, specifying among 
other things the officers and types of personnel, the various 
subdivisions of the agency, and the duties, functions, and gen-
eral authority or jurisdiction of all divisions of the agency in 
each of the several types of cases handled. 
Similar problems are presented in connection with adminis-
trative interpretations of the regulatory statutes administered 
by the agencies. It having become an accepted technique of 
statutory draftsmanship to establish legislative standards in 
broad, vague, and general terms, the office of interpretation 
and construction has become commensurately more impor-
tant. Without it, those subject to the statutory regulation are 
at a loss to know what compliance will be deemed to require. 
For example, the term "employee" may under one statute 
6 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 195. Sec. 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946 requires federal agencies to conform to most of these suggestions. 
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be interpreted to include and under another statute to ex-
clude, those who by common-law tests are independent con-
tractors.7 Only by the publication of interpretative statements 
can the public be advised in detail as to the requirements of 
the statute. 
These first two functions of the administrative rule-mak-
ing power, then, amount to little more than making available 
to all interested parties full information as to the methods of 
procedure and the standards of statutory interpretation which 
will be employed by the agency in making its decisions. The 
problem is relatively simple. 
But greater difficulty is encountered in connection with a 
third function of administrative rules-i.e., enunciating ad-
ministrative policies (as distinct from standards of legislative 
interpretation). In establishing these administrative policies 
(which, while perhaps in furtherance of a general legislative 
purpose, go quite beyond the realm of interpretation or con-
struction and into the field of discretionary policy making) 
the agencies are ordinarily free to choose between the method 
of formulating a general policy in the form of regulations, 
and that of working out policy piecemeal by decisions in vari-
ant case situations. 
In certain cases, the latter method serves important admin-
istrative purposes. In a new field, such as television, adjudica-
tion of a variety of cases may serve to clarify problems and 
avoid errors that might result from premature publication of 
a general rule. Further, the problems of policy presented to 
some agencies are too complex to permit of codification by 
quasi-legislation. For .example, it would obviously be quite 
infeasible to provide by regulation under what circumstances 
7 In Walling v. American Needlecrafts (C.C.A. 6th 1943), 139 F. (zd) 6o, 
certain homeworkers were held to be employees under the Fair Labor Standards 
A,~!i but similar homeworkers were held not to be employees for purposes of 
Social Security taxes in Glenn v. Beard (C.C.A. 6th 1944), 141 F. (zd) 376; 
and cf., National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 
III, 64 s. Ct. 851 (1944). 
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a new utility operation would be licensed as being justified by 
the public interest, convenience, or necessity. 
In some circumstances, perhaps, there are justifiable rea-
sons for keeping confidential the criteria of decision. In cases 
where the agency regulates conduct in a field where tempta-
tion is offered to stray from highest moral standards (the 
regulation of liquor traffic might be mentioned) it has been 
suggested that announcement of the furthermost reaches of 
permissible conduct would encourage some licensees to go 
right to that boundary line where the legal merges with the 
illegal. 
But ordinarily, after having attained experience in its field, 
an agency is able to reach rather definite conclusions on most 
policy matters. Sometimes, an agency's arrival at this stage 
is followed by the enactment of regulations. The National 
War Labor Board, for example, in the early days of its 
World War II creation, at first decided applications for wage 
increases on an ad hoc basis. As some experience was gained, 
general regulations and statements of policies were enunci-
ated; and as these were tested in the course of daily case 
decisions, various amendments and refinements were devised, 
until after some two years' experience it became fairly possi-
ble to ascertain from the agency's rules what its ruling would 
be in various situations. 
The difficulty arises in cases where the agency does not 
choose to promulgate its fully developed internal criteria as 
regulations. Then, those dealing with the agency are in the 
unenviable position of being unable to ascertain the basis on 
which cases will be decided. The practical difficulties of at-
tempting to bring one's course of conduct into compliance 
with an administr~tive policy which must be complied with, 
but the terms of which can be only guessed, scarcely require 
elaboration.8 Lack of knowledge of these criteria, further, in-
8 Handler, "Unfair Competition," zx lA. L. REV. 175, z59 (1936); Maslow, 
"Poor Food and Drug Laws," z NAT. LAW. GUILD Q. zs (1939). 
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terferes with the settlement of controversies in the prelim-
inary, informal stage and thus often makes necessary the 
conduct of formal judicial proceedings which might otherwise 
be avoided. There are still broader reasons for the promulga-
tion of such internal administrative policies. If cases are 
determined on the basis of such a criterion, rather than by the 
exercise of judgment in the particular case, both the parties 
and reviewing court are in fairness and justice entitled to 
know it.9 
Aside from statutory provision, such as Section 3 of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, there is little 
authority to require the promulgation into interpretative 
rules of such internal criteria.10 But the cause of good admin-
istration is substantially furthered by the exercise of this func-
tion of the administrative rule-making powers. 
3· Hearings in Connection with the Adoption of Rules 
While the legal requirements as to giving notice and con-
ducting hearings precedent to the promulgation of rules 11 
are rather attenuated, save for specific requirements of occa-
sional state statutes and the general requirement imposed on 
federal agencies by Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, yet the actual practice recognizes the practical need of 
utilizing this device. There is general recognition that good 
administration requires an agency to obtain and consider the 
comments of all interested parties as to the contents of pro-
posed rules. 
It is further clear, and generally conceded, that the type 
of hearing which should precede the administrative promul-
gation of rules is quite different in character and scope than 
9 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(1942) 296. 
lO But see Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. 
1937), 95 F. (2d) 91. 
11 Discussed supra, Ch. 4· 
PROCEDURE IN MAKING RULES 263 
the hearings conducted by legislative committees. The ad-
ministrative agency, starting where the legislature left off, is 
necessarily concerned with minutiae that the legislature could 
not take time to consider; and there is accordingly a need for 
painstaking and detailed investigation, and assembling of 
facts, going far beyond the general statements and arguments 
of policy which are characteristic of legislative hearings on 
pending bills. Further, the fact that the administrative agen-
cy's personnel does not comprise a democratically elected 
group representing the diverse viewpoints of their constitu-
ents, but is rather an unrepresentative special interest group, 
further emphasizes the necessity of hearings. It is only in 
this way that the agency can obtain the breadth of view nec-
essary to the most successful conduct of its work. 
There are thus two prime objectives in the information-
gathering activities that precede the adoption of rules by 
administrative agencies. The first is to assure wise adminis-
trative action. The second is to make sure that those whose 
interests will be directly affected by the rule are satisfied that 
their interests have received fair and adequate consideration. 
Granting opportunity to those primarily affected to partici-
pate in the rule-making process not only satisfies them of the 
fairness of the procedure, but is effective also to enlist their 
acquiescence and co-operation in carrying out the require-
ments of the rule as finally adopted.12 Accordingly, the hear-
ing procedures should be so devised as best to attain these 
two objectives. 
The first step in the procedure should be, ideally, publica-
tion of notice of an intent to make a rule. This serves fair 
notice on those concerned, and gives them an opportunity to 
adjust themselves to meet new requirements. The giving of 
such notice, too, is frequently productive of suggestions which 
12 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(1942) 297· 
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may be of value to the agency in the second step of the proce-
dure, which is investigation. 
Factual investigation by the agency, preparatory to the 
promulgation of a rule, is of all-embracing importance. Pub-
lic hearings are not always productive of precise factual data; 
yet it is the duty of the agency to make sure that it has 
obtained full and accurate factual information as to all rele-
vant factors. Only by careful investigation can this be 
achieved. Such investigation, further, often serves to formu-
late issues for further discussion. 
After the information has been assembled, it is the best 
practice, wherever feasible, for the agency to publish a tenta-
tive draft of the proposed rule. This serves a fair warning 
of what may be expected, and serves to facilitate the execu-
tion of the next and crucial part of the task-exposing the 
proposal to the test of public criticism and comment, before 
the rule is formally put into effect. 
The mechanics of this final step-obtaining participation 
in the actual rule-making process of those whose interests will 
be directly affected-must of course vary in different types 
of situations. In some cases, informal conferences may serve 
this purpose better than a formal public hearing. This may 
well be true where the group affected is small (as in the case 
of regulations of the Federal Reserve Board) or where the 
regulation involves primarily technical questions (as in the 
case of rules of the Federal Communications Commission re-
lating to broadcasting, or the accounting rules promulgated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission) .13 The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of I 946, Section 4, requires federal 
agencies to afford interested parties an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rule-making procedure at least to the extent of 
submitting written data, and further requires that there be 
13 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 64-68. 
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opportunity for oral participation where some other statute 
requires a hearing. An interesting device, sometimes em-
ployed very effectively by agencies operating in fields where 
broad arguments of social and economic policy are tempered 
by more or less technical considerations-as in the field of 
unemployment insurance-is that of an unofficial tripartite 
advisory committee. Composed so as to give equal repre-
sentation to conflicting points of view-often industry, labor, 
and the public-it is the function of such a committee to 
work out technically acceptable solutions to problems compli-
cated both by administrative difficulties and by emotional 
clashes between competing special interest groups. In devis-
ing rules by which it shall be determined, for example, 
whether an unemployed worker is "available for work," or 
whether an employee injured at his job is "totally incapaci-
tated," such tripartite committees can frequently devise a 
formula which will be reasonably satisfactory to all affected 
groups and will at the same time be administratively feasible. 
But even in cases where there is no unalterable need for a 
public hearing, it is still advisable to supplement informal 
conferences by such a hearing, in order to make sure that no 
one can justifiably complain that his special interests were 
overlooked. At some stage of the proceedings, therefore, a 
public hearing should be held in almost every type of case.u 
The scope of such hearing, and the general manner of its 
conduct, is again a problem for the wise discretion of the in-
dividual agency. The practices of the federal agencies are 
discussed in the report of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee.15 Where the regulation involves many broad problems, 
incapable of reduction to precise issues, a general informatory 
hearing is perhaps necessary (as if, for example, the question 
14 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(I942) 30I et seq. 
15 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc, No. 8, 
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I 94I) I I I et seq. 
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is whether a utility commission should extend its field of 
regulatory activity to fleets of trucks operated by private 
carriers, and if so, how many aspects of their operations 
should be regulated-whether the rules should extend only 
to safety requirements or whether they should cover also such 
matters as maximum hours, overtime pay, minimum wages, 
etcetera). In such cases, it is ordinarily imJ?ractical to do more 
than to give all interested parties an opportunity to present 
their arguments. On the other hand, where the affected group 
is small, or where the issues involved can be formulated in 
fairly definite terms, much more satisfactory results can be 
obtained by utilization of adversary hearings, where witnesses 
are examined and cross-examined, and opportunity is given 
for the filing of formal briefs and full oral argument. A 
prime example is that of public utility rate hearings, where a 
quasi-legislative function is carried out by quasi-judicial pro-
cedure. 
Another significant method of assuring effective public 
participation in rule-making procedures is to afford interested 
parties a statutory right to petition the agency for the adop-
tion of a proposed rule, or the amendment of an existing 
rule. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act of r 946 
provides this as to the federal agencies. 
Employment of these successive steps-first, announce-
ment of the intent to formulate a rule; second, investigation; 
third, issuance in draft form of a proposed rule; fourth, ex-
posing the proposed rule to the test of public examination and 
criticism-has been demonstrated by experience to be in most 
cases the best method by which to insure wise administrative 
action, even though not a matter of legal requirement, except 
as specific statutory provisions may so enact. There are cases, 
to be sure, where some of the steps may be omitted, as in the 
adoption of purely procedural regulations, where an agency 
PROCEDURE IN MAKING RULES 267 
can sometimes proceed with safety on the basis of its own 
knowledge. But departures from this model procedure should 
not be sanctioned unless the desirability of the departure is 
clear. 
4· The Necessity of Findings 
(a) In absence of specific statutory provision. Where the 
power of an administrative agency to make a certain type of 
order depends on the existence of particular facts, it is obvi-
ously necessary to determine that such facts exist before the 
order can properly be made. Initially and primarily, it is the 
duty of the agency to make its own finding and determination 
as to the existence of the requisite factual situation, before it 
takes any affirmative action. 
As a matter of orderly procedure, it is obviously the pref-
erable practice for the agency to make a formal determina-
tion and finding as to the existence of such facts, in support 
of its order. This has been laid down as a positive requirement 
in several cases wherein an administrative order or regulation 
has been held invalid because of the failure of the agency to 
make the necessary findings.16 
Conversely, where the controlling statute does not condi-
tion the agency's regulatory power upon the existence of cer-
tain facts, there is no necessity for the agency to make any 
explanatory findings or declarations of policy in connection 
with the promulgation of its orders.11 
Where the agency is authorized to make regulations of a 
generally applicable character, it is somewhat uncommon for 
16 Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of State of 
Kansas, 260 U.S. 48, 43 S. Ct. 51 (1922); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 
S. Ct. 283 (1924); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 
241 (1935); United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 55 S. Ct. 
268 ( 1935). See annotation in 146 A. L. R. 209. 
17 Cf., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 56 S. Ct. 159 
(1935). 
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the legislature to condition the exercise of the power on the 
existence of particular facts. This requirement, as pointed 
out in the last-cited case, is more often found where the con-
templated administrative order is directed primarily against 
a particular party or group. It is, therefore, sometimes said 
that when an agency acts in a legislative capacity by making a 
rule, regulation, or order of general application, it need not 
make findings. But it would seem that the distinction is not 
primarily the nature of the order; rather, it is a question as to 
what the legislature has required. 
The requirement that express findings be made in support 
of the order, in those cases where the legislature has condi-
tioned the agency's power to issue an order upon the exist-
ence of specified conditions, has been criticized/8 and there is 
some suggestion that the doctrine requiring findings may in 
time be dropped as an unnecessary safeguard against hasty 
or ill-advised administrative action.19 Tending in this direc-
tion are cases which insist that the doctrine may not be ap-
plied technically, so as to require a finding on every con-
ceivable relevant factor,20 and cases which hold that the 
proper remedy (in cases where the agency has failed to make 
the required findings) is not to set the order aside, but rather 
to remand it to the administrative agency and give it an op-
portunity to perfect its record by making formal findings.21 
(b) Statutory requirements. Court-imposed requirements 
as to the making of findings to support administrative orders 
and regulations are far less rigorous than the requirement 
18 61 A. B. A. REP. 720, 775 (1936). 
19Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C.C.A. 8th 1941), 122 F. 
(2d) 564. 
20 Andree & Seedman, Inc., et al. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Divi-
sion of United States Department of Labor (App. D. C. 1941), 122 F. (2d) 
634· 
21 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C.C.A. 7th 1941), no 
F. (2d) 258; Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C.C.A. 8th 1941), 
122 F. (zd) 564. 
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quite often imposed by legislatures,22 providing that the rules 
and regulations issued by the agency must be based on defi-
nite findings, which must in turn be supported by evidence 
taken at a formal hearing. In this type of case, the findings 
concern not only the existence of a general factual situation 
on which the agency's power is conditioned, but must further 
demonstrate in detail the reasonableness of the order or regu-
lation. Such provisions, it seems clear, require extensive par-
ticipation in the rule-making procedure by the private parties 
affected (because they must have full opportunity to present 
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, et cetera) and further re-
quire clear and close thinking on the part of the administra-
tive draftsmen, thus tending to promote carefully drawn 
rules. If it is necessary to have such statutory provisions to 
gain these results, the practice of putting such requirements 
into the statutes should be continued. But if, on the other 
hand, free public participation and careful, exacting adminis-
trative draftsmanship can be achieved without these require-
ments, there is but little need for their continuance. Such 
statutory requirements are burdensome, in requiring the ap-
plication of the procedures of a judicial trial to administrative 
rule making. The effectiveness of these procedures is in-
evitably limited by distinctive characteristics of rule-making 
activities, where the issues are complex, numerous, and not 
clearly defined; where the interests of the parties concerned 
are so diverse as to be frequently incapable of alignment into 
classes; and where the final outcome involves essentially not 
a determination as to fact and law, but primarily a judgment 
as to the future consequences of proposed rules. 
22 For example, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, sz Stat. 1055, :1.1 U.S.C. 
§ 371 (e); Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, so Stat. :1.46, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 6o8 (c); Bituminous Coal Act, so Stat. ·7S> IS U.S.C. § 8zg; Fair Labor 
Standards Act, sz Stat. 1064, :1.9 U.S.C. § zo8. 
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5. Drafting of Rules 
While it is not unusual for administrative agencies to con-
sult with representatives of the parties primarily affected as 
to the actual drafting of the administrative rules (and this 
is frequently done by submitting for comment and criticism a 
tentative draft of a proposed rule), yet the actual formula-
tion of the text of the rule is ultimately the sole responsibility 
of the agency. 
Because of the greater necessity for close attention to 
minute detail, drafting of administrative rules and regula-
tions presents difficulties which can often be avoided in legis-
lative draftsmanship. There is a greater danger that some 
obscure but nonetheless important contingency will not be 
provided for; and to meet this danger, a practice has evolved 
of providing a deferred effective date. This gives those af-
fected a grace period in which to adjust their affairs to meet 
the new requirements, and also gives an important opportu-
nity to correct any oversights which may have occurred. 
Legislation providing for the deferred effectiveness of regu-
lations having statutory effect (with appropriate exceptions 
to prevent undue delay in emergency situations) is to be 
recommended.23 
A somewhat more drastic provision which is occasionally 
encountered requires that the administrative regulations be 
laid before the legislature for its approval or disapproval. 
Several variants of this policy are found. It may be simply 
provided that the regulations be laid before the legislature 
for its information. As to this requirement, there is little room 
23 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, 
nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) II5· Sec. 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946 requires (in the case of federal agencies) that substantive rules (with 
'some stated exceptions) must be published at least thirty days prior to the effec-
tive date, except "as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found 
and published with the rule." 
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for objection, although there is room for considerable scep-
ticism as to the effectiveness of such procedure in encourag-
ing legislative examination of the administrative activity; a 
more effective way of accomplishing this result would be to 
require the annual submission of detailed reports as to the 
agency's activities. Sometimes it is provided that the regula-
tion shall be noticed for legislative review and possible 
amendment or annulment within a specified period. While 
of course the legislature always has this power, nevertheless 
such provision does have a very real effect, in that it brings 
the regulations before the legislative body, and facilitates the 
making of an attack by interested parties on the challenged 
regulation. A third type of proviso, far more stringent than 
the others, decrees that the regulation shall not remain in 
effect beyond a limited period unless within such period it is 
approved and ratified by the legislature. Where this require-
ment is adopted, no more than legislative procrastination is 
required to abolish a rule which might have met with over-
whelming legislative approval. 
While not unknown in American practice,24 the theory of 
laying administrative regulations before the legislature has 
been far more popular in England than in this country. The 
English experience, particularly since the adoption of the 
Statutory Instruments Act of 1946/4a has demonstrated the 
great practical effectiveness of this simple device.25 
24 E.g., the Reorganization Act, 53 Stat. s6z, 5 U.S.C. §§ 133 c-d. 
24a 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 36; 39 Rallis. Stat. 783. 
25 Under the English practice, a Statutory Instruments Committee in the 
House of Commons (or its counterpart in the House of Lords) examines ad-
ministrative regulations to determine whether the special attention of Parlia-
ment should be directed thereto on the grounds (among others) that the 
regulation is not open to challenge in the courts, or appears to make unusual 
or unexpected use of the powers conferred, or purports to have unauthorized 
retrospective effect. The accomplishments of this Committee are discussed in a 
provocative article by J. A. G. Griffith, "Delegated Legislation-Some Recent 
Developments," 11. MODERN LAW REV. 1.97 ( 1949). 
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6. Publication of Rules 
The unavailability of administrative rules and regulations 
(many of which have, to a substantial degree, the force and 
effect of laws), has long been a source of practical difficulty. 
As early as 1920, John A. Fairlie wrote an article 26 urging 
the adoption of a uniform system for publication of rules, 
regulations, and orders adopted by executive agencies in the 
federal government. His arguments attracted the attention 
of other writers, and the subject received growing attention in 
periodical literature during the ensuing fifteen years.27 At-
tention was directed to the contrast between the situation in 
the United States, where it was often impossible to ascertain 
the provisions of a governing regulation except by discovery 
of the original thereof within the offices of the issuing agen-
cy/8 and in England, where rather comprehensive require-
ments for advance publication of administrative rules had 
been in effect since 1 8 9 3. 29 
However, neither the growing literature on the subject nor 
the attention directed to the English situation led Congress 
to take any action. As late as 1933, the President rejected a 
suggestion by a group of government officials that a daily 
publication be instituted to print administrative rules, orders, 
and regulations.30 The following year, however, official in-
26 "Administrative Legislation," 18 MICH. L. REV. 181 (1920). 
27 See James H. Ronald, "Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation," 
7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 52 (1938) for a comprehensive survey of the studies 
which have been made. An outstanding article is that of Erwin N. Griswold 
"Government in Ignorance of Law-A Plea for Better Publication of Executive 
Legislation," 48 HARV. L. REv. 198 ( 1934). 
28 Erwin N. Griswold testified, for example, that in 1930 he found that cer-
tain Treasury Department bond regulations were available only in typed form 
in the Treasury Department's Bond Division. Hearings on H. R. r 13 3 7, 74th 
Congress, before subcommittee II of House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 21, 1936. 
29 See Cecil T. Carr, DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1921), 36; The English 
statute is 56 & 57 Viet., c. 66. 
30 Ronald, "Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation," 7 GEo. · 
WAsH. L. REv. sz, 6s (1938). 
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terest in the problem became at last aroused when it was dis-
covered that a hapless individual had been arrested, indicted, 
and held in jail for asserted violation of an administrative 
regulation which had in fact (inadvertently, it appears, and 
without the knowledge of the prosecuting officials) been re-
pealed prior to his arrest. The case involved a gentleman 
named Smith, who had been arrested for alleged violation of 
one paragraph of the N.I.R.A. Petroleum Code. The govern-
ment appealed from an adverse decision in the lower courts, 
and shortly before the case was scheduled for argument in 
the Supreme Court, the Justice Department discovered that 
the paragraph in question had been dropped from the Code. 
The Justice Department moved, successfully, to dismiss the 
appeal.31 Upon the argument of another case at the next term 
of court, involving the same Code/2 the situation was re-
ferred to in the oral arguments, and Justice Brandeis exten-
sively interrogated government counsel. Considerable news-
paper publicity resulted, and in the same year the Federal 
Register Act was passed. 33 
The Federal Register Act, providing for the publication 
of presidential proclamations and such "classes of documents 
as the President shall determine from time to time to have 
general applicability and legal effect" has resulted in making 
widely available the rules and regulations issued by federal 
agencies. It has not, to be sure, eliminated the difficulty of 
locating the particular regulation with which one may be 
concerned, but at least it is now possible to make the search 
in any well-equipped library.34 
31 United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633,55 S. Ct. 345 (1934). 
32 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 ( 1935). 
33 Act of July 26, 1935; 49 Stat. soo, 44 U.S.C. § 301. 
34 A very useful article, describing the most convenient methods of utilizing 
the wealth of administrative legislation printed in the Federal Register, is 
Wigmore, "The Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations: How to 
Use Them-If You Have Them," 29 A. B. A. J. 10 (1943). In similar vein 
is Lavery, "The Federal Register-Its Present Day Meaning for the Practicing 
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The problem of locating the applicable regulations is 
facilitated by the publication of the Code of Federal Regu-
lations, originally authorized by Section 11 of the Federal 
Register Act, and published periodically since 1939. In this 
publication, federal administrative regulations of current 
legal effect are codified under fifty titles, each of which is 
in turn divided into several parts. 
Publication of the regulations of state agencies presents 
additional problems because in many states the promulgation 
of new regulations is comparatively infrequent, and the 
volume of new rules scarcely justifies frequent periodical 
publication. Provisions are found in several states for the 
publication of a state code, embracing all currently effective 
rules and regulations of state agencies; and in a number of 
instances, various expedients are adopted to make readily 
available, at quarterly or semiannual intervals, supplemental 
information. 85 
Lawyer," 7 F. R. D. 625 (1948). Other articles discussing the details of the 
act are found in 49 HARV. L. REv. 1209 (1936); 4 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 268 
(1936); 31 ILL. L. REV. 357 (1936). 
85 California, Government Code, §§ II371, 1138o, 11409; Connecticut, 
Public Act No. 67, 1945; Indiana, Annotated Statutes, § 60-1505 (Burns Supp. 
1946); Michigan, Annotated Statutes, §§ 3.560 (7)-(18); Minnesota, An-
notated Statutes, §§ 15.045-71 North Dakota, Revised Code, §§ 28-32-03-31 
Ohio, Gen. Code Ann.§§ 154-65; Wisconsin, Statutes, §§ 35·93> 22.7.03. See 
N. L. Nathanson, "Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative 
Law," 33 IA. L. REv. 252 (1948). 
CHAPTER 14 
Legal Effect of Rules 
1. The Problem 
S
INCE the bulk of an administrative agency's work is 
normally carried on within the framework of a more or 
. less elaborate set of agency-created rules and regulations, 
questions frequently arise (both within the agency itself and 
in connection with judicial review of the agency;s proceed-
ings) as to the significance and legal effect of such rules and 
regulations. Such issues are raised in a variety of ways. The 
question may be as to the effect of a party's refusal to com-
ply with a rule. Or it may, conversely, concern the results 
of voluntary compliance with an invalid rule. The inquiry 
may be as to the validity of a rule, as to the consequences 
of disregard of an admittedly valid rule, or as to the right 
of an agency to change its rules. 
The legal effect of such rules and regulations depends on 
a variety of factors. The purpose of the rule, the authority 
on which it was issued, the reasonableness of a proposed 
application or nonapplication of the rule, and other similar 
factors, are all taken into consideration by the courts. But 
these factors are seldom isolated in judicial opinions, and 
many seemingly contradictory dicta may be found. Some care 
is required to determine what constitute the controlling ele-
ments of decision in any particular situation. 
2. Status of Substantive Regulations as Laws 
Perhaps the most frequently recurring question is whether 
or not a particular regulation, purporting to lay down a 
substantive requirement of conduct, has the force of law. In 
brief, it might be answered that the regulation has such effect 
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if it is upheld by the courts; but this answer, of course, 
merely avoids the real question: On what basis will the 
courts determine whether to uphold the regulation? Is it to 
be approached with the deference accorded legislation, or is 
it to be treated merely as a partisan interpretation of the 
legislature's mandate-an interpretation which the courts, 
in the exercise of their judicial prerogatives, are free to 
disregard? 
While the cases appear to indicate some conflict of judicial 
thinking on this problem, most of the seeming inconsistencies 
of statement can be reconciled by making a distinction be-
tween the so-called legislative regulations and what may be 
termed interpretative regulations.1 Thus, it is said that a 
legislative regulation has the force of law, while an inter-
pretative regulation has no such force unless and until it is 
accepted by the courts as a correct interpretation of the 
statute. 
However, this distinction oversimplifies the problem. It 
is really true of both types of regulations that they have 
legal effect in determining the rights of parties, unless they 
are invalidated by the courts. In the case of legislative 
regulations, the likelihood that the courts will set them aside 
is comparatively remote; and on the other hand, the courts 
not infrequently set aside regulations which are merely in-
terpretative. The difference is based not on any inherent 
distinction between the two types of regulations, but is rather 
empmc. 
1 The courts do not often emphasize this distinction. It has been carefully 
developed, with some variety of phraseology, by several students. E.g., F. P. 
Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," z9 GEO. L. J. I (I 940) 1 
Fred T. Field, "The Legal Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretation," THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX (19Z1) 91; J.P. Comer, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES, Chs. II, V ( 19Z7) ; Alvord, "Treas-
ury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case," 40 CoL. L. REv. z5z (I940) 1 
Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, 
Estate, and Gift Taxes," 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556 (1940), For a general dis-
cussion of how regulations are interpreted by the Courts, see Newman, "How 
Courts Interpret Regulations," 35 CAL, L. REV. 509 ( 1947). 
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A legislative rule is one promulgated pursuant to a 
specific delegatory provision in the governing statute. The 
statute sets the general standard (always necessary in the 
case of delegation of legislative authority), authorizes the 
agency to determine the actual content of the law by regu-
lation, and provides the sanctions which will result from 
nonconformance with the rule-or (what is really the same 
thing) sets a general rule and authorizes the agency to 
provide by appropriate regulations for exceptions to the rule. 
Where the legislature has clearly delegated such author-
ity, the only issues that can normally be raised as to the 
validity of the rule concern the questions whether it is ultra 
vires as exceeding the scope of the authority delegated, and 
whether it is violative of the due process guarantees. These 
issues are not often presented; and accordingly such regula-
tions are normally treated on the same basis as legislative 
acts. 
In some cases, it is clear that the legislature has author-
ized an agency to promulgate legislative rules of this type. 
Typical examples would be rate orders of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, or regulations by the Department 
of Labor defining certain exemptions under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.2 Occasionally the statute specifically declares 
that the regulations shall have the force and effect of law.3 
Sometimes, the statute provides penalties that will result 
from noncompliance with the regulations.4 Or similarly, the 
statute may make noncompliance with the regulations a 
2 Sec. r 3 (a) provides in part that there shall be exempt from the overtime 
provisions of the law "any employee employed in a bona :fide executive, ad-
ministrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the capacity of 
outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the 
Administrator)." 29 U.S.C. §§ 2or, 213. 
s E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 610. 
4 E.g., Naval Stores Act, 7 U.S.C. § 96; Cotton Standards Act of 1923, 7 
U.S.C. § 6o; Grain Standards Act of 1916, 7 U.S.C. § 85; Bituminous Coal 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 830. 
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ground for revocation of permits or licenses.5 Conversely, 
the statute may authorize the making of regulations which 
will relax a statutory rule otherwise applicable.6 In all these 
cases, it is clear that the regulations issued pursuant to such 
express authority have, unless ultra vires, the same status 
substantially as a statute. 
But the legislative intent is not always so clear. For ex-
ample, in many cases the only express delegation of power 
to make regulations is the common bestowal of authority to 
make "such regulations as may be necessary or proper to 
carry out the provisions of this Act"-to adopt language 
which is approximated in many statutes. In many instances, 
regulations issued under such authority are not legislative. 
Normally, regulations issued under such authority relate 
merely to procedural details, having no significant substan-
tive effect. If cast in the terms of substantive requirements, 
they must as a rule stand merely as the agency's interpre-
tation of the meaning of statutory language, and cannot 
normally be accorded the status of the legislative type of 
regulation above discussed.7 In other cases, there is room 
for argument whether the intent of the statute is that sanc-
tions shall attach only to violation of the statute, or as well 
to any violation of regulations issued under the statute. 
In those cases where it does not clearly appear that power 
to promulgate a legislative regulation has been delegated, 
the courts usually treat the regulation on the same basis as 
in cases where there can be no doubt but that the regulation 
5 E.g., Federal Communications Act of 19341 47 U.S.C. § 151, 
6 E.g.,§ 3 (b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (c). 
7 The distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations has not 
been crystallized in the cases; and the courts sometimes treat as legislative regu-
lations what appear to be merely interpretative regulations-e.g., Helvering, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 308 U. S. 90, 6o 
S. Ct. I 8 ( 1 9 3 9) . See tenBroek, "Interpretative Administrative Action and the 
Lawmaker's Will," 20 OREGON L. REV. 206 (1941); and comment, 56 HARV. 
L. REV. 100 (1942). 
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is merely interpretative. It can therefore fairly be said that 
unless the governing statute plainly gives legislative effect 
to the regulations, they shall be treated merely as inter-
pretative. 
While the term is somewhat deprecatory in its implica-
tions, it should not be taken as an indication that an inter-
pretative regulation is without any significant legal effect. 
The vast majority of the rules and regulations issued by 
administrative agencies fall into this category; and their 
effectiveness is one of the greatest sources of administrative 
powers. 
The principle has been stated frequently that such regu-
lations are entitled to great weight as presumptively correct 
interpretations of the statute, and the tendency of the courts 
is to accord them ever-increasing respect. But they are not 
blindly accepted, and their persuasiveness or putative legal 
effect varies in accordance with several factors. It is said that 
such regulations may be considered only where the statute 
is ambiguous.8 Granting the ambiguity of the statute, the 
weight accorded the interpretative regulation depends in 
part on circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness. If the regu-
lation is new,9 does not represent long administrative ex-
perience/0 and has not been generally acquiesced in,11 it is 
accorded but little more weight than is granted to a well-
written brief. On the other hand, where it appears that the 
agency's construction of a statute as exemplified in an inter-
pretative rule or regulation represents expert knowledge 
8 Biddle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30Z u. s. 573> s8 s. Ct. 379 
(1938); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, z8z U.S. 740, 51 S. Ct. Z97 
( 193 I); Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, z98 U. S. 
441, 56 s. Ct. 767 (1936). 
9Walling v. Swift & Co. (C.C.A. 7th 194z), 131 F. (zd) z49; Burnet v. 
Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. I, 52. S. Ct. Z75 (1932.). 
lO United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 2.81 (1939); Fleming 
v. A. H. Belo Corp. (C.C.A. sth 1941), 12.1 F. (zd) 207. 
11 United States v. Erie R. Co., 236 U.S. 2.59, 35 S. Ct. 396 (1915). 
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as to administrative needs and convenience/2 and where it 
appears that the rule is of long standing and has received 
the acquiescence of interested persons/3 then, so long as the 
administrative interpretation is reasonable, it is given great 
and often controlling weight.14 
There are sometimes found affirmative legislative indica-
tions of approval of the administrative construction-and 
this of course further inclines the courts to accept and enforce 
the regulation.15 In come cases, as in those last cited, such 
indication of legislative approval is realistic. In many other 
instances, decision is placed on the theory (which however 
fallacious logically, is a well-established legal fiction) that 
re-enactment of the statutory provision without change sub-
sequent to the promulgation of the regulation indicates 
legislative approval of the regulation.16 But recognizing that 
legislative re-enactment is often accomplished without the 
existence of the regulation in question ever having been 
brought to the attention of the legislature, the courts do 
not hesitate to set aside an interpretative regulation deemed 
to be inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the 
statute, despite the re-enactment of the statute without 
change subsequent to the promulgation of the regulation.17 
12 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39, 6o 
S. Ct. 51 (1939); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 
77,53 S. Ct. 42 (1932). 
13 United States v. Chicago, N. S. & M. R. Co., 288 U. S. t, 53 S. Ct. 245 
(1933); Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 34 S. Ct. 685 (1914). 
14 Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144 
(1931); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 1 53 S. Ct. 152 (1932). 
15 Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 256, 54 S. Ct. 159 
(1933); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 51 S. Ct. 510 
(1931). 
16 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 
59 S. Ct. 45 (1938); Hartley, Executor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
295 U.S. 2.16, 55 S. Ct. 756 (1935). 
17 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39, 6o 
S. Ct. 51 (1939); compare Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 6oS. Ct. 18 (1939); and Helvering, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Hallock, 309 U.S. to6, 6oS. Ct. 444 ( 194o). 
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The doctrine is fundamentally one of convenience and must 
sometimes be disregarded-as where a complaisant legis-
lature had thus "ratified" one interpretation on several 
occasions, and then without hesitation proceeded to "ratify" 
similarly a new and different interpretation, by again re-
enacting the statute without change after a change in the 
administrative interpretation.18 
In the case of interpretative regulations, then (and in this 
may be included all regulations other than those wherein 
the legislature has plainly delegated authority to prescribe 
legislative regulations, subject to a stated standard, and the 
violation of which is made subject to definite statutory 
sanctions), the substantive requirements of the regulation 
are considered as interpretations of the substantive require-
ments of the statute. So long as they represent an interpre-
tation or construction of the statute which is acceptable to 
the courts, they have the force of law. But they lose all 
. force and effect, ab initio, if held to be an incorrect inter-
pretation, and are subject to judicial scrutiny on more issues 
than are true legislative regulations. Being vulnerable to 
attack on more grounds than are legislative regulations, 
interpretative regulations are more likely to be set aside than 
are those of the former type. This, essentially, is the dif-
ference in legal effect between legislative and interpretative 
regulations setting forth substantive requirements. 
3· Status of Procedural Regulations 
There is, of course, no question as to the power of an 
administrative agency to make rules of procedure to govern 
the normal conduct of the agency's tasks, subject always to 
18 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 306 U.S. IIo, 59 S. Ct. 42.3 (1939). 
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the condition that such rules cannot limit, extend, or other-
wise control the agency's statutory jurisdiction and powers.19 
The question as to the legal effect of such rules is not 
often raised. They are designed to control the process of 
adjudication within the agency; and parties to the proceed-
ings within the agency ordinarily conform to the require-
ments of such rules for the obvious reason that the prospects 
of obtaining a desired result within the agency are jeopard-
ized by nonconformance with its procedural rules. The rules 
are not ordinarily burdensome, but typically are loosely 
drawn; and substantial conformity therewith is all that is 
required. 
While it is frequently said that rules of practice, pleading, 
procedure, and evidence promulgated by an administrative 
agency under proper legal authorization have the force and 
effect of law,20 this is true in a limited degree only. Such 
regulations do not ordinarily affect or attempt to control 
the substantive rights of the parties; and indeed for this 
very reason are not ordinarily subject to judicial review.21 
Noncompliance with such procedural regulations does not 
ordinarily constitute a violation of the controlling statute.22 
While a party might in some cases be denied relief by the 
agency solely because of his disregard of its procedural 
rules, ordinarily substantial compliance therewith is all that 
is insisted upon. It would ill become administrative agencies, 
created in part for the purpose of avoiding the technicalities 
19 Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co. (App. 
D. C. 1929), 37 F. (2d) 442; Weaver v. Blair (C.C.A. 3d 1927), I9 F. (2d) 
I6. 
20 See Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 25 I U. S. 342, 349, 40 S. Ct. 
I 55 (I 920) ; Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion (App. D. C. I938), 98 F. (2d) 282. 
2l Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App. D. C. 
I938), 99 F. (2d) 399; Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 304 U.S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963 (I938). 
22 Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. International Milling Co. (C.C.A. 8th I93o), 
43 F. (2d) 93; United States v. Eaton, I44 U.S. 677, I2 S. Ct. 764 (I892). 
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of court procedure, to insist on any rigid formalities in their 
own practice; and it would seem that any overly strict in-
sistence on procedural niceties which operated to deprive a 
party of a full and fair hearing would not be permitted, 
but could be corrected by application to the courts. 
4· Criminal Penalties for Violation of Rules 
The reluctance of the courts to permit the delegation of 
any extensive responsibilities to administrative agencies in 
the field of criminal law, has led to the imposition of strin-
gent restrictions on the power of administrative agencies 
to promulgate regulations whose violation carries criminal 
sanctions. 
While an agency may be empowered, in cases where a 
plain need for such delegation exists, to prescribe by regula-
tion the particular acts which will constitute violations of a 
generally phrased statute that creates the crime and fixes 
the penalty,23 agencies have not generally been permitted to 
adopt rules creating crimes or fixing penalties.24 
The reluctance of the courts to grant legal status to 
administrative rules carrying criminal sanctions is exemplified 
by the cases denying legal effect to traffic rules, governing 
the use of public streets, when prescribed by an administra-
tive agency rather than by a municipal governing body.211 
This extreme view is not universally shared,26 and it is diffi-
23 Yakus v. United States, 3Z 1 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 66o ( 1944) 1 United 
States v. Grimaud, z2o U.S. 506,31 S. Ct. 480 (1911)1 In re Kollock, 165 
U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444 ( 1897); Musgrove v. Parker, 84 N. H. 550, 153 Atl. 
320 (1931); Howard v. State, 154 Ark. 430, 242 S. W. 818 (1922) 1 People 
v. Soule, 238 Mich. 130, 213 N. W. 195 (1927). 
24 United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 ( 1892) 1 United 
States v. Maid (D. C. Cal. 1902), 116 Fed. 65o; People v. Grant, z4z App. 
Div. 31o, 275 N.Y. S. 74 (1934). 
25 E.g., City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 ( 1925) 1 
Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa 98, 251 N. W. 39 (1933). 
26 See Smallwood v. District of Columbia (App. D. C. 1927), 17 F. (2d) 
210; Hamann v. Lawrence, 354 Ill. 197, 188 N. E. 333 (1933). 
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cult to explain on logical grounds the reason for denying 
legal effectiveness to administrative rules carrying criminal 
penalties, although similar rules carrying civil penalties may 
be sustained.27 The explanation must lie in an inherent con-
viction on the part of the courts that it is unwise to grant 
broad powers over civil liberties to agency officials who are 
subject to political pressures and are immune from the direct 
control of the electorate. 
Disregard of an administrative regulation that carries 
penal sanctions may involve consequences of civilliability.28 
Similarly, a contract made in contravention of such a crim-
inally-sanctioned administrative rule may be unenforceable 
as against public policy.29 
5. Effect of Reliance on Regulations and Problems of 
Retroactive Application 
If a person challenges the validity of a regulation-
either on the grounds that a legislative regulation is ultra 
vires or that an interpretative regulation is based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the statute-he is not without 
remedies to obtain a judicial determination of the correct-
ness of his position. But it is not the ordinary case where 
a person affected by a regulation will choose to pursue this 
course. As to the vast majority of persons affected by a 
regulation, common prudence will require that he conform 
to the requirements of the regulation. If he does so, and 
the regulation is later held invalid, or is subsequently 
changed by the administrative agency, then what is his 
position? 
If the regulation on which he relied is held invalid, it 
would seem he is in substantially the same position as one 
27 E.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S. E. 665 (1909). 
28 See Clarence Morris, "The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liabili-
ty," 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1933). 
29 See Walter Gellhorn, "Contracts and Public Policy," 35 CoL. L. REV. 679, 
696 (1935). 
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relying on an unconstitutional statute, or an erroneous opin-
ion of counsel. 
If the regulation is changed, his position is but little 
better. 
If it is a legislative regulation, it is normally competent 
for the agency to amend its regulation, just as it is proper 
for a legislature to amend a statute; and there is normally 
nothing to prevent the amended regulation being applied in 
situations where it has retroactive effects. Ordinarily, admin-
istrative discretion is exercised in favor of preventing any 
harsh results from such retroactive application; and some-
times the statute makes particular provisions to this end. 
Occasionally, an agency is deemed to be estopped from apply-
ing retroactively an amended regulation or legislative deter-
mination.30 But unless protection is provided in one of these 
particular methods, an individual who acted in re,liance on 
the regulation may be substantially prejudiced by an amend-
ment thereto. 
When the regulation is interpretative, there is again no 
particular ground for denying the agency the power to 
change its interpretation. The doctrine of legislative "rati-
fication" through re-enactment without change is not pressed 
to the logical extreme of concluding that such re-enactment 
freezes the interpretation, which becomes thereby a part 
of the law and incapable of change by the administrative 
agency. Agencies have on occasion taken the position that 
a new interpretative regulation, rather than the superseded 
one on which the individual relied, should be applied retro-
actively to a closed transaction.31 
30 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 52 
S. Ct. 183 (1932). 
31 C/., Lang v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 304 U. S. 264, 58 S. Ct. 
88o ( 1938); Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 297 u. s. IZ9, s6 s. Ct. 397 ( 1936). 
RULE MAKING 
While the courts have indicated disapproval of the retro-
active application of regulations,82 there is but scant author-
ity for denying the agency power to insist on a retroactive 
application. In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.83 
it was held that after an interpretative regulation had been 
"ratified" by legislative re-enactment, and was otherwise 
valid, a new and different interpretative regulation could 
not be retroactively applied to the prejudice of an individual 
who had relied on the former interpretation. Broad exten-
sion of this principle would seem desirable. 
The legislatures have in some measure met the situation. 
In several federal statutes, for example, protection is spe-
cifically provided for persons relying on the regulations of 
an agency, even though such regulations be later superseded 
or invalidated.84 
6. Agen~y Disregard for or Suspension of Rules 
Questions arising in connection with the disregard by 
administrative agencies of their self-imposed rules 811 are no 
more than another manifestation of the ever-present prob-
lem of reaching a fair and workable compromise between 
the administrator's demand for extreme fluidity (permitting 
expeditious disposal of the agency's business) and the re-
spondent's demand for static regularity (permitting him to 
ascertain in advance of administrative determination what his 
rights are and how they can be asserted). The administrator 
would be glad to have the privilege of refusing to follow a 
rule whenever, in the interest of achieving a particular result, 
it would be convenient to disregard it. Opposing counsel 
32 Miller v. United States, 294 U. S. 435, 55 S. Ct. 440 (1935); United 
States v. Davis, 132 U.S. 334, 10 S. Ct. 105 (1889). 
33 306 U.S. 11o, 59 S. Ct. 423 (1939). 
84 E.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23; so U.S.C. App. 
§ 901; Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 908; 15 U.S.C. § 78; 
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, Ch. 52; 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 251. 
35 Related questions are discussed supra, Ch. 8, p. 167, in connection with 
the procedural requirements of a fair trial. 
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would be equally delighted with a rule that any disregard by 
an agency of any of its rules, at any time and under any cir-
cumstances, would be a basis for invalidating the agency's 
determination. 
The problem arises chiefly in connection with procedural 
rules. Rules of substance-whether legislative or interpreta-
tive-are either followed or changed. They cannot very well 
be simply disregarded or overlooked. But in the case of 
procedural rules, it is often expeditious for an agency simply 
to ignore a certain rule in some particular case and adopt 
therein a different procedure than that contemplated by the 
agency's rules. 
The parties may waive compliance with the rules, and if 
the waiver is made voluntarily, with full knowledge of the 
situation, no difficulty arises.36 Similarly, there can be no 
doubt as to the right to disregard minutiae of procedure in 
a particular case where to do so is necessary to reach a just 
result.37 While not quite so clear, it seems that if it can be 
shown that a particular rule was established solely for the 
agency's own convenience, it may be waived by the agency.88 
At the opposite extreme, it is clear that an agency will 
not be permitted to adopt a special rule of procedure for 
the sole purpose of affecting the outcome of a particular 
case, or (with a conscious desire toward this end) willfully 
to ignore a rule in some particular case.89 
36Cf., Zigelhofer v. Reynolds, 5:1. L. D. 38 (19:1.7), where the Department 
of the Interior gave relief to. a party who had been misled by a representative 
of the Department as to its rules of practice. 
37 Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co. (App. 
D. C. 19:1.9), 37 F. (zd) 442.; Gillis v. Public Service Commission, 105 Pa. 
Super. 3891 161 Atl. 563 (1937.). 
38 System Federation No. 6, et al. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 2. N. R. 
A. B. 178 (1937); In the Matter of Emil Denemar~, Inc., 2. F. C. C. 474 
(1936); cf., Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 
6th 1940), 133 F. (zd) 38. 
39 Colyer v. Skeffington (D. C. Mass. 192.0), 2.65 Fed. 17, 47, rev'd on 
other points in Skeffington v. Katzeff (C.C.A. ut 19:1.2.), 2.77 Fed. u9; 
People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, IIO Misc. 5191 180 N.Y. S • .554 (192.0), aff'd 
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Between these two extremes is a broad field where there 
is room to debate the wisdom and fairness of a disregard 
of procedural rules in a particular case, and where it is 
somewhat a matter of conjecture whether such disregard 
has affected private rights. 
If it fairly appears that some prejudice might likely have 
resulted from such disregard of established rules, or that 
the departure caused great inconvenience to the parties or 
took them unfairly by surprise, the .courts quite readily set 
aside the administrative determination. Particularly is this 
true where the rule was established to protect the interests 
of the parties appearing before the agency.40 
In many cases there appears a strong tendency to set aside 
administrative determinations because of a disregard of the 
agency's established procedural rules, even though there is 
no showing as to the likelihood that prejudice or serious 
inconvenience resulted. The dictum in Bilokumsky v. Tad 41 
that "one under investigation . . . · is legally entitled to 
insist upon the observance of rules promulgated by the Sec-
retary pursuant to law" has been applied quite literally. For 
example, in Sibray v. United States 42 in releasing an alien 
detained in connection with deportation proceedings because 
of the Department's nonobservance of its procedural rule, 
the court declared "It is not within our province to specu-
late in any particular case what effect the disregard of those 
rules might or might not have." 43 
194 App. Div. 9z1, 184 N.Y. S. 943 (19zo). For an interesting example of 
an agency's voluntary adherence to this principle, see In the Matter of Consum-
ers Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444 ( 1939). 
40 United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins (C.C.A. zd 1935), 79 F. (zd) 533; 
Erie R. Co. v. City of Paterson, 79 N.J. L. 5n, 76 Atl. 1065 (1910); Mah 
Shee v. White (C.C.A. 9th 1917), zp Fed. 868; Ex parte Radivoeff (D. C. 
Mont. 19zz), :t78 Fed. zz7. 
41 :t63 u.s. 149> xss, 44 s. Ct. 54 (19:t3). 
42 (C.C.A. 3d 19u), z8z Fed. 795, 798. 
43 And see United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v. Dunton (D. C. N. Y. 
1923), z88 Fed. 959· 
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But if it can be fairly shown that the failure to follow 
the agency's rules did not affect the result of the case, the 
failure may be excused. Thus, the same court which in United 
States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins 44 set aside a deportation 
order because, in violation of departmental rules, one exam-
iner had heard the testimony and another had submitted 
findings thereon, held in another alienage case that receipt 
of a doctor's report not prepared in conformity with the 
departmental rules was not fatal to the validity of the pro-
ceeding, where there was other evidence in the record which 
would justify the order.45 In other cases, a plainly immate-
rial disregard of procedural rules or practices has been per-
mitted.46 
The general approach of the courts to the problem, then, 
is that an agency desiring to change its procedural rules 
should do so in advance of the institution of proceedings in 
any case where the changed rules are to be followed. Dis-
regard of established rules is ordinarily fatal, unless the 
agency can show a voluntary waiver of the rule, or can 
show that the disregard was necessary in order to reach a 
fair result and did not prejudice the rights of private par-
ties, or that the rule was one adopted solely for the con-
venience of the agency and which the respondent had no 
right to rely on, or that the disregard did not affect the 
outcome of the case. 
In deciding whether an agency has sustained this burden, 
courts are not unmindful that too rigid an application of 
the doctrine prohibiting disregard of procedural rules would 
encourage the tendency of some agencies to proceed almost 
44 (C.C.A. 2d 1935), 79 F. (2d) 533· 
45 United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (zd) 
166. 
46 E.g., Baitinger Elec. Co. v. Forbes, 170 Misc. 589, 10 N.Y. S. (zd) 924 
(1939). 
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without rules. The doctrine should not be pressed so far as 
to induce agencies to adopt the protective device of promul-
gating procedural rules so vague in nature as to make it 
impossible to show a violation of the rules. Such application 
of the doctrine would defeat its purpose, which is to guar-
antee that standards of administrative procedure should be 
equally as fair as those of court procedure. 
CHAPTER 15 
Validity of Rules and Regulations 
I. Logical Criteria 
LOGICALLY, the questions to be examined by the courts, in determining the validity of a rule or regu-lation adopted by an administrative agency, should 
depend on the type of regulation involved. In the case of 
a legislative regulation (i.e., one promulgated pursuant to 
a delegation of legislative power, the violation of which 
involves statutory sanctions) the queries would be: first, 
whether the regulation related to the subject matter on 
which power to legislate had been delegated; second, 
whether the regulation conformed to the standards pre-
scribed in the delegatory statute; and third, whether the 
regulation was invalid on constitutional grounds, such as due 
process. The approach should be somewhat different, from a 
purely logical viewpoint, when an interpretative regulation 
is challenged. In such cases, the inquiry would be funda-
mentally a question as to whether the ruling correctly in-
terpreted the statute, and involved with this issue would 
be a question as to whether the challenged ruling amounted 
to an attempt to exercise legislative powers which had not 
been delegated. If this were the case, the ruling involved 
would be held invalid as going beyond the sphere of in-
terpretation and into that of legislation. 
But in a field so surcharged with delicate questions of 
policy, and the balancing of competing claims and divergent 
governmental theories, the law cannot live on logic. The 
approach must be realistically pragmatic. While the decisions 
are ordinarily couched in maxims that set forth general 
"tests" as to the validity of regulations, yet these formal 
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criteria often express the result of a judgment rather than 
the means by which that judgment was reached. In inter-
preting and evaluating the decisions, the circumstances under 
which the rule was announced require as careful considera-
tion as the rule itself. The general rules laid down in the 
decisions, like the maxims of equity, are not to be overlooked 
but still are not to be taken as touchstones to the decision 
of any particular case. 
These general rules for the most part do not specifically 
recognize the distinction which logically should be made 
between legislative regulations and interpretative regula-
tions. This is in part due to the traditional reluctance of 
many courts to admit that legislative functions may be del-
egated-any type of agency lawmaking is said, euphemis-
tically, to be merely "administrative"-and is in part a result 
of the difficulty of differentiating between legislative and 
interpretative regulations. In many cases, where an agency 
has been granted some legislative powers, it is often a matter 
of conjecture whether a particular regulation was intended 
to be an exercise of such delegated legislative authority or 
merely an exercise of the agency's broad implicit power to 
interpret, for purposes of its administrative activity, the stat-
ute under which it operates. However, despite the lack of 
formal acknowledgment of the fundamental difference be-
tween legislative and interpretative regulations, there is a 
practical recognition of this difference running through the 
cases.1 A dictum or general rule laid down by the court in 
a case dealing with an interpretative regulation will often 
receive but lip service in a case involving a legislative regula-
tion. The fundamental logical difference between these two 
types of rules or regulations must therefore be borne in 
1 There are, however, some cases where a seemingly illogical result was 
reached by treating as legislative an interpretative regulation, or vice versa. F. 
P. Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," 29 GEO. L. J. 1 (1940). 
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mind in examining the general rules as laid down by the 
courts. 
2. General Tests of Validity 
(a) Exceeding authority conferred. It is often said that 
a regulation is invalid if it exceeds the authority conferred 
by statute. This truism affords but a limited source of guid-
ance, for of course the difficult question, always, is the deter-
mination of the outermost limits of the delegated authority. 
The rule has but little independent force except in cases 
where a power has been delegated to make legislative rules 
within a plainly limited sphere and subject to defined stand-
ards, and where the rule adopted exceeds this sphere or is 
contrary to the standards.2 The rule may also be applied to 
cases where there has been no delegation of legislative power, 
and where a regulation issued as an administrative interpre-
tation of the statute is found to go beyond the sphere of 
interpretation and into the forbidden realm of legislative 
regulation.3 In other types of cases, this general criterion is 
merely the characterization of a result arrived at by some 
more specific course of reasoning. 
(b) Conflict with statute. In many cases, the conclusion 
that a regulation is invalid as exceeding the authority con-
ferred on the agency by statute is premised on the fact that 
there is a conflict between the challenged rule or regulation, 
on the one side, and, on the other, provisions of the govern-
ing statute or the standard laid down therein as a guide to 
the exercise of the agency's rule-making powers. A good 
example of the application of this general principle to a 
legislative regulation is Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod-
2 E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 27 S. Ct. 153 
(1906). 
S E.g., Work, Secretary of the Interior v. United States ex rel. Mosier, 261 
U.S. 352, 43 S. Ct. 389 (1923). 
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ucts, Inc./ where power had been delegated to an agency to 
define the "area of production" within a statutory provision 
exempting from the requirement of certain overtime wage 
payments individuals employed in the "area of production" 
in the canning or packing of agricultural commodities. Under 
the statute, the administrator was given legislative power to 
define the "area of production"; and he adopted a definition 
which excluded from the exemption canneries which em-
ployed more than a certain number of persons. Here, the 
general standard as laid down by Congress related to the 
geographical contiguity between the cannery and the growing 
areas; and the administrative agency's regulation was based 
on a policy completely at odds with this standard. 
In cases where an interpretative regulation is thus in 
conflict with the court's interpretation of the statute, the 
conclusion of invalidity could be premised, in succinct terms, 
on the basis that the agency's interpretation of the legal 
meaning of the statute was wrong. Where this is so, the 
courts frequently invalidate an erroneous agency interpre-
tation by saying that the regulation in question is invalid as 
being in conflict with the statute. Thus in Helvering, Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Sabine Transportation Co./ 
the court declared in setting aside the challenged regulations 
that they "in the teeth of the unambiguous mandate of the 
statute, are contradictory of its plain terms." 6 
(c) Extending or modifying statute. In some cases, the 
conflict between the regulation and the statute appears be-
cause the regulation seeks to extend or modify the statute. 
4 pz U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. u 15 ( 1944). 
l5 318 u.s. 306, 311-JIZ, 63 s. Ct. 569 (1943). 
6 For similar cases, see M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. z67, 59 
S. Ct. 186 (1938); Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
2.98 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767 (1936); Watts v. United States (C.C.A. zd 
1936), 8z F. (zd) 266; United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S. 
21o, 40 S. Ct. 139 (192o). 
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The cases above discussed 7 as typical of the trend of many 
agencies to extend beyond allowable limits the policy of the 
governing statute, present examples of regulations held in-
valid on this ground. In many instances, interpretative regu-
lations which carry interpretation to a point of legislation, 
have been thus held invalid. As the court said in Merritt v. 
Welsh,8 "If experience shows that Congress acted under a 
mistaken impression, that does not authorize the Treasury 
Department . . . to make new laws which they imagine 
Congress would have made had it been properly informed." 
This principle has been applied frequently. Thus, where a 
statute permitted duty-free importation of animals brought 
into this country for breeding purposes, and the customs 
officials undertook by regulation to limit the privilege to 
cases where the animals were of superior stock, adapted to 
improving the breed, this regulatory modification of the 
governing statute was held invalid.9 A similar result was 
reached where a statutory authorization permitting the cut-
ting of timber on public lands for "domestic uses," was 
sought to be limited by regulations so as to exclude the 
cutting of timber for certain domestic purposes deemed un-
desirable; 10 and again where an agency attempted by a 
general regulation to revoke outstanding permits without 
recourse to the statutory proceedings prescribed as a condi-
tion of the revocation of permits.11 Not infrequently, regula-
tions under the internal revenue laws have been held invalid 
as being attempts to add supplementary legislative provi-
7 Ch. 12, ns. 18-32. 
8 Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 704 (1881). 
9 Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 1 S. Ct. 423 (1883). 
10 United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 25 S. Ct. 2U 
(1905). 
11 Campbell, Federal Prohibition Administrator v. Galeno Chemical Co., 2.81 
U.S. 599, so S. Ct. 412 (1930). 
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sions.12 A regulation improperly restricting or narrowing a 
statute, or an agency's jurisdiction thereunder, would sim-
ilarly be invalid.18 
(d) No reasonable relationship to statutory purpose. In 
some cases the general policy of the regulation seems un-
related to the general policy of the statute, but neither 
direct conflict with the statute nor any clear extension of the 
statutory command can be shown. In such cases, at least if 
convinced that the challenged regulation produces burden-
some and inequitable results, the courts may set it aside as 
bearing no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the 
governing statute and producing a result which is out of 
harmony with the statute and hence unreasonable.14 For ex-
ample, where a statute authorized a state agency to make 
certain regulations to prevent a waste of oil reserves, and it 
was shown that certain proration orders issued under such 
authority were not effective to prevent waste but did produce 
untoward effects in compelling pipe-line owners to furnish 
a market to producers who had no pipe lines, the regulation 
was held invalid on these broad grounds.15 On a similar 
basis, regulations which attempt too rigidly to limit the 
degree of proof which will be required in various adminis-
trative proceedings, or to impose arbitrary tests where the 
statutory requirement is more flexible, may be held invalid.16 
Again, a regulation is said to have no reasonable relationship 
12 E.g., Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Credit Alliance 
Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 6z S. Ct. 989 (1942); Taft v. Helvering, Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 195,61 S. Ct. 244 (1940). 
13 Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 253 U. S. 117, 40 S. Ct. 466 
(1920). 
14 For statements of the rule, see dicta in Manhattan General Equipment Co. 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397 (1936); 
Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144 (1931), 
15 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 57 S. Ct. 364 
(1937). 
16 United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 33 S. Ct. 412 (1913); Lynch, 
Executrix v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 44 S. Ct. 488 ( 1924); Miller 
v. United States, 294 U. S. 435, 55 S. Ct. 440 (1935). 
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to the statute when it attempts to include what had, by 
apparent inadvertency, been omitted by the statute from the 
legislative scheme.17 
(e) Unreasonable and arbitrary regulations; violation of 
due process. Where excess of authority cannot be predicated 
on the grounds that a regulation is in conflict with the statute, 
or improperly extends or modifies the statute, or has no 
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute (all of 
these being obviously closely related grounds), then a con-
clusion of invalidity must ordinarily be premised on the 
grounds that the challenged regulation is so unreasonable 
and arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. 
As it is sometimes put, the regulation is invalid if it goes 
beyond what the legislature could authorize.18 If the regula-
tion, had it been enacted as a statute by the legislature, would 
have been held unconstitutional on any of the grounds on 
which statutory enactments may be attacked, then the regula-
tion must fall. A regulation which amounts to a deprival of 
property without due process/9 or is unreasonably discrim-
inatory 20 may be set aside on this basis. Or the coUJ;t may by 
judicial construction limit the scope of a regulation on the 
grounds that it would be invalid unless so limited.21 
3· Factors Underlying Decision 
These general tests offer at best a basis for argument as to 
the validity or invalidity of a challenged regulation. Does the 
regulation conflict with the statute by altering its meaning; or 
17 Iselin v. United States, 2.70 U.S. 2.45, 46 S. Ct. 2.48 (192.6). 
18 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 2.43 U. S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387 
(1917). 
19 International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. so6, 42. S. Ct. 179 (1922). 
20 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 2.84 U. S. 8o, 52 S. Ct. 87 
(1931). 
21 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117,46 S. Ct. 
2.15 ( 192.6); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 32.7 U. S. 614, 66 S. Ct. 
705 (1946). 
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does it merely interpret and clarify an ambiguous statutory 
phrase? This question cannot be answered on a rhetorical 
basis; it often involves subtle judgments on deep-seated 
policy questions. Does the regulation "extend" the statute, 
or does it merely specify an application of the general legis-
lative purpose which was implicit in the general language 
used by the legislature? This inquiry likewise is not purely 
logical; the answer depends largely on a judgment as to 
how broad a discretion should be vested in administrative 
agencies to implement vague statutory language. Is there a 
reasonable relationship between the terms of the regulation 
and the general statutory purpose? Appraisals of reasonable-
ness are never based on logic. 
In all but the plainest cases, the application of these gen-
eral tests is at best highly debatable. The general tests do 
little more than define the actual issue which must be argued. 
Decision of this issue is to a large extent dependent on the 
particular factual details and social implications of each case. 
But there are some basic points of view which are ordinarily 
followed. 
Implicit in many of the decisions cited above is a recog-
nition of the doctrine that the scope of a particular agency's 
regulatory power must be determined by the character of 
the statute involved, and by the consequent practical need 
for giving a large degree of freedom of action to the admin-
istrative authorities. This principle was clearly enunciated in 
United States v. A ntikamnia Chemical Company. 22 
The statute involved in that case required that medicinal 
preparations should bear a label stating "the quantity or 
proportion of . . . acetanilid, or any derivative or prepa-
ration of any such substances CQntained therein." The manu-
facturer of certain pills which contained acetphenetidin, a 
derivative of acetanilid, marketed them with a label which 
22 231 U.S. 654, 662, 666, 34 S. Ct. 222 (1914). 
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stated the quantity and proportion of acetphenetidin con-
tained. The manufacturer claimed that this constituted com-
pliance with the statute, and that a regulation which further 
required him to specify on the label that the acetphenetidin 
was a derivative of acetanilid was invalid as extending the 
statutory requirement. The issue therefore was whether or 
not the regulation added to the law in providing that the 
label must state not only the name of the derivative (which 
the statute required) but also the name of the substance from 
which it was derived (as to which the statute was silent). In 
holding the regulation valid, the court pointed out that the 
purpose of the law was to warn the public of the presence 
of deleterious drugs in medicinal preparations; that a state-
ment of the name of the derivative unaccompanied by an 
explanation of the substance from which it was derived 
would not accomplish this purpose, because while the public 
generally had some notion of the possible deleterious effects 
of acetanilid and would be warned by information that the 
medicine contained a derivative of acetanilid, yet the con-
sumer would not be so warned if the label stated merely 
the name of the derivative and did not explain that it was 
a derivative of acetanilid. The extent of an agency's regula-
tory power, said the court "must be determined by the pur-
pose of the Act and the difficulties its execution might en-
counter." 
This practical doctrine of expediency is, then, a funda-
mental factor underlying judicial determination of the 
validity of administrative rules and regulations. Where the 
purpose of the statute is to vest broad discretionary powers 
in an agency, and where successful execution of the agency's 
task of administration so requires, a broad measure of auton-
omy will be accorded the agency; and there will be a tend-
ency to view its regulations as in harmony with the statute 
and reasonable. Where, on the other hand, the statute does 
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not disclose a purpose of any such broad grant of power to 
the agency, and where no need can be readily seen for the 
extensive implementation of the statute through the medium 
of regulations, the courts will be more ready to discover a 
conflict between the statute and the regulation, or to hold 
that the regulation attempts to enlarge the statute, or is 
unreasonable. 
A second factor is essentially historical. During the decade 
of I9JD-I940, roughly, there developed (particularly in the 
federal courts, although the same trend can be seen in the 
decisions of many state courts) a much more wholehearted 
acceptance of administrative tribunals as respected and inde-
pendent agencies of justice than had theretofore generally 
existed. This recognition of agencies as an integral part of 
the judicial system has led the courts to accord a more hos-
pitable reception to challenged administrative regulations. 
Regulations which might have been held invalid in an earlier 
era are now likely to be upheld. 
These two factors are interrelated. Recent statutes often 
pertain to fields of social control wherein the need for 
administrative discretion is obvious; and in such cases of 
course it is customary for the statute to lay down only 
broad standards, leaving significant details to be worked out 
through administrative rules and regulations of the agencies. 
Given this type of statute, and a judicial atmosphere of 
friendliness to the theory of administrative regulation, a 
challenged rule or regulation is quite likely to be held valid, 
unless plainly at odds with the statute or subject to clear 
constitutional infirmities. 
The practical effect of these two factors can be seen by 
examining variant case situations. 
Where a statute creates or recognizes private rights, and 
the purpose or effect of the regulation is to limit or restrict 
such rights, the courts were strongly inclined, until a few 
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years ago at least, to find the regulations invalid.23 This atti-
tude is still seen in the cases, but its rigor is considerably 
diminished, as may be illustrated by National Broadcasting 
Co., Inc. v. United States,24 where the court in holding valid 
regulations which put many restrictions on the rights of radio 
broadcasting companies to effect intercompany affiliations, 
disposed of the claim that the regulations were arbitrary by 
saying that it did not have the technical competence to pass 
upon the wisdom of the regulations.25 
Regulations promulgated by agencies whose task is the 
conduct of public business have always received a more 
kindly reception than those that control or regulate the 
carrying on of private business, for in such fields as the 
preservation of public health, the administration of the postal 
system, and the regulation of the currency, the courts have 
long been ready to concede the need for broad administrative 
discretion. As the philosophy of committing broad powers 
to administrative agencies in the regulation of private busi-
ness is coming to gain wider acceptance, this differentiation 
is becoming less noticeable. 
The field of tax regulations could be made a separate 
study, so great are the number of cases passing on the validity 
of regulations issued under taxing statutes. For many years, 
it was in this field particularly that the courts were likely 
to hold regulations invalid. Any attempt to enlarge ever so 
minutely the plain requirement of the statute was held in-
valid. Partly this represented the philosophy that ambiguities 
23 E.g., Campbell, Federal Prohibition Administrator v. Galeno Chemical 
Co., et al., 281 U.S. 599, 50S. Ct. 412 (1930); Goldsmith v. United States 
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 46 S. Ct. 215 (1926). 
24 319 U.S. 19o, 63 S. Ct. 997 (1943). 
25 With this decision may be compared the opinion in the earlier case of 
Waite et al. v. Macy et al., 246 U.S. 6o6, 6o8-6o9, 38 S. Ct. 395 (1918), 
where the court in invalidating regulations which would have excluded certain 
types of tea from import, said, "No doubt it is true that this Court cannot 
displace the judgment of the board in any matter within its jurisdiction, but it 
is equally true that the board cannot enlarge the powers given to it by statute.'' 
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in taxing statutes should be construed in favor of the tax-
payer; and partly it resulted from the fact that the courts 
could see no need for relying on administrative discretion in 
this field. Tax statutes involved typical legalistic problems; 
and there was little in the nature of the problems involved 
to lead the courts to defer to the expert knowledge of an 
administrative body. But as the complexity and technicality 
of tax statutes has developed to a point where the study of 
them is almost a separate science, and as the style of drafts-
manship of the tax statutes has changed so that the question 
of taxability often depends on a matter of technical judgment 
rather than on a juristic interpretation of legalistic language, 
there has been a corresponding change in the attitude of 
the courts.26 
But despite the hospitable reception which the courts now 
give challenged rules of administrative agencies, and despite 
the fact that statutes are now frequently so drawn as to make 
it clear that a wide measure of discretion must be allowed in 
the making of implemental regulations, still a regulation 
cannot stand which is plainly at odds with the legislative 
purpose, or plainly involves a usurpation of power, or is 
indubitably arbitrary and unreasonable. 





Availability and General Functions 
of Judicial Review 
FOR a long time, it was believed by many that the courts should exercise a general superintending control over the actions of administrative agencies, and that the 
processes of judicial review should be relied on to correct 
any errors of administration. For various reasons, this has 
proved impractical, and it has become generally recognized 
that the function of the courts, in reviewing administrative 
determinations, must be for the most part limited to such 
matters as (I) checking excessive assumptions of power by 
the executive; (2) speaking the final word on important 
questions of statutory interpretation; (3) requiring fair pro-
cedure in administrative action; and (4) invalidating arbi-
trary or capricious administrative action. While the scope and 
effectiveness of judicial review vary widely in different case 
situations, so as to preclude the drawing of any categorical 
conclusions as to the purposes it may properly serve, yet the 
general trend of court decisions (except in cases where a 
statute prescribes a broad review) is in the direction of 
reducing the scope of review. 
I. Practical Difficulties Limiting Effectiveness of Judicial 
Review 
There are many purely practical considerations which limit 
the availability of judicial review as a general corrective for 
allegedly erroneous administrative action. In the first place, 
the number of administrative adjudications is so great as 
to preclude the possibility of court review in more than a 
small percentage of the cases decided. In the vast majority 
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of cases, the administrative determination must be the final 
one. Further, the expense incident to perfecting an appeal 
and obtaining judicial review is such that in many cases the 
parties cannot afford to take the case into court. 
In certain types of cases, the delay involved in judicial 
review is a determining factor. Business transactions cannot 
always await the final outcome of time-consuming appellate 
procedures. In the fields of trade and finance, the situation 
which gave rise to the administrative order will often have 
been so changed during the course of six months or a year 
that the questions involved would have become moot before 
the court could pass judgment on the case. Then, too, the 
effect of administrative action cannot always be erased by 
a subsequent judicial reversal of the agency's determination. 
A stop order by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
for example, or even a threat that such an order might be 
issued, effectively kills a proposed offering of securities; and 
a subsequent judicial determination that the order was im-
properly entered would never resurrect the deal. 
Perhaps most important of the practical limitations on 
judicial review as a corrective device is the plain fact that 
the minutiae of a case cannot ordinarily be brought to the 
attention of the reviewing court. The records are so long, 
the factual situations so complex and technical, and the time 
available for argument so short, that it is impossible for the 
reviewing court to get more than the high lights of the ques-
tions actually fought out before the administrative agency. 
The details which perhaps should be controlling of the dis-
position of the particular case may be lost to sight. Slugging 
in the clinches may escape the referee's eye. The reviewing 
court often cannot obtain the intimate knowledge of the case 
which is requisite to fully informed consideration and judg-
ment. Of course, the conclusive effect given to most of the 
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findings which have a factual aspect contributes to this diffi-
culty. The reviewing court must consider the case in the light 
of the broad and general factual findings made by the agency, 
and these often tend to transform a case from a concrete 
practical situation to an abstract legalistic problem which does 
not reflect the hard realities involved. 
2. Restraints on Judicial Action 
(a) Judicial self-restraint. The doctrine that courts and 
agencies are to be regarded as co-ordinate instrumentalities 
of justice, sharing joint responsibilities to attain the ends 
sought by the legislature in passing a statute/ has had im-
portant effects in determining the availability and functions 
of judicial review.2 It is fundamentally the attitude of the 
courts, rather than the provisions of statutes, which deter-
mines the actual scope of judicial review; and as both federal 
and state courts have come to grant increased respect to 
administrative determinations, the extent of review has been 
narrowed. 
This tendency has had many repercussions. It can be seen 
in the increasing frequency with which courts, after holding 
an original determination invalid, remand the case for further 
consideration by the agency, rather than making a final de-
cision.3 It can be seen in the tendency to treat as issues of 
fact what might well be considered as issues of law.4 It can 
be seen in suggestions that in some cases judicial review 
1 Cf., United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939). 
2 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 174; Landis, "Administrative Policies and 
the Courts," 47 YALE L. J. 519 (1938); Merrill, "Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, A Functional Prospectus," 23 NEB. L. REV. 56 
(1944). 
s E.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. 
1215 (1944). 
4 E.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 
581, 65 S. Ct. 829 (1945); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326 
(1941). 
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should not be granted except as required by legislative 
mandate.5 
There has developed, in short, a judicial disinclination to 
substitute the judgment of judges for the discretion of ad-
ministrators. This has gone far to reduce the availability and 
limit the functions of judicial review. 
(b) Constitutional limitations. Legislative attempts to 
provide extensive judicial review of administrative determi-
nations have sometimes run afoul of the doctrine prohibiting 
courts from exercising nonjudicial powers. Particularly in the 
federal courts, there has been a consistent refusal to review 
what are deemed "administrative" questions. 
One of the leading cases, illustrative of the problem, is 
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company,6 
where the matter involved was an administrative ruling re-
ducing the permissible hours of service of a radio station. The 
lower courts, in accordance with the provisions of the appli-
cable statute, revised the administrative order; but when 
review was sought in the Supreme Court, that court dismissed 
the writ of certiorari on the grounds that the question was 
purely administrative or legislative, and that thus no case 
or controversy within the judiciary article of the Constitution 
was presented. Somewhat similar rulings have been made as 
to review of certain issues in rate-making cases 7 and trade-
mark cases. 8 
But this doctrine does not, of course, bar judicial review 
of such questions as the "reasonableness" of an administrative 
order or whether it is "in conformity with law." 9 The doc-
5 E.g., Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 
320 U.S. 297,301, 64 S. Ct. 95 (1943). 
6 281 U.S. 464, so S. Ct. 389 (1930). 
7 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445 
(1923). 
8 Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, 47 S. Ct. 284 
(1927). 
9 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 
U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933); Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. 
Havemeyer, 296 U.S. so6, 56 S. Ct. 36o (1936). 
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trine proscribes review only in those cases where the court is 
asked to substitute its judgment for the discretion of an 
administrative agency on a question which is not to be settled 
by deductive legalistic reasoning. 
Nor does the doctrine apply to the so-called federal legis-
lative courts. Such bodies as the territorial courts, the Court 
of Claims and the Tax Court may be vested with some ad-
ministrative powers.10 Similarly, the courts of the District 
of Columbia may be required to discharge administrative 
duties.11 
While appellate state courts have often refused to review 
the decisions of administrative agencies where only adminis-
trative questions were involved/2 nevertheless the state courts 
have been less strict in their insistence that certain types of 
administrative determinations are nonreviewable. In the state 
courts, judicial review of rate-fixing proceedings, determina-
tions granting or denying licenses to operate common carriers, 
and even tax assessments, has not uncommonly been per-
mitted. The distinction between what will be reviewed, and 
what not, is largely historical; where a particular state court 
has long exercised its powers in a particular type of case, the 
issues involved, even though not strictly legalistic, are 
deemed "subject for judicial determination," 13 and the court 
will continue to decide such issues, even though from a purely 
logical viewpoint they might be deemed administrative in 
character. 
3· Constitutional Right of Review 
The decreasing significance of judicial review in the field 
of administrative law is nowhere better illustrated than in the 
10 Williams v. United States, 2.89 U.S. 553,53 S. Ct. 751 (1933) 1 American 
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (z6 U.S.) 511 (182.8). 
11 O'Donoghue v. United States, 2.89 U. S. p6, 53 S. Ct. 740 ( 1933). 
12 E.g., Hodges v. Public Service Commission, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 
834 (1931). 
13 Murray's Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 
( 59 u.s.) z 7 z, 2.84 (18 55). 
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deterioration of the doctrines recognizing a constitutional 
right to obtain judicial review on certain types of issues. It 
has commonly been supposed that there existed an immutable 
right to obtain judicial review on questions of law, questions 
of jurisdictional fact, and questions of constitutional fact. The 
letter of the rule perhaps still stands; but its substance has 
been depleted to the extent that the rule is deprived of most 
of the significance long attributed to it. 
(a) Issues of law. The commonplace that final decision on 
questions of law must be reserved for the courts traces back 
principally to the decision in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. 
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota,14 holding invalid a state statute 
providing that an administrative determination as to the rea-
sonableness of railroad rates should be final and not subject 
to judicial review. Such issue, the court said, was "eminently 
a question for judicial investigation." While the court was 
undoubtedly influenced by the apparent unreasonableness of 
the whole statutory scheme, under which there was no re-
quirement of hearing and no provision for safeguarding pri-
vate rights/5 and while therefore the decision does not really 
foreclose the question as to the permissibility of granting ad-
ministrative agencies power to make final and nonreviewable 
determinations of legal issues, nevertheless it has commonly 
been supposed that the decision held exactly that. 
It is undoubtedly true that the power of final decision on 
judicial matters involving private right cannot constitution-
ally be taken away from the courts; but this does not mean 
that the courts will review every such issue of law involved 
in an administrative determination. 
Many types of administrative determination involving is-
sues of statutory construction or other legalistic inquiries do 
14 134 U.S. 418, 458, 10 S. Ct. 46z, 702 (1890). For a more modern view 
on the question as to the constitutionality of providing for administrative finali-
ty on questions of law, see comment: 26 CAL. L. REv. 683 (1938). 
15 See Freund, THE PoLICE PoWER (1904) § 381. 
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not determine matters of absolute private right, but involve 
rather the granting or denial of some privilege. In such cases, 
it seems that the legislature may grant to administrative 
agencies the power to decide with finality issues of law.16 In 
this way, a variety of important legal issues may be removed 
from the sphere of judicial decision. 
But far more significant, so far as concerns the extent of 
participation by the courts in matters committed originally to 
administrative decision, is the judicial doctrine that as a mat-
ter of comity or convenience, the courts will not concern 
themselves with every asserted error of law 17 on the part of 
the agencies. It is not so much a matter of denial of the power 
of review, but rather a reluctance to exercise it. The adminis-
trative determination will be accepted, without close scrutiny, 
if it has "a reasonable basis in law." 18 The courts hesitate to 
assert and exercise their power of judicial review, where the 
legislature has not expressly so required or authorized, unless 
the "type of problem involved and the history of the statute 
in question" indicate that judicial review should be supplied.19 
In short, the courts will concern themselves only with the 
vital, fundamental questions of law involved in administra-
tive determinations, and will often decline to review other 
issues which, although perhaps controlling of the result in the 
particular case, are not thought to have broad interest and 
significance. 
Another path which has led to the diminution of effective 
judicial review has been by way of calling issues of fact what 
might with equal logic be deemed matters of law. The classic 
comment of Dickinson, pointing out that there is no fixed 
16Van Horne v. Hines (App. D. C. I94I), I22 F. (2d) 207; Nolde & 
Horst Co. v. Helvering (App. D. C. I94I), 122 F. (2d) 41. 
17Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 32I U.S. 231, 64 S. Ct. 
495 (I944). 
18 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 
III, I3I, 64 s. Ct. 85I (I944). 
19 Switchmen's Union of North America v. National ·Mediation Board, 320 
u.s. 297> 30I, 64 s. Ct. 95 (I943). 
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distinction between matters of fact and law, but that "The 
knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage," 20 has been 
echoed by the Supreme Court.21 The general policy of ju-
dicial self-restraint has increasingly led the courts to charac-
terize as issues of fact, and hence nonreviewable, issues which 
with equal logic, could have been deemed issues of law, and 
reviewable,22 had the courts desired to review them. Thus, 
questions as to the meaning of the term "employee," or the 
"appropriateness" of a formula employed in rate-fixing pro-
ceedings, are treated as presenting issues of fact.23 Many is-
sues of law, masquerading as matters of fact, thus escape 
judicial review. 
While the power of the courts to review and settle issues 
of law must of course remain, yet the growing deference paid 
to administrative determinations has much diminished the 
extensiveness with which appellate courts probe into decisions 
which could be said quite properly to involve fundamentally 
issues of law .24 
The provisions of Section 10 (e) of the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of r 946 may have some effect to en-
large the scope of review of federal agency determinations, 
where the error alleged is predicated on what can fairly be 
termed a question of law; but it would appear that this statute 
does not deprive the courts of continuing to exercise judicial 
20 John Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 
(1927) 55; and see Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of 
Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944); Brown, "Fact and Law in 
Judicial Review," 56 HARV. L. REv. 899 (1943); Isaacs, "The Law and the 
Facts," 22 CoL. L. REV. I (1922); Stern, "Review of Findings of Administra-
tors, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REV. 70 
(1944). 
21 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,670,64 S. Ct. 1240 (I944). 
22 Cf., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YoRK (1942) 347-349. 
23 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al., 324 
U. S. 581, 65 S. Ct. 829 (1945); National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944). 
24 Cf., Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139, 65 S. Ct. 161 
(1944). 
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prerogatives in deciding how broad the scope of review 
should be. The implications of this section are uncertain.25 
(b) Jurisdictional facts. The ruling in Crowell v. Ben-
son 26 (which held that an employer was entitled to a judicial 
trial de novo on the factual questions on which depended the 
jurisdiction of the United States Employees' Compensation 
Commission to make an award against him,27 and which 
marked the zenith if not the birth of the doctrine that a right 
to judicial review de novo exists on all questions of jurisdic-
tional fact) has in the intervening years lost much of the 
practical significance it was originally thought by many to 
possess as establishing a minimum standard of judicial partici-
pation in administrative adjudication. 
The case appears, indeed, to have been a departure from 
the logic of many earlier cases 28 and must be taken to be 
greatly limited by, if it has not in fact been disregarded in, 
subsequent decisions. It can scarcely be reconciled with the 
decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation,29 
25 There are two schools of thought as to whether § 10 (e) authorizes or 
requires the courts to broaden the scope of judicial review. The Attorney Gen-
eral has suggested that it merely restated the then existing law (letter dated 
October 19, 1945, addressed to Senate Judiciary Committee and printed as App. 
B, Sen. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)); but there is indicatiop in 
the Congressional debates that a broader scope of review is intended. (Congres-
sional Record, May 24, 1946, 5654, 5657.) That the act should be construed 
to enlarge the scope of review is forcibly argued by John Dickinson, 33 A. B. A. 
J. 434 ( 1947). For additional views, see Shine, "Administrative Procedure Act: 
Judicial Review 'Hotchpot'?" 36 GEo. L. J. 16 (1947); Hinman, "Effect of 
the Administrative Procedure Act on Judicial Review of Administrative Ac-
tion," 20 RocKY MT. L. REV. 267 (194S). The courts have not yet settled the 
question. Compare Snyder v. Buck (D. C. D. C. 194S), 75 F. Supp. 902; Olin 
Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (D. C. Mass. 1947), 72 F. 
Supp. 225; United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi (C.C.A. 3d 194S), 166 F. 
(2d) 457· 
26 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 2S5 (1932). Many volumes of commentary have 
been written about this case. See for example, So U. PA. L. REV. 1055 ( 1932); 
46 HARV. L. REv. 47S (1933); 22 CoRN. L. Q. 349, 515 (1937). 
27Those jurisdictional facts being: (1) whether the accident occurred on 
navigable waters; ( 2) whether an employer-employee relationship existed. 
28 SoU. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932); Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 
2S. 
29 3o3 U.S. 41, 5S S. Ct. 459 (1938). 
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in which it was held that a federal district court had no juris-
diction to entertain a suit raising a question as to whether the 
National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of contem-
plated proceedings; and its philosophy was essentially re-
pudiated in later cases where, there being doubts as to 
whether an administrative agency had jurisdiction in the 
premises, the court remanded the case to that agency for 
further findings on the jurisdictional question.80 
Similarly, the decisions in the state courts indicate that no 
broader scope of review will be applied to determinations of 
jurisdictional fact than to other factual determinations.81 
Judicial redetermination of the facts on which depends the 
jurisdiction of the administrative agency can no longer be 
regarded as an absolute legal right. 
(c) Constitutional facts. Closely related to the jurisdic-
tional fact doctrine is the principle that where the existence 
of a private right asserted under the Constitution depends on 
a finding of fact, there is a right to judicial review de novo of 
that issue of fact. This doctrine appeared to have been re-
affirmed, by a divided court, as late as 1936.82 But its vitality 
has since largely disappeared, and the more recent decisions 
suggest judicial acceptance of the argument that there is no 
logical basis for distinguishing between ordinary facts and 
constitutional facts.88 Even in cases where confiscation is as-
serted, and this of course is the typical case for the application 
of the rule requiring full judicial review of questions of con-
stitutional fact, the courts have not in more recent years 
so See, for example, City of Yonkers et al. v. United States et al., 320 U. S. 
685, 64 S. Ct. 327 ( 1944); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power 
Commission, 324 U.S. 515, 65 S. Ct. 749 (1945). 
81 E.g., Dimino v. Independent Warehouses, Inc., 284 N.Y. 481, 31 N. E. 
(2d) 911 (1940); Miles v. Colegrove, 258 App. Div. 1014, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 
988 (1940), aff'd 284 N.Y. 6o9, 29 N. E. (2d) 929 (1940). 
82 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720 
(1936); cj., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 
40 S. Ct. 527 (1920). For law review comment on the doctrines of these cases, 
see: 4 ILL. L. Q. 44 (1921); 43 HARV. L. REv. 1249 (1930); 40 HARV. L. 
REv. 1033 (1927); 27 W.VA. L. Q. 207 (1921); 36 GEo. L. J. 337 (1948). 
38 Cj., Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 124. 
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always consented to review the facts involved. Here again, 
increased deference for the judgment of administrative agen-
cies has been reflected in the decisions of the courts. Thus, 
where it was claimed by an oil producer that a state order 
limiting its production was confiscatory, the Supreme Court 
observed that the inquiry was one for determination by an 
administrative agency possessing expertness in the particular 
subject, and that it was not for the court to pass upon the pro-
priety of the order, even though it might appear to the court 
that a different order would be wiser.34 
There can be no disagreement with the somewhat conserv-
ative expression of opinion by several members of the Attor-
ney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure who 
observed that "in the future, fact issues involving due process, 
equal protection, and doubtless also other constitutional guar-
anties will in all probability no longer be subject to court 
review as a matter of constitutional right." 35 
While of course the power of the courts to review ques-
tions of law, questions of jurisdictional fact, and questions of 
constitutional fact, cannot well be doubted, yet the courts no 
longer feel bound to review every issue which can be so 
described. Rather, the courts are inclined to limit review to 
those cases and those issues which are deemed to be particu-
larly important or which are thought to be more suitable for 
judicial determination than for determination by an adminis-
trative agency. Conversely, where it is thought that the prob-
lem is more suitable for administrative handling, no searching 
review will be supplied even on these fundamental questions. 
Increasing deference for administrative determinations de-
creases the scope of judicial participation in administrative ., 
law. 
34 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 
573, 6oS. Ct. 1021 (1940); 311 U.S. 614, 61 S. Ct. 66 (1940); 3II U.S. 
57o, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1941), 
35 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1941) 210. 
CHAPTER 17 
Utilization and Exhaustion of Administrative 
Processes as Conditions Precedent 
to Review 
D ISINCLINATION on the part of the courts to intervene in fields where judicial or legislative powers have been vested in administrative agencies is evi-
denced by the development of the doctrines requiring liti-
gants to address their complaints initially to administrative 
tribunals, rather than to the courts, and further requiring 
them to exhaust all possibilities for obtaining relief through 
administrative channels before appealing to the courts. 
In this connection, there have developed several interre-
lated doctrines, including (I) the rule of prior resort, some-
times called the principle of primary jurisdiction; ( 2) the 
requirement of exhausting all available administrative reme-
dies before appealing to the courts; and (3) the principle of 
estoppel for failure to utilize administrative remedies/ While 
all of these related principles may be bound up in a single 
case, and are not always treated separately in judicial opin-
ions, yet such separation is convenient for purposes of analy-
sis and discussion. 
I. The Doctrine of Prior Resort 
During the last two decades there has developed in the 
federal courts a strong inclination to refuse jurisdiction of a 
case wherein the issues are such that they could have been 
presented in the first instance to an administrative body. Simi-
lar principles are followed in many state courts, but with 
1 For a comprehensive general discussion, see E. B. Stason's article on 
"Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 
MINN. L. REV. s6o (1941). 
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considerable variation from state to state, with occasional 
repudiation of the doctrine.2 
The rule is frequently said to have been established in the 
Abilene Cotton Oil case.3 There, suit had been brought in 
the Texas state courts to recover reparations for allegedly 
excessive rates charged by the railroad. It was defended on 
the ground that no prior application had been made to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for relief. The court held 
that this defense was valid-that the Interstate Commerce 
Act by implication (despite the act's declaration that none of 
its provisions should be deemed to abridge existing common-
law remedies) barred resort to the courts until the Interstate 
Commerce Commission had been permitted to pass upon the 
reasonableness of the challenged rate. 
The reasons for the rule are well stated in United States 
Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd.4 In that case, 
plaintiff sought in the federal district court to enjoin an al-
leged restraint of trade, charging that the defendants had 
offered lower rates to shippers who agreed to ship none of 
their goods on plaintiff's vessels. A motion to dismiss was 
granted because the plaintiff had failed to resort first to the 
United States Shipping Board, the court suggesting that the 
inquiry as to whether the challenged combination ~~s illegal 
would depend on many technical factors which might be 
better understood by the Commission than by the courts, and 
2 E.g., Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Co., 59 R.I. z9, 
193 Atl. 879 (1937). In Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Driscoll, 343 
Pa. 109, 21 A. (zd) 9u (194•), the court in effect refused to apply the 
doctrine where to do so would involve assertedly irreparable injury. The fed-
eral courts appear to give little consideration to this argument. Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); Aircraft 
& Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 7 sz, 773, 67 S. Ct. 1493 
( 1947). Some of the state courts appear to apply the principle to newer agen-
cies, but to adhere to established practices which in the case of some of the older 
agencies-e.g., local taxing boards-permitted more extensive judicial inter-
vention. 
3 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., zo4 U. S. 4z6, z7 S. Ct. 
350 (1907). 
4 284 u.s. 474> 5Z s. Ct. Z47 (•9JZ). 
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pointing out that only by requiring the initial presentation of 
all such questions to the administrative agency could uniform-
ity of ruling be attained. 
There are, in other words, two reasons for the rule: first, 
to take full advantage of administrative expertness; and sec-
ond, to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws. 
The rule is apparently one of general applicability. It has 
a long history in the railroad and shipping cases of the type 
wherein it was first promulgated,5 and has been extended into 
many other fields, including some not characterized by the 
technical complexities which underlay the development of 
the rule in the Interstate Commerce Commission cases where 
it originated. Among the fields of administrative activity to 
which the doctrine has been extended are those of trade regu-
lation,6 labor disputes/ and tax collection.8 
Likewise, the rule has come to be applied not only toques-
tions of a technical factual content but as well to issues of 
much broader character. It has been applied to issues of juris-
dictional fact (which not long ago were thought to be exclu-
sively for the courts) ,9 issues as to the unreasonableness of 
5 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 
481, 30 S. Ct. 164 (r9ro); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Brothers Coal Min-
ing Co., 238 U.S. 456, 35 S. Ct. 896 (1915); Director General of Railroads 
et al. v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498, 41 S. Ct. 151 (1921); Alabama & V. Ry. 
Co. v. Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 271 U.S. 244, 46 S. Ct. 535 (1926) [all 
of these cases, in fact, preceding the so-called birth of the rule in the Abilene 
case ( r 92 7), and being perhaps progenitors of the rule rather than instances 
of its application]; Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482, 48 S. Ct. 
342 (1928); Board of Railroad Commissioners of North Dakota v. Great 
Northern Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 412, 50S. Ct. 391 (1930). 
6 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 29 r U. S. 67, 54 S. Ct. 
315 (1934); Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 
U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934). 
7 Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Schauf!ler, 303 U. S. 54, 
58 S. Ct. 466 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 
58 S. Ct. 459 (r938). 
8 Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337,57 S. Ct. 8r6 (1937); United 
States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269, 51 S. Ct. 376 (r93r). 
9 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 
(1938). 
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administrative regulations/0 and some issues of law.11 It has 
been held that an administrative officer could not be enjoined 
from enforcing an allegedly invalid administrative regula-
tion without application first being made to the officer for 
modification of the objectionable rule.12 
While there have been assertions that the doctrine has no 
application to "pure" questions of law 13 (such as might be 
raised by an issue as to the legality of the statute under which 
an agency operates) 14 there is but infrequently an opportu-
nity to raise such a question. As distinctions between law and 
fact become constantly more blurred, and the enforcement of 
asserted legal rights comes to be conditioned largely upon 
administrative discretion, there are but few issues which the 
courts are likely henceforward to characterize as purely legal. 
Where the legal question is bound up with an administrative 
question, the rule of prior resort applies.15 
The rule of prior resort will, it appears, be applied where-
ever the court believes (considering opportunities of utilizing 
technical competence and obtaining uniformity of rule) that 
the legislature intended the issues to be left to the administra-
tive agency for initial determination.16 In an era of increasing 
respect for administrative adjudication, it can be expected 
that there will be but few cases where the courts will conclude 
there was no such legislative intention. Only where it can be 
convincingly shown that an alleged administrative remedy 
10Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317,65 S. Ct. II51 (1945). 
11 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., Ltd., 234 U. S. 138, 
34 S. Ct. 885 (1914); Aron v. Federal Trade Commission (D. C. Pa. 1943), 
so F. Supp. 289. 
12p, F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570,54 S. Ct. 277 (1934). 
13 Great Northern Ry. Co. et al. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 
42 S. Ct. 477 (1922); and see discussion in United States Navigation Co., Inc. 
v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S. Ct. 247 (1932). 
14 See 35 CoL. L. REv. 230, 234 (1935). 
15 Cf., Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) p. 199, § 219. 
16 See opinion of Brandeis, J., in Great Northern Ry. Co.,et al. v. Merchants' 
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 2.85, 42. S. Ct. 477 (192.2). 
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would be plainly inadequate 17 will the courts excuse the re-
quirement of prior resort to administrative remedies. 
2. The Requirement of Exhausting Administrative Remedies 
(a) Historical basis of rule. Not only must a question 
cognizable by an administrative agency be first presented to 
it, rather than to the courts, but there is a further requirement 
that the case must run the full gamut of administrative pro-
ceedings, before an application for judicial relief may be con-
sidered. This is the doctrine requiring exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. It means, in effect, that the administrative 
agency is entitled to the first and last word. It must be given 
an opportunity to speak first (this is the doctrine of prior 
resort), and it cannot be deprived of the power to pass upon 
the case until it has spoken its last word with reference 
thereto. 
While this requirement of exhausting administrative reme-
dies has a somewhat different historical background than the 
rule of prior resort, yet the two doctrines have developed 
into complementary parts of a general principle which ordi-
narily serves to preclude judicial consideration of a question 
while there remains any possibility of further administrative 
action. 
The reasons for the rule requiring exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies are basically the same as those which long 
ago led to the adoption of the familiar tenet of appellate prac-
tice that appeals may be taken only from a final judgment. If 
appeals to the courts were to be permitted while a matter was 
still pending before an administrative agency, the result 
would be productive of much confusion and delay. Piecemeal 
litigation would be permitted. Many unnecessary and even 
vexatious appeals would be taken. The work of the courts 
would be needlessly increased. Further, the taking of such 
17 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226 ( 1944). 
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interlocutory appeals would interfere with the most effective 
conduct of the work of the administrative agencies them-
selves. 
Frequently, the rule has been applied in cases where equi-
table relief in the nature of an injunction is sought against an 
administrative agency/8 and in such cases the result is often 
premised on the maxim that equitable relief will not be 
granted where some other adequate remedy is available. But 
the reason for the rule goes further. It is applicable to pro-
ceedings at law as well as suits in equity.19 
The rule is said to be of special force where resort is had 
to the federal courts to restrain the action of state o:ffi.cers,20 
and in such cases it is sometimes suggested that a fundamental 
18 Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works of West 
Virginia, 172 U.S. 32, 19 S. Ct. 90 (1898); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 ( 1908); Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 
U.S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617 (1932). 
19 First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of County 
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 (1924); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 337,57 S. Ct. 816 (1937). 
20 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 52 S. Ct. 217 (1932); Central 
Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 290 U. S. 
2 64, 54 S. Ct. 154 ( 19 3 3). Sometimes, proceedings in the state courts to review 
and revise orders of state agencies are themselves administrative in character. 
In such cases, a review of the order of the state agency in the federal courts 
may not normally be had until the state courts have been appealed to [Prentis 
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908); Porter v. 
Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617 (1932); 287 U.S. 346, 53 
S. Ct. 132 (1932) (rehearing)], save possibly in cases where confiscation is 
presently in process and no relief to stay the confiscation may be had in the state 
courts [Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 353 
( 1923) ], or where other unusual circumstances are present [City Bank Farmers 
Trust Co., Executor v. Schnader, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 291 U. S. 
24, 54 S. Ct. 259 (1934)]. The problem of seeking relief in the federal courts 
from orders of state administrative agencies is further complicated by the 
provisions of the Johnson Act, 50 Stat. 738, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1), limiting the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts to grant injunctive relief in various 
types of cases where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the 
state courts. Still further complications arise from the tendency of the federal 
courts to extend the philosophy of the Johnson Act to cases where it does not 
in terms apply [as in the case of an application for a declaratory judgment-
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 63 S. Ct. 1070 
( 1943)], and the general disinclination of the federal courts to pass upon 
cases involving action of state administrative agencies, where questions of state 
law are fundamentally involved. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643 (1941). 
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basis of the rule is the principle that comity between different 
departments of government requires that the federal courts 
should stay their hand until the state administrative processes 
have been completed. But the doctrine applies with just as 
great rigor where the appeal is from an agency of the federal 
government to the federal courts. Comity is not alone the 
basis for the rule. 
Again, it is sometimes said that the doctrine is related to 
the familiar principle that official acts will be presumed to be 
correct and lawful-that if an error is committed in the initial 
steps of administrative activity it will be corrected by the 
higher administrative authorities.21 
But the real basis for the rule is that it constitutes a doctrine 
of self-limitation which the courts have evolved in marking 
out the boundary line between the powers of the courts and 
those of administrative agencies. While it is sometimes sug-
gested that the rule is fundamentally one of discretion, and 
may be relaxed in the sound judgment of the trial court,22 
yet such relaxation may be expected only in those cases, dis-
cussed below, where it is said that the rule does not apply. In 
general, it is to be considered a mandatory requirement-a 
rule of judicial administration, and not merely one governing 
the exercise of discretion.23 
(b) Instances of application of rule. Administrative ap-
peals. It is very commonly held, in a wide variety of situa-
tions, that if the original administrative determination may be 
appealed to an appellate administrative agency (or to a lower 
court exercising administrative functions) such administrative 
21 Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153 
(1925). 
22 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 58 S. Ct. 199 ( 1937). 
23 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 3 o 3 U. S. 41, 5 1, 58 S. Ct. 4 59 
(1938); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 753, 67 
S. Ct. 1493 (1947). See Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 
YALE L. J. 981 (1939), suggesting that the application of the doctrine should 
not be deemed discretionary. 
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remedies must be exhausted. Perhaps the most common in-
stance of this application of the rule is in connection with state 
tax administration.24 The rule has been frequently applied 
under similar circumstances in connection with decisions of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.25 It has been applied as to 
various state agencies.26 In cases where further administrative 
appeals are provided for, the rule requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies appears clearly to be of general ap-
plication, and one which may be invoked regardless of the 
nature or particular function of the agency involved, except 
as it may be modified by particular statutory enactment (cf., 
Section I o (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946). 
Administrative consideration continuing. It is even clearer 
that where the consideration of the case by the agency is still 
continuing, and no decision has as yet been reached, the courts 
will not normally interfere.27 
Where it is claimed tribunal has no jurisdiction. The claim 
that the agency is exceeding its jurisdiction in a pending case 
is not ordinarily, in the federal courts at least, enough to af-
ford a basis to transfer the proceedings into the courts, prior 
to the completion of the administrative proceedings.28 In the 
state courts, however, there is some tendency to hold that 
where the jurisdiction of the agency is challenged, resort may 
be had directly to the courts for a decision on this question.29 
24 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners 
of County of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 ( 1924). 
25 E.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 471 
( 1934). 
26 E.g., Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 S. Ct. 7 
(1934). 
2T New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U.S. 261, 13 S. Ct. 303 (1893); Oregon v. 
Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 6o, 26 S. Ct. 568 (19o6). 
28 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 
(1938); Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U, S. 1601 47 
S. Ct. 553 (1927); but cf., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land (App. D. C. 1945), 
151 F. (2d) 292. 
29 This is particularly true in tax cases. See, e.g., Koch v. City of Detroit, 
236 Mich. 338, 210 N. W. 239 (1926). 
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Where unconstitutional administrative action is asserted. 
There are some suggestions that where it can be shown that 
the prescribed administrative remedy fails to comply with the 
requirements of procedural due process, the rule does not ap-
ply,30 but the cases are not clear enough to indicate that any 
substantial relaxation of the rule is to be expected on this 
basis. In the more common case, where the administrative 
action is claimed to be unconstitutional as applied to the par-
ticular facts of the case, it is usually held that the administra-
tive remedy must be pursued to the end,31 and this holding 
seems to be fully in accord with requirements of orderly pro-
cedure and with the general principles on which the rule is 
founded. 
Where underlying statute is assailed. Where it is claimed 
that the statute under which the agency is acting is itself un-
constitutional, it may be that the question can be raised direct-
ly in the courts without first exhausting administrative pro-
ceedings.32 But this has not been clearly established.33 
(c) When is administrative remedy exhausted? Adminis-
trative proceedings frequently assume the character of a 
seamless web, which goes on and on and then starts over; and 
consequently questions sometimes arise, in connection with 
the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, as to 
when this requirement has been satisfied. 
Motions for rehearing. One of the most perplexing ques-
tions is whether the party seeking to appeal the administra-
tive decision must file a motion for a rehearing of his case 
30 Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 54 S. Ct. 7I2 (I934); Munn v. 
Des Moines Nat. Bank (C.C.A. 8th I927), I8 F. (2d) 269; Kansas City 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Ogden Levee Dist. (C.C.A. 8th I926), IS F. (2d) 637. 
31 First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of County 
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 (I924). 
32 Buder v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis (C.C.A. 8th I927 ), I6 F. (2d) 990. 
33 See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission of State of New York, 
z66 U. S. 265, 45 S. Ct. So ( I924); and Berger, "Exhaustion of Administra-
tive Remedies," 48 YALE L. ]. 98 I ( I939). 
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before the highest administrative body, before taking the case 
into the courts. 
A comparatively early decision 34 indicated that application 
for rehearing was not a condition precedent to judicial relief 
when the pertinent statute merely conferred the privilege of 
filing such a motion, but did not make it mandatory, and the 
granting of the motion was entirely within the discretion of 
the agency. A number of subsequent decisions followed this 
holding, and it was commonly supposed that if the agency 
had already passed on the specific contentions which would be 
advanced in the motion for a rehearing, it was unnecessary to 
take this formal step. But later decisions cast doubt on the 
rule so stated.35 It is now said by the Supreme Court that 
while there is "no fixed rule" requiring the filing of such a 
motion, yet it is to be considered a condition precedent to the 
right to seek judicial review where such device would offer 
"a new opportunity to obtain critical administrative review of 
the question." 36 The controlling inquiry in each case thus be-
comes whether or not a motion for rehearing would result in 
the agency's giving to the question involved its further con-
sidered attention. If such would be the case, the motion 
should be filed. Whether such would be the case depends, of 
course, on many factors which cannot be foretold in advance. 
The only safe rule of practice, consequently, is to file such a 
motion where provision therefor is made (unless the con-
trolling statute makes it unnecessary, as appears to be the case 
34 Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 2.62. U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466 
(192.3). 
35 Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission 
(App. D. C. 1938), 98 F. (:~.d) 2.82.; Federal Power Commission v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co. v. Slattery, 302. U.S. 3oo, 58 S. Ct. 199 (1937); Peoria Braumeister Co. 
v. Yellowley (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 12.3 F. (:~.d) 637. 
36 Levers v. Anderson, 32.6 U. S. 2.19, 2.2.4, 66 S. Ct. 72. ( 1945 ), where the 
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that on the particular facts 
involved, the application was merely a "normal, formal type of motion" and 
not a condition to judicial review. 
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in certain situations under Section 10 (c) of the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of I 946). 
Indications of adverse decision. Normally, a justifiable be-
lief that the agency will decide the case adversely to the liti-
gant does not excuse going through with the administrative 
proceedings to their bitter end before seeking judicial review. 
Newspaper stories, declarations of counsel, or general state-
ments by the agency as to its contemplated action are not 
normally enough to show that the final result of the adminis-
trative action is so well known as to make resort to the admin-
istrative process merely a waste of time.37 But in rare cases, 
where it can be shown that the final decision has in fact been 
reached, and that nothing remains but the preparation and 
entry of the formal order, it may be held that resort to the 
courts is not premature, even though the administrative for-
malities have not been completed.38 
Unreasonable delay. If delay on the part of an agency in 
deciding a case is so long and unreasonable, and so productive 
of hardship as to evidence a complete disregard of a party's 
substantial rights, it may be considered that all effective pos-
sibilities of obtaining administrative relief have been ex-
hausted, and an appeal to the courts permitted.39 
3· Estoppel by Reason of Failing to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies 
Ordinarily, when a petition seeking judicial redress of al-
leged administrative error is denied on the grounds that the 
petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, it 
only means that the party must go back to the administrative 
agency and proceed to exhaust the remedies there available to 
37 Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 49 S. Ct. 282 
(1929). 
38 City Bank Farmers Trust Co., Executor v. Schnader, Attorney General of 
Pennsylvania, 291 U.S. 24, 54 S. Ct. 259 ( 1934). 
39 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 2 70 U. S. 58 7, 46 S. Ct. 408 ( 192 6). 
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him. It occasionally happens, however, that after such an at-
tempt to take the case into the courts has been rebuffed, the 
petitioner finds that it is too late to seek further administra-
tive consideration of the case. The administrative remedies 
which he failed to exhaust in the first instance are no longer 
available. The unfortunate petitioner in such cases must go 
without relief. He is deprived of the chance to have a hearing 
on his claim, before either the administrative agency or the 
courts. 
This is the so-called doctrine of estoppel for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. It amounts to no more than 
applying the usual doctrine in cases where the results may be 
disastrous. 
The principle is dramatically illustrated by the decision in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Fairchild Engine and 
Airplane Corporation/0 where the respondent undertook to 
prove certain facts by a witness who testified to them from 
hearsay. The trial examiner ruled that in view of the circum-
stances of the case the hearsay would not be received. At the 
conclusion of the day's hearings, late in the afternoon, re-
spondent offered to produce on the following day a witness 
who could testify to the facts in question from personal 
knowledge. The trial examiner refused to continue the hear-
ing to permit this to be done; and the record was closed 
without this evidence; and the Board made a finding against 
respondent. On proceedings brought to enforce the order of 
the Board, the Court held that while this action of the trial 
examiner was arbitrary and unreasonable, still no relief could 
be afforded, because of the failure of the respondent to apply 
for leave to introduce additional testimony.41 Accordingly, an 
40 (C.C.A. 4th 1944), 145 F. (zd) 214. 
41 Since such application could have been made directly to the court, it might 
be said that there was involved something more than a failure to exhaust an 
administrative remedy; but the case really falls within the same principle. 
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order was entered enforcing the Board's order. It was too late 
for respondent to obtain any relief from arbitrary adminis-
trative action. 
The doctrine of estoppel is savagely harsh. There is some 
doubt to what extent it applies outside of cases where strong 
reasons of public convenience require that a final and unas-
sailable determination be speedily reached. Typical of this 
category, of course, are tax cases, where the constant pressing 
need for the prompt collection of the public revenues is so 
dominant a factor in judicial thinking. It is in tax cases that 
the doctrine has most frequently been applied. A leading case 
is First National Bank v. Board of Commissioners of Weld 
County/2 where the taxpayer's complaint was that its prop-
erty had been assessed far above market value, while property 
of other taxpayers had been assessed not in excess of market 
value. In this type of case, of course, an assessment is ordi-
narily deemed void. But in the reported case, the taxpayer 
had neglected to appeal to the state tax commission or the 
state board of equalization; and a demurrer to its action to 
recover the excess taxes paid was upheld on the grounds that 
it had failed to exhaust administrative remedies which were 
available. After the defeat in the lawsuit, it was too late for 
the taxpayer to go back to the administrative authorities to 
obtain relief. 
Even in tax cases, there are decisions which refuse to apply 
the doctrine where resort to the administrative remedy would 
be plainly futile or inadequate,48 or where the tax statute was 
void.44 
42 264 U.S. 450,44 S. Ct. 385 (1924). 
43 Montana Nat. Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County of Montana, 276 
U.S. 499,48 S. Ct. 331 (1928); Munn v. Des Moines Nat. Bank (C.C.A. 8th 
1927), 18 F. (2d) 269. 
44 Buder v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis (C.C.A. 8th 192.7), 16 F. (zd) 990. 
See E. B. Stason, "Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort 
to Administrative Remedies," 28 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930). 
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But despite the association of the estoppel rule with tax 
cases, and the fact that even in that field the doctrine is not 
unswervingly applied where the resulting inequities would 
shock the judicial conscience, it cannot be assumed that the 
doctrine is limited to the tax field. It has been applied in other 
situations and is seemingly of general application.45 
45 See Johnson v. United States (C.C.A. 8th 1942.), 12.6 F. (2.d) 2.42.; and 
Leebern v. United States (C.C.A. sth 1941), 12.4 F. (2d) sos. 
CHAPTER 18 
The Scope of Judicial Review 
A. FAcToRs AFFECTING ScoPE oF REVIEW 
THE factors determining the scope and extent of judicial review of administrative decisions are essen-tially temporal in nature, varying with the attitude of 
the particular court, the subject of the administrative activity, 
the reputation of the particular tribunal involved, the method 
by which review is obtained, and other elements which vary 
widely from case to case. Any specific conclusions as to what 
questions will be considered by the reviewing court must be 
reached on the basis of a detailed study of cases involving a 
particular agency. 
But this does not mean that the forest must be examined 
tree by tree. Out of the confusing welter of decisions there 
appear certain broad trends--certain indications of the factors 
which influence courts in their determination of the extent to 
which they will review decisions of administrative agencies. 
Analysis of these factors affords some guide-only tentative, 
but still of practical value-in determining the scope of re-
view likely to be afforded in a situation involving a new 
agency or a new issue, as to which there has been no direct 
pronouncement defining the scope of review. 
In viewing the decisions for purposes of such horizontal 
classification, the question is not so much the precise extent 
to which the courts will review the correctness and validity 
of factual inferences or statutory interpretations made by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission or by the Federal Trade 
Commission or some other agency; but rather the inquiry is 
why the courts examine more searchingly the rulings made 
by one agency than those made by another. If the reason can 
330 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 331 
be discovered, some basis will be afforded for predicting the 
extent to which the courts will review rulings to be made by 
new tribunals whose decisions will be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny in future years. 
I. Methods of Review 
The extent of review is often controlled by limitations 
inherent in the procedural method by which the question is 
presented to the reviewing court.1 
(a) Statutory methods of review. Where the statute set-
ting up the agency makes specific provision for judicial review 
of the agency's determinations, the statutory method is ordi-
narily exclusive, and courts will but seldom permit the em-
ployment of any other procedural device (such as a writ of 
mandamus, or petition for certiorari) as a means of bringing 
the administrative determination into court for purposes of 
review.2 
While the statutes seldom prescribe the scope of review 
(except in terminology so vague as to leave the determination 
of the actual extent of review to the courts) yet the fact that 
the statutory method is exclusive often operates indirectly to 
limit the scope of review. The statutory method may be in-
appropriate for the raising of certain q~estions that could be 
raised if other procedural devices were available. 
So far as the statute does set out some indication of the 
permissible scope of review, it is controlling, subject only to 
constitutional requirements which preclude vesting in the 
1 The general problem is thoroughly discussed by E. B. Stason, "Methods 
of Judicial Relief from Administrative Tribunals," 24 A. B. A. J. 274 
(1938); and McAllister, "Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administra-
tive Orders," z8 CAL. L. REV. 129 (1940). 
2 Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 
58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); United Employees Ass'n v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1938), 96 F. (zd) 875; Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Alex-
ander, 306 U.S. 615, 59 S. Ct. 489 (1939), aff'g (D. C. D. C. 1938), 24 
F. Supp. 88o; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Andrews (C.C.A. zd 
1937), 88 F. (2d) 441. 
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courts revisory powers so broad as to amount to a delegation 
of administrative duties,3 and which preclude depriving the 
courts of the power to review constitutional questions and 
essential questions of statutory construction.4 
(b) Common-law methods of review. In appropriate 
cases-usually, where no specific statutory method is pro-
vided 5-relief may be had by virtue of the common-law 
writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition; or by their 
statutory counterparts. Where such method of review is em-
ployed, the extent of relief is governed primarily by the 
limitations inherent in these procedural devices. 
Certiorari. Certiorari is not ordinarily available in the 
federal courts as a device to review administrative orders.6 
In the state courts, it is probably the most commonly em-
ployed device to review orders of state tribunals; and while 
the questions which may be raised on certiorari proceedings 
vary widely in different states, depending on the effect of 
statutory modifications of the common-law scope of the writ, 
yet in general the extent of review available on certiorari 
proceedings is somewhat circumscribed. It is of course effec-
tive to raise questions as to the jurisdiction of the agency; 
and the general tendency in the state courts is to hold that 
when the writ is directed to an administrative agency, the 
court is enabled to pass upon (a) questions of law appearing 
on the face of the record, and (b) claims that the adminis-
3 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 
S. Ct. 389 (1930); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751 
(1933); Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350 
(1914). 
4 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932); cf., Otis Elevator 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922). 
5 Or where the statutory method of review does not cover the particular 
situation involved. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 59 
S. Ct. 160 (1938); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 
3o6 u.s. 56, 5 9 s. Ct. 409 (1939). 
6 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. r6z, 33 S. Ct. 639 ( 1913); Public Clear-
ing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 ( 1904). 
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trative order 1s plainly irregular or illegal.7 Questions as to 
the weight of the evidence, of course, cannot be reviewed 
on certiorari proceedings. 
The availability of judicial relief by way of a writ of 
certiorari is also limited by the doctrine that certiorari will 
lie only where the decision of the agency is judicial in 
character, rather than legislative or purely administrative. 
On the question as to when the agency's determination is to 
be described as judicial, there is of course a contrariety of 
opinion. Thus, denial of a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to a public utility has been described as judicial; 8 
while the revocation of such a certificate has been described 
as nonjudiciaP The conclusion in each case is apparently 
affected by (a) the court's judgment as to the desirability 
of reviewing a particular type of determination; and (b) by 
the availability of other methods of review-the courts being 
inclined to permit the use of the writ where no other method 
of review would be open. Many of the state court decisions 
(but not all of them) can be reconciled on the basis that 
where the agency is required to grant a hearing and there 
consider a claim of legal right, the proceeding will be deemed 
reviewable by certiorari; and conversely the writ is not 
usually available where the agency is not required to grant 
a hearing. 
lld.andamus. In the comparatively few cases where man-
damus is available to review agency determinations, the area 
of review is closely circumscribed by the nature of the writ. 
It is available as a means of compelling an officer or agency 
7Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444 (r872); Jackson v. People, 
9 Mich. rrr ( r86o); comment, "Review of Acts of Non-Judicial Bodies by 
Certiorari," 19 lA. L. REV. 6o9 (1934). 
8 People ex rel. Steward v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 160 N. Y. 
zo2, 54 N. E. 697 (1899). 
9 People ex rel. Keating v. Bingham, 138 App. Div. 736, IZJ N.Y. S. 506 
(191o); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public-Service Commission, 
r8r Ga. 75, r8r S. E. 834 (1935). · 
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to perform a purely ministerial act where refusal to perform 
it violates a clearly established legal right, and it can be 
utilized to compel an agency to assume jurisdiction over a 
case which it is the duty of the agency to decide; 10 but it 
can seldom if ever be employed as a means of raising any 
other question of law. It does not reach questions of fact 
decided by the administrative agency. 
Its only substantial function, then, is to compel an agency 
to perform its clear legal duty; and if any doubt is raised 
as to the existence of a strict and undoubted legal right in 
the petitioner to the claimed relief, the writ may be denied.11 
Thus, mandamus is unavailable where the act which peti-
tioner seeks to compel the agency to perform is one involving 
some measure of discretion. A modicum of discretionary 
power is sufficient to render nugatory mandamus proceedings. 
Thus, where the requested administrative action involves the 
construction of a statute, the action of the agency is said by 
the federal courts, at least, to involve a measure of discretion, 
making mandamus unavailable.12 Many of the state courts, 
however, will review some issues of statutory construction 
on mandamus. 
Where the agency performs a judicial function, the courts 
will not, on mandamus proceedings, direct the agency as to 
what decision to make on a legal question involved in the 
administrative proceeding .13 
Even where a strict legal right on the part of the petitioner 
can be shown, relief may be denied on the basis that man-
damus is an equitable remedy, which should not be granted 
10 Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steam-
ship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 32 S. Ct. 556 (1912). 
11 United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U. S. 540, 57 
S. Ct. 8 55 (I 9 3 7). See Sherwood, "Mandamus to Review State Administrative 
Action," 45 MICH. L. REV. 123 (1946), for a general discussion of the 
availability of mandamus to review administrative proceedings. 
12 United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343, 41 S. Ct. 131 (1920); 
Thomas v. Vinson (App. D. C. 1946), 153 F. (zd) 636. 
13 People ex rel. McCabe v. Matthies, 179 N. Y. 242, 72 N. E. 103 ( 1904). 
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unless the inconvenience to the government is more than 
counterbalanced by a resulting substantial benefit to the peti-
tioner.14 On similar grounds, relief by mandamus is ordinarily 
denied where it can be shown that some other assertedly 
adequate remedy is available.15 
In the federal courts, the usefulness of this writ is further 
impaired by the circumstance that (save for the courts of 
the District of Columbia, which have inherited some of the 
common-law powers of the Maryland courts) 16 the district 
courts have no general original power to issue writs of man-
damus, but may grant the writ only in aid of already acquired 
jurisdiction/7 or as empowered by statute in specific cases. 
The writ is rarely available to review determinations of fed-
eral agencies, for the state courts may not issue the writ 
against federal officers.18 
Prohibition. The writ of prohibition, where available, raises 
only the single question as to whether the agency, in connec-
tion with the performance of a judicial function, is unlawfully 
assuming a power it cannot legally exercise, because beyond 
its statutory jurisdiction. It will not issue to prevent the 
performance of executive or ministerial functions/9 in the 
absence of specific statutory provisions, such as are found in 
a few states. It is unavailable in the federal courts.20 
14 United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352, 53 S. Ct. 614 
( 1933); Matter of Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N. Y. 358, 182 
N. E. 16 (1932). 
15 United States ex rel. Frey v. Robertson (App. D. C. 1933), 63 F. (2d) 
457; United States ex rel. Carroll Electric Co. v. McCarl (App. D. C. 1925), 
8 F. (2d) 910. 
16 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 524 (1838). See Miller, 
"Control of the Interstate Commerce Commission by Mandamus," 4 GEo. 
WASH. L. REV. ll8 (1935). 
17 Bath County v. Amy, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 244 (1871); Labette County 
Commissioners v. United States, 112 U.S. 217, 5 S. Ct. 108 (1884). 
18M'Clung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 598 (1821). 
19Lodge v. Fletcher, 184 Mass. 238, 68 N. E. 204 (1903); Butler v. 
Selectmen of Wakefield, 269 Mass. 585, 169 N. E. 498 (1930) 1 and cases 
cited in annotation, 115 A. L. R. 3; 159 A. L. R. 627. 
2o 34 CoL. L. REv. 899, 905 (1934). 
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(c) Collateral attack. The extremely limited scope of re-
view which may be obtained by means of the common-law 
writs, and their unavailability in many types of situations, 
has rendered it necessary to employ various methods of col-
lateral attack as a means of reviewing administrative deter-
minations, in cases where no statutory method of review is 
provided or where the method of review provided by statute 
is inadequate. The usual methods of collateral attack em-
ployed are (1) bills for injunction; (2) damage actions 
against administrative officers; (3) actions for restitution; 
and (4) actions for declaratory judgments.21 
Bills for injunction. Not infrequently, statutory provisions 
authorize the filing of a bill for injunction to review par-
ticular agency determinations, and in such cases, the scope of 
review is determined on the same basis as in other instances 
where review is by statutory method. So far as the statute 
specifies the extent of review which is to be had, the statute 
is controlling. To the extent that the statute is silent as to 
the intended breadth of review, the question is one for the 
courts, to be determined in accordance with the general prin-
ciples discussed infra. 
Only where there is no such statutory provision does an 
application for injunctive relief assume the true character 
of a collateral attack. In such instances, it must usually be 
shown, in order to sustain the bill, that the agency action 
complained of is void rather than merely erroneous/2 that 
21 While perhaps not strictly a method of collateral attack, petitions for 
declaratory judgment have recently become available as an effective method 
for raising questions as to the jurisdiction of an agency and as to the validity 
of agency rules. See cases collected in note: Stason, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE TRIBUNALS, zd ed. (I947) 599-6oq and I49 A. L. R. 349· For law re-
view comment, see Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law," 
I I N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. I 3 9 ( I 9 3 3) ; Ellingwood, "Declaratory Judgments in 
Public Law," 29 ILL. L. REV. I, I74 (I934); Martin, "The Declaratory 
Judgment Act in Public Law Controversies," 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 5I4 
(r939); Davison, "Administrative Legislation," 34 ILL, L. REv. 65I (I940), 
22 Stone v. Heath, I79 Mass. 385, 6o N. E. 975 (I90I). 
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irreparable injury would be suffered,23 and that there is no 
adequate remedy at law.24 
A bill for an injunction may be utilized, typically, to 
review an assertion that a statute is unconstitutional, or that 
enforcement of a particular order will result in a deprival of 
due process. It is employed frequently in tax cases. However, 
application of general doctrines of equity as to the availability 
and functions of injunctive remedies circumscribes the utility 
of this device as a means of obtaining a general review of the 
fairness, justice, or legal correctness of the determinations of 
administrative agencies. 
Damage actions against administrative officers. Histori-
cally, the basic common-law remedy for the protection of an 
individual against illegal official action was a private action 
for damages. In such a case, if the plaintiff could show that 
the action of the officer was a private wrong (not justifiable 
under the statute), he was entitled to recover damages. The 
issue thus presented was whether or not an officer was legally 
entitled to do what he did do in the particular case-whether 
the law authorized his conduct under the circumstances. Ob-
viously, the scope of review in such an action was necessarily 
limited. Because of these obvious inadequacies of this com-
mon-law remedy, indeed, it became largely displaced by the 
familiar bill for an injunction. However, the remedy is still 
available, and is occasionally used.25 
The older cases allowed recovery quite freely, not only 
for action under an unconstitutional statute, but also in cases 
where, because of a mistaken determination of fact, the officer 
took some action not authorized by the statute. Thus, where 
an officer was authorized to destroy diseased cattle, and (on 
finding cattle to be diseased) destroyed them, but a jury later 
23 California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 59 S. Ct. 166 (1938). 
24 Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 52 S. Ct. 267 ( 1932). 
25 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 
118,59 s. Ct. 366 (1939). 
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found that the cattle had not in fact been diseased, it was said 
that the officer had killed cattle which were not diseased, and 
had hence committed a wrong which could not be justified 
under the statute, and was therefore liable in damages.26 But 
the results of this doctrine were unsatisfactory. The danger 
of an administrative official subjecting himself to substantial 
personal liability-if a jury, trying the factual question de 
novo (and often on less complete evidence than that on which 
the officer acted) should determine the factual question dif-
ferently than the officer had-was an obvious deterrent to 
yigilant administrative enforcement. Further, the theory of 
according greater weight to the jury's fact finding than to 
the factual determination of the administrative officer was 
completely at odds with fundamental tenets of the doctrine 
of administrative expertise. Consequently, as a means of 
avoiding the harsh results of the rule, some courts developed 
a theory that where the administrative function is judicial in 
character (or quasi-judicial, as it has been commonly called), 
the administrative officer is exempt from liability so long as 
he acts within his jurisdiction and in good faith. 27 Sometimes 
it is said that the immunity is available only where no prop-
erty right is invaded, but the courts have gone far, in order 
to protect an officer, in finding this requirement satisfied.28 
Actions for restitution. Closely related to the damage 
action is a private suit seeking restitution of moneys collected 
by an administrative officer or agency, which are alleged to 
have been improperly collected. The typical case is the suit 
to recover taxes paid under protest. 
26 Lowe v. Conroy, r2o Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (r9o4). 
27 See note, 34 MICH. L. REV. II3 (1935); Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. So 
(r883); Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 244, ro8 N. W. 311 (r9o6); 
Williams v. Rivenburg, 145 App. Div. 93, 129 N.Y. S. 473 (r9rr). 
28 For example, it was held in Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 2 r 7 Wis. 223, 
2 58 N. W. 8 57 (I 9 3 5), that revocation of a building permit did not invade 
any property right, and that therefore an officer who revoked the permit was 
not liable for damages. 
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At common law, there was doubt whether such an action 
could be maintained unless the actions of the administrative 
officer were void, rather than merely erroneous.29 In most of 
the states, and under various federal statutes, these actions 
are now controlled by specific statutory provision, and the 
question as to the scope of review is primarily a question as 
to what the statute provides. 
2. "Facts" v. "Law" as a Criterion of Review 
The classical dichotomy (asserting that the courts should 
judicially review questions of law passed on by administrative 
agencies, but should not review their determinations of fact, 
beyond ascertaining whether the determinations are sup-
ported by substantial evidence) is of little use as a working 
tool. One cannot predict the scope of review which will be 
accorded by ascertaining whether the question involved is 
one of law or of fact. 
The basic reason for this, as pointed out in the classic 
statement of Dickinson/0 is that there is no fixed distinction 
between questions of fact and questions of law, but "The 
knife of policy alone affects an artificial cleavage." What 
would be considered in many connections as a question of 
law-e. g., a question as to whether, on stated facts, the 
relationship between two parties is that of employer and 
employee or independent contractor,31 or a question of reason-
ableness 32-may be treated as a question of fact to eliminate 
judicial review, where considerations of policy dictate such 
results. On the other hand, determinations which are labeled 
findings of fact, may be treated as involving questions of law, 
29 United States Trust Co. of New York v. Mayor, etc., of City of New 
York, 144 N.Y. 488, 39 N. E. 383 (1895). 
30 Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 
(1927) 55· 
31 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 3:u U. S. 
111, 64 S. Ct. 851 ( 1944). 
32 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 325 U. S. 365, 
6s s. Ct. 1232 (1945). 
340 JUDICIAL REVIEW 
and subject to review.33 The distinction, as the Supreme Court 
has said, "is often not an illuminating test and is never self-
executing." 34 Judges may often disagree as to whether a 
question is one of fact or of law; and the disagreement re-
flects merely different judgments as to the proper extent of 
review.35 
Even if it can be agreed that a certain issue is one of fact 
or of law, the question as to the actual scope of review is 
still unanswered. As to whether a factual determination is 
supported by substantial evidence, judges of a court often 
disagree, the disagreement representing different philosophies 
as to the proper scope of review. And where the question is 
one of law, there still remains the question as to whether the 
court should ascertain merely whether the decision has "a 
reasonable basis in the law" or whether the court should 
determine the law question independently. Judgment on all 
these points reflects no logical distinctions but represents rath-
er a delicate balancing of many imponderable policy factors. 
As it is well stated by Justice Brandeis: 36 ". • • in deciding 
when, and to what extent, finality may be given to an admin-
istrative finding of fact involving the taking of property, the 
court has refused to be governed by a rigid rule. It has 
33 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 1 64 S. Ct. 1240 (1944) 1 
where the court pointed out that the determination of the so-called ultimate 
facts "implies the application of standards of law," and declared that in such 
cases "the conclusion that may appropriately be drawn from the whole mass of 
evidence is not always the ascertainment of the kind of 'fact' that precludes 
consideration by this Court." Cf., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. :u6, 
236, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945), where the court said, "State courts cannot avoid 
review by this Court of their disposition of a constitutional claim by casting 
it in the form of an unreviewable finding of fact." 
34 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 1 64 S. Ct. 1240 (1944). 
35 E.g., majority and dissenting opinions in Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 4021 
62 S. Ct. 326 (1941). 
36 Concurring opinion, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 
U. S. 38, 81, 56 S. Ct. 720 ( 1936). How such considerations may affect the 
scope of review is pointed out in McDermott, "To What Extent Should the 
Decisions of Administrative Bodies be Reviewable by the Courts?" 25 A. B. 
A.]. 453 (1939). 
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weighed the relative values of constitutional rights, the essen-
tials of powers conferred, and the need of protecting both. It 
has noted the distinction between informal, summary admin-
istrative action . . . and formal, deliberate, quasi-judicial 
decisions. . . . It has considered the nature of the facts in 
issue, the character of the relevant evidence, the need in the 
business of government for prompt final decision. . . . It 
has enquired into the character of the administrative tribunal 
provided and the incidents of its procedure." 
Whether the question be one of fact or law, the scope of 
review does not depend on any logical or mechanical classifi-
cation of the issue under one category or the other. Rather, 
the extent to which the court will review the agency's deter-
mination depends on more vital factors. These factors reflect 
the court's judgment as to the appropriate spheres of admin-
istrative and judicial activity. The judgment on this ultimate 
question is based not on logic but on experience and phi-
losophy. 
3· Conduct of Public Business v. Regulation of Private 
Business 
The distinction between the regulation of private business 
and the conduct of public business furnishes a criterion ca-
pable of fairly definite and objective application as a basis on 
which to predict the scope of judicial review that will be 
afforded. 
Where the purpose of the administrative tribunal is to 
discharge a function which is essential to the perpetuation 
of government itself, far different considerations apply than 
where the tribunal's purpose is to regulate the conduct of 
private business enterprise. 
In administrative determinations which are incidental to 
the conduct of the public business, there are many cases where 
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the sovereign's free will is unfettered-where decisions do 
not determine legal rights, but merely establish the extent 
of a privilege which the government is free to grant or deny, 
as in public lands and veteran's pension cases, or the granting 
of licenses to establish businesses of the sort which the gov-
ernment may regulate to the point of extinction, like saloons 
and public dance halls.37 In other instances, legal rights are 
to a larger degree involved, but the need for a prompt deter-
mination of the dispute is more impelling than the need for 
a detailed reconsideration of each case. Thus, in immigration 
matters, the courts have been willing to sacrifice some doubts 
as to the correctness and justice of individual determinations 
because of the practical necessity for the speedy disposition of 
such cases.38 In tax cases and customs cases, the courts, recog-
nizing the overwhelming public interest in the prompt col-
lection of the public revenues in order to permit the uninter-
rupted operation of governmental processes, accord a large 
degree of finality to administrative decisions.39 
On the other hand, where the incidence of the adminis-
trative function falls primarily on the conduct of private 
business, the administration's demands for autonomy are less 
persuasive. The courts have clearly recognized a need for 
more extensive review where administrative determinations 
directly affect the operation of business enterprise.40 In this 
37 United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 2.3 
S. Ct. 698 (1903); United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 S. 
Ct. 12 (1888); Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. p, 19 S. Ct. 317 (1899); 
State of Kansas v. Sherow, 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866 ( 1912); State ex rel. 
Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 (1889); Mc-
Millan v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 Pac. 943 (1925). 
38 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 2.53 U. S. 454, 40 S. Ct. 566 (1920); Van 
Vleck, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) Ch. V. 
39 Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214, I 3 S. Ct. 5 72 ( 1893) ; Stason, 
"Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative 
Remedies," 2.8 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930). 
40 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. S. 
662, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 
134, 53 S. Ct. 52. (1932); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 180 U.S. 
19, so s. Ct. I (1929). 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-3 
field, overly drastic restrictions of judicial review might serve 
ultimately to impair rather than foster the effectiveness of 
governmental processes; a reasonably broad review helps to 
maintain public confidence in the fairness of the administra-
tive activity. 
There are some agencies which neither carry on the neces-
sary business of government nor regulate the actual operation 
of private business, but are rather charged with the duty of 
enforcing a general rule of conduct prescribed by statute. 
Thus, the National Labor Relations Board does not actually 
regulate industry (as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion regulates the investment banking business and some cor-
porate reorganizations) but merely insists that industry in 
the conduct of business shall not transgress certain standards 
of behavior prescribed by Congress. Where such is the nature 
of the agency's task, it impinges less substantially on the 
conduct of private affairs. It does not regulate, but merely 
polices. In such cases, the trend is in the direction of a nar-
rowing scope of review. 
4· Legislative v. Judicial Powers 
Another guide which is of some assistance in predicting 
the scope of review which will be allowed in particular cases 
is based on the distinction between those administrative func-
tions which are basically of a legislative character and those 
which are essentially judicial in nature. Administrative agen-
cies act in three fields: (a) those which are traditionally 
deemed executive or administrative; (b) those in which the 
agency makes rules analogous to legislative enactments; and 
(c) those in which the determinative functions resemble so 
closely the processes of the constitutional courts that frank-
ness compels the application of the adjective "judicial." 
So far as the action is purely executive or ministerial, 
judicial review may be limited to a determination that the 
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agency has kept within its statutory powers and has followed 
statutory procedure.41 The field of executive action is tra-
ditionally one for comparatively unbridled administrative 
discretion. 
Where, however, the agency fulfills a function that is 
traditionally legislative, less freedom from control is per-
mitted. A standard must be set up by which the agency's acts 
are to be measured. The courts must determine whether a 
proper standard has been set up, and whether the agency has 
complied with that standard.42 The judicial approach is some-
what similar to that employed when a statute is attacked on 
constitutional grounds-highest respect is shown for the leg-
islative or administrative determination, but the courts must 
intervene when the bounds imposed by the enabling enact-
ments are overreached. 
When the agency exercises judicial powers, it passes on 
questions intimately associated with personal rights of liberty 
and property, presented in a form readily susceptible to 
judicial consideration. Judicial review is likely to be granted 
at least to the extent of passing on vital issues of statutory 
construction, scrutinizing claims that the agency has violated 
those ordinary decencies of judicial procedure that constitute 
the requirements of procedural due process; 43 determining 
whether it has decided cases on the basis of matters not before 
the agency or on preformed opinions; 44 and deciding whether 
its findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
41 Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N. E. (2d) 281 (1938); Federal Radio 
Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, so S. Ct. 389 (1930). 
42 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. 
Ct. 837 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 
(1935); State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 
220 N. W. 929 (1928). 
43 Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App. 
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 517; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville 
& N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913). 
44 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 55 S. Ct. 
462 (1935); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion (App. D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 564. 
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5. Discretionary Powers 
If an administrative agency is in fact endowed with truly 
discretionary powers, judicial review of its discretionary acts 
may properly be denied.45 An act of free discretion, referable 
to no fixed standard except governmental desire, is not appro-
priate for judicial review.46 
But instances are uncommon where an agency exercises 
pure and untrammeled discretionary powers. Rarely is an 
agency of the government granted discretionary powers as 
broad as those of its principal. Usually, the delegated discre-
tion is limited to interstitial legislative powers-to the deter-
mination, within stated limits, of the proper means of execut-
ing a stated legislative purpose. In such cases, review is 
appropriate to determine whether the agency's discretion was 
controlled by improper considerations-whether its discretion 
was abused.47 
Control of discretion is not typically a judicial function, 
nor is there promise of any assured gain to be derived from 
superimposing the discretion of the judge upon that of the 
administrator. Rather, the problem of controlling the scope 
of administrative discretion is fundamentally political; it is 
for the legislature, primarily, to determine the breadth of 
discretionary power to be vested in a branch of the govern-
ment which is comparatively free of popular control. The 
most that the courts can do is to ascertain that the adminis-
trative action has not exceeded the limits of the delegated 
discretion. 
45 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 
587 (1928); City of Chicago v. Kirkland (C.C.A. 7th 1935), 79 F. (2d) 
963. See Treves, "Administrative Discretion and Judicial Control," 10 Mon. 
L. REV. 276 (1947). 
46 People ex rel. Keating v. Bingham, 138 App. Div. 736, 123 N.Y. S. 506 
(1910). Provisions allowing review in such cases may be unconstitutional. 
Norwalk Street Railway Company's Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1o8o 
(1897). 
47 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct. 
22 (1911); City of Monticello v. Bates, 169 Ky. 258, 183 S. W. 555 (1916). 
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Hence, when an agency asserts that its decision is non-
reviewable, because reached in the exercise of its discretionary 
power, the first task of the reviewing court is to determine 
to what extent the agency's powers are discretionary.48 The 
court must then ascertain whether the agency has exceeded 
these limits. If it has stayed within the area of delegated 
discretion, there is no further question presented. 
6. Character of Administrative Procedure 
Because of the duty of the courts to review assertions that 
the course of proceedings adopted by an agency constituted 
a deprival of procedural due process, the scope and extent 
of review is affected indirectly by the character of the agency's 
procedure. The more summary the administrative procedure, 
the more searching must judicial review be in order to permit 
the court to determine whether perfunctory adherence to 
customary forms masks arbitrary or capricious action. Simi-
larly, where investigatory, prosecuting, and adjudicatory 
powers are combined in a single agency-and particularly 
where they are not rigidly divided between separate depart-
ments of that agency-searching inquiry may be required to 
determine whether there has been any infringement of the 
guaranties of fair procedure. 49 
Conversely, where the determination is based on eviden-
tiary findings, made after a formal hearing at which there 
was afforded ample opportunity to present testimony and 
meet the arguments of the adverse party-where the proce-
dure is essentially that of a legislative court-the inclination 
of the courts is to probe less deeply. In other words, the 
48 Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 24 S. Ct. 595 (1904); Yudel-
son v. Andrews (C.C.A. 3d 1928), 25 F. (2d) So; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. 
Brady (C.C.A. 4th 1932), 61 F. (2d) 242. 
49 It has been suggested that § 10 (3) (5) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act authorizes the determination de novo by the reviewing court of the facts 
pertinent to any relevant question of law, in cases where the agency's deter-
mination was not based on a statute-required hearing. See Congressional 
Debate, "The Congressional Record," May 24, 1946, 5654, 5657. 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 347 
character of the administrative procedure affects the scope of 
judicial review to the extent that suspicions of arbitrary or 
careless administration prompt the courts to examine care-
fully the fairness of the procedures adopted. 
Aside from this, the character of the administrative pro-
cedure may affect the scope of judicial review in another way. 
If the procedure is such as to beget lack of confidence in the 
probable correctness of the administrative determination, 
there is an inclination to allow a fuller review. Thus, it has 
been suggested that the doctrine according great weight to 
administrative findings of fact "has and should have" little 
bearing on certain findings of the Patent Office because of the 
ex parte nature of the particular proceedings, allowing inter-
ested parties but a limited opportunity to be heard.50 
7. Experience of Agency 
Both in legislative and judicial spheres of administrative 
activity, the experience of the particular agency is a factor 
which plays some part in judicial determination as to the 
proper extent of review. The greater experience an agency 
may possess, the greater confidence will be indulged by the 
courts in its decisions. The high quality of performance 
demonstrated by the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
won for its determinations the respect of the courts even 
before the Federal Trade Commission, for example, was 
organized.51 The latter body was, for a time, viewed some-
what with mistrust by the courts.52 In earlier days, for ex-
50 Opinion of Frank, J., concurring in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Cor-
poration (C.C.A. 2d 1942), 130 F. (2d) 290, 294· 
5l E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S. 
441, 27 S. Ct. 700 (1907); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & 
N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913). 
52 It is said that some ten years after the creation of the Federal Trade 
Commission, one appellate judge confessed that when reviewing a determina-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was always his inclination to 
affirm; and that when reviewing a determination of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, he entertained some predisposition toward reversal. 24 A. B. A. J. 
z8s (1938). 
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ample, the courts were inclined to insist that its factual 
inferences would be accepted only if they were "reasonable" 
or "legitimate" or "necessary," and there was considerable 
readiness to find the inferences unreasonable; 53 and similarly, 
it was declared that what constituted unfair competition was a 
question for the courts rather than for the agency.54 But in 
more recent years, as the courts have come to repose more 
confidence in the Commission, its inferences have been more 
readily accepted without review/5 and the courts give far 
greater weight to the Commission's determination as to the 
propriety or impropriety of a given trade practice. 
The successful experience of an administrative agency is 
the best criterion of its true expertness; and the pleas that 
the expert knowledge of an administrative body should not 
be jettisoned, carry far greater weight where the asserted 
expertness has been demonstrated.56 
8. Miscellaneous Factors Affecting Likelihood of Fair Trial 
The continued insistence of the courts on the maintenance 
of standards of fair play in administrative procedure has led 
reviewing judges to probe somewhat more deeply in cases 
where factors are present which may make it difficult for the 
53 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 6sr, 51 S. Ct. 
587 (1931); Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 
2.73 U.S. sz, 6r, 47 S. Ct. 255 (192.7). 
54 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 2.53 U. S. 42.1, 40 S. Ct. 572. 
(r92o); Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Pub. Co., z6o U. S. 568, 43 
S. Ct. 210 (1923). 
55 Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65 
S. Ct. 971 (1945); Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 
29I U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (I934). 
56 Cf., the discussion in Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 6s 
S. Ct. I 6 I (I 944), as to the reasons for giving weight to an interpretative 
opinion of the Wage and Hour Division; and the reasons given in Davies 
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 32 I u. s. 144, I 56, 64 s. Ct. 474 ( 1944), for 
refusing to follow the construction given a statute by the Office of Price 
Administration. 
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agency to observe high standards of fairness.57 Political pres-
sure is present in varying degrees in different tribunals. Its 
significance, where present, is reflected by the frank state-
ment of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative 
Management: 
" the independent comm1sswn is obliged to 
carry on judicial functions under conditions which 
threaten the impartial performance of the judicial 
work. . . . Pressures and influences properly enough 
directed toward officers responsible for formulating and 
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmos-
phere in which to adjudicate private rights." 58 
Where the danger of improper political motivation is appar-
ent, it is to be expected that judicial review will be somewhat 
more searching. 
·opportunities for reaching an unbiased decision are in 
some fields rendered difficult by the highly subjective char-
acter of the inquiry. As has been wisely said, "The more 
indefinite the standard, the greater is obviously the tempta-
tion to use the law as a weapon." 59 A familiar example of 
the difficulty of applying vague standards is found in the 
fields of economic legislation, operating in terms of fraud, 
discrimination, monopoly, unreasonable charges, and similar 
concepts. In fields where technical competence plays a large 
part, and where a reasonably objective test is to be applied, 
administrative conclusiveness is more readily conceded than 
in fields where more judgment and less cold fact are in-
57 "Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiar-
ly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and imp<!,rtial, others 
subservient." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 52, 56 
S. Ct. 720 (1936). 
58 Sen. Doc. No.8, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 68. 
59 Freund, GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) 31. 
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volved, and where distinctions between findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are almost obliterated. 
B. ScoPE oF REVIEW ON APPEALs FROM DETERMINATIONS 
OF SPECIFIC AGENCIES 
Decisions laying down rules as to the extent of review 
on appeals from the determinations of various particular 
agencies illustrate the application of the general factors above 
discussed. 
I. Workmen's Compensation Cases 
The field of workmen's compensation presents a middle 
ground, so far as concerns the scope of judicial review of 
administrative determinations. Factors which in other types 
of cases prompt the courts to examine with care the agency's 
factual inferences are here lacking; but there are also absent 
the factors which in some cases are effective to eliminate 
review of issues involving questions that could be described 
as issues of law. 
Workmen's compensation commissions are engaged essen-
tially in administering a social insurance program, the costs 
of which are widely spread. The administrative activity does 
not bear so directly or so oppressively on private affairs as 
in cases where, for example, an agency undertakes to regulate 
the trade practices of some particular industry. In some re-
spects, the task of the compensation commissions is coming 
to be viewed as the discharge of one of the normal functions 
of government-like carrying mail or policing highway traf-
fic. To the extent that the function is thus coming to be 
considered as the conduct of the public business, there is a 
growing tendency in the courts to restrict the scope of judicial 
review. On the other hand, the compensation awards remain 
a direct burden on the individual employer or his insurance 
carrier, and a broader scope of review is granted than in cases 
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where a purely public program is being carried out which 
does not directly impinge on private rights of person or 
property. 60 
(a) Factors tending toward broad review. There are pres-
ent in this field a number of factors which militate toward a 
substantial degree of judicial review. Thus, in the first place, 
the compensation commissions exercise a function which is 
typically judicial-determining contested issues of fact and 
law by hearing evidence and interpreting a governing statute. 
The tendency to grant broader review where the agency exer-
cises judicial functions is thus operative in cases of this type. 
Secondly, the compensation commissions typically have but 
a small measure of discretion-when the facts are found, the 
decision must be based on the provisions of the controlling 
statute. There is thus but little occasion to restrict review on 
the principle that judicial respect and deference must be 
accorded the judgment of the agency in matters involving 
discretion. Thirdly, the law questions presented have a non-
technical background; courts feel themselves on familiar 
grounds in considering such questions as the meaning of 
"dependent," the significance of the phrase "arising out of 
and in the course of employment," the definition of "engaged 
in trade or business," and the like. Consequently, courts are 
more ready to impose their own judgments than in fields 
where the controlling statutes and regulations are cast in the 
terminology of a complex, technical field. 
(b) Factors tending toward narrow review. On the other 
hand, there are also present factors which disincline the courts 
to probe extensively into the intrinsic correctness of the ad-
ministrative determination. For one thing, the courts exhibit 
60 C/., the suggestion in Crowell v. Benson, 2.85 U. S. :u, so, 52. S. Ct. 2.85 
( 19 3 2), indicating that a narrower scope of review would have been afforded, 
had the matter related solely to the conduct of public business. For a general 
survey of the scope of review in workmen's compensation cases, see Horovitz, 
"Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensation," 2.1 IND. L. J. 473 (1946). 
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some tendency toward viewing it as socially desirable to 
sustain the grant of compensation unless the decision is 
plainly erroneous. The fact that the amount involved in the 
individual case is not large likely contributes somewhat to-
ward acceptance of this philosophy. There is little in the 
character of the administrative procedure to create concern 
or alarm. Judicial-type hearing procedures are usually em-
ployed, and there is seldom any serious question presented 
as to the granting of a fair trial. Even where this point is 
urged, the courts hear it with considerable scepticism.61 There 
is usually but little if any political motivation in the function-
ing of compensation commissions, nor are such agencies often 
exposed to questionable pressures. These factors likewise 
incline the courts to accept the administrative determinations 
as presumptively fair and just. Finally, the long experience 
and demonstrated expertness of compensation commissions 
operate to create judicial respect for the administrative deter-
mination. 
(c) Fact and law. In reconciling these opposed tendencies, 
the courts have been inclined to accept without critical exami-
nation determinations which are purely factual or based on 
inferences as to the facts, but at the same time to describe 
as issues of law and grant full review to issues of statutory · 
interpretation and application which in other types of cases 
might be deemed nonreviewable issues of fact. Thus, the 
question as to whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor is ordinarily deemed a reviewable 
question of law in compensation cases; whereas in unfair labor 
practice cases it may be deemed a question of fact.62 
61 E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, zoz Cal. 
437, z61 Pac. 295 (1927); King v. Alabam's Freight Co., 40 Ariz. 363, 12. 
P. (zd) 294 (1932), holding that the mere fact that the testimony given 
before a referee had not been transcribed when the award was made did not 
indicate that the Commission did not consider the testimony, since there was 
no proof that the Commission did not have the stenographer read the untran-
scribed testimony. 
62 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 
111, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944). 
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Decision on all ordinary questions of litigation facts is 
reserved almost exclusively for the commissions. It is fre-
quently said, for example, that the court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to sustain the findings, 
and all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the 
validity of orders granting compensation.63 Doubts as to 
whether the award is supported by evidence should be re-
solved in favor of the injured employee.64 Even if the find-
ings of the commission are inconsistent, it is enough if some 
of the findings sustain the award.65 
Likewise, the agency's inferences from established primary 
facts are ordinarily accorded the same conclusiveness as is 
granted the agency's findings as to the primary facts.66 
It was in this field, to be sure, that the doctrine as to 
judicial review de novo of "jurisdictional facts" was estab-
lished in Crowell v. Benson 67 but the validity of this doctrine, 
and its vitality even in the federal courts is open to serious 
doubt; and several state courts, both before and after this 
decision, have considered jurisdictional facts on the same basis 
as other factual questions. 68 
Because of the comparatively long time that workmen's 
compensation commissions have been functioning, there may 
63 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. House, 217 Ala. 422, ll6 So. 167 
(1928); Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson Airplane Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 169, 52 
S. W. (2d) 1019 (1932); Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 173 Wis. 128, 179 N. W. 590 (I92I). 
64 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoage (App. D. C. 1933), 65 F. (2d) 822. 
65 Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, I77 Cal. 378, 
I 70 Pac. 822 ( I9I 8). 
66Goldsworthy v. Industrial Commission, 2I2 Wis. 544, 250 N. W. 427 
(1933); Noto v. Hemp & Co., 231 Mo. App. 982, 83 S. W. (2d) I36 
( 19 3 5) ; Ginsberg v. Burroughs Adding Machine Co., 204 Mich. I 30, I 70 
N. W. I5 (I9I8). 
67 285 U.S. 22, 34, 52 S. Ct. 285 (I932). 
68 Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, I70 Cal. I8o, 149 Pac. 35 (1915); 
County of San Bernardino v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 217 Cal. 
618, 20 P. (2d) 673 (1933); O'Hara's Case, 248 Mass. 31, 142. N. E. 844 
(1924); Matter of Dimino v. Independent Warehouses, Inc., 284 N.Y. 481, 
31 N. E. (zd) 911 (194o); Matter of Miles v. Colegrove, 258 App. Div. 
IOI4, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 988 (1940), aff'd 284 N.Y. 609, 29 N. E. (2d) 929 
( 1940). 
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be found in this field a series of decisions regarding judicial 
review, which extend over a period of years and illustrate the 
changing trend of the courts. Thus, many early cases insisted 
that where the facts were such as to support equally an infer-
ence justifying an award or an inference denying it, it was 
the duty of the agency to make the inference which denied 
the award.69 Early attempts of the legislatures to change this 
result by enacting "presumption statutes" to aid the compen-
sation claimants were in some instances blandly disregarded 
by the courts. 70 But by the time of the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Del Vecchio v. Bowers/1 sustaining the validity of, 
and giving substantial effect to such presumption statutes, 
there had developed a tendency (which under the Supreme 
Court's decision became a binding requirement) to grant a 
much larger degree of freedom to the compensation commis-
sions to make such inferences as they choose. 
2. Taxation 
(a) Determinations involve conduct of public business. 
The overwhelming necessity of the prompt collection of 
the public revenues is a brooding omnipresence in the judicial 
consciousness, when courts are reviewing administrative de-
terminations in tax matters. The exercise of the power of 
taxation (which has been characterized by the Supreme Court 
as an "imperious necessity of all government, not to be re-
stricted by mere legal fictions") 72 through administrative 
agencies, is the outstanding example of the principle that 
where an agency is conducting the public business, the courts 
will review the administrative determinations less rigorously 
than where an agency is regulating private business. 
69 Chaudier v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 206 Mich. 433, I 73 N. W. 198 
(1919); Sparks v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 195 Iowa 334, 190 N. W. 
593 (1922). Several state courts still follow this rule. 
70 Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N. Y. S. 700 
(1921). 
71 296 U.S. 28o, 56 S. Ct. 190 (1935). 
72Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503, so S. Ct. 356 (1930). 
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In few fields is the scope of judicial review more narrow 
than in that of taxation. The slowness of the courts to inter-
fere in cases involving collection of governmental revenue 
is illustrated by the vigorous application in tax cases of the 
principles requiring complete exhaustion of all possible ad-
ministrative procedures, before the courts will even take 
jurisdiction over the controversy. In tax cases (though per-
haps not in all other types of cases), this principle of prior 
resort is applied, even though the alleged error is one that 
would render the administrative determination void.73 
(b) Treatment of factual questions and inferences. None 
of the important factual questions determined by agencies 
administering tax laws can be effectively reviewed in the 
courts. In cases involving ad valorem taxes, the underlying 
factual issue is usually that of the true value of the property; 
but this question of valuation is ordinarily deemed nonju-
dicial, the courts refusing to review the question unless it 
can be established that the assessors committed fraud or 
adopted fundamentally wrong methods of valuation.74 Partly 
for the reason that assessments are often fixed on bases other 
than the taking of testimony, some courts even refuse to 
consider whether or not there was any evidence at all to 
support the administrative conclusion as to value.75 
In many excise tax cases, decision turns primarily on an 
inference to be made from somewhat ambiguous circum-
stances; and in such cases the principle is met that it is the 
73 Stason, "Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to 
Administrative Remedies," 28 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930); among recent 
general discussions of the scope of review in tax cases, see Dwan, "Administra-
tive Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury Practice," 46 CoL. L. REV. 58 I 
( 1946); Gordon, "Reviewability of Tax Court Decisions," 2 TAx L. REV. 171 
(1947); Heidenreich, "Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of the United 
States Tax Court," 29 MINN. L. REV. 186 (1945). 
74 See Luce, "Assessment of Real Property for Taxation," 35 MICH. L. REV. 
1217, 1239 (1937); cases collected in Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (192.4), 
§§ 1612, 1645· 
75 Board of Commissioners of County of Finney v. Bullard, 77 Kan. 349, 
94 Pac. 129 (r9o8). 
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function of the tax authorities, and not of the courts, to draw 
inferences from the facts and to choose between conflicting 
inferences. 76 
Where decision rests fundamentally on a factual question, 
the suggestion is made that there is no warrant for the 
expenditure of any great amount of judicial energy in dis-
covering the truth; 77 and references are constantly found, 
both in state and federal decisions, to the greater expertness 
of the administrative officials in determining the difficult 
factual problems involved in taxation matters. 
(c) Treatment of questions of law. Even where the con-
trolling issue is clearly a question of law, the attitude of 
judicial abstinence is adhered to. In the famous Dobson case 78 
the Supreme Court criticized the lower federal courts for 
interfering too readily with the determinations of the admin-
istrative authorities in the taxation field, and indicated that 
even though the question involved was one of law, the de-
cision was not to be reversed so long as the administrative 
decision on the law question was reasonable.79 Similarly, it 
has been suggested that the court's function, on review of a 
tax case, is limited to corrections of "obvious errors"; 80 that 
the courts should reverse only for a "clear cut mistake of 
law"; 81 and that the administrative decision should be ac-
76Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 3I6 U. S. I64, 62 S. Ct. 984 
(I 942) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Inv. Co., 
Ltd., 323 U.S. I1 9, 65 S. Ct. I69 (I944). 
77 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Inv. Co., Ltd., 
323 u.s. II9, 65 s. Ct. I69 (I944). 
78 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 496-498, 
64 S. Ct. 239 (1943). 
79 For an analysis of this decision, see Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The 
Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (I944). Congressional 
disapproval of some phases of the decision is indicated in the I 948 Revenue 
Act (I.R.C. I I4I (a)). 
80 Slee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. zd I93o), 42 F. (zd) 
I84. 
81 Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 3d I944), 
I40 F. (zd) 7 59· 
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cepted so long as it has "reasonable basis in the law." 82 About 
the most that can be said is that the administrative decision 
on law questions is not controlling, if clearly erroneous.83 
The courts have, to be sure, reserved to themselves the 
right to speak with finality on issues of law, but unless the 
question is one of broad general interest the courts are likely 
to accept, without critical re-examination, the conclusion of 
the agency. The point will not necessarily be considered de 
novo merely because it involves an issue of law. 
The state courts, partly because many of them have not 
reached the wholehearted acceptance of the doctrine (which 
is characteristic of the federal courts) that administrative 
agencies should be recognized as co-ordinate agencies of 
government, and partly because tax cases coming before them 
do not involve so many subtle technicalities as do many of 
the cases arising under the federal tax laws, are on the whole 
inclined to review tax cases somewhat more intensively than 
do the federal courts. But even in the state courts, the old 
aphorism to the effect that doubts as to the collectability of 
a disputed tax should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, 
has been quite effectively displaced by the attitude that the 
demand of the administrative agency for the payment of the 
tax should be respected unless the agency can be shown to 
be wrong. 
(d) Role of discretion and expert judgment. Another 
reasS)n for the strict limitations imposed by the courts on 
the/extent of judicial review in the tax field lies in the cir-
c;:umstance that the decisions of the tax agencies are not 
strictly judicial. In large measure their functions are execu-
82 Smith v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (App. D. C. 
1944), 141 F.(zd) 529· 
83 Cf., Hormel v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U. S. 
ssz, ss6, 61 s. Ct. 719 (1941), where a footnote to the opinion says that the 
Board's rulings on questions of law are "not as conclusive as its :findings of 
fact." 
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tive and ministerial, and this is often asserted as a basis for 
restricting the scope of review.84 As one court put it, practical 
business experience and common sense are the best guides in 
administering tax laws.85 Many of the questions involved are 
not deemed to be peculiarly within the special competence 
of the judges. Thus is effect given to the general principle 
that where a substantial measure of executive autonomy is 
involved in the operations of an agency, the scope of review 
will be restricted. 
The principle that less review will be permitted where 
discretion is involved, is likewise reflected in cases passing 
on the proper scope of judicial review in the tax field. It is 
frequently pointed out that the courts should not interfere 
unless there has been a clearly arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of discretion by the taxing officials.86 In many cases, 
the administrative officials are vested with a large measure 
of real discretion-a classical example being that where the 
tax collector was permitted to decide which of alternative 
bases was to be used to measure the tax.87 In other cases, 
what is really involved is not so much discretion as the exer-
cise of judgment. Thus, the determination of value is said 
to be a matter of discretion.88 
84 Daffin v. Scotch Lumber Co., 226 Ala. 33, I45 So. 452 ( I933); Man-
nings Bank v. Armstrong, 204 Iowa 512, 21I N. W. 485 (1926); In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, I79 Atl. 357 (I935). 
85[n re Harleigh Realty Company's Case, 299 Pa. 385, I49 Atl. 653 
(I930). 
86 E.g., Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 293 U. S. 102, 55 S. Ct. 55 
(I934); Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 
55 (I924); Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237, I78 N. E. 7I (I93I); City 
of Birmingham v. Oakland County Supervisors, 276 Mich. I, 268 N. W. 409 
(1936); Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, I34 Me. 28, I8o Atl. 803 
(I935). 
87 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 2 7 7 U. S. 55 I, 4 8 S. Ct. 
587 (1 928). 
88 E.g., Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, I 17 Neb. 214, no 
N. W. 241 (I928); Colorado Tax Commission v. Midland Terminal Ry. Co., 
93 Colo. Io8, 24 P. (2d) 745 ( 1933). 
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There can also be plainly seen, in tax cases, the operation 
of the principle that where an agency through long experi-
ence has gained true expertness in its field, the extent of 
review will be narrow. The Supreme Court has more than 
once had occasion to refer to the tax administrators' "practical 
knowledge of the intricate details incident to tax problems." 89 
Again, conceding candidly that the subject is "so complex as 
to be the despair of judges," the court has bluntly suggested 
that the administrative agency "is relatively better staffed 
for its task than is the judiciary." 90 Likewise in matters of 
state taxation, the state courts recognize and defer to the 
long experience of the administrative authorities. The prac-
tical knowledge of assessors as to property values, and their 
experienced judgment in choosing the proper method for 
assessment of utility, mining, or industrial properties, are 
effective deterrents to broad judicial review. 
(e) Confidence in fairness of administrative procedure. 
The procedures adopted by the taxing authorities are ordi-
narily fair, and there is but seldom occasion for the courts 
to examine critically the course of the administrative pro-
ceedings, in order to determine whether due process has been 
denied. The Tax Court, in the field of federal taxation, has 
long been recognized as furnishing a model of proper admin-
istrative procedure. As the Supreme Court had occasion to 
summarize, this agency "is independent, and its neutrality 
is not clouded by prosecuting duties. Its procedures assure 
fair hearings. Its deliberations are evidenced by careful opin-
ions. All guides to judgment available to judges are habit-
ually consulted and respected. It has established a tradition 
of freedom: from bias and pressures. . . . Individual cases 
89 Burnet v. S. & L. Building Corp., 2 8 8 U. S. 40 6, 415, 53 S. Ct. 42 8 
(1933). 
90 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 498, 64 S. 
Ct. 239 (1943). 
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are disposed of wholly on records publicly made, in adversary 
proceedings, and the court has no responsibility for previous 
handling. Tested by every theoretical and practical reason 
for administrative finality, no administrative decisions are 
entitled to higher credit in the courts." 91 Similarly, the state 
courts have frequently recognized the general fairness of the 
procedures employed by the tax collectors, and have been 
content sometimes to rest decision on the presumption that 
the officers performed their duties properly.92 
In summary, nearly all the factors above discussed as 
tending to affect the scope of judicial review, operate to 
restrict the scope of review in tax cases. The field involves 
the conduct of public business, a matter in which the courts 
are always reluctant to interfere. The administrative agencies 
exercise functions which are largely executive or ministerial, 
rather than purely judicial. They are vested with an impor-
tant measure of discretion. Their procedures are fair. The 
agencies through long experience have developed true ex-
pertness. The questions involved are not such as to fall 
peculiarly within the particular competence of the courts. 
3· Federal Trade Commission 
Nearly all of the considerations which have prompted the 
courts narrowly to circumscribe the scope of review in tax 
cases may be seen in inverse operation in Federal Trade 
Commission cases, where the scope of review has traditionally 
been very broad. The various factors which affect judicial 
determination of the proper scope of review-the public or 
private sphere of the agency's activities, the character of its 
91 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 498-499, 
64 S. Ct. 239 (1943). 
92 Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P. 
(2d) 585 (1931); Daly v. Fisk, 104 Conn. 579, 134 Atl. 169 (192.6); 
People ex rel. Carr v. Immanuel Herald Publishing House, 323 Ill. 574, 154 
N. E. 439 (1926); Kelly v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 2.03 Wis. 639, 2.34 
N. W. 701 (1931). 
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functions (whether legislative or judicial), the extent of its 
discretionary powers, the experience of the agency, and the 
character of its procedure-have influenced the courts to 
probe searchingly in Federal Trade Commission cases, just 
as they have influenced the courts to limit the scope of 
review in tax cases. 
For this reason, an examination of the cases wherein the 
courts have determined the proper scope of review of Federal 
Trade Commission orders is interesting as a means of further 
illustrating the operation of the deep imponderables which 
play so large a part in determining the scope of review of 
administrative orders. Further, an examination of the cases 
involving judicial review of Federal Trade Commission 
orders has an independent value because it illustrates how 
completely the attitude of the courts toward the determina-
tions of a particular agency may change over a period of a 
decade. In the case of this particular agency, the change in 
judicial attitude may be ascribed in part to the recent broad 
trend of respect for administrative adjudication and the grad-
ual adaptation of judicial doctrine to this new phenomenon,93 
but it is in part at least due to the fact that as the agency has 
gained experience and improved its administrative techniques, 
it has been granted greater deference than was formerly 
accorded.94 
(a) Regulation of private business. One of the primary 
factors accounting for the attitude which the courts have dis-
93 Countryman, "The Federal Trade Commission and the Courts," 17 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 83 at 96 (1942); Davison, "The Place of Federal Trade Commis-
sion in Administrative Law," 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 280 (1940); Daniels, 
"Judicial Review of Fact Findings of Federal Trade Commission," 14 WASH. 
L. REV. 37 (1939). 
94 E.g., while in earlier cases the courts freely amended the form of the 
Commission's orders, in 1944 we find the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declaring, in response to a claim that an order was so broad that it might 
operate in futuro to prohibit lawful conduct, "Of course the influence o£ 
changed business conditions must be taken into account in reaching a decision; 
but there is no reason to believe that the Federal Trade Commission will fail 
in its duty in this respect." American Chain & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission (C.C.A. 4th 1944), 139 F. (2d) 622. 
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played in reviewing Federal Trade Commission decisions is 
the fact that the Commission is not conducting public business, 
like tax collection, but is rather engaged in as far-reaching 
regulation of private business as has been undertaken by any 
governmental agency. Restrictions as to the price at which 
a manufacturer may sell, the discounts he may give, the 
forms of advertising a seller may employ, and the like, all 
reach to the very heart of private business operations; and 
all involve matters which had been traditionally subject to 
few controls. In such fields, the courts are reluctant to grant 
administrative agencies a free rein. This can be illustrated, 
of course, by earlier cases which imposed severe restrictions 
even on the right of the Commission to obtain information.95 
It can be seen in the courts' repeated characterization as ques-
tions of law issues which might be deemed questions of 
fact-e. g., the question as to what methods of competition 
are unfair, and the question as to whether a proceeding in-
volves the public interest. It can be seen in the readiness of 
the courts to substitute their notions as to proper remedy for 
those of the Commission. While the general attitude of dis-
trust toward any agency seeking to intermeddle in private 
affairs was of course far stronger a decade ago than it is 
now, nevertheless the impulse to watch with care adminis-
trative regulation of purely private business still remains. It 
has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
pointing out that decisions as to the scope of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission's jurisdiction could not be relied 
upon as establishing like powers for the Federal Trade Com-
mission, for the reason-inter alia-that there is so wide a 
difference in the nature of the enterprises which these two 
agencies affect.96 In regulating railroads, the Interstate Com-
95 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 1 44 
S. Ct. 336 ( 1924); Federal Trade Commission v. Baltimore Grain Co. (D. C. 
Md. 1922), 284 Fed. 886, aff'd 267 U.S. 586, 45 S. Ct. 461 (1924). 
96 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 3 u U. S. 349, 353, 
61 S. Ct. 58o (1941). 
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merce Commission is exercising a function which has been 
recognized as a responsibility of government. It has come 
to be thought of as a part of the public business. But regu-
lating the sales methods of a vendor of penny candy bars is 
a different matter. 
(b) Adequacy of administrative procedure. A second 
factor which in the past made for comparatively broad re-
view of decisions of the Federal Trade Commission was a 
lack of confidence on the part of the courts in the fairness 
of the agency's procedures. In former years, there was per-
haps some basis for such suspicion. The courts were not un-
aware, for example, that proceedings against a respondent 
were frequently inspired by the complaint of a competitor, 
who wished to utilize the agency as an ally in a private 
competitive struggle. The practice under which the agency's 
staff assistants prepared the Commission's findings also gave 
rise to doubts. Further, the form of the findings in many 
cases did not inspire confidence-witness the conclusion 
reached in 1924 by one writer that in a number of cases 
( 1) the Commission's findings failed "to give an adequate 
account of respondent's defense, or even to mention the evi-
dence given in respondent's behalf" and ( 2) that the "fre-
quently obvious attempt to frame findings with a view to 
the legal result desired, rather than as a mirror of events 
and circumstances" 97 contributed in a substantial degree to 
the scant respect paid by the courts to the Commission's 
findings. Such cavalier treatment of the testimony was al-
luded to in court opinions.98 While the Commission has gone 
far toward eliminating much of the basis for criticism on 
such grounds, the courts still find occasion to point out de-
fects. In one case, for example, the Commission was taken 
97 Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (192.4) 140, 162.-63. 
98 L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission of America (C.C.A. 6th 
1923), 289 Fed. 985; Curtis Pub. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 
3d 192.1), 2.70 Fed. 881, aff'd sub nom. Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis 
Pub. Co., 26o U.S. 568, 43 S. Ct. 2.10 (192.3). 
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to task for its opposition to a request by respondent that the 
trial examiner's report be certified as part of the record, and 
the court pointed out that the variance between the findings 
of the Commission and those of the trial examiner detracted 
from the claim that the findings of the Commission were 
supported by substantial evidence.99 The apparent reluctance 
of the Commission in some cases to submit to judicial review 
has been the subject ~f judicial comment.100 
Despite the fact that such criticisms continue to appear 
occasionally, nevertheless the courts (accepting the philoso-
phy of the new administrative freedom) are in recent years 
more ready to grant enforcement of the Commission's orders. 
In one case, for example, the court criticized the refusal on 
the part of the Commission to furnish respondent with a bill 
of particulars, remarking that the Commission should in fair-
ness have done so; but the court still held that it could not 
be established that the refusal of the bill of particulars was 
prejudicial and accordingly determined that the order should 
be enforced.101 
(c) Experience and expertness of agency. In the earlier 
days of the Commission's history, there was considerable 
skepticism as to the true expertness of the Commissioners. 
This was referred to in both leading discussions of the work 
of the Commission prior to 1935.102 This attitude was un-
questionably an important factor in many court decisions. 
In the course of time, this attitude has to a large extent 
at least disappeared, and the Commission is recognized as 
a body of experts, duly informed by experience, whose judg-
99 Kidder Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1941), II7 F. 
(2d) 892· 
100 American Drug Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 8th 1945), 
149 F. (2d) 6o8. 
101 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th 1944), 
142 F. (2d) 511. 
102 McFarland, JuDICIAL CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION 
AND THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) 176-177; and Hender-
son, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) 328, 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 365 
ment is to be respected. But the courts still are more willing 
to displace their judgment for that of the agency in the case 
of this Commission than in the case of many other adminis-
trative tribunals, and for the reason that the formulae and 
concepts with which the Federal Trade Commission works 
fall within the particular competence of the courts. The 
judges have apparently felt 103 that only the courts are fully 
qualified to work with such formulae. Questions relating to 
unfair trade practices and unreasonable restraints of com-
petition. do not possess the baffling technicalities of the rate 
problems handled by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
nor the newness and strangeness of the labor relations prob-
lems handled by the National Labor Relations Board. They 
are questions as to which the courts feel themselves on 
familiar ground. Consequently, there has never developed 
quite the respect for administrative expertise that other agen-
cies have enjoyed. 
(d) Role of discretion. In complaint proceedings, there is 
usually a rather narrow issue involved: Has the respondent 
violated a particular section of the statute? In determining 
this question, there is comparatively little room for the 
exercise of discretion. Rather, it is a matter of determining 
whether specified charges have been proved, and this is 
determined as a result of comparatively formal, court-like 
proceedings. This lack of opportunity for wide exercise of 
administrative discretion has served to broaden the permissi-
ble scope of judicial review. 
In one phase of the procedure, however, there is a large 
amount of discretion involved. This is the matter of deter-
mining what remedy shall be adopted, in cases where a 
violation of the law has been established. Shall a respondent, 
for example, be completely enjoined from using a particular 
103 As suggested by Thurman N. Arnold, THE BoTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 
(1940) 99· 
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trade name which infringes on the rights of another and is 
deceiving to the public, or shall he simply be required to 
add an explanatory statement, to wipe out the likelihood of 
deception? Here, increasing respect is being shown for the 
determinations of the Commission, although several of the 
circuit courts of appeal have exhibited considerable reluctance 
toward yielding their former prerogative of freely revising 
the form of the Commission's orders/04 and there still re-
mains a noticeable readiness to find that the Commission has 
abused its discretion in this regard.105 
(e) Lack of legislative power. The functions of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission have been regarded primarily as 
judicial, rather than legislative. This again has served to 
permit a broad scope of review. The tendency of the courts 
to treat nearly all of the ultimate issues before the Commis-
sion as questions of law rather than of fact has of course 
served to accentuate this trend. 
(f) Treatment of questions of law and fact. As a result 
of the fact that (because of the operation of the various 
factors above described) the courts have been inclined to 
104 E.g., see the concurring opinion in Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. Federal 
Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 1944), 142. F. (zd) 437, 442, pointing out 
that "Until recently this court would have regarded itself as competent to 
modify an order which imposed a restraint broader than the necessities of the 
case required"; and see Herzfeld v. Federal Trade Commission ( C.C.A. 2d 
1944), 140 F. (zd) 207, 2.09, where it was said: "Such tribunals possess 
competence in their special fields which forbids us to disturb the measure of 
relief which they think necessary. . . . Congress having now created an 
organ endued with the skill which comes of long experience and penetrating 
study, its conclusions inevitably supersede those of the courts, which are not 
similarly endowed." 
105 In Federal Trade Commission v. A. P. W. Paper Co., Inc., 328 U. S. 
193, 66 S. Ct. 932 (r946), it was held that the Commission lacked the power 
to prohibit a manufacturer's use of the words "Red Cross" and the Greek Red 
Cross emblem in the sale of its product. In Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 327 U.S. 6o8, 66 S. Ct. 758 (1946), the court, while recogniz-
ing that the Commission had broad latitude to exercise its own judgment in 
shaping its order, reversed an order which prohibited the use of a trade name 
because the record did not show that the Commission had considered whether 
some change short of complete excision would have satisfied the ends of the 
act. 
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probe deeply when reviewing determinations of the Federal 
Trade Commission, issues which might well have been de-
scribed as issues of fact (and hence closed to review) have 
been described as reviewable issues of law. Thus, the deter-
mination of the Federal Trade Commission as to the fairness 
of a trade practice is deemed a question of law for the courts; 
whereas the determination by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission as to the fairness of a preferential rate is deemed a 
question of fact. The difference is not logical, but empiric. It 
is accounted for by some difference in the attitude with which 
the courts view determinations of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and those of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
This tendency to treat many of the issues decided by the 
Federal Trade Commission as issues of law has of course 
broadened the scope of review. 
But even the Commission's decisions on the facts have 
not, until the last decade, been accorded the respect paid 
the factual determinations of other agencies. Thus, one stu-
dent of the Commission has concluded that up to 1930 the 
courts had, in reviewing Commission orders, determined the 
sufficiency of the pleadings, determined what should consti-
tute proofs, and what conclusions should be drawn from the 
evidence; and that in fact in only two instances during the 
decade from 1919 to 1929 did the Supreme Court express 
or approve a real deference to the Commission's findings.106 
Another student observed somewhat earlier that not a single 
case could be found in which it could be said that the find-
ings of the Commission had in any way affected the decisions 
of the courts.107 
During this earlier period, the courts had no difficulty in 
determining that the findings of the Commission were not 
supported by substantial evidence, and hence could be dis-
106 McFarland, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) p, 96. 
107 Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION (1924) 336. 
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regarded. But two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1934 108 
insisted that a more generous treatment must be accorded 
the findings of the Commission. Since that time, the courts 
have been cautious in disturbing the findings of the Com-
mission on pure issues of litigation facts, but even in such 
instances, refusal to accept the findings of the Commission 
is sometimes encountered.109 
Where the conclusion of the Commission rests on infer-
ence, rather than an issue of primary fact, the courts have 
been more ready to review the reasonableness of the inference 
than has been true in cases involving other agencies. In Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Asso-
ciation,110 it was said that the inferences reasonably drawn 
from the facts were for the Commission, thus implying the 
existence of a somewhat broad power in the courts to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the inference. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. Raladam Co.,111 the phrase used was "neces-
sary inference." This led several of the courts of appeal to 
conclude that where the finding rested on inference, the court 
was free to disregard the Commission's conclusion, if it could 
be deemed in any way unreasonable or not a necessary 
inference.112 Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
108 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 54 S. 
Ct. 315 (1934), and Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 
291 U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934). 
109 In Gelb v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1944), 144 F. (2d) 
s8o, for example, a finding based on the opinion of a single expert, overlook-
ing opposed testimony which was in part uncontradicted, was set aside as being 
without substantial support in the evidence. 
110 Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 
p, 6 3, 4 7 s. Ct. 2 55 ( I 9 2 7) . 
111 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 651, 51 S. 
Ct. 587 (I9JI). 
112 See, e.g., Dearborn Supply Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 
1944), 146 F. (2d) s, where the facts had been stipulated, but an order 
based on inferences not included in the stipulated facts was held to be without 
support in the evidence; and see Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 
(C.C.A. 6th 1941), 123 F. (2d) 34, rev'd in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 62 S. Ct. 966 (1942). 
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a greater respect must be paid the Commission's inferences, 
remarking in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission 113 that the "weight to be attributed to the facts 
proved or stipulated, and the inferences to be drawn from 
them [italics added], are for the Commission to determine, 
not the courts." But even in that case, the court took pains 
to point out that "We cannot say that the Commission's 
inference here is not supported by the stipulated facts," thus 
indicating that there still remains some readiness to inquire 
whether the facts do support the inference. 
Thus, it must be concluded that even on issues of fact, 
the findings of the Commission received for many years but 
scant deference from the courts. While the trend is clearly 
in the opposite direction, there still remains considerable 
reluctance on the part of some of the courts of appeal, at 
least, to accord the Commission's findings on the facts a full 
measure of respect, particularly in cases where the finding 
rests on inference. 
On many of the issues decided by the Commission, full 
review is permitted because of the readiness of the courts to 
treat as issues of law what might be characterized as issues 
of fact. Thus, questions as to whether the public interest is 
involved in a proceeding, whether a trade practice is unfair, 
whether a practice fosters monopoly, or amounts to an inter-
ference with competition, have been deemed matters of law 
for the courts. 
Here again, the present trend is toward a narrower scope 
of review. While still recognizing the early established doc-
trine 114 that what is an unfair method of competition is a 
question for the courts, the decisions are coming to emphasize 
113 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 32-4 U. S. 
726, 739 , 65 s. Ct. 961 (1 945). 
114 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572 
(1920). 
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the great weight to be given to the findings and experienced 
judgment of the Commission in determining this question.115 
Similarly, the rule reserving to the courts the determination 
as to whether public interest is involved,116 is coming to be 
tempered by the readiness of the courts to accept the finding 
of the Commission that the requisite public interest is pres-
ent.117 
4· Interstate Commerce CommisSion 
(a) Judicial recognition of agency's expertness. Recog-
nition that the Interstate Commerce Commission exercises 
true expertness in passing on complex and technical problems 
led the courts, at a comparatively early period, to adopt a 
self-denying attitude in reviewing the determinations of this 
agency. There is probably no agency which enjoys in greater 
degree the confidence of the courts, and for this reason, the 
scope of review available in the courts is very narrow.118 
Long ago, the Supreme Court characterized this agency as 
a "tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience." 119 
The respect thus indicated for the ability and fairness of the 
Commission has not lessened through the years. More re-
115 Hastings Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I946), 
I53 F. (2d) 253. 
116Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. I9, so S. Ct. I (I929). 
117 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I944), 
I42 F. (2d) SII; Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. Federal Trade Commission 
(C.C.A. 2d I944), I42 F. (2d) 437· 
118 It was not always thus. Before the turn of the century, courts determined 
the case de novo when the Commission applied for enforcement of its order, 
and the courts without hesitation substituted their judgment for that of the 
Commission on matters of fact, law, and policy. See I Sharfman, THE INTER-
STATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION ( I93 I) 23 et seq. The passage of the Hepburn 
Act of I9o6 (34 Stat. 584) had much to do with the change of attitude. For 
an excellent detailed history of changing judicial attitudes toward the decisions 
of the Commission, see 2 Sharfman, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
(I93I) 384-452; and McFarland, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ( I933); 
Tollefson, "Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 503 (I937). 
119 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S. 441, 
454, 27 S. Ct. 7oo (I9o7). 
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cently the court pointed out that "We certainly have neither 
technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon 
the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission." 120 Simi-
larly, the court has reversed lower courts for redetermining 
"administrative" questions passed on by the Commission.121 
The great respect of the courts for the demonstrated 
expertness and fairness of the Commission could be illus-
trated in many ways. It was no accident which led the courts 
to formulate with reference to this agency's decisions the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine (since applied to other agen-
cies) which requires that initial resort be had to the agency 
for a determination of an otherwise justiciable question which 
could be presented to the agency.122 It is commonplace that 
for many years the Interstate Commerce Commission fared 
better in the courts than did other agencies. Nor is this fact 
merely of historical significance. A general disposition to 
accord the Interstate Commerce Commission's determinations 
greater weight than that of newer and less experienced 
agencies can be seen in many recent cases.123 
This respect for the ability and impartiality of the Com-
mission, coupled with the fact that it works in a field so 
technical and complex as to be the despair of the uninitiated, 
are probably the two predominant factors which have induced 
the courts to limit very narrowly the available scope of 
rev1ew. 
(b) Legislative nature of determinations. Many years 
ago, the Supreme Court declared the rate-making functions 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to be legislative, 
120 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 3 I4 U. S. 534, 548, 
62 S. Ct. 366 (I942); and see Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 
649, 6 7 s. Ct. 9 3 I (I 94 7). . 
121 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. I77> 59 S. Ct. 160 (1938). 
122 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 
350 (1907). 
123 Interstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City, 3:u U. S. 503, 
64 S. Ct. II29 (I944); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 
S. Ct. 474 (1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 3u, 64 S. Ct. 587 (1944). 
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rather than judicial/24 and the Court has more recently 
taken occasion to observe that the rate-making process is 
essentially empiric.125 Many of the other functions of the 
Commission fall within the same category, in that the agency 
is changing existing conditions by making a new rule to be 
applied thereafter rather than investigating, declaring, and 
enforcing liabilities as they stand on past facts, under laws 
already existing. Thus, in making regulations as to the assign-
ment of railroad cars between competing prospective users, 
or deciding whether to compel the fixing of joint or through 
rates, or defining the scope of operations to be permitted 
under "grandfather clauses" (permitting long established 
carriers in a given field to continue certain operations without 
qualifying for a license under a subsequently adopted law), 
or deciding whether "need is found . . . to establish for 
private carriers . . . maximum hours of service of em-
ployees," 126 the Commission is functioning rather in the field 
of delegated legislation than that of delegated adjudication. 
The possible scope of judicial review is always more 
narrow, where the administrative determination is legislative. 
Further, where an agency's activities are predominantly in 
the legislative field, and where a legislative element creeps 
into activities which also bear some indicia of judicial proceed-
ings, there is a tendency to deny review of matters which 
might otherwise be deemed to be reviewable by the courts 
as involving questions of law. 
These factors account in large part for the very restricted 
scope of review which is available in the courts when orders 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission are challenged. The 
courts often conclude that the inquiry involved is essentially 
124 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,226-227,29 S. Ct. 
67 (1908). 
125 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 62 S. Ct. 
366 (1942). 
126 Sec. 204 (a) (3) Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 546, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 304. 
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legislative, or (as it is euphemistically called) "administra-
tive," and hence the function is said to be "reserved for the 
Commission,". and one in which the court is accordingly not 
at liberty to consider the soundness of the agency's reasoning 
or the wisdom of its determinations.127 
(c) Conduct of public business. The functions of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission have not been viewed as 
involving the regulation of private business. Control of 
common carriers and other like utilities has been viewed as 
something much more closely related to the conduct of public 
business. While the actual operation of railroads has been 
made a function of government only in emergency periods, 
yet this industry has long been deemed to be one "affected 
with a public interest," and hence subject to a much greater 
degree of governmental control than those industries which 
until recently at least were deemed to be more or less purely 
the private affairs of the individual entrepreneurs. As the 
Supreme Court recently put it, ". . . the owners of . . . 
railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his 
farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily 
to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially 
a public function, it is subject to state regulation." 128 
Since the regulation of railroads and other carriers by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission has thus been regarded as 
a matter closely akin to the conduct of the public business, 
the general principles which operate to restrict the scope of 
judicial review in cases where administrative agencies are 
merely conducting the public business, are applicable on 
review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders. The 
determinations of this Commission are thus viewed in a dif-
ferent light than those of such agencies as the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
127 Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 47 S. Ct. 727 ( 1927); Noble v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 88,63 S. Ct. 950 (1943). 
128 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. sox, so6, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946). 
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whose activities in large measure involve the regulation of 
what has been called purely private business. The tendency 
to restrict judicial review, where the matter involved is the 
conduct of the public business, has been another factor in-
fluencing the very narrow scope of review of decisions of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 
(d) Discretion. As is always true where an agency exer-
cises substantial legislative powers, the determinations of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission involve a large measure of 
discretion. And always, where the role of discretion looms 
larger, the scope of review becomes smaller. The courts have 
not infrequently had occasion to allude to the importance of 
giving free rein to the Commission's discretion. Thus, where 
the question was as to the propriety of prescribed accounting 
methods, the court observed that it was "without power to 
usurp its [the Commission's] discretion and substitute our 
own." 129 Again, where it was claimed that the controlling 
statute in effect required the Commission to adopt a different 
hearing procedure than had been employed, the court de-
clared that it was not "at liberty to prescribe general attitudes 
the Commission must adopt towards the exercise of discretion 
left to it rather than the courts." 13° Further, the court has 
recognized that because of the discretionary nature of the 
Commission's determinations, it is at liberty to make succes-
sive decisions which appear inconsistent. The court has thus 
pointed out that "Considerations that reasonably guide to 
decision in one case may rightly be deemed to have little 
or no bearing in other cases." 131 
129 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, z87 U.S. 134, 141, 53 S. Ct. sz 
(1932). 
13° Interstate Commerce Commission v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U. S. 
671,691,63 S. Ct. 1296 (1943). 
131 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States, z98 U. S. 349, 359, 56 S. Ct. 797 
(1936). 
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Thus, the important part that discretion plays in the 
Commission's determinations has been another factor which 
militates for restricted judicial review. 
(e) Character of procedure. Proceedings before the Com-
mission are marked by a degree of regularity (if not for-
mality) strongly reminiscent of judicial proceedings. The 
Commission's rules are not unlike rules of court. It has its 
own roster of practitioners (specially admitted to practice 
before the Commission) who are mostly specialists in the 
field. Its practices as to the holding of hearings and as to 
the technique of decision making are well established. All 
of its standards of procedure have long been hailed as models 
for other agencies to follow. There has been little if any 
suggestion of bias or partiality on the part of the members 
of the Commission or its staff. The agency is comparatively 
isolated from political pressure. That its officers have special 
competence and ability, in a field where there is a real need 
for technical competence, is never challenged. 
All of these factors further serve to disincline the courts 
to probe deeply into the fairness and reasonableness of the 
Commission's decisions. 
(f) Questions of fact and law. Since all of the criteria on 
which the scope of review normally depends (absent statu-
tory regulation) recommend, in the case of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, that only a narrow review should 
be permitted, it is not surprising that in addition to being 
ready to find "substantial support" in the evidence for 
any challenged findings of fact, the courts show a readi-
ness to describe as issues of fact matters which might other-
wise be deemed questions of law. Thus, such questions 
as-( I) whether a rate is unreasonable or discriminatory; 132 
132 Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268, 46 
S. Ct. soo (1926). 
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( 2) whether a preference is undue and unreasonable; 133 
(3) whether a difference in rates constitutes an "unjust dis-
crimination"; 134 ( 4) whether the statutory term "transpor-
tation" includes yardage service; 135 and (5) whether the 
statutory term "deficit" should be construed one way or 
another 136-have all been deemed to be questions of fact, on 
which the determination of the Commission is conclusive, 
unless it can be plainly shown that the determination was 
entirely without support in the record. 
Why the reasonableness or fairness of a trade practice is 
a question of law, as to which the determination of the 
Federal Trade Commission is only advisory, whereas the 
question as to the reasonableness or fairness of a rate differ-
ential is a question of fact, as to which the determination of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission is conclusive, is a 
question which presents logical difficulties but which can be 
easily answered in the light of practical experience. And the 
life of the law, as the profession has been reminded by one 
of its masters, has been experience, not logic. 
The courts have not insisted that there must be any show-
ing of the reasonableness of the inferences of fact reached 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rather, the court 
has recognized that the Commission may be presumed to be 
able to draw inferences that are not obvious to others.137 
Even where it cannot be disputed that the issues involved 
present questions of law, within the proper competence of 
the courts, there has been great respect paid to the wisdom 
of the Commission. In at least one case, for example, the 
133 United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 235 U. S. 314, 35 S. Ct. r 13 
(1914). 
134 L. T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 967 
(1943). 
135Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216,62 S. Ct. 948 (1942). 
136 Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127, 54 S. Ct. ro8 
(1933); noted in 33 MICH. L. REV. 120 (1934). 
137 O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294, 36 S. Ct. 313 (1916). 
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Supreme Court asked the Commission for advice as to the 
meaning and application of its order.138 And not long ago 
the court observed that "Only where the error is patent may 
we say that the Commission transgressed." 139 Fundamental 
questions of statutory interpretation and the like are of course 
reserved to the courts, particularly where the question affects 
the jurisdiction or powers of the Commission. Except in such 
cases, the courts are disinclined to make an independent 
determination of what might be termed questions of law un-
less the case be one where it appears that the question is 
not "technical," and where the inquiry "would, in all re-
spects, be like that commonly made by courts when called 
upon to construe and apply any other document." 140 
In all respects, therefore, the complex and technical nature 
of the problems handled by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and likewise the demonstrated competence of the 
Commission in its special field, have been the keystone in the 
determination by the courts as to the scope of judicial review 
of its determinations. Any inquiry closely related to factual 
considerations is likely to be deemed a nonreviewable ques-
tion of fact, and only those issues which are largely divorced 
of technical character are deemed reviewable questions of law. 
5· National Labor Relations Board 
The National Labor Relations Board operates largely in 
a field unknown to the common law. In determining, for 
example, what unit is appropriate for collective bargaining 
138 Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 3 I 8 U. S. 67 5> 6 3 S. Ct. 8 34 
(1943). 
139 United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 482, 62 
S. Ct. 722 (1942). 
140 W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 299 U. S. 
393,398,57 S. Ct. 265 (1937); and see Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 216 U.S. 538, 30 S. Ct. 417 (r9ro), where the court 
declared that the mere preference of customers for a particular route could 
not, as a matter of law, be taken as a basis for a determination that any other 
route was unreasonable and unsatisfactory. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
purposes (considering such issues as whether the several 
plants of a single company should bargain jointly or sepa-
rately, whether skilled tradesmen should be represented by 
the same union as unskilled factory help, and the like), and 
similarly in determining what remedies are appropriate to 
eradicate the effectiveness of a prior unfair labor practice, 
the Board is dealing with problems quite unfamiliar to the 
courts. The National Labor Relations Act 141 created whole 
congeries of rights and remedies for labor unions which had 
been previously without substantial judicial recognition. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the courts should show but 
little inclination to substitute their judgment for that of the 
Board on such matters. The courts have no established legal 
standards by which to judge the propriety of the Board's 
action, in many types of cases. 
On the other hand, in carrying out the varied tasks 
imposed upon it by the statute, the Board has had to face 
many questions involving statutory interpretation and certain 
basic constitutional questions, on which the courts feel them-
selves to be on familiar grounds. As to these issues, the courts 
have evinced a willingness to grant full review. 
Thus, judicial review of determinations of the National 
Labor Relations Board stands on somewhat different footing 
than in the case of either the Federal Trade Commission or 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The tendencies and 
basic principles which influence the courts in determining 
the scope of review remain much the same, but their appli-
cation leads to somewhat different results. The courts are, 
on the whole, probably less willing to reverse the National 
Labor Relations Board than the Federal Trade Commission; 
on the other hand, the National Labor Relations Board has 
141 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 15 I et seq. Note that the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, has limited the 
Board's power in many respects, and has narrowed its discretion in determining 
what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. 
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not enjoyed the immunity from extensive judicial supervision 
that has long been accorded the Interstate Commerce Com-
m1ss1on. 
(a) Regard for expertness of agency. Very frequently, 
proceedings before the Board involve difficult questions as 
to an employer's motive. Whether a certain course of action 
does or does not constitute an unfair labor practice often 
depends upon an employer's intent. Thus, granting an in-
crease in pay is ordinarily proper. But if an increase is granted 
during a union's organizational campaign, it may appear to 
have been calculated to discourage organization, and thus to 
constitute an unfair labor practice. Such would be the case, 
for example, if the announcement of the pay increase were 
linked with a public reminder that it is not necessary to join 
a union in order to get a pay raise at that plant.142 In its 
evaluations of the tangled web of contradictory evidence so 
often encountered in hearings on charges of unfair labor 
practice, the Board is credited with an expert ability to dis-
cover the truth. Similarly, when the question concerns the 
remedy which in the particular case will be most efficient to 
carry out the underlying purpose of encouraging collective 
bargaining, deference is paid to administrative experience. 
Further, the National Labor Relations Act is construed as 
having been intended to leave a great deal to the .judgment 
of the Board. Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that 
"The Act . . . entrusts to an expert agency the main-
tenance and promotion of industrial peace . . . factors 
outside our domain of experience may come into play." 143 
Similarly, in upholding an order requiring restitution of 
dues checked off to a company dominated union, as against 
the argument that the order in question violated common-law 
142 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. W. A. Jones Foundry & Ma-
chine Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 123 F. (2d) 552. 
143 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 
194-195, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941). 
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principles of estoppel, the court declared that the Board was 
not compelled to observe conventional legal principles in 
fashioning its order, and observed: "Whether and to what 
extent such matters should be considered is a complex prob-
lem for the Board to decide in the light of its administrative 
experience and knowledge." 144 
The court has likewise said, in sustaining the validity of 
a Board ruling prohibiting the enforcement of a company 
rule which forbade any solicitation on company premises, that 
one of the purposes of the Congress in creating the Board 
". . . is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under 
the particular statute made by experienced officials with an 
adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject." 145 
Again, in sustaining as a finding of fact the determination 
by the Board that newspaper distributors who by common-
law tests might have been deemed independent contractors 
should be treated as employees for purposes of the act, the 
court pointed out: "Everyday experience in the administra-
tion of the statute gives it [the Board] familiarity with the 
circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships 
in various industries . . . and with the adaptability of 
collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of . . . 
disputes. . . . The experience thus acquired must be 
brought frequently to bear. . . . determining whether 
unfair labor practices have been committed, 'belongs to the 
usual administrative routine' of the Board." 146 
But judicial respect for the Board's informed knowledge 
does not go so far as in the case of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. On such questions as to whether employees dis-
charged for engaging in illegal activities retain the benefits 
144 Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 319 
U.S. 533, 543, 63 S. Ct. I2I4 (I943). 
145 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 
793, 8oo, 65 S. Ct. 982 (I945). 
146 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 
III at I3o, 64 S. Ct. 85r (I944). 
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of the statute,147 or whether the Board's order may be per-
mitted to go further than the immediate necessities of the 
case require,148 or whether stipulated facts may be deemed 
to be an unfair labor practice/49 the courts do not show a 
slavish acceptance of the conclusions of the Board, but rather 
determine the questions for themselves. 
(b) The role of discretion; legislative and judicial 
powers. In refusing to review the Board's decision as to the 
appropriateness of a particular bargaining unit or the pro-
priety of a particular remedy, the courts not infrequently 
refer to the fact that as to such matters, the Board exercises 
a broad measure of discretion. Thus, where one labor organ-
ization claimed that the Board's choice of a bargaining unit 
discriminated unfairly against its members, the court ob-
served that the matter was one which "involves an exercise 
of discretion on the part of the Board." 150 Again, where the 
question involved the propriety of an order requiring that 
wages be paid retroactively to men who had never been 
hired, the court said, "Because the relation of remedy to 
policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, 
courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's dis-
cretion and must guard against the danger of sliding uncon-
sciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spa-
cious domain of policy." 151 
But inasmuch as the functions of the National Labor 
Relations Board are primarily judicial in nature and involve 
but little legislative prerogative, the degree of discretion 
147 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 
U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490 ( 1939). 
148 National Labor Relations Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 61 
S. Ct. 693 (1941). 
149 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S. 
678, 64 s. Ct. 830 (1944). 
150 International Association of Machinists; Tool and Die Makers Lodge 
No. 35 etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72, 82, 61 S. Ct. 83 
(1940). 
151 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 
194, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941), 
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enjoyed is more limited than that possessed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in exercising its broad legislative 
powers. Thus, in one case, the court, after conceding that 
the authorization of the Board to determine the remedy is 
broad, yet insisted that this discretion "has its limits," and 
held that nothing in the act conferred upon the Board dis-
cretionary power to order reinstatement of seamen who had 
struck in violation of the federal mutiny statute.152 In a some-
what similar case, the court declared that "whatever discre-
tion may be deemed to be committed to the Board, its limits 
were transcended" by an order requiring the reinstatement 
of former employees who had engaged in a sit-down strike.153 
The extent to which the Board's powers are discretionary 
varies with the type of proceeding. In selecting the unit which 
shall be used for collective bargaining, it exercises a large 
measure of discretion, and review is accordingly narrowed. 
But in deciding whether an unfair labor practice has been 
committed, or whether in order to effectuate the policy of 
promoting the bargaining power of unions it may condone 
illegal activities, the Board's activity is judicial, rather than 
discretionary, and a broader scope of review is permitted. 
(c) Public interest involved. In carrying out its duties, 
the National Labor Relations Board cannot quite be said 
to be engaged in the conduct of the public business, in the 
sense that such observation can be made of the tax collector 
or the customs inspector or the immigration officer. But, on 
the other hand, neither can the National Labor Relations 
Board be viewed as an agency which regulates private business 
in the sense that the Federal Trade Commission restricts 
merchandising practices or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission controls the activities of brokers and investment 
152 Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I 6 U. S. 
31, 62 S. Ct. 886 (1942). 
153 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 
U.S. 24o, 258, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939). 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 383 
bankers. Its functions are much more closely related to the 
conduct of the public business than to the regulation of pri-
vate business, for the Board does not exercise any superin-
tending control over the methods which the entrepreneur 
shall employ in running his business. It only insists that in 
running it, he must not discourage union activities among his 
employees. It does not undertake to fix hours, or wages, or 
prices, or trade practices, or employment conditions. Neither 
does it require disclosure of confidential information. Its 
function is merely that of a policeman, enforcing a more or 
less well defined rule of conduct. As the Supreme Court has 
put it, the function of the Board is to facilitate the "Attain-
ment of a great national policy," which, it is judicially 
recognized, is to be sought "through expert administration 
in collaboration with limited judicial review." 154 
In other words, the courts take the attitude that it has 
become a part of the public business of the country to police 
labor relations to the extent, at least, of effectively dis-
couraging unfair labor practices. There is thus a tendency 
to trim the scope of judicial review to the restricted scope 
customarily available where the administrative agency is 
merely conducting the public business. 
(d) Fairness of administrative procedure. The National 
Labor Relations Board does not enjoy, as does the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the benefits of a general or unani-
mous judicial conviction that its attitude is unbi~sed and its 
procedures carefully designed to assure fair treatment to 
the parties respondent. The Supreme Court from time to 
time has had occasion implicitly to criticize some of the 
attitudes and procedures of the Board. Thus, it has been 
necessary for the court to remind the Board that it does not 
154 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 
188, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941). 
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have power to impose penalties.155 Again, the Board has been 
cautioned that it does not have warrant to issue a general 
injunction against any violation of the statute, where the 
evidence disclosed only a limited violation and there was no 
basis shown for anticipating further attempts to violate the 
law.156 
The Board has been found guilty of exhibiting an excess 
of zeal, with the pointed observation that "the Board has 
not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor 
Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore 
other and equally important Congressional objectives. . . . 
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body 
that it undertake this accommodation [of one statutory 
scheme to another] without excessive emphasis upon its im-
mediate task." 157 
The opinions of the Board have not been regarded as 
models of clarity. In one case, the Supreme Court com-
plained, in remanding a case for further consideration by the 
Board, that "From the record of the present case we cannot 
really tell why the Board has ordered reinstatement of the 
strikers. . . . The administrative process will best be 
vindicated by clarity in its exercise." 158 
In another case, while the majority of the court sustained 
the Board in its refusal to admit or consider certain evidence 
which two of the parties to a Board proceeding wished to 
introduce, a minority protested bitterly against the unfair-
155 Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I I U. S. 7> 
6I s. Ct. 77 (I940). 
156 National Labor Relations Board v. Express Pub. Co., 3 I2 U. S. 426, 6I 
S. Ct. 693 ( I94I). 
157 Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3I6 U. S. 
3I, 47, 62 S. Ct. 886 (I942). 
158 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I3 U. S. I77> 
I96-I97> 6I s. Ct. 845 (I94I). 
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ness of this refusal to consider matters which might have been 
of importance.159 
In another case, refusal to receive evidence was criticized 
by the court as unreasonable and arbitrary.160 
In the earlier days of the Board's history, protests were 
frequently made against the practice which it was alleged 
the Board then followed, whereby decisions were sometimes 
actually made by "review attorneys" who had not heard the 
testimony. Similarly, it was claimed the Board entered orders 
without having familiarized itself with the contents of the 
record on which the order was based. These complaints were 
frequently considered by the courts of appeal/61 and they 
were sufficiently numerous to raise considerable doubt as to 
the fairness of the Board's earlier procedures. Similarly, 
attacks were frequently made, and sometimes with success/62 
upon the unfair conduct of trial examiners, and their demon-
strated bias and prejudice. 
The doubts thus engendered had some influence (for a 
time, at least) in persuading the courts to probe more search-
ingly when reviewing orders of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board than when considering orders of such agencies 
as the Interstate Commerce Commission. As with developing 
159 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 x 3 U. S. 
146, 6x S. Ct. 908 (1941). 
16° Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938). 
161 National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. sth 
1938), 98 F. (2d) 444; Botany Worsted Mills v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1939), xo6 F. (2d) 263; Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 95 F. (2d) 390; 
Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 
8th 1939), 103 F. (2d) 953; Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 305 U.S. 364, 59 S. Ct. 301 (1939); National Labor Relations Board 
v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (2d) 16. 
162 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (Union of 
Ward Employees) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 103 F. (2d) 147; National Labor 
Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. sth 1943), 136 F. (zd) 562; Inland Steel 
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 109 F. (zd) 9· 
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years the Board gained a maturity of judgment, and cor-
rected many of the conditions which led to this criticism of 
its fairness, there has of course been a corresponding lessen-
ing of this earlier inclination to extend the scope of review. 
(e) Review of questions of fact. While the Supreme Court 
on occasion 163 and the courts of appeal not infrequently 164 
found that there was no vestige of substantial evidence to 
support the findings of the Board and accordingly refused 
to accept its factual findings, and while the courts have 
had not infrequent occasion to reiterate, in reviewing find-
ings of the Board, that mere uncorroborated hearsay or 
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence/65 yet any 
examination of the decisions makes it equally clear that very 
little evidence is required to meet the test of "substantiality" 
which prior to the recent amendment of the statute rendered 
the Board's factual findings conclusive.166 Further, in those 
cases where it was believed that administrative experience 
163 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamp-
ing Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 (1939). 
164 E.g., Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board ( C.C.A. 
8th I94o), III F. (2d) 783; National Labor Relations Board v. Goshen Rub-
ber & Manufacturing Co. (C.C.A. 7th I94o), IIO F. (2d) 432; National 
Labor Relations Board v. International Shoe Co. (C.C.A. 8th I94o), II6 F. 
(2d) 31; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 
sth I94o), 1I2 F. (2d) 545; Martel Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (C.C.A. 4th I94o), I14 F. (2d) 624. 
165 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 
I97, 59 S. Ct. 206 (I938); Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th I938), 93 F. (2d) 985; Interlake Iron Corp. v. 
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1942), I3I F. (2d) 129.· 
166 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Bell Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 3I9 U. S. so, 63 S. Ct. 905 (1943); Washington, Virginia 
& Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 30I U. S. 142, 57 
S. Ct. 648 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 
U. S. 5 84, 61 S. Ct. 3 58 (I 94 I). Note that the Labor Management Relations 
Act, I947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, broadens the courts' power 
to review issues of fact. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456 ( 1951). See Iserman, "The Labor 
Management Act: New Law as to Evidence and the Scope of Review," 33 
A. B. A. J. 760 (1947); George, "Evidence in NLRB. Cases in the Supreme 
Court," 30 CoRN. L. Q. 350 ( 1945). 
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attributed trustworthiness to a determination which could be 
treated as either a question of law or fact, the courts have 
treated as questions of fact issues which would probably be 
considered reviewable as questions of law, were it not for 
the trust reposed in administrative expertise. Thus, the ques-
tion as to whether or not, on undisputed facts, a relationship 
was one of employer-employee or of independent contractor-
ship was treated as a question of fact; 167 and similarly the 
question as to whether the activities of a fraternal insurance 
association substantially affect commerce, so as to come within 
the Board's jurisdiction, has been treated (despite the doc-
trine thought to permit independent review of questions of 
jurisdictional fact) as a question for the Board to decide.168 
The various factors above discussed which have persuaded 
the courts to review somewhat broadly those determinations 
by the Board which have a legalistic background have occa-
sionally prompted the courts to examine critically inferences 
made by the Board from established primary facts. Thus, 
where it was thought a particular order might have been 
entered without giving due consideration to the employer's 
constitutional rights of free speech, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Board's finding 
of coercion was based solely on an announcement made by 
the company's president (in which case constitutional limita-
tions would have vitiated the order) or whether it was based 
on a whole congerie of circumstances; and the court held 
that the findings of the Board were so ambiguous and doubt-
ful that its inference could not be sustained. The court re-
manded the case to the Board for further consideration.169 
167 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322. U. S. 
III, 64 s. Ct. 8p (1944). 
168 Polish National Alliance of United States of America v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643,64 S. Ct. II96 (1944). 
169 National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 
U.S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344 (1941). 
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On the other hand, cases are much more frequent where 
the court's respect for the Board's particular experience in 
the complexities of labor relations has led it to sustain with-
out inquiry the inference made by the Board from proved 
facts. The court has held, for example, that the Board need 
not show that there is evidence to support its inference that 
a rule against solicitation of any sort on company premises 
is an unfair labor practice.170 Not infrequently, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that Congress entrusted to the Board, 
and not to the courts, the drawing of inferences from incon-
clusive factual showings. The court has recognized that in 
unfair practice cases, the lack of positive evidence is nat-
ural; 171 and it has more than once reversed courts of appeal 
for substituting their judgment for that of the Board as to 
the inference to be drawn from disputed facts.172 
(f) Questions of law. In those fields where it is felt 
that administrative competence and experience should be a 
controlling factor in decision, the courts have been satisfied 
if the Board's conclusion has a "reasonable basis in the law." 
Even if the law question might have been otherwise deter-
mined by the court, the administrative decision will not be 
upset unless it is patently wrong. In this connection, the 
courts have stressed the points (I) that where the question 
is one which arises initially in agency proceedings, it acquires 
a somewhat factual tinge even though it might otherwise be 
deemed purely a law question; and (2.) that application of 
statutory language to given facts, as distinguished from pure 
interpretation of the statutory language, is rather for the 
170 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 
793, 65 s. Ct. 982 (1 945). 
171 National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc., 
315 U.S. 685, 62 S. Ct. 846 (1942). 
172 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 31 I U. S. 584, 
597, 61 S. Ct. 358 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada 
Consolidated Copper Corp., p6 U.S. 105, 62 S. Ct. 96o (1942); National 
Labor Relations Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 6o S. Ct. 
6II (1940). 
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Board than for the court. Thus, the court has said, "Undoubt-
edly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when 
arising for the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for 
the courts to resolve. . . . But where the question is one 
of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceed-
ing which the agency administering the statute must deter-
mine initially, the reviewing court's function is limited." 173 
Again, the court has pointed out that ordinarily determina-
tion of what constitutes an unfair labor practice is for the 
Board as part of its task of "applying" the act's general 
prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of 
events which might be charged as violative of the act.174 
Still again, the question as to whether or not it is appropriate 
for the Board to order an employer to bargain with a union 
representing only a minority of his employees, where the 
union's majority status was lost because of the employer's 
unfair labor practices, was treated as a question for the 
Board.175 While this could be viewed as presenting only a 
law question, yet it is obvious that such questions of interpre-
tation are peculiarly susceptible to considerations of informed 
administrative judgment. 
But the courts find somewhat more frequently in the case 
of the National Labor Relations Board than in the case of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, perhaps, that the 
question involved is not controlled by considerations of spe-
cialized knowledge, and that accordingly the question falls 
within the peculiar competence of the courts and should be 
fully reviewed and redetermined as presenting questions of 
law. Thus, where the question was whether the term "em-
ployee" could be extended to include former employees dis-
173 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., pz U. S. 
rii, r3o-rp, 64 S. Ct. 851 (r944). 
174 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 
793,65 s. Ct. 98z (1945). 
175 National Labor Relations Board v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U. S. 5 u, 6z 
s. Ct. 397 (194Z). 
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charged for unlawful conduct, the court had no hesitancy in 
reviewing and reversing the Board's conclusion.176 And while 
as above noted, the determination as to whether or not an 
unfair labor practice has been committed is ordinarily con-
sidered a question for the Board, yet where that question is 
presented on clearly established facts, it is treated as a ques-
tion of law.177 
The division of justiciable questions between unreviewable 
issues of fact and fully reviewable issues of law is, in other 
words, somewhat different in the case of this agency than in 
the case of either the Interstate Commerce Commission or 
the Federal Trade Commission. The differences can be 
accounted for largely by differences in the types of issues 
involved, and in the varying applicability of the general 
principles which influence the courts toward either broad or 
narrow revtew. 
176 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 
U.S. 2.4o, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939). 
177 E.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 32 x 
U.S. 678, 64 S. Ct. 83o (1944). 
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Administrative Procedure Act 1 
AN AcT to improve the administration of justice by pre-
scribing fair administrative procedure. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
TITLE 
Sec. I. This Act may be cited as the "Administrative 
Procedure Act." 
DEFINITIONS 
Sec. 2. As used in this Act-
( a) Agency.-"Agency" means each authority (whether 
or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the 
Government of the United States other than Congress, the 
courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, 
1 Act of June II, 1946, c. 324, 6o Stat. :1.37, 5 U.S.C. § Ioox. 
The following amendments, which have excluded from the operation of the 
Act particular administrative agencies or particular administrative functions, 
were enacted prior to January x, r 9 51 : 
Act of August 8, 1946, c. 870, Title III, § 30:>., 6o Stat. 918 (relating to 
various functions of the Federal Housing Expeditor) ; 
Act of August xo, 1946, c. 951, Title VI,§ 6or, 6o Stat. 993 (likewise relating 
to certain functions of the Federal Housing Expeditor); 
Act of March 31, 1947, c. 30, § 6 (a), 6r Stat. 37 (relating to the administra· 
tion of Sugar Controls) ; 
Act of June 30, 1947, c. 163, Title II, § :>.~o, 61 Stat. zox (relating to the 
Housing and Rent Act of 1947); 
Act of March 30, 1948, c. 161, Title III,§ 301, 6:>. Stat. 99 (relating to the 
Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947, as amended in 1948); 
Act of February :>.6, 1949, c. II, 63 Stat. 7 (relating to the Export Control 
Act); 
Act of September 8, 1950, c. 932, Public Laws 774 (relating to functions 
exercised under the Defense Production Act of 1950); 
Act of September 27, 1950, c. 1052, Public Law 843 (relating to proceedings 
for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens). 
39 1 
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or the District of Columbia. Nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to repeal delegations of authority as provided by 
law. Except as to the requirements of section 3, there shall 
be excluded from the operation of this Act (I) agencies com-
posed of representatives of the parties or of representatives 
of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by 
them, ( 2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) mili-
tary or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war 
or in occupied territory, or (4) functions which by law expire 
on the termination of present hostilities, within any fixed 
period thereafter, or before July I, I947, and the functions 
conferred by the following statutes: Selective Training and 
Service Act of I 940; Contract Settlement Act of I 944; 
Surplus Property Act of I 944· 
(b) Person and Party.-"Person" includes individuals, 
partnerships, corporations, associations, or public or private 
organizations of any character other than agencies. "Party" 
includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party, 
or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted 
as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein 
shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any 
person or agency as a party for limited purposes. 
(c) Rule and Rule Making.-"Rule" means the whole 
or any part of any agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency and 
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, 
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations 
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances 
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices 
bearing upon any of the foregoing. "Rule making" means 
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agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal 
of a rule. 
(d) Order and Adjudication.-"Order" means the whole 
or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, 
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency 
in any matter other than rule making but including licensing. 
"Adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of 
an order. 
(e) License and Licensing.-"License" includes the 
whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, 
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or 
other form of permission. "Licensing" includes agency proc-
ess respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, sus-
pension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amendment, 
modification, or conditioning of a license. 
(f) Sanction and Relief.-"Sanction" includes the whole 
or part of any agency (I) prohibition, requirement, limita-
tion, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; 
(2) withholding of relief; (3) imposition of any form of 
penalty or fine; (4) destruction, taking, seizure, or withhold-
ing of property; ( 5) assessment of damages, reimbursement, 
restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; ( 6) require-
ment, revocation, or suspension of a license; or ( 7) taking of 
other compulsory or restrictive action. "Relief" includes 
the whole or part of any agency (I) grant of money, assist-
ance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or 
remedy; ( 2) recognition of any claim, right, immunity, 
privilege, exemption, or exception; or (3) taking of any 
other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial 
to, any person. 
(g) Agency Proceeding and Action.-"Agency proceed-
ing" means any agency process as defined in subsections (c), 
(d), and (e) of this section. "Agency action" includes the 
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whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, 
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act. 
PuBLIC INFORMATION 
Sec. 3. Except to the extent that there is involved (I) any 
function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public 
interest or ( 2) any matter relating solely to the internal 
management of an agency-
( a) Rules.-Every agency shall separately state and 
currently publish in the Federal Register (I) descriptions 
of its central and field organization including delegations 
by the agency of final authority and the established places 
at which, and methods whereby, the public may secure infor-
mation or make submittals or requests; (2) statements of 
the general course and method by which its functions are 
channeled and determined, including the nature and require-
ments of all formal or informal procedures available as well 
as forms and instructions as to the scope and contents of all 
papers, reports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules 
adopted as authorized by law and statements of general 
policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the 
agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules addressed 
to and served upon named persons in accordance with law. 
No person shall in any manner be required to resort to 
organization or procedure not so published. 
(b) Opinions and Orders.-Every agency shall publish 
or, in accordance with published rule, make available to public 
inspection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of 
cases (except those required for good cause to be held con-
fidential and not cited as precedents) and all rules. 
(c) Public Records.-Save as otherwise required by stat-
ute, matters of official record shall in accordance with pub-
lished rule be made available to persons properly and directly 
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concerned except information held confidential for good 
cause found. 
RuLE MAKING 
Sec. 4· Except to the extent that there is involved (I) any 
military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United 
States or ( 2) any matter relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts-
( a) Notice .-General notice of proposed rule making 
shall be published in the Federal Register (unless all persons 
subject thereto are named and either personally served or 
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law) 
and shall include (I) a statement of the time, place, and 
nature of public rule making proceedings; ( 2) reference to 
the authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) 
either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a de-
scription of the subjects and issues involved. Except where 
notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection shall 
not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, 
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or in 
any situation in which the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons 
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure 
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest. 
(b) Procedures.-After notice required by this section, 
the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written 
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to 
present the same orally in any manner; and, after considera-
tion of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall in-
corporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement 
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of their basis and purpose. Where rules are required by 
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing, the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall 
apply in place of the provisions of this subsection. 
(c) Effective Dates.-The required publication or serv-
ice of any substantive rule (other than one granting or 
recognizing exemption or relieving restriction or interpreta-
tive rules and statements of policy) shall be made not less 
than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except 
as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found 
and published with the rule. 
(d) Petitions.-Every agency shall accord any interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule. 
ADJUDICATION 
Sec. 5· In every case of adjudication required by statute 
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved 
( 1) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and 
the facts de novo in any court; ( 2) the selection or tenure 
of an officer or employee of the United States other than 
examiners appointed pursuant to section 11 ; (3) proceed-
ings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or 
elections; (4) the conduct of military, naval, or foreign 
affairs functions; (5) cases in which an agency is acting as 
an agent for a court; and ( 6) the certification of employee 
representatives-
( a) N otice.-Persons entitled to notice of an agency 
hearing shall be timely informed of (I) the time, place, and 
nature thereof; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction 
under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters 
of fact and law asserted. In instances in which private persons 
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are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall 
give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law; 
and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive 
pleading. In fixing the times and places for hearings, due 
regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the 
parties or their representatives. 
(b) Procedure.-The agency shall afford all interested 
parties opportunity for ( 1) the submission and consideration 
of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of 
adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and 
the public interest permit, and ( 2) to the extent that the 
parties are unable so to determine any controversy by con-
sent, hearing, and decision upon notice and in conformity 
with sections 7 and 8. 
(c) Separation of Functions.-The ,Same officers who 
preside at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 7 
shall make the recommended decision or initial decision re-
quired by section 8 except where such officers become unavail-
able to the agency. Save to the extent required for the dis-
position of ex parte matters as authorized by law, no such 
officer shall consult any person or party on any fact in issue 
unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to partici-
pate; nor shall such officer be responsible to or subject to 
the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent 
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for any agency. No officer, employee, or agent 
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a 
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, 
recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 
8 except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This 
subsection shall not apply in determining applications for 
initial licenses or to proceedings involving the validity or 
application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities 
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or carriers; nor shall it be applicable in any manner to the 
agency or any member or members of the body comprising 
the agency. 
(d) Declaratory Orders.-The agency is authorized in 
its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of other 
orders, to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy 
or remove uncertainty. 
ANCILLARY MATTERS 
Sec. 6. Except as otherwise provided in this Act-
( a) Appearance.-Any person compelled to appear in 
person before any agency or representative thereof shall be 
accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and ad-
vised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other 
qualified representative. Every party shall be accorded the 
right to appear in person or by or with counsel or other duly 
qualified representative in any agency proceeding. So far as 
the orderly conduct of public business permits, any inter-
ested person may appear before any agency or its responsible 
officers or employees for the presentation, adjustment, or 
determination of any issue, request or controversy in any pro-
ceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise) or in con-
nection with any agency function. Every agency shall proceed 
with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented 
to it except that due regard shall be had for the convenience 
and necessity of the parties or their representatives. Nothing 
herein shall be construed either to grant or to deny to any 
person who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or repre-
sent others before any agency or in any agency proceeding. 
(b) Investigations .-No process, requirement of a re-
port, inspection, or other investigative act or demand shall be 
issued, made, or enforced in any manner or for any purpose 
except as authorized by law. Every person compelled to sub-
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mit data or evidence shall be entitled to retain or, on payment 
of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript 
thereof, except that in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding 
the witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of 
the official transcript of his testimony. 
(c) Subpenas.-Agency subpenas authorized by law shall 
be issued to any party upon request and, as may be required 
by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of 
general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence 
sought. Upon contest the court shall sustain any such sub-
pena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is 
found to be in accordance with law and, in any proceeding 
for enforcement, shall issue an order requiring the appear-
ance of the witness or the production of the evidence or data 
within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for 
contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply. 
(d) Denials.-Prompt notice shall be given of the denial 
in whole or in part of any written application, petition, or 
other request of any interested person made in connection 
with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior 
denial or where the denial is self-explanatory, such notice 
shall be accompanied by a simple statement of procedural or 
other grounds. 
HEARINGS 
Sec. 7. In hearings which section 4 or 5 requires to be 
conducted pursuant to this section-
( a) Presiding Officers.-There shall preside at the tak-
ing of evidence ( r) the agency, ( 2) one or more members 
of the body which comprises the agency, or (3) one or 
more examiners appointed as provided in this Act; but 
nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct 
of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or 
before boards or other officers specially provided for by or 
400 APPENDIX 
designated pursuant to statute. The functions of all presiding 
officers and of officers participating in decisions in conformity 
with section 8 shall be conducted in an impartial manner. 
Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he deems him-
self disqualified; and, upon the filing in good faith of a 
timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualifica-
tion of any such officer, the agency shall determine the matter 
as a part of the record and decision in the case. 
(b) Hearing Powers.-Officers presiding at hearings shall 
have authority, subject to the published rules of the agency 
and within its powers, to (I) administer oaths and affirma-
tions, ( 2) issue subpenas authorized by law, (3) rule upon 
offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, (4) take or 
cause depositions to be taken whenever the ends of justice 
would be served thereby, (5) regulate the course of the 
hearing, ( 6) hold conferences for the settlement or simpli-
fication of the issues by consent of the parties, ( 7) dispose 
of procedural requests or similar matters, ( 8) make decisions 
or recommend decisions in conformity with section 8, and 
( 9) take any other action authorized by agency rule con-
sistent with this Act. 
(c) Evidence.-Except as statutes otherwise provide, the 
proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof. 
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every 
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion 
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and 
no sanctions shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except 
upon consideration of the whole record or such portions there-
of as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in 
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence. Every party shall have the right to present his case 
or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit re-
buttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as 
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. 
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In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits 
or applications for initial licenses any agency may, where the 
interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt 
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence 
in written form. 
(d) Record.-The transcript of testimony and exhibits, 
together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, 
shall constitute the exclusive record for decision in accordance 
with section 8 and, upon payment of lawfully prescribed costs, 
shall be made available to the parties. Where any agency 
decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing 
in the evidence in the record, any party shall on timely 
request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary. 
DECISIONS 
Sec. 8. In cases in which a hearing is required to be con-
ducted in conformity with section 7-
(a) Action by Subordinates.-In cases in which the agen-
cy has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the 
officer who presided (or, in cases not subject to subsection (c) 
of section 5, any other officer or officers qualified to preside 
at hearings pursuant to section 7) shall initially decide the 
case or the agency shall require (in specific cases or by 
general rule) the entire record to be certified to it for initial 
decision. Whenever such officers make the initial decision and 
in the absence of either an appeal to the agency or review 
upon motion of the agency within time provided by rule, 
such decision shall without further proceedings then become 
the decision of the agency. On appeal from or review of the 
initial decisions of such officers the agency shall, except as it 
may limit the issues upon notice or by rule, have all the 
powers which it would have in making the initial decision. 
Whenever the agency makes the initial decision without 
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having presided at the reception of the evidence, such officers 
shall first recommend a decision except that in rule making 
or determining applications for initial licenses (I) in lieu 
thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or any of 
its responsible officers may recommend a decision or ( 2.) any 
such procedure may be omitted in any case in which the 
agency finds upon the record that due and timely execution of 
its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires. 
(b) Submittals and Decisions.-Prior to each recom-
mended, initial, or tentative decision, or decision upon agency 
review of the decision of subordinate officers the parties shall 
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit for the con-
sideration of the officers participating in such decisions (I) 
proposed findings and conclusions, or ( 2.) exceptions to the 
decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate officers 
or to tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting reasons 
for such exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions. The 
record shall show the ruling upon each such finding, con-
clusion, or exception presented. All decisions (including 
initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become 
a part of the record and include a statement of (I) findings 
and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon 
all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on 
the record; and ( 2.) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, 
relief, or denial thereof. 
SANCTIONS AND PowERS 
Sec. 9· In the exercise of any power or authority-
( a) In General.-No sanction shall be imposed or sub-
stantive rule or order be issued except within jurisdiction del-
egated to the agency and as authorized by law. 
(b) Licenses.-ln any case in which application is made 
for a license required by law the agency, with due regard to 
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the rights or privileges of all the interested parties or ad-
versely affected persons and with reasonable dispatch, shall 
set and complete any proceedings required to be conducted 
pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of this Act or other proceedings 
required by law and shall make its decision. Except in cases 
of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or 
safety requires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension, revoca-
tion, or annulment of any license shall be lawful unless, prior 
to the institution of agency proceedings therefor, facts or 
conduct which may warrant such action shall have been 
called to the attention of the licensee by the agency in writing 
and the licensee shall have been accorded opportunity to 
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful require-
ments. In any case in which the licensee has, in accordance 
with agency rules, made timely and sufficient application for 
a renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any 
activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such appli-
cation shall have been finally determined by the agency. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Sec. ro. Except so far as (I) statutes preclude judicial 
review or ( 2) agency action is by law committed to agency 
discretion-
( a) Right of Review.-Any person suffering legal wrong 
·because of any agency action or adversely affected o~ ag-
grieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant 
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. 
(b) Form and Venue of Action.-The form of proceeding 
for judicial review shall be any special statutory review pro-
ceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified 
by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any appli-
cable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory 
judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction 
or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
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Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or 
criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the 
extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for 
such review is provided by law. 
(c) Reviewable Acts.-Every agency action made review-
able by statute and every final agency action for which there 
is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to 
judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate 
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be sub-
ject to review upon the review of the final agency action. 
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency 
action otherwise final shall be final for the purposes of this 
subsection whether or not there has been presented or deter-
mined any application for a declaratory order, for any form 
of reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires 
by rule and provides that the action meanwhile shall be inop-
erative) for an appeal to superior agency authority. 
(d) Interim Relief.-Pending judicial review any agency 
is authorized, where it finds that justice so requires, to post-
pone the effective date of any action taken by it. Upon such 
conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary 
to prevent irreparable injury, every reviewing court (includ-
ing every court to which a case may be taken on appeal from 
or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a review-
ing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate 
process to postpone the effective date of any agency action 
or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the re-
view proceedings. 
(e) Scope of Review.-So far as necessary to decision 
and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability 
of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency 
action unlawfully withhel<:f or unreasonably delayed; and 
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(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be (I) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ( 2) con-
trary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of 
procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial 
evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 
7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute; or ( 6) unwarranted by the 
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determina-
tions the court shall review the whole record or such portions 
thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall 
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 
ExAMINERs 
Sec. 11. Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the 
extent not inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed 
by and for each agency as many qualified and competent 
examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to 
section 7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation 
so far as practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent 
with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examin-
ers shall be removable by the agency in which they are em-
ployed only for good cause established and determined by 
the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Com-
mission) after opportunity for hearing and upon the record 
thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by 
the Commission independently of agency recommendations 
or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of 
1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs 
( 2) and ( 3) of subsection (b) of section 7 of said Act, as 
amended, and the provisions of section 9 of said Act, as 
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amended, shall not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or 
temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners 
selected by the Commission from and with the consent of 
other agencies. For the purposes of this section, the Commis-
sion is authorized to make investigations, require reports by 
agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the 
Congress, promulgate rules, appoint such advisory commit-
tees as may be deemed necessary, recommend legislation, 
subpena witnesses or records, and pay witness fees as estab-
lished for the United States courts. 
CoNSTRUCTION AND EFFECT 
Sec. I2. Nothing in this Act shall be held to diminish the 
constitutional rights of any person or to limit or repeal addi-
tional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recog-
nized by law. Except as otherwise required by law, all re-
quirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure 
shall apply equally to agencies and persons. If any provision 
of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, the 
remainder of this Act or other applications of such provision 
shall not be affected. Every agency is granted all authority 
necessary to comply with the requirements of this Act through 
the issuance of rules or otherwise. No subsequent legislation 
shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this 
Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so ex-
pressly. This Act shall take effect three months after its 
approval except that sections 7 and 8 shall take effect six 
months after such approval, the requirement of the selection 
of examiners pursuant to section 11 shall not become effective 
until one year after such approval, and no procedural re-
quirement shall be mandatory as to any agency proceeding 
initiated prior to the effective date of such requirement. 
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Accounting systems, power of 
agencies to prescribe, 14.2. 
Administrative adjudications, 
technique of decision making, 
2 I I. 
Administrative agencies 
characteristics 
biased interpretation of evi-
dence, 235· 
broadening policy of stat-
ute, 225. 
effect of discovery powers, 
125· 
eliminating hearings, 236. 
enlarging agency jurisdic-
tion, 225. 
interest in result, 20. 
keeping criteria of decision 
secret, 261. 
reliance on discretion, 2 I, 
224. 
reliance on private consul-
tations, 237. 
reluctance to furnish bills 
of particulars, I o8. 
reluctance to give notice 




continuity of supervision, 
19. 
execution of preventive leg-
islation, I4. 




United States, 1 o. 
Administrative functions 
courts will not exercise, 33· 
not judicially reviewable, 33, 
308. 
Administrative law, definitions, 
4· 
Administrative officers, personal 
liability, 337. 
Administrative rules. See Rule 
making; Rules. 
Alien proceedings 
judicial review, 342. 
notice and hearing, 63. 
Bias and prejudice 
interest in result typical of ad-
ministrative agencies, 20. 
personal or pecuniary interest, 
157· 
personal prejudice, 158. 
type of partiality that disquali-
fies, 157· 
Bills of particulars, I03, Io8. 
Burden of proof, in administra-
tive proceedings, I 89. 
Certiorari, judicial review by 
certiorari, 332. 
Collateral attack, on adminis-
trative orders, 336. 
Constitutional fact questions, 
scope of review, 3 I 4· 
Crimes, violation of rules as 
crimes, 283. 
Cross-examination, right to, 171. 
461 
INDEX 
Declaratory judgments, use in 
administrative proceedings, 
336. 
Delegation of powers 
crimes, delegation of power 
to define, 42, 2S3. 
limits 
cases where constitutional 
limits are nonexistent, 
45· 
stricter where judicial pow-
er delegated, 44· 
subdelegation 
practical problems, 49· 
validity, 4S. 
tests of validity 
discretion in executing law 
as against power to make 
law, 37· 
effect of broad judicial re-
view, 44· 
effect of provision for notice 
and hearing, 43· 
need for expertness, 43· 
power to determine facts as 
against power to make 
policy, 3S. 
precluding delegation of 




mental departments, 31. 
preventing delegation of 
uncontrolled discretion-
ary powers, 34· 
relationship of standard to 
establish legal concepts, 
41. 
subordinate rules within 
prescribed limits, 3S. 
sufficiency of statutory 
standard, 36. 
tradition, effect of, 41. 
Discovery. See Examination of 
books and records; Inspection 
of premises; Physical inspec-
tions; Reports; Subpoenas. 
Discretionary powers 
general 
effect on judicial review, 
345· 
tendency to rely on discre-
tion, 21. 
limits 
cases where unlimited dis-
cretionary powers may 
be delegated, 45· 
effect of separation of pow-
ers doctrine, 34· 
Due process. See also Procedural 
due process. 
notice and hearing, s6. 
Eminent domain, necessity of 
notice and hearing, 64. 
Estoppel for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedy, prin-
ciple analyzed, 326. 
Evidence. See also Official 
notice. 
burden of proof 
on agency, 1S9. 
shifting to respondent, I S9. 
common-law rules 
not binding, I So, 1S2. 
tendency to follow, I So. 
exclusion of proper evidence, 
ISs. 
exclusionary rules 
following equity rules, IS I. 
immaterial evidence, I 81. 
irrelevant evidence, IS I. 
power to exclude evidence, 
I S1. 
general tendency to follow 








equally balanced, I 90. 
legal residuum rule, I92· 
practice of agencies, I 86. 
presumptions 
agency power to make, 
189. 
presumption statutes, I 90. 
privilege 
rules followed, I 84. 
receipt of incompetent eVI-
dence 
ordinarily permissible, I 82. 
sometimes reversible error, 
I84. 
substantial evidence rule. See 
also Judicial review. 
necessity of residuum of 
legal evidence, I 92. 
rational basis for decision, 
I97· 
tests of substantiality, I95· 
use of record in another pro-
ceeding, 204. 
written evidence, I 88. 
Examination of books and rec-
ords. See also Subpoenas. 
consent of respondent re-
quired, I 2 7. 
statutes, effect of, I 2 7. 
Exhausting administrative 
remedies 
application of doctrine, 322. 
estoppel for failing to exhaust 
remedies, 326. 
historical basis for rule, 320. 
indications of adverse decision, 
326. 
jurisdiction of agency, 323. 
motion for rehearing, 324. 
reasons for rule, 3 I 8. 
unconstitutionality of agency 
action, 324. 
when are remedies exhausted 
indications of adverse de-
cision, 326. 
motions for rehearing, 324. 
unreasonable delay, 326. 
Fact questions, distinguished 
from questions of law, 339· 
Fair trial 
agency rules, 167. 
cross-examination of wit-
nesses, I 7 1. 
departure from agency rules, 
167, 286. 
findings, necessity of, 22 I. 
following agency rules, I67. 
general requirements, 149· 
hearing officer, I76. 
impartiality of tribunal 
general requirement, I 54· 
interest in result immaterial, 
154· 
personal or pecuniary inter-
est, I57· 
personal prejudice, I58. 
where all officers preju-
diced, 161. 
information as to nature of 
charge, I05. 
interference with presentation 
of evidence, I59· 
necessity of intermediate re-
port, 220. 
private hearings, I64. 
representation by counsel, 
165. 
right to examine opposing evi-
dence, 170. 
INDEX 
Fair trial (continued) 
right to inttoduce evidence, 
I7.4· 
right to meet agency's case, 
I69. 
rule that he who decides must 
hear case 
difficulties of enforcing 
rule, 2I9. 
extent of mastery of record 
required, 2 I 7. 
general, 2 I 5. 
interrogatories to agency 
members, 2 I 9· 
methods of determining 
whether agency has fol-
lowed rule, 2 I 9· 
need not read record, 2 I 8. 
time of hearing, I63. 
timeliness of hearing, I 7 4· 
Federal Administrative Proced-
ure Act 
bias and prejudice, 158. 
cross-examination, I72. 
examination of books and rec-
ords, I27. 
hearing officers, I 77, 2 I 5. 
judicial review 
issues of law, 3I2. 
notice and hearing, 83. 
official notice, 206. 
petitions for adoption of rules, 
266. 
pleading, I03. 
prehearing conferences, I 24. 
public participation in rule 
making, 264. 
publication of rules, 262. 
recommended decision by 
hearing officer, 2 II. 
representation by counsel, 
I66. 
rule making, 254, 256. 
subpoenas, I 4 5. 
substantial evidence rule, I 9 7. 
time of hearing, I63. 
Federal Communications Com-
mission, rule of evidence, I 86. 
Federal Register Act, publica-
tion of rules, 2 7 3. 
Federal Trade Commission 
consent orders, I 2 1. 
judicial review, scope of, 360. 
rule of evidence, I 8 7. 
Findings 
in connection with rule mak-
ing, 267. 
requirement that findings sup-
port decision, 2 2 1. 
Hearing. See Fair trial; Notice 
and hearing. 
Hearing officers 
powers, I 76. 
qualifications, I 7 7. 
responsibilities, I 7 7. 
In junctions, method of judicial 
review, 336. 
Inspection of premises, power to 
inspect, I42. 
Intermediate reports 
agency may eliminate, 220. 
general procedure, 2 I 3· 
Interrogatories, to members of 
agency, limits on, 2I9. 
Interstate Commerce Commis-
Sion 
judicial review, scope of, 370. 
rules of evidence, I 86. 
Judge-prosecutor combination 
permitted under Constitution, 
so. 
practical results, 5 I, 22 I. 
Judicial functions 
limits on quasi-judicial powers, 
32. 
INDEX 465 
generally reviewable, 3 I o. 
what are, 3 I 2. 
Judicial functions (continued) 
necessity of notice and hear-
ing, 57· 
scope of review, 343· 
Judicial notice. See Official no-
tice. 
Judicial power, definition, 28. 
Judicial review 
administrative procedure 
affecting scope of review, 
346. 
collateral attack, 336. 
constitutional facts 
reviewability, 3I4. 
constitutional limitations. See 
Judicial review, limits on. 
discretionary functions 
scope of review, generally, 
345· 
estoppel preventing review. 
See Estoppel. 
exhausting administrative 
remedy. See Exhausting 
administrative remedies. 
fact questions 
artificiality of distinction be-
tween fact and law, 339· 
reviewability of, 339· 
fair trial 
claim of denial reviewable, 
149· 
Federal Trade Commission 
cases 






scope of review, 370. 
issues of law 
distinguished from questions 
of fact, 339· 
when not reviewable, 311. 
jurisdictional facts 
history of doctrine, 3 I 3· 
not always reviewable, 3I4. 
legislative functions 




tion not reviewable, 33, 
308. 
delay as limiting factor, 
306. 
generally, 305. 
judicial self-restraint, 307. 
methods of review 
actions for restitution, 338. 
certiorari, 332. 
collateral attack, 336. 
damage action against offi-
cers, 337. 





statutory methods, 33I. 
National Labor Relations 
Board cases 
scope of review, 377· 
prior resort to administrative 
remedy. See Prior resort. 
questions reviewed. See Scope 
of review. 
rule-making functions 
scope of review, generally, 
293, 343· 
scope of review 
discretionary powers, 345· 
experience of agency a fac-
tor, 347. 
INDEX 
Judicial review (continued) 
"fact" v. "law" as criterion 
of review, 339, 352, 
356, 366, 375> 386. 
factors affecting 
character of administra-
tive procedure, 346, 
359> 363, 375, 383. 
discretionary powers, 
345, 358, 365, 374> 
381. 
experience of agency, 
347, 364, 370, 379· 
generally, 330. 
legislative v. judicial 
functions, 343, 366, 
371, 381. 
likelihood of fair trial, 
348. 
public v. private business, 
341, 354, 361, 373> 
382. 
Federal Trade Commission 
cases, 360. 
Interstate Commerce Com-
mission cases, 370. 
judicial functions, 34 3· 
legislative functions, 343· 
National Labor Relations 
Board cases, 377. 
rule-making functions, 293, 
343· 
tax cases, 354· 
workmen's compensation 
cases, 350. 
substitute for notice and hear-
ing, 85. 




scope of review, 313. 
Jurisprudence of administrative 
agencies 
broadening policy of statute, 
228. 
enlarging agency jurisdiction, 
225. 
evaluation of evidence, 235· 
generally, 223. 
reliance on discretion, 224. 
reliance on private consulta-
tions, 237· 
res judicata, 24 I. 
stare decisis, 238. 
statutory interpretation, 225. 
Legislation 
drafting 
problem of limiting agency 
discretion, 46. 
preventive 
role of administrative agen-
cies, 14. 
Legislative functions 
limits on delegation of, 28. 
necessity of notice and hear-
ing, 57· 
scope of judicial review, 343· 
Legislative power, definition, 28. 
Liabilities, of officers for erro-
neous decisions, 3 3 7. 
Licenses 
granting 
notice and hearing, 76. 
revocation 
notice and hearing, 78. 
Mandamus 
as method of judicial review, 
333· 
Monopolies and unfair competi-
tion 
judicial review of decisions 
concerning, 360. 
INDEX 
National Labor Relations Board 
consent orders, I 22. 
judicial review, scope of, 3 77. 
Notice and hearing 
form of notice, 94· 
necessity of giving 
alien proceedings, 63 
history of doctrine, 55. 
licensing proceedings, 76. 
not dependent on legislative 
or judicial nature of 
function, 57, 67, 7I, 72. 
public safety cases, 7 4· 
rate cases, 7 I. 
removal of public officers, 
64. 
rule making, 67. 
tax cases, 59· 
tests 
availability of judicial re-
view as excusing, 6o, 
85. 
balancing public and 
private interests, 64, 
75, 82, 88. 
discretionary powers, 
basis for omitting no-
tice, 59, 78, 88. 
hearing v. objective tests, 
59, n, 89. 
legislative v. judicial 
functions, 57, 67, 7I, 
72. 
number of persons in-
volved, 59, 62, 64, 
70, 72. 
substantiality of property 
interests involved, 59, 
64, 66, 75, So. 
tendency to require 
where few involved, 
59, 64, 89. 
tradition in particular field, 
ss, 8I, 87. 
service of notice, 90. 
statutory requirements 
effect of failure of statute 
to require notice, 84. 
general, 8 3· 
substitutes for 
gener;l effect, 57. 
judicial review as substitute, 
6o, 85. 
sufficiency 
tax cases, 6o. 
waiver, 87. 
who entitled to notice, 91. 
Official notice 
defined, 206. 
freely permitted in certain 
cases, 208. 
general problem, I 99· 




modern rule, 206. 
refusal to believe testimony 
distinguished, 20I. 
use of record in another pro-
ceeding, 204. 
where agency exercises legisla-
tive function, 205. 
Opportunity to be heard. See No-
tice and hearing. 
Orders, necessity of findings, 
221. 
Physical inspections, limits on use 
of, I42. 
Pleading 
amendments, I I o. 
answers, I I 2. 
bills of particulars, I08. 
general rules, I02. 
468 INDEX 
Pleading (continued) 
statutory provisions, I03. 
variances, I I o. 
Post-office orders, notice and 
hearing, 6 5. 
Practice before agencies 
general role of counsel, 23. 
Presumptions, effect on burden 
of proof, I 89. 
Pre-trial hearings. See Proced-
ure. 
Primary jurisdiction doctrine. 
See Prior resort doctrine. 
Prior resort doctrine 
application of rule, 3 I 8. 
history of rule, 3 I 7. 
limitation on judicial review, 
3I6. 
reasons for rule, 3 I 8. 
Procedural due process, informa-
tion as to nature of charge, 
I05. 
Procedural rules, 2 8 I. 
Procedure 
character of administrative 
procedure affecting scope of 
review, 346. 
prehearing procedure 
disposal of cases by consent, 
I2I. 
narrowing of issues, I I9. 
need for regulation, I I 6. 
purposes, I I4. 
utility to respondent, 115. 
rehearing 
where original order not 
based on hearing, I 24. 
Prohibition, use of to review ad-
ministrative proceedings, 335· 
Public officers 
removal 
notice and hearing, 64. 
Public safety cases, notice and 
hearing, 7 4· 
Quasi-judicial power, distinction 
from judicial power fictitious, 
29, 36. 
Quasi-legislative power, distinc-
tion from legislative power fic-
titious, 29, 35· 
Questions of constitutional fact, 
scope of review, 3 I 4. 
Questions of fact, difficulty of 
defining, 339· 
Questions of jurisdiction, scope of 
review, 3I3. 
Questions of law, distinguished 
from questions of fact, 339· 
Rate cases, notice and hearing, 
7!. 
Re-enactment without change, 
effect on rules, 280. 
Regulations. See Rules and Rule 
making. 
Reports, power of agencies to re-
quire reports, I 4 I. 
Res judicata 
administrative recognition of 
doctrine, 24 7. 
cases involving grant, 242. 
generally, 24 I. 
nonrecurring factual situa-
tions, 242. 
orders affecting continuing 
course of conduct, 244· 
Rule making 
deferred effective date, 270. 
defined, 254· 
drafting of rules, 2 7 o. 
findings 




Rule making (continued) 
hearing on proposed rules 
constitutional necessity, 67. 
general practice, 262. 
nature of hearing, 265. 
history of rule-making powers, 
253· 
interpretative rules 
defined, 2 56. 
investigation re proposed rule, 
264. 
legislative rules 
defined, 256, 276. 
legislative survey of rules, 
27 I. 
notice of hearing 
constitutional necessity, 67. 
petitions for adoption of rules, 
266. 
public participation, 264. 
publication of proposed rules, 
264. 
publication of rules, 259, 272. 
submission of rules to legisla-
ture, 27 I. 
Rules 
criminal penalties for violation 
of rules, 283. 
deferred effective date, 2 70. 
disregard of, by agency, 286. 
effect as "laws" 
generally, 2 7 5. 
interpretative rules, 279· 
legislative rules, 2 77. 
procedural regulations, 
281. 
statutory provisions, 2 77. 
interpretative rules 
defined, 256. 
judicial review of rules. See 
Judicial review. 
legal effect, generally, 275· 
legality. See Tests of validity. 
legislative rules 
defined, 256, 276. 
procedural rules, 281. 
publication, 259, 272. 
"re-enactment without 
change" doctrine, 280. 
reliance on rules, effect of, 
284. 
retroactive application, 2 8 5. 
suspension of, 286. 
tests of validity 
arbitrary rules, 297. 
character of statute in-
volved, 299· 
conduct of public business, 
301. 
conflict with statute, 293· 
due process violated, 297. 
exceeding authority con-
ferred, 2 9 3. 
extending statute, 294· 
legalistic view, 291. 
modifying statute, 294· 
need for administrative dis-
cretion, 298. 
restriction of private rights, 
300. 
tax cases, 301. 
unreasonableness, 297. 
unrelated to statutory pur-
pose, 296. 
Separation of powers. See also 
Delegation of powers. 
combination of legislative, ju-
dicial, and executive func-
tions, 50. 
Standards 
necessity, in delegating legisla-
tive power, 36. 
relationship to established legal 
concepts, 4 1. 
Stare decisis 





agency rules of statutory 
construction, 2 2 5. 
economic interpretation, 
232· 
invalid where statute ex-
tended, 230. 
Subpoenas 
documents in possession of 
third party, I 38. 
enforcement 
application to court, I 30. 
contempt proceedings, I29. 
privileged matters, I 32. 
remedy against improper de-
mand, I40. 
right of respondent to sub-
poena 
generally, I43· 
power of agency to limit, 
I45· 
subpoena to agency repre-
sentatives, I 4 7. 
statutes 
control issuance of sub-
poenas, 128. 
tests of validity 
balancing private and public 
interests, I 36. 
description of documents, 
I31. 
form of demand, I36. 
invasion of privacy, I 33· 
jurisdiction of agency, I 32. 
nature of proceeding, effect 
of, I34· 
relevancy, I 3 I. 
Substantial evidence rule. See 
Evidence. 
Suit for damages, liability of ad-
ministrative officers, 33 7. 
Taxation 
notice and hearing in tax 
cases, 59· 
scope of judicial review in tax 
cases, 354· 
Witnesses. See Evidence. 
Workmen's compensation cases, 
judicial review, 350. 
